Saturday, 29 February 2020
Justice In The Social Order
By William Matheson
Chesley, Ontario.
OURS is a day of conflict. The times are out of joint. It is therefore a time when the idea of justice is much to the fore. But the reason for this is not any consciousness that justice prevails. It is not because the sanctity of justice is deeply appreciated. It is rather because of the consciousness, or at least the notion, that the reign of justice in human affairs is sadly wanting. When we say, the idea of justice, we are thinking of the fact that universally amongst mankind a principle is recognised which we call justice. The fact is, however, that the ideas of what is just and what is unjust in human relations are bafflingly multitudinous. Yet there is no factor in a man’s experience of the disagreeable and unpleasant which can embitter his soul more than his conviction that he is suffering unjustly. This seems to arise, partly at least, from the belief that the party responsible for the injustice must be conscious of it as surely as he is. Men seem to take this for granted intuitively.
When we go to the Scriptures for light on the matter we find this very fact of embitterment in the first recorded illustration of what constitutes injustice. Cain was a tiller of the soil but Abel was a keeper of sheep. Both alike presented each his offering before the Lord. Cain offered of the fruit of the ground which he tilled. Abel brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. The Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering: but unto Cain and to his offering he had not respect. Manifestly Cain somehow was aware of apparent discrimination against him. We are told that he was very wroth and his countenance fell. The Lord read Cain’s thoughts. In his heart he was alleging respect of persons in the acceptance of Abel’s offering and the rejection of his own. The Lord pointed out to him the groundlessness of such an imagination, and showed him that the way of acceptance for him was as open to him as it was to Abel, and further that his accepting of that way would result still in the recognition of his primacy. Cain’s proud heart interpreted the dictate of justice, “no respect of persons”, under the bias of undue respect to his own person and will before the Lord. He hardened his heart in proud impenitence, and urged on by the bitterness conceived in his soul by the false conviction of his having suffered injustice, he murdered Abel who had not wronged him. The conception of injustice in this record springs from the notion of “respect of persons”. This reveals what seems to be the basic element in the scriptural conception of justice. Justice means “no respect of persons”.
In the Book of Job we find Job’s three friends endeavouring to vindicate God’s dealing with him in his sore affliction on the ground of the justice of God. Job could not tolerate their effort at penetrating the darksome mystery of his afflictions, for he was conscious of the falsity of some of their allegations. Yet it led him to a closer scrutiny of his own conduct. He was aware of the justness of God and recognised clearly that any injustice or unfairness on his part toward others would bring him under the severe condemnation of God. So in his review of his own behaviour he says, “If I did despise the cause of my manservant or of my maidservant, when they contended with me; what then shall I do when God riseth up? and when he visiteth, what shall I answer him? Did not he that made me in the womb make him? and did not one fashion us in the womb?” (Job 31:13–15). How far removed is the thought here from that which prevailed and prevails in other quarters where the master and the servant occupy different planes. Here all are recognised as on the same level before the One who did fashion us in the womb. This, of course, does not signify equality, for inequality prevails amongst men as it prevails amongst the blades of grass and amongst the leaves of a tree. The idea that is here implied as basic to fair dealing and justice in social relations is that of “no respect to persons”. Job must not despise the cause of his manservant or his maidservant. This principle issues as a corollary from creation: “Did not he that made me in the womb make him?”.
In Leviticus 19:15, we read “Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour”. This is not a directive to a judge but counsel for the masses of the people in their social relations. It does find practical repetition in Deuteronomy 1:17, where Moses, in his parting historical review to Israel, refers definitely to his own charge to their judges, “Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear the small as well as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man; for the judgment is God’s”. In like manner Jehoshaphat instructed the judges in his day, and based his counsel on the fact that “There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking of gifts” (II Chron. 19:7). Not only the official judges were exhorted to reflect the character of their God in the discharge of their official duties but the people likewise are urged to do the same in their every day social intercourse. Thus a fundamental characteristic of the moral glory of Jehovah our God is insisted upon in that he “regardeth not persons”. He is just.
This, however, is a peculiar expression. There is a paradox apparent in it. The thought is by no means the notion of disregard of, or indifference to, persons. There is no notion of despising or belittling the person of any one. It is the very reverse. It is as appears in Job’s reference to it. It matters not how lowly in the scale of society anyone may be, that person holds a place before God that yields him a right equally with any person occupying a higher place in that scale. The conventions of human society agreed upon merely by men have no bearing in the allocations of justice. No caste system can be allowed. The idea inculcated in “no respect of persons” is that of the indefeasible recognition of all persons as persons before God. To accept the person of one in the way of discriminating against another is to despise that other. It is this which makes “respect of persons” most offensive before God. To despise the person of any man is to offend not against that man so much as against God, for “in the image of God made he man”, whoever that man may be. This is illustrated in the law of capital punishment against murderers and, in reverse, in the rule regarding flagellation, “Forty stripes he may give him, and not exceed: lest, if he should exceed, and beat him above these with many stripes, then thy brother should seem vile unto thee” (Deut. 25:3). Even Paul, the hated outcast, five times suffered only “forty stripes save one” (II Cor. 11:24).
There are those who seek to belittle the Old Testament as a source of authoritative instruction on this question of the content of the idea of justice. They would impute to those who find anywhere in the Old Scripture a rich mine of pregnant thought and of divine indoctrination in this respect the fallacy of themselves first putting in the content which they profess to elicit. They allege that the ideas are first learned from the New Scripture or from some other source and then are thereafter conveniently discovered to have been implicit in the Old. As for the Decalogue, no light shines from it for them on the matter, and at best these commandments cover a very narrow range. And how glibly honoured names of Christ’s worthy witnesses of the past are brought in to confirm such wanton evacuation of the Old Scripture to make such efforts acceptable to those who, though wary, may yet be forgetful of our Lord’s premonition, “But be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your Master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren” (Matt. 23:8). Now it is quite true that the words of Scripture do suffer such maltreatment at the hands of men at times. Do they not also suffer peculiarly in reverse from those who seek to water down their meaning at times almost to sheer inanity? Happy is the man whose reverence for Scripture “restrains him from first forcing into the content of its words what he is desirous of taking out. Happy is the man who comes to the word of Scripture honestly, humbly and wholeheartedly divesting himself of any preconceived theories of its origin and history and of the trammelling imaginations of limitations necessitated by some mundane philosophy which he had come to accept, and who therefore seeks insight into, and understanding of, its true content at the hand of the Spirit of Truth. For did not Jesus open the understandings of his disciples to understand these very Scriptures before commissioning them to be his witnesses? There is something very worthwhile for Christ’s witnesses in them apparently. Afterward they went everywhere preaching the word. But it was Christ and him crucified that they preached. They found the old word of Scripture pregnant indeed. They found in it spiritual indoctrination far beyond what the natural man can find in it, because the things of the Spirit are foolishness to him. So, if what we find in Moses and the Psalms and the Prophets coincides with what our Lord himself taught and with what his Apostles proclaimed, we’ll not consider ourselves responsible for first putting into the Old Scripture what we wish to take out.
Paul reminds those who are masters that “your Master also is in heaven; neither is there respect of persons with him” (Eph. 6:9). This is quite a levelling word and in its context is rather significant: almost as much so as Peter’s word to Cornelius, when the gulf between Jew and Gentile was bridged, “Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons” (Acts 10:34). But it is in the Epistle of James that we find the basic character of this principle of justice set forth in its far-reaching authority. In James we read, “My brethren, have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect of persons” (2:1). Having pointed out the wrong of such conduct on their part when they honour the wealthy and show disrespect and discourtesy to the poor, he continues, “If ye fulfil the royal law according to the scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, ye do well; but if ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors. For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all” (James 2:8–10). James finds the under-girding principle of the ten commandments to be just this, “no respect of persons”, and that is the principle of justice. While James writes of the royal law according to the Scripture, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”, he goes on to illustrate what he means by keeping the whole law and yet offending in one point by citing explicitly the seventh and the sixth commandments of the Decalogue. He makes it clear that he is thinking of the ten commandments when he refers to “the whole law”. It is this law to which he manifestly refers when he says, “If ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors”. “Respect to persons” simply contradicts “thy neighbour as thyself”. The several commandments are thus declared by James to be a whole of such a nature that a breach at any point is a breach of all. This appears quite understandable when we see that each commandment is simply the application of one and the same principle to the varying spheres of relationship to God and of human social activity and interest.
The first three of the ten commandments express the divine application of the principle of justice to man’s activities to Godward exclusively. This is the sphere of religion. The fourth commandment inculcates the worship of our Creator God but leads us out from his worship as exclusively formal religion and into the social sphere by blending with the idea of worshipful rest the fundamental practical commandment for the social order which requires man’s exercise of himself in working for his living. From the beginning man was made to work. The fall of man by sin entailed toilsomeness and sorrow so that “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread”. It is not out of place here to stress this two-edged character of the Sabbath commandment. It exhibits the unity of the order of life religiously and morally. This word requires much more than worshipful rest every seventh day. It demands quite as explicitly the earning of our living by labour on the other six days of the week. The blending of these two elements of worshipful rest and of working for our living in the one commandment places both alike on the highest plane. Can higher honour be paid to labour? This is surely a matter of pregnant significance for the solution of the labour problems which are rife in the social order to-day. Working for our living is a primary duty according to the divine order of justice, and this requirement is in flat and irreconcilable conflict with a too-commonly accepted slogan, “The world owes us a living”. True religion is bound up inescapably with any adequate solution of the labour problem. It reminds the master here of the one Master of all, even Christ, and that there is no respect of persons with him, while it inspires the servant to obedient service for the Lord’s sake. It insists on the master’s interest in providing an adequate and fully-rounded living for his servant as for himself and on the servant’s vital interest in the profitable productivity of his master’s business that both may mutually be blessed.
When we pass this nexus to the commandments which deal exclusively with the social order, we find that the first of these deals with the obligation due by us to those through whom, under God, we have our being, father and mother. This is fundamental in the social order. The second deals with the obligation due by us personally with respect to God’s gift of life. The third deals with the obligation due by us with respect to the power of procreation or sex relations. The fourth deals with the obligation due by us with respect to the economic conditions of living. The fifth deals with the obligation due by us with respect to the sphere of reputation. The sixth then deals with the source of unjust action in the motive of covetousness, which is idolatry, the worship and service of the creature rather than of the Creator. Thus the tenth commandment completes the circle by bringing us back to the first commandment, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me”, which is practically identical with the word of Jesus, “Ye cannot serve God and mammon”. The ten commandments in the spiritual sphere may then properly be likened to the seven basic colours in the physical sphere, under which are comprehended all possible hues and tints. For notwithstanding their striking distinctiveness they all blend and unite to afford us the pure white of light. Parabolically, this illustrates how the ten commandments, pregnantly comprehending the whole round of life, blend and unite into one spiritual whole, yielding us our true religion and our ethics. The expression of the principle of justice as the principle of order results in the world of spirits in absolute unconditional subserviency to the living God, and in the social sphere in “thy neighbour as thyself”. And the motive power for the fulfillment of this law is love. And thus in the social order the principle of order is justice and the bond of unity is love.
When a lawyer asked Jesus a question, “tempting him, and saying, Master, which is the great commandment in the law? Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”. And to this he added the penetrating and significant comment, “On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets” (Matt. 22:35–40). Let us not doubt that if we are led by the Spirit of truth into the meaning of Moses, the Psalms, and the Prophets, we’ll find the divine order of things and learn that the basic principle of that order is justice. If we will have it otherwise expressed we may say that the foundation principle of all right action is truth as David implied when he repented of his transgression and confessed, “Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward parts” (Psalm 51:6). What better definition of truth can we get than that truth is justice to facts, the same principle applied in the sphere of facts which, in the sphere of persons, is expressed, “thy neighbour as thyself”? And thus may we understand the word of Jesus to Pilate, when, speaking of his kingdom, he said, “To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice” (John 18:37).
From him, then, let us seek to learn the bearing and true application of the principle of justice in the social order. This he has made plain in the illustration of the good Samaritan, as he has come to be known. Jesus apparently had been placing heavy stress on the greatness of their privilege who heard him teaching and saw him sealing his teaching as of God. “And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and tempted him, saying, Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?” (Luke 10:25). The critical character of this episode is clearly indicated by the language of its narration. It was a momentous occasion. Jesus asked in reply a very definite and pointed question: “What is written in the law? how readest thou?”. Definitely the investigation concerned the interpretation of the law. Jesus first referred him to the Old Scripture, “what is written”. The lawyer clearly understood this first question. In masterly fashion, he gave a comprehensive summary in Scripture language of what is written, reminiscent indeed of the answer of Jesus to that other lawyer who had asked which is the great commandment in the law. For he answering said, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself”. Jesus said to him, “Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live” (Luke 10:27, 28). So far the lawyer had read the law rightly. But he proceeded to focus attention on the minor element of his own comprehensive answer by asking Jesus, “And who is my neighbour?”. This lawyer seems to have followed a carefully prepared line of approach on the question. Jesus granted him his way and answered his intriguing question by a graphic and most comprehensive illustration. He told the story of a certain man who was following the well-known road from Jerusalem on his way to Jericho when bandits assaulted him. They stripped him even to his clothing, and wounded him, leaving him half-dead. A certain priest came down that way but on seeing him passed by on the other side. Then a Levite came that way, came and looked on him, but passed by on the other side also. Both these persons apparently belonged to this locality. They both surely knew the law. Perhaps both excused themselves as having urgent business, perhaps an appointment to keep, or feared to get themselves entangled in the crime in any way, or considered the danger of their being set upon by the bandits themselves if they tried to help the victim. Yet they ignored the law. For a human life was at stake and before that consideration other responsibilities must fade into comparative insignificance. Against this dark background of failure a bright scene shines. For “a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, and went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee” (Luke 10:33–35). This Samaritan was apparently on an important errand but, whatever his business was, it had to wait on the more important business which God, in his providence, had thrust in this wise upon him.
It may truly be said that the only bond between the Samaritan and his stricken neighbour was as attenuated as it well could be. There appears no more than the bond of a common humanity, and that with some very adverse conditions further to lessen its force. They two were separated by bitter differences of creed and of race, and apparently these were emphasised by differences of politics, of language and of social status. Furthermore they seem to have been complete strangers to one another whose dwellings had hitherto been far apart. Manifestly the lesson is plain that our neighbour is any fellowman who may in any way come into the pathway of our life, anyone of whom we must say, “Did not one fashion us in the womb?”.
But Jesus was here interpreting the law of “thy neighbour as thyself”. He was not, explicitly not, expounding the activity of charity or of grace. He was simply setting forth an illustration of love fulfilling the law. The question may be asked, Did not the Samaritan exceed in his conduct what the law required of him? Now we know that Jesus did not intend to confound the lawyer or to confuse him as to how he should read the law. He simply set before him an illustration of what the law required of the Samaritan. He was required to recognize the half-dead victim by the roadside who had come so unexpectedly into his life as his neighbour according to the term, “thy neighbour as thyself”. To this neighbour, a man hitherto unknown, he was required to render whatever aid and comfort he himself would have another render to himself had he been in that victim’s place. This he did and, in doing it, he illustrated the simple requirement of justice according, not to evangelical ideals newly made known by Jesus, but according to the ancient scriptural rule, “thy neighbour as thyself”. There have been those who claim that the law did not require of the Samaritan to go farther than to place this neighbour in the care of the innkeeper, whose business it was to care for wayfarers. But that would be a strange course to take. The innkeeper had become the Samaritan’s neighbour too, and it would surely be less than just of the Samaritan to unload his self-acknowledged responsibility upon this neighbour. To do so would plainly not be a case of “thy neighbour as thyself”. We have no right to read this illustration of the Samaritan as teaching the doctrine of grace. This is to sidestep our Lord’s carefully guarded illustration of the simple requirement of justice, for the half-dead victim had no responsibility whatsoever for his own sad plight. Every detail indicates our Lord’s intention to interpret for us the plain dictate of, “thy neighbour as thyself”, or “no respect of persons”. Had the Samaritan done less than he did, he would have manifested a love or respect for himself greater than for his neighbour. According to this commandment we are to love ourselves. But we are not to love ourselves more than we love our neighbours, otherwise we become guilty of “respect of persons”, and so deal unjustly. And that this is the mind of our Lord respecting the true content of the Old Scripture is manifest from his words, “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets” (Matt. 7:12).
There are those who prefer to interpret this illustration of the good Samaritan for the glorification of love. Certainly the motive of love was active in his heart. Love is the fulfilling of the law. It is well to bear in mind, however, that it is a vain and most mischievous thing to set forth love as in any possible respect a rival of justice, for our admiration. Thus Paul describes love, that it “rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth” (I Cor. 13:6). They twain, love and justice, are one in the eternal being of God, just as affection and thought are one in human experience, one, not in any sense of identity, but one in the sense that the one is complementary to the other to make a whole, an experience. For God is love and God is light. Light is always associated with knowledge of the truth in Scripture teaching. Truth is identified with reality, justice to facts, things as they are. When Jesus warned, “Take heed therefore that the light which is in thee be not darkness” (Luke 11:35) he manifestly referred to the danger of leaning unto our own understanding rather than trusting in the Lord with all our heart (Prov. 3:5). For he assures us that, “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself” (John 7:17). This is to reach the rock bottom of truth and to have one’s dwelling in light.
The notion that love can ever supersede justice or that eventually justice may be sublimated into love arises from the failure to recognise that they are disparate elements in our experience. Love belongs to the affective aspect of our experience whereas justice belongs to the perceptive. The one is wholly subjective and is the reaction of the person toward the object presented to him. Justice is distinctively objective and presents itself to the mind as factual and necessary. So long as human experience retains this two-fold characteristic of the objective and the subjective, or the emotional reaction to this objective, so long must justice and love remain distinct though united. We cannot know the one without the other, and only when thought can be transmuted into affection can love reign without justice. And that is never so far as our present experience indicates. Love, the love of God, is the motive power of eternal life, and justice is the principle of the law which that love fulfils, and against which that love can never exert pressure to break forth from its limiting dictate. The affection which urges to injustice to persons or to facts for any cause whatsoever is something other than the love of God. But when Jesus said to the lawyer, “This do, and thou shalt live” (Luke 10:28) he was stating a simple fact. Only a soul already possessed of eternal life could love the Lord his God with all his heart, with all his soul, with all his strength, and with all his mind, and his neighbour as himself. For this love of God is the very power of life eternal and out of it issues the power to “love my neighbour as myself”. Jesus said in his intercessory prayer, “This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent” (John 17:3). This knowledge of God implies love of God.
There is persistent determination on the part of many to exalt love into a primacy over justice. The practical effect of this is gravely mischievous and tragically disastrous. It provides the basis for the absolute reign of sheer expediency. And so in modern thought the ideal in government has very largely come to mean not the establishment and the maintenance of justice but “the greatest good of the greatest number”. The corroding effect and power of this scheme in government reaches its zenith of exhibition in totalitarianism, under which social order no individual rights, as defined by justice, remain. Love (and who can define it except in terms of the object for which the affection is entertained?) is the moving power in all activity. To insist that love then is the supreme factor in all proper activity comes to mean that “might is right”. But when the motive power of action is defined as the love that. “rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth”, and that is inevitably the love of God, then we are holding securely by the grand fact that “right is might”.
A certain colour for this claim for the primacy of love is found in the famous passage in I Corinthians 13 which concludes, “And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity”. We must not overlook that the Apostle is here comparing three things which all belong to the same sphere, the sphere of the subjective. Faith as here used signifies the exercise of the soul Godward, not the substance of what is believed, but the action of laying hold upon the object of faith. In the same way hope is here used of the subjective exercise of the soul, just as love inevitably is. Now he declares and justifies the primacy of love amongst these three. But there is nowhere to be found in the language of Scripture any suggestion of the primacy of love over justice or truth. Truth and justice are to be equated in this reference, and it is in the face of Christ’s word, “Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice”, to make claim for the primacy of love. Who are they “that are of the truth” but those who love it because they love God? So love and truth occupy alike the same divine and eternal plane.
It is not ours to detract from the praise of love, nor to try to narrow the sphere in which love operates. It is ours to attempt such an analysis of the character and activity of love as may serve to place the function of justice in a clearer light. Love is a force or power. It is indeed the power of spiritual life. It is the mightiest force of all. Justice is, strictly speaking, not a force at all. It is a principle. We often use language which seems to imply that there is mightiness in justice. That is misleading language. For example, a sense of justice has moved men to deeds of courage, of daring and of power. It is not the power of justice that is thus exhibited. It is the power of love, love for, or devotion to, justice, or to those to be protected from injustice. And truly behind all suggestion that there is force or power in justice lies the conception that justice is divine and so divine power is behind it. But love is a power yet not a principle. Love is a force and does not define or determine its own way any more than any other force or power does. When we would define a force we seek to exhibit the law which its activity follows. Justice defines the limits within which love can have free play. Within the limits of justice love has utmost freedom of activity. So the divine word describes love in the restrictive terms of justice, love “rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth”. There can be no “law of love” then which transcends the reign of justice. Justice must reign forever in the social order wherein there ever shall be free agents in fellowship, for, wherever mine and thine and his are intertwining, justice is the principle of order, and love can and shall have free-play and manifest itself as the bond of unity.
This principle, “thy neighbour as thyself”, abides unchangeable everywhere and under all conditions. It is true that in the mêlée of life it is often exceedingly difficult to deal impartially, that is, to give to each his due as against rivals. But the difficulty arises from our sinful frailty of which an outstanding characteristic is our excessive love of self. If only our eye were single then our whole body would be full of light and we could readily discern the lines of equity which now are blurred and often badly tangled to our vision. It matters not, however, how tangled the threads may appear in the web of life that we must weave, nor how manifold the claims that press upon us, the pathway to be followed is determined by this ancient word, “thy neighbour as thyself”. Whatsoever deviation from that pathway takes place is wrong. And as a noted English author, and a professed agnostic at that, had one of his characters say, “Though right and wrong may be near neighbours, yet the line that separates them is of an awful sacredness”, so it is. For the line that separates them is the line defined by the principle of justice.
In the social order we begin with the twain who are, by divine institution, one flesh. Man was not made to be an isolationist. At the very outset of human history man’s incompetency to live alone is most strikingly proclaimed. Woman was provided as an help suited to him, and so the real unit in human society is not the individual but the married couple. It is a matter of observation that the entrance of the great schism through man’s injustice to God reflected itself straightway in man’s injustice to woman. Man sought to sidestep his own personal responsibility by casting the blame on his wife. And so schism entered the social order. This schism is the appalling effect of injustice and from it the social order on this earth has suffered ever since.
There is no more delicate, no more penetratingly essential, no more truly vitalizing bond in human society or the social order than the bond of matrimony. The troth that is mutually pledged in marriage is to be regarded as underlying the entire fabric of the social order. Upon the keeping of it with loyalty and fidelity hangs not only the happiness of the contracting parties themselves and of their immediate families but also the well-being in measure of the whole social order of which they form a part. It is in the powers of procreation mutually entrusted and pledged one to another in the matrimonial bond that the unity of twain in one flesh resides. A breach of faithfulness at this point is the alone ground for divorce action in the order of divine justice. Whatever other breaches or separations may occur, they can not furnish ground for divorce action. To allow any other pleas for divorce than adultery is to place one’s own will in command and means excessive love of self as over against the social order, as well as over against God. In the effort to apply the principle of justice through statute law in the social order it is a matter of primary importance that the ordinance of marriage should be maintained on this high level of sanctity.
When, however, we face the problem of law in the social order on earth we must ever bear in mind that the term “law” in this connection is distinctively other than the term “law” as used when we say that justice is the law that love fulfils. In this latter case we deal with that ideal condition where from within his inmost being, and without coercion of any kind, a man, because he has truth in his inward part, does justly, loves mercy, and walks humbly with his God (Micah 6:8). No law is needed on the statute books for such a person. The law is in his heart. The contrast between these different conceptions of law finds clear expression in Jeremiah 31:31–33 (quoted in Hebrews 8:8–10), “Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers.. .. But this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel; After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts.. . .” So the Apostle writes, “But we know that the law is good, if a man use it lawfully; knowing this, that the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient” (I Tim. 1:8, 9). Under this condition where the spirit of disobedience is prevailing, the approach to a perfect application of the principle of justice in the social order is very difficult and can never be complete. Such written law cannot cover every case, circumstance and condition individually with the result that it often fails to apply with perfect fitness. This is because it has to run in what is termed “blanket” form. Yet wherever men enjoy the freedom that prevails where the establishment and maintenance of justice is recognised as the function of government or of the state, there is bound to be an alertness against “respect of persons” in the framing as well as in the administration of law. Under the representative system in legislatures a growing approximation toward law that represents a common effort to stem the activities of the lawless and disobedient, while yet guarding zealously against infringement upon the free activity of the righteous, should be the aim in view. This brings into stress the sine qua non of a people thoroughly grounded in the understanding of justice and imbued with its spirit, as, reaching this ideal, it is described in the passage above referred to, “And they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord” (Jer. 31:34).
Under the scriptural or Christian scheme of the social order the supreme end in view is to prepare men for that kingdom whereinto there shall enter nothing “that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie” (Rev. 21:27). This kingdom, which is not of this age, is a kingdom of free agents, each and every one of whom contributes his part in that social order in perfect harmony and unison with all others, not under any external pressure or coercive influence, but in utmost freedom and free-play of functioning. This is the kingdom of light where love, the power of life, re-unites the membership of humanity, by deliverance from its present schismatic plight, in endless unity in Christ Jesus, as the ingrafted branches become one in the vine, all alike sharing its nurturing life. But in order to this preparation, men must have under their individual power and responsibility the means of life, that they may learn to use them with due regard to their own interest and to the interest of others from the narrowest circles to the broadest outlines of humanity’s social order.
It is by learning to live in the social order here according to the dictate of justice and moved by love that men are being prepared here to live hereafter in perfect harmony. In the Pentecostal days a number of believers, in the ecstacy of their new-found freedom in Christ, actually pooled all their possessions to live together as having all things in common. Extravagant conclusions have been derived from this experiment as to the character and economic polity of the kingdom which Christ came to establish. We have here only to observe the sober way in which Peter pointed out to Ananias that the recognition of private property rights continued as the basic principle in the Christian community. The process of learning how to use, and not to abuse, our earthly property in our dealings and relations with our fellows depends on the recognition of this principle. It is really essential to the enjoyment of our free agency in the social order. Every effort to deprive men of private property rights, whether in eating or in drinking, in family relations or in finance, under any pretext whatsoever, is in conflict with this simple dictate of justice. In I Timothy 4:1–6; 6:6–10, Paul deals sharply with such tendencies and sets forth the true Christian view on the question. The use of money involves no impropriety nor injustice. Yet, owing to the love of money in the hearts of men, the cries of those who have been and are oppressed by cruel capitalistic harpies have truly filled the very heavens with the gloom and sadness of economic woes. This has led to the most extravagant denunciations of and opprobrious imputations against money down the centuries. But these vicious evils arise, not from the use of money, but from its abuse or unjust use. The key to this problem lies in the will of man. The root of the trouble is not touched by doing away with the use of money. The love of money is a root of all evil, and from it spring these evils. But love is a matter of the person, of the heart. A change in the economic system leaves the heart of man unchanged. In the order of justice it belongs to the glory of man that he should have dominion over things and that things should not have dominion over him. James uses scathing language about those who defraud their servants and heap up treasure to rust. The master who defrauds his servants of their just return for services rendered, and the servant who defrauds his master of a just measure of service, both are guilty of making unjust use of money. Of ancient time Job recognised the cause of his man-servant to be sacred, and Paul instructed slaves to serve their earthly masters as being themselves Christ’s free men. Thus the use of one man’s service by another is placed on the proper plane, the plane of equity. It is well indeed for employers of labour to bear in mind that more has to be taken into account in arriving at equity in dealing with servants than the strict equation of so much pay for so much work. Where humanity receives due recognition, the necessity of a livelihood for the employee enters into the consideration. The bearing of the statements in our Lord’s parable of the workers in the vineyard on this question is too readily overlooked or sidestepped. Jesus puts into the employer’s lips the words, “Whatsoever is right (just) I will give you”, when he addresses the labourers who had gone idle owing to want of employment during much of the day. Then at the close of the day he orders his steward to give them all a penny. Is there not here a lesson as to the responsibility of the social order or the state with respect to the unemployed who are willing to work? It is a grievous evil and a festering sore in the social order where men who are willing to work for their living, but cannot find employment, are shown no consideration by the state. The fact of the matter is that justice, “thy neighbour as thyself”, penetrates more deeply and requires greater consideration for our fellows than our selfish natures are capable of envisaging. Of course, this is also a two-edged sword, for it penetrates just as piercingly into the question of the consideration owed by the servant to his master, and of the common responsibility to earn our living for ourselves and for our dependents by our labour. All who have a keen sense of personal responsibility regularly display a persistent determination to find ways and means for earning their living.
But one reason why we readily overlook the profound and sweeping character of the requirement of justice in social relations is that we too readily yield our minds to custom and use as they prevail amongst us. This influence gives a decided bias in the direction of the toleration of definitely covetous inclinations. In so far as law is concerned, it can never translate the principle of justice into effective operation beyond the outward manifestation in the deeds of men. All that just legislation can do is to condemn the openly unjust deed and even that only after a general method, and to exercise restraint upon evil-doers. When, in Romans 13:4, it is said of the ruler that he “beareth not the sword in vain”, it is added, “for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil”. But there remains a wide range of activity between the actual doing of evil and the doing of full justice. An employer may be punctual and exact in paying such wages as he has agreed to pay, and yet be very far from treating his workman in accordance with, “thy neighbour as thyself”. His zeal for profit for himself may sadly outstrip his concern for his neighbour’s well-being. No doubt as the light of the true facts concerning the bearing of justice on human relations shines more clearly into the minds of the people and their legislators, the scope of this range will continue to be narrowed. The greatness of the progress in this direction in the English-speaking world during the past two hundred years is one of the most remarkable developments in human history. And the definite principle directing this development is justice, scriptural justice at that, but merely opening from bud toward full-blown flower.
When it is written that the ruler “beareth not the sword in vain”, his authority to exercise physical force to restrain evil-doers is clearly intended. Therefore he is to be feared by evil-doers. It is also indicated that in resisting evil-doers his authority extends to the power over life itself. In other words, governments have power from God to resist evil-doers to the death. This is the authority that is exercised by a police force for the maintenance of law within the domain of the authority which appointed them. This is the authority by which governments maintain armies, air forces and navies. It is specifically an authority limited to the necessity for maintaining justice within and without any government’s domain. No government can have any right from God to exercise this authority in the cause of evil or injustice. When one nation or group of nations invades the precincts of another’s right it is only just and proper for the latter to oppose such invasion to the death. Indeed it would mean failure to exercise authority aright, were the latter to allow justice to be trampled under foot by an evil-doer. The possession of authority entails responsibility for the due exercise of that authority. Without the maintenance of justice society cannot enjoy order or peace. In so far as injustice prevails peace is imperilled. Thus justice is basic to peace. Therefore peace, however precious and eagerly to be sought after, is, after all, a condition only secondary to justice. The authority of the ruler or government extends to the persons of all subjects so that compulsory service for the defence of justice is within its scope, although amongst a freedom-loving people it may be exercised only as a last resort. This is particularly so because under all blanket laws instances of undue hardship and injustice are bound to arise. Yet justice requires that all subjects alike recognize their personal responsibility when the well-being of all alike is imperilled. Yet it must ever be safeguarded that the state exists for man, not man for the state, as under totalitarian concepts. The ruler is a minister of God for the good of the subject or citizen (Rom. 13:4).
The exercise of this extreme form of governmental authority under stress of necessity leads, however, to the uncovering of conditions which may confront the government with unexpected problems. If the necessity of the nation calls for the physically fit to face the perils and the sacrifices of war when others physically unfit are to be excused, does not a problem respecting the nation’s responsibility for the physical fitness and health of her citizens arise? A little problem respecting the education of the citizenry arises. And again parents who have sweated and toiled and worried in the bringing up of their sons find the state laying claim upon their services just when they are of age to work and, it may be, to give some return of comfort, if not of finance, to them. The necessity of the whole nation calls for the benefit and protection of their sacrifice and service. Can it be maintained in equity that there is nothing owing by the nation in the way of helping to prepare future citizens for the discharge of the responsibilities of citizenship? The development of a crisis in which the state is obliged to exercise its utmost reach of authority surely helps to bring to the foreground certain realities of the mutuality of responsibility, according to justice, as between citizens and the state, which otherwise are likely to remain neglected. But once they are brought into the focus of attention, it is the duty of the state to endeavour a remedy of discovered injustices and some specific method of consideration for the children on whom the future well-being of the state so largely depends.
We have touched only the fringes of the application of the principle of justice in the social order. The field here is wide and the problems complex. Yet the difficulty is not so much to be met in the way of sensing the path of duty as defined by the scriptural rule, “thy neighbour as thyself”. Our difficulty lies rather in the actual doing of what that rule requires. Respect for our own persons bars the way to ready response in action. Yet only in doing is there vital reception of knowledge in this sphere. What is owed by one man to another really defines what one nation owes to another. Therefore only as individual citizens in a nation come to recognize and to practise the principle of justice, and its leaven permeates the masses, can a nation rise to the high plane of just international outlook and practice. Until all nations rise to this, no settled peace seems to lie in prospect. Nor ought we to deem this too much to expect in view of the stupendous difficulties in the way. Let us humbly reckon that as we hope, in face of difficulties quite as great in our personal sphere, to overcome by the grace of the Lord, so by that same grace shall the social order of humanity also overcome in due time.
But man was not made to find his joy and rest in the mere contemplation of noble philosophical and ethical ideals and principles. That way in itself is barren of salvation for man and for human society. Man was made to find his joy and rest in personal communion and fellowship, and that supremely with the living God. So Jesus said, “Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me” (John 12:31, 32). In Christ and him crucified are exhibited the majestic inviolability of justice and the overpowering mastery of love. For, as the prophet of old proclaimed it, so in him has it been fulfilled for all to see, “All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all” (Isaiah 53:6). By honest faith in this Redeemer alone is the principle of justice and the power of love generated in the hearts of men by the Spirit of truth. Then each and every one who has thus come to Christ to drink the water of life becomes in turn a fountain of living water to all around, until, let us despair not of it, the kingdom of this world becomes the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ. Then shall justice be the principle of order and love the bond of unity in the social order; and so shall we, according to his promise, behold “new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness” (II Peter 3:13).
Chesley, Ontario.
OURS is a day of conflict. The times are out of joint. It is therefore a time when the idea of justice is much to the fore. But the reason for this is not any consciousness that justice prevails. It is not because the sanctity of justice is deeply appreciated. It is rather because of the consciousness, or at least the notion, that the reign of justice in human affairs is sadly wanting. When we say, the idea of justice, we are thinking of the fact that universally amongst mankind a principle is recognised which we call justice. The fact is, however, that the ideas of what is just and what is unjust in human relations are bafflingly multitudinous. Yet there is no factor in a man’s experience of the disagreeable and unpleasant which can embitter his soul more than his conviction that he is suffering unjustly. This seems to arise, partly at least, from the belief that the party responsible for the injustice must be conscious of it as surely as he is. Men seem to take this for granted intuitively.
When we go to the Scriptures for light on the matter we find this very fact of embitterment in the first recorded illustration of what constitutes injustice. Cain was a tiller of the soil but Abel was a keeper of sheep. Both alike presented each his offering before the Lord. Cain offered of the fruit of the ground which he tilled. Abel brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. The Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering: but unto Cain and to his offering he had not respect. Manifestly Cain somehow was aware of apparent discrimination against him. We are told that he was very wroth and his countenance fell. The Lord read Cain’s thoughts. In his heart he was alleging respect of persons in the acceptance of Abel’s offering and the rejection of his own. The Lord pointed out to him the groundlessness of such an imagination, and showed him that the way of acceptance for him was as open to him as it was to Abel, and further that his accepting of that way would result still in the recognition of his primacy. Cain’s proud heart interpreted the dictate of justice, “no respect of persons”, under the bias of undue respect to his own person and will before the Lord. He hardened his heart in proud impenitence, and urged on by the bitterness conceived in his soul by the false conviction of his having suffered injustice, he murdered Abel who had not wronged him. The conception of injustice in this record springs from the notion of “respect of persons”. This reveals what seems to be the basic element in the scriptural conception of justice. Justice means “no respect of persons”.
In the Book of Job we find Job’s three friends endeavouring to vindicate God’s dealing with him in his sore affliction on the ground of the justice of God. Job could not tolerate their effort at penetrating the darksome mystery of his afflictions, for he was conscious of the falsity of some of their allegations. Yet it led him to a closer scrutiny of his own conduct. He was aware of the justness of God and recognised clearly that any injustice or unfairness on his part toward others would bring him under the severe condemnation of God. So in his review of his own behaviour he says, “If I did despise the cause of my manservant or of my maidservant, when they contended with me; what then shall I do when God riseth up? and when he visiteth, what shall I answer him? Did not he that made me in the womb make him? and did not one fashion us in the womb?” (Job 31:13–15). How far removed is the thought here from that which prevailed and prevails in other quarters where the master and the servant occupy different planes. Here all are recognised as on the same level before the One who did fashion us in the womb. This, of course, does not signify equality, for inequality prevails amongst men as it prevails amongst the blades of grass and amongst the leaves of a tree. The idea that is here implied as basic to fair dealing and justice in social relations is that of “no respect to persons”. Job must not despise the cause of his manservant or his maidservant. This principle issues as a corollary from creation: “Did not he that made me in the womb make him?”.
In Leviticus 19:15, we read “Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour”. This is not a directive to a judge but counsel for the masses of the people in their social relations. It does find practical repetition in Deuteronomy 1:17, where Moses, in his parting historical review to Israel, refers definitely to his own charge to their judges, “Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear the small as well as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man; for the judgment is God’s”. In like manner Jehoshaphat instructed the judges in his day, and based his counsel on the fact that “There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking of gifts” (II Chron. 19:7). Not only the official judges were exhorted to reflect the character of their God in the discharge of their official duties but the people likewise are urged to do the same in their every day social intercourse. Thus a fundamental characteristic of the moral glory of Jehovah our God is insisted upon in that he “regardeth not persons”. He is just.
This, however, is a peculiar expression. There is a paradox apparent in it. The thought is by no means the notion of disregard of, or indifference to, persons. There is no notion of despising or belittling the person of any one. It is the very reverse. It is as appears in Job’s reference to it. It matters not how lowly in the scale of society anyone may be, that person holds a place before God that yields him a right equally with any person occupying a higher place in that scale. The conventions of human society agreed upon merely by men have no bearing in the allocations of justice. No caste system can be allowed. The idea inculcated in “no respect of persons” is that of the indefeasible recognition of all persons as persons before God. To accept the person of one in the way of discriminating against another is to despise that other. It is this which makes “respect of persons” most offensive before God. To despise the person of any man is to offend not against that man so much as against God, for “in the image of God made he man”, whoever that man may be. This is illustrated in the law of capital punishment against murderers and, in reverse, in the rule regarding flagellation, “Forty stripes he may give him, and not exceed: lest, if he should exceed, and beat him above these with many stripes, then thy brother should seem vile unto thee” (Deut. 25:3). Even Paul, the hated outcast, five times suffered only “forty stripes save one” (II Cor. 11:24).
There are those who seek to belittle the Old Testament as a source of authoritative instruction on this question of the content of the idea of justice. They would impute to those who find anywhere in the Old Scripture a rich mine of pregnant thought and of divine indoctrination in this respect the fallacy of themselves first putting in the content which they profess to elicit. They allege that the ideas are first learned from the New Scripture or from some other source and then are thereafter conveniently discovered to have been implicit in the Old. As for the Decalogue, no light shines from it for them on the matter, and at best these commandments cover a very narrow range. And how glibly honoured names of Christ’s worthy witnesses of the past are brought in to confirm such wanton evacuation of the Old Scripture to make such efforts acceptable to those who, though wary, may yet be forgetful of our Lord’s premonition, “But be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your Master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren” (Matt. 23:8). Now it is quite true that the words of Scripture do suffer such maltreatment at the hands of men at times. Do they not also suffer peculiarly in reverse from those who seek to water down their meaning at times almost to sheer inanity? Happy is the man whose reverence for Scripture “restrains him from first forcing into the content of its words what he is desirous of taking out. Happy is the man who comes to the word of Scripture honestly, humbly and wholeheartedly divesting himself of any preconceived theories of its origin and history and of the trammelling imaginations of limitations necessitated by some mundane philosophy which he had come to accept, and who therefore seeks insight into, and understanding of, its true content at the hand of the Spirit of Truth. For did not Jesus open the understandings of his disciples to understand these very Scriptures before commissioning them to be his witnesses? There is something very worthwhile for Christ’s witnesses in them apparently. Afterward they went everywhere preaching the word. But it was Christ and him crucified that they preached. They found the old word of Scripture pregnant indeed. They found in it spiritual indoctrination far beyond what the natural man can find in it, because the things of the Spirit are foolishness to him. So, if what we find in Moses and the Psalms and the Prophets coincides with what our Lord himself taught and with what his Apostles proclaimed, we’ll not consider ourselves responsible for first putting into the Old Scripture what we wish to take out.
Paul reminds those who are masters that “your Master also is in heaven; neither is there respect of persons with him” (Eph. 6:9). This is quite a levelling word and in its context is rather significant: almost as much so as Peter’s word to Cornelius, when the gulf between Jew and Gentile was bridged, “Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons” (Acts 10:34). But it is in the Epistle of James that we find the basic character of this principle of justice set forth in its far-reaching authority. In James we read, “My brethren, have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect of persons” (2:1). Having pointed out the wrong of such conduct on their part when they honour the wealthy and show disrespect and discourtesy to the poor, he continues, “If ye fulfil the royal law according to the scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, ye do well; but if ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors. For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all” (James 2:8–10). James finds the under-girding principle of the ten commandments to be just this, “no respect of persons”, and that is the principle of justice. While James writes of the royal law according to the Scripture, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”, he goes on to illustrate what he means by keeping the whole law and yet offending in one point by citing explicitly the seventh and the sixth commandments of the Decalogue. He makes it clear that he is thinking of the ten commandments when he refers to “the whole law”. It is this law to which he manifestly refers when he says, “If ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors”. “Respect to persons” simply contradicts “thy neighbour as thyself”. The several commandments are thus declared by James to be a whole of such a nature that a breach at any point is a breach of all. This appears quite understandable when we see that each commandment is simply the application of one and the same principle to the varying spheres of relationship to God and of human social activity and interest.
The first three of the ten commandments express the divine application of the principle of justice to man’s activities to Godward exclusively. This is the sphere of religion. The fourth commandment inculcates the worship of our Creator God but leads us out from his worship as exclusively formal religion and into the social sphere by blending with the idea of worshipful rest the fundamental practical commandment for the social order which requires man’s exercise of himself in working for his living. From the beginning man was made to work. The fall of man by sin entailed toilsomeness and sorrow so that “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread”. It is not out of place here to stress this two-edged character of the Sabbath commandment. It exhibits the unity of the order of life religiously and morally. This word requires much more than worshipful rest every seventh day. It demands quite as explicitly the earning of our living by labour on the other six days of the week. The blending of these two elements of worshipful rest and of working for our living in the one commandment places both alike on the highest plane. Can higher honour be paid to labour? This is surely a matter of pregnant significance for the solution of the labour problems which are rife in the social order to-day. Working for our living is a primary duty according to the divine order of justice, and this requirement is in flat and irreconcilable conflict with a too-commonly accepted slogan, “The world owes us a living”. True religion is bound up inescapably with any adequate solution of the labour problem. It reminds the master here of the one Master of all, even Christ, and that there is no respect of persons with him, while it inspires the servant to obedient service for the Lord’s sake. It insists on the master’s interest in providing an adequate and fully-rounded living for his servant as for himself and on the servant’s vital interest in the profitable productivity of his master’s business that both may mutually be blessed.
When we pass this nexus to the commandments which deal exclusively with the social order, we find that the first of these deals with the obligation due by us to those through whom, under God, we have our being, father and mother. This is fundamental in the social order. The second deals with the obligation due by us personally with respect to God’s gift of life. The third deals with the obligation due by us with respect to the power of procreation or sex relations. The fourth deals with the obligation due by us with respect to the economic conditions of living. The fifth deals with the obligation due by us with respect to the sphere of reputation. The sixth then deals with the source of unjust action in the motive of covetousness, which is idolatry, the worship and service of the creature rather than of the Creator. Thus the tenth commandment completes the circle by bringing us back to the first commandment, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me”, which is practically identical with the word of Jesus, “Ye cannot serve God and mammon”. The ten commandments in the spiritual sphere may then properly be likened to the seven basic colours in the physical sphere, under which are comprehended all possible hues and tints. For notwithstanding their striking distinctiveness they all blend and unite to afford us the pure white of light. Parabolically, this illustrates how the ten commandments, pregnantly comprehending the whole round of life, blend and unite into one spiritual whole, yielding us our true religion and our ethics. The expression of the principle of justice as the principle of order results in the world of spirits in absolute unconditional subserviency to the living God, and in the social sphere in “thy neighbour as thyself”. And the motive power for the fulfillment of this law is love. And thus in the social order the principle of order is justice and the bond of unity is love.
When a lawyer asked Jesus a question, “tempting him, and saying, Master, which is the great commandment in the law? Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”. And to this he added the penetrating and significant comment, “On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets” (Matt. 22:35–40). Let us not doubt that if we are led by the Spirit of truth into the meaning of Moses, the Psalms, and the Prophets, we’ll find the divine order of things and learn that the basic principle of that order is justice. If we will have it otherwise expressed we may say that the foundation principle of all right action is truth as David implied when he repented of his transgression and confessed, “Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward parts” (Psalm 51:6). What better definition of truth can we get than that truth is justice to facts, the same principle applied in the sphere of facts which, in the sphere of persons, is expressed, “thy neighbour as thyself”? And thus may we understand the word of Jesus to Pilate, when, speaking of his kingdom, he said, “To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice” (John 18:37).
From him, then, let us seek to learn the bearing and true application of the principle of justice in the social order. This he has made plain in the illustration of the good Samaritan, as he has come to be known. Jesus apparently had been placing heavy stress on the greatness of their privilege who heard him teaching and saw him sealing his teaching as of God. “And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and tempted him, saying, Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?” (Luke 10:25). The critical character of this episode is clearly indicated by the language of its narration. It was a momentous occasion. Jesus asked in reply a very definite and pointed question: “What is written in the law? how readest thou?”. Definitely the investigation concerned the interpretation of the law. Jesus first referred him to the Old Scripture, “what is written”. The lawyer clearly understood this first question. In masterly fashion, he gave a comprehensive summary in Scripture language of what is written, reminiscent indeed of the answer of Jesus to that other lawyer who had asked which is the great commandment in the law. For he answering said, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself”. Jesus said to him, “Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live” (Luke 10:27, 28). So far the lawyer had read the law rightly. But he proceeded to focus attention on the minor element of his own comprehensive answer by asking Jesus, “And who is my neighbour?”. This lawyer seems to have followed a carefully prepared line of approach on the question. Jesus granted him his way and answered his intriguing question by a graphic and most comprehensive illustration. He told the story of a certain man who was following the well-known road from Jerusalem on his way to Jericho when bandits assaulted him. They stripped him even to his clothing, and wounded him, leaving him half-dead. A certain priest came down that way but on seeing him passed by on the other side. Then a Levite came that way, came and looked on him, but passed by on the other side also. Both these persons apparently belonged to this locality. They both surely knew the law. Perhaps both excused themselves as having urgent business, perhaps an appointment to keep, or feared to get themselves entangled in the crime in any way, or considered the danger of their being set upon by the bandits themselves if they tried to help the victim. Yet they ignored the law. For a human life was at stake and before that consideration other responsibilities must fade into comparative insignificance. Against this dark background of failure a bright scene shines. For “a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, and went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee” (Luke 10:33–35). This Samaritan was apparently on an important errand but, whatever his business was, it had to wait on the more important business which God, in his providence, had thrust in this wise upon him.
It may truly be said that the only bond between the Samaritan and his stricken neighbour was as attenuated as it well could be. There appears no more than the bond of a common humanity, and that with some very adverse conditions further to lessen its force. They two were separated by bitter differences of creed and of race, and apparently these were emphasised by differences of politics, of language and of social status. Furthermore they seem to have been complete strangers to one another whose dwellings had hitherto been far apart. Manifestly the lesson is plain that our neighbour is any fellowman who may in any way come into the pathway of our life, anyone of whom we must say, “Did not one fashion us in the womb?”.
But Jesus was here interpreting the law of “thy neighbour as thyself”. He was not, explicitly not, expounding the activity of charity or of grace. He was simply setting forth an illustration of love fulfilling the law. The question may be asked, Did not the Samaritan exceed in his conduct what the law required of him? Now we know that Jesus did not intend to confound the lawyer or to confuse him as to how he should read the law. He simply set before him an illustration of what the law required of the Samaritan. He was required to recognize the half-dead victim by the roadside who had come so unexpectedly into his life as his neighbour according to the term, “thy neighbour as thyself”. To this neighbour, a man hitherto unknown, he was required to render whatever aid and comfort he himself would have another render to himself had he been in that victim’s place. This he did and, in doing it, he illustrated the simple requirement of justice according, not to evangelical ideals newly made known by Jesus, but according to the ancient scriptural rule, “thy neighbour as thyself”. There have been those who claim that the law did not require of the Samaritan to go farther than to place this neighbour in the care of the innkeeper, whose business it was to care for wayfarers. But that would be a strange course to take. The innkeeper had become the Samaritan’s neighbour too, and it would surely be less than just of the Samaritan to unload his self-acknowledged responsibility upon this neighbour. To do so would plainly not be a case of “thy neighbour as thyself”. We have no right to read this illustration of the Samaritan as teaching the doctrine of grace. This is to sidestep our Lord’s carefully guarded illustration of the simple requirement of justice, for the half-dead victim had no responsibility whatsoever for his own sad plight. Every detail indicates our Lord’s intention to interpret for us the plain dictate of, “thy neighbour as thyself”, or “no respect of persons”. Had the Samaritan done less than he did, he would have manifested a love or respect for himself greater than for his neighbour. According to this commandment we are to love ourselves. But we are not to love ourselves more than we love our neighbours, otherwise we become guilty of “respect of persons”, and so deal unjustly. And that this is the mind of our Lord respecting the true content of the Old Scripture is manifest from his words, “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets” (Matt. 7:12).
There are those who prefer to interpret this illustration of the good Samaritan for the glorification of love. Certainly the motive of love was active in his heart. Love is the fulfilling of the law. It is well to bear in mind, however, that it is a vain and most mischievous thing to set forth love as in any possible respect a rival of justice, for our admiration. Thus Paul describes love, that it “rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth” (I Cor. 13:6). They twain, love and justice, are one in the eternal being of God, just as affection and thought are one in human experience, one, not in any sense of identity, but one in the sense that the one is complementary to the other to make a whole, an experience. For God is love and God is light. Light is always associated with knowledge of the truth in Scripture teaching. Truth is identified with reality, justice to facts, things as they are. When Jesus warned, “Take heed therefore that the light which is in thee be not darkness” (Luke 11:35) he manifestly referred to the danger of leaning unto our own understanding rather than trusting in the Lord with all our heart (Prov. 3:5). For he assures us that, “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself” (John 7:17). This is to reach the rock bottom of truth and to have one’s dwelling in light.
The notion that love can ever supersede justice or that eventually justice may be sublimated into love arises from the failure to recognise that they are disparate elements in our experience. Love belongs to the affective aspect of our experience whereas justice belongs to the perceptive. The one is wholly subjective and is the reaction of the person toward the object presented to him. Justice is distinctively objective and presents itself to the mind as factual and necessary. So long as human experience retains this two-fold characteristic of the objective and the subjective, or the emotional reaction to this objective, so long must justice and love remain distinct though united. We cannot know the one without the other, and only when thought can be transmuted into affection can love reign without justice. And that is never so far as our present experience indicates. Love, the love of God, is the motive power of eternal life, and justice is the principle of the law which that love fulfils, and against which that love can never exert pressure to break forth from its limiting dictate. The affection which urges to injustice to persons or to facts for any cause whatsoever is something other than the love of God. But when Jesus said to the lawyer, “This do, and thou shalt live” (Luke 10:28) he was stating a simple fact. Only a soul already possessed of eternal life could love the Lord his God with all his heart, with all his soul, with all his strength, and with all his mind, and his neighbour as himself. For this love of God is the very power of life eternal and out of it issues the power to “love my neighbour as myself”. Jesus said in his intercessory prayer, “This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent” (John 17:3). This knowledge of God implies love of God.
There is persistent determination on the part of many to exalt love into a primacy over justice. The practical effect of this is gravely mischievous and tragically disastrous. It provides the basis for the absolute reign of sheer expediency. And so in modern thought the ideal in government has very largely come to mean not the establishment and the maintenance of justice but “the greatest good of the greatest number”. The corroding effect and power of this scheme in government reaches its zenith of exhibition in totalitarianism, under which social order no individual rights, as defined by justice, remain. Love (and who can define it except in terms of the object for which the affection is entertained?) is the moving power in all activity. To insist that love then is the supreme factor in all proper activity comes to mean that “might is right”. But when the motive power of action is defined as the love that. “rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth”, and that is inevitably the love of God, then we are holding securely by the grand fact that “right is might”.
A certain colour for this claim for the primacy of love is found in the famous passage in I Corinthians 13 which concludes, “And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity”. We must not overlook that the Apostle is here comparing three things which all belong to the same sphere, the sphere of the subjective. Faith as here used signifies the exercise of the soul Godward, not the substance of what is believed, but the action of laying hold upon the object of faith. In the same way hope is here used of the subjective exercise of the soul, just as love inevitably is. Now he declares and justifies the primacy of love amongst these three. But there is nowhere to be found in the language of Scripture any suggestion of the primacy of love over justice or truth. Truth and justice are to be equated in this reference, and it is in the face of Christ’s word, “Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice”, to make claim for the primacy of love. Who are they “that are of the truth” but those who love it because they love God? So love and truth occupy alike the same divine and eternal plane.
It is not ours to detract from the praise of love, nor to try to narrow the sphere in which love operates. It is ours to attempt such an analysis of the character and activity of love as may serve to place the function of justice in a clearer light. Love is a force or power. It is indeed the power of spiritual life. It is the mightiest force of all. Justice is, strictly speaking, not a force at all. It is a principle. We often use language which seems to imply that there is mightiness in justice. That is misleading language. For example, a sense of justice has moved men to deeds of courage, of daring and of power. It is not the power of justice that is thus exhibited. It is the power of love, love for, or devotion to, justice, or to those to be protected from injustice. And truly behind all suggestion that there is force or power in justice lies the conception that justice is divine and so divine power is behind it. But love is a power yet not a principle. Love is a force and does not define or determine its own way any more than any other force or power does. When we would define a force we seek to exhibit the law which its activity follows. Justice defines the limits within which love can have free play. Within the limits of justice love has utmost freedom of activity. So the divine word describes love in the restrictive terms of justice, love “rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth”. There can be no “law of love” then which transcends the reign of justice. Justice must reign forever in the social order wherein there ever shall be free agents in fellowship, for, wherever mine and thine and his are intertwining, justice is the principle of order, and love can and shall have free-play and manifest itself as the bond of unity.
This principle, “thy neighbour as thyself”, abides unchangeable everywhere and under all conditions. It is true that in the mêlée of life it is often exceedingly difficult to deal impartially, that is, to give to each his due as against rivals. But the difficulty arises from our sinful frailty of which an outstanding characteristic is our excessive love of self. If only our eye were single then our whole body would be full of light and we could readily discern the lines of equity which now are blurred and often badly tangled to our vision. It matters not, however, how tangled the threads may appear in the web of life that we must weave, nor how manifold the claims that press upon us, the pathway to be followed is determined by this ancient word, “thy neighbour as thyself”. Whatsoever deviation from that pathway takes place is wrong. And as a noted English author, and a professed agnostic at that, had one of his characters say, “Though right and wrong may be near neighbours, yet the line that separates them is of an awful sacredness”, so it is. For the line that separates them is the line defined by the principle of justice.
In the social order we begin with the twain who are, by divine institution, one flesh. Man was not made to be an isolationist. At the very outset of human history man’s incompetency to live alone is most strikingly proclaimed. Woman was provided as an help suited to him, and so the real unit in human society is not the individual but the married couple. It is a matter of observation that the entrance of the great schism through man’s injustice to God reflected itself straightway in man’s injustice to woman. Man sought to sidestep his own personal responsibility by casting the blame on his wife. And so schism entered the social order. This schism is the appalling effect of injustice and from it the social order on this earth has suffered ever since.
There is no more delicate, no more penetratingly essential, no more truly vitalizing bond in human society or the social order than the bond of matrimony. The troth that is mutually pledged in marriage is to be regarded as underlying the entire fabric of the social order. Upon the keeping of it with loyalty and fidelity hangs not only the happiness of the contracting parties themselves and of their immediate families but also the well-being in measure of the whole social order of which they form a part. It is in the powers of procreation mutually entrusted and pledged one to another in the matrimonial bond that the unity of twain in one flesh resides. A breach of faithfulness at this point is the alone ground for divorce action in the order of divine justice. Whatever other breaches or separations may occur, they can not furnish ground for divorce action. To allow any other pleas for divorce than adultery is to place one’s own will in command and means excessive love of self as over against the social order, as well as over against God. In the effort to apply the principle of justice through statute law in the social order it is a matter of primary importance that the ordinance of marriage should be maintained on this high level of sanctity.
When, however, we face the problem of law in the social order on earth we must ever bear in mind that the term “law” in this connection is distinctively other than the term “law” as used when we say that justice is the law that love fulfils. In this latter case we deal with that ideal condition where from within his inmost being, and without coercion of any kind, a man, because he has truth in his inward part, does justly, loves mercy, and walks humbly with his God (Micah 6:8). No law is needed on the statute books for such a person. The law is in his heart. The contrast between these different conceptions of law finds clear expression in Jeremiah 31:31–33 (quoted in Hebrews 8:8–10), “Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers.. .. But this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel; After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts.. . .” So the Apostle writes, “But we know that the law is good, if a man use it lawfully; knowing this, that the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient” (I Tim. 1:8, 9). Under this condition where the spirit of disobedience is prevailing, the approach to a perfect application of the principle of justice in the social order is very difficult and can never be complete. Such written law cannot cover every case, circumstance and condition individually with the result that it often fails to apply with perfect fitness. This is because it has to run in what is termed “blanket” form. Yet wherever men enjoy the freedom that prevails where the establishment and maintenance of justice is recognised as the function of government or of the state, there is bound to be an alertness against “respect of persons” in the framing as well as in the administration of law. Under the representative system in legislatures a growing approximation toward law that represents a common effort to stem the activities of the lawless and disobedient, while yet guarding zealously against infringement upon the free activity of the righteous, should be the aim in view. This brings into stress the sine qua non of a people thoroughly grounded in the understanding of justice and imbued with its spirit, as, reaching this ideal, it is described in the passage above referred to, “And they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord” (Jer. 31:34).
Under the scriptural or Christian scheme of the social order the supreme end in view is to prepare men for that kingdom whereinto there shall enter nothing “that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie” (Rev. 21:27). This kingdom, which is not of this age, is a kingdom of free agents, each and every one of whom contributes his part in that social order in perfect harmony and unison with all others, not under any external pressure or coercive influence, but in utmost freedom and free-play of functioning. This is the kingdom of light where love, the power of life, re-unites the membership of humanity, by deliverance from its present schismatic plight, in endless unity in Christ Jesus, as the ingrafted branches become one in the vine, all alike sharing its nurturing life. But in order to this preparation, men must have under their individual power and responsibility the means of life, that they may learn to use them with due regard to their own interest and to the interest of others from the narrowest circles to the broadest outlines of humanity’s social order.
It is by learning to live in the social order here according to the dictate of justice and moved by love that men are being prepared here to live hereafter in perfect harmony. In the Pentecostal days a number of believers, in the ecstacy of their new-found freedom in Christ, actually pooled all their possessions to live together as having all things in common. Extravagant conclusions have been derived from this experiment as to the character and economic polity of the kingdom which Christ came to establish. We have here only to observe the sober way in which Peter pointed out to Ananias that the recognition of private property rights continued as the basic principle in the Christian community. The process of learning how to use, and not to abuse, our earthly property in our dealings and relations with our fellows depends on the recognition of this principle. It is really essential to the enjoyment of our free agency in the social order. Every effort to deprive men of private property rights, whether in eating or in drinking, in family relations or in finance, under any pretext whatsoever, is in conflict with this simple dictate of justice. In I Timothy 4:1–6; 6:6–10, Paul deals sharply with such tendencies and sets forth the true Christian view on the question. The use of money involves no impropriety nor injustice. Yet, owing to the love of money in the hearts of men, the cries of those who have been and are oppressed by cruel capitalistic harpies have truly filled the very heavens with the gloom and sadness of economic woes. This has led to the most extravagant denunciations of and opprobrious imputations against money down the centuries. But these vicious evils arise, not from the use of money, but from its abuse or unjust use. The key to this problem lies in the will of man. The root of the trouble is not touched by doing away with the use of money. The love of money is a root of all evil, and from it spring these evils. But love is a matter of the person, of the heart. A change in the economic system leaves the heart of man unchanged. In the order of justice it belongs to the glory of man that he should have dominion over things and that things should not have dominion over him. James uses scathing language about those who defraud their servants and heap up treasure to rust. The master who defrauds his servants of their just return for services rendered, and the servant who defrauds his master of a just measure of service, both are guilty of making unjust use of money. Of ancient time Job recognised the cause of his man-servant to be sacred, and Paul instructed slaves to serve their earthly masters as being themselves Christ’s free men. Thus the use of one man’s service by another is placed on the proper plane, the plane of equity. It is well indeed for employers of labour to bear in mind that more has to be taken into account in arriving at equity in dealing with servants than the strict equation of so much pay for so much work. Where humanity receives due recognition, the necessity of a livelihood for the employee enters into the consideration. The bearing of the statements in our Lord’s parable of the workers in the vineyard on this question is too readily overlooked or sidestepped. Jesus puts into the employer’s lips the words, “Whatsoever is right (just) I will give you”, when he addresses the labourers who had gone idle owing to want of employment during much of the day. Then at the close of the day he orders his steward to give them all a penny. Is there not here a lesson as to the responsibility of the social order or the state with respect to the unemployed who are willing to work? It is a grievous evil and a festering sore in the social order where men who are willing to work for their living, but cannot find employment, are shown no consideration by the state. The fact of the matter is that justice, “thy neighbour as thyself”, penetrates more deeply and requires greater consideration for our fellows than our selfish natures are capable of envisaging. Of course, this is also a two-edged sword, for it penetrates just as piercingly into the question of the consideration owed by the servant to his master, and of the common responsibility to earn our living for ourselves and for our dependents by our labour. All who have a keen sense of personal responsibility regularly display a persistent determination to find ways and means for earning their living.
But one reason why we readily overlook the profound and sweeping character of the requirement of justice in social relations is that we too readily yield our minds to custom and use as they prevail amongst us. This influence gives a decided bias in the direction of the toleration of definitely covetous inclinations. In so far as law is concerned, it can never translate the principle of justice into effective operation beyond the outward manifestation in the deeds of men. All that just legislation can do is to condemn the openly unjust deed and even that only after a general method, and to exercise restraint upon evil-doers. When, in Romans 13:4, it is said of the ruler that he “beareth not the sword in vain”, it is added, “for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil”. But there remains a wide range of activity between the actual doing of evil and the doing of full justice. An employer may be punctual and exact in paying such wages as he has agreed to pay, and yet be very far from treating his workman in accordance with, “thy neighbour as thyself”. His zeal for profit for himself may sadly outstrip his concern for his neighbour’s well-being. No doubt as the light of the true facts concerning the bearing of justice on human relations shines more clearly into the minds of the people and their legislators, the scope of this range will continue to be narrowed. The greatness of the progress in this direction in the English-speaking world during the past two hundred years is one of the most remarkable developments in human history. And the definite principle directing this development is justice, scriptural justice at that, but merely opening from bud toward full-blown flower.
When it is written that the ruler “beareth not the sword in vain”, his authority to exercise physical force to restrain evil-doers is clearly intended. Therefore he is to be feared by evil-doers. It is also indicated that in resisting evil-doers his authority extends to the power over life itself. In other words, governments have power from God to resist evil-doers to the death. This is the authority that is exercised by a police force for the maintenance of law within the domain of the authority which appointed them. This is the authority by which governments maintain armies, air forces and navies. It is specifically an authority limited to the necessity for maintaining justice within and without any government’s domain. No government can have any right from God to exercise this authority in the cause of evil or injustice. When one nation or group of nations invades the precincts of another’s right it is only just and proper for the latter to oppose such invasion to the death. Indeed it would mean failure to exercise authority aright, were the latter to allow justice to be trampled under foot by an evil-doer. The possession of authority entails responsibility for the due exercise of that authority. Without the maintenance of justice society cannot enjoy order or peace. In so far as injustice prevails peace is imperilled. Thus justice is basic to peace. Therefore peace, however precious and eagerly to be sought after, is, after all, a condition only secondary to justice. The authority of the ruler or government extends to the persons of all subjects so that compulsory service for the defence of justice is within its scope, although amongst a freedom-loving people it may be exercised only as a last resort. This is particularly so because under all blanket laws instances of undue hardship and injustice are bound to arise. Yet justice requires that all subjects alike recognize their personal responsibility when the well-being of all alike is imperilled. Yet it must ever be safeguarded that the state exists for man, not man for the state, as under totalitarian concepts. The ruler is a minister of God for the good of the subject or citizen (Rom. 13:4).
The exercise of this extreme form of governmental authority under stress of necessity leads, however, to the uncovering of conditions which may confront the government with unexpected problems. If the necessity of the nation calls for the physically fit to face the perils and the sacrifices of war when others physically unfit are to be excused, does not a problem respecting the nation’s responsibility for the physical fitness and health of her citizens arise? A little problem respecting the education of the citizenry arises. And again parents who have sweated and toiled and worried in the bringing up of their sons find the state laying claim upon their services just when they are of age to work and, it may be, to give some return of comfort, if not of finance, to them. The necessity of the whole nation calls for the benefit and protection of their sacrifice and service. Can it be maintained in equity that there is nothing owing by the nation in the way of helping to prepare future citizens for the discharge of the responsibilities of citizenship? The development of a crisis in which the state is obliged to exercise its utmost reach of authority surely helps to bring to the foreground certain realities of the mutuality of responsibility, according to justice, as between citizens and the state, which otherwise are likely to remain neglected. But once they are brought into the focus of attention, it is the duty of the state to endeavour a remedy of discovered injustices and some specific method of consideration for the children on whom the future well-being of the state so largely depends.
We have touched only the fringes of the application of the principle of justice in the social order. The field here is wide and the problems complex. Yet the difficulty is not so much to be met in the way of sensing the path of duty as defined by the scriptural rule, “thy neighbour as thyself”. Our difficulty lies rather in the actual doing of what that rule requires. Respect for our own persons bars the way to ready response in action. Yet only in doing is there vital reception of knowledge in this sphere. What is owed by one man to another really defines what one nation owes to another. Therefore only as individual citizens in a nation come to recognize and to practise the principle of justice, and its leaven permeates the masses, can a nation rise to the high plane of just international outlook and practice. Until all nations rise to this, no settled peace seems to lie in prospect. Nor ought we to deem this too much to expect in view of the stupendous difficulties in the way. Let us humbly reckon that as we hope, in face of difficulties quite as great in our personal sphere, to overcome by the grace of the Lord, so by that same grace shall the social order of humanity also overcome in due time.
But man was not made to find his joy and rest in the mere contemplation of noble philosophical and ethical ideals and principles. That way in itself is barren of salvation for man and for human society. Man was made to find his joy and rest in personal communion and fellowship, and that supremely with the living God. So Jesus said, “Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me” (John 12:31, 32). In Christ and him crucified are exhibited the majestic inviolability of justice and the overpowering mastery of love. For, as the prophet of old proclaimed it, so in him has it been fulfilled for all to see, “All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all” (Isaiah 53:6). By honest faith in this Redeemer alone is the principle of justice and the power of love generated in the hearts of men by the Spirit of truth. Then each and every one who has thus come to Christ to drink the water of life becomes in turn a fountain of living water to all around, until, let us despair not of it, the kingdom of this world becomes the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ. Then shall justice be the principle of order and love the bond of unity in the social order; and so shall we, according to his promise, behold “new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness” (II Peter 3:13).
Friday, 28 February 2020
The Christian Theistic Philosophy Of Law And Jurisprudence
By W. Stanford Reid
McGill University, Montreal.
ONE of the major questions which the world faces to-day is that of the nature of law. While men have usually realized that law is one of the great means of social control, by which and under which they must live, if they would live at all, yet there lies before us to-day as there has not done for over a hundred years, the problem of the origin and validity of law. Is law simply the expression of the will of an omnicompetent dictator? Is it the expression of the will of an omnicompetent people? Or, is it ultimately the expression of the will of an omnicompetent God?
To the first question Nazis and Fascists answer yes. To the second many of our humanistic democrats will give an affirmative answer. Yet in doing so they ultimately support human dictatorship for they make man the only source of law. Germany’s history since 1920 is a good instance of the consequences of the humanistic view. To Christians, however, law can have no meaning apart from the will of the sovereign God; and in these days of doubt and lawlessness it behooves them to set forth this view. Theirs is the only view which will really cut the ground from under the humanism which is driving even democratic nations into the totalitarian camp.
In the following pages an attempt will be made to outline, rather briefly, the Christian theistic philosophy of law. Although by no means as fully as possible an endeavour will be made to fulfill Cardozo’s definition when he said: “A philosophy of law will tell us how law comes into being, how it grows and whither it tends, genesis and development, and end or function, these things, if no others will be dealt with in its pages”.[1]
The Source and Origin of the Law
Although Christian theism teaches that God is the source of all reality, it does not hold the Hegelian view that the world is “a development of those principles or determinations which form the content of the divine mind”.[2] Rather, accepting the doctrine of the tri-unity of God, it insists that God and the world are absolutely different. God finds His complete expression in the interrelations of the Trinity, so that He is independent of temporal reality and history. These latter, being created by Him solely for His own glory, are upheld and preserved by none other than His sovereign power.[3]
In creating reality, God established certain independent but externally related spheres, each of which possesses its own laws. He made the spheres of number, space, physics and biology, within which lie both animate and inanimate creation. The laws of number, space and physics govern the non-organic realm, while along with these the laws of biology govern both the plant and animal kingdoms. Starting with the simplest sphere, that of number, all the spheres build upon those that precede, each adding something new.
The spheres of matter and animal life, however, were not the only ones created. Another creature of an altogether higher order was placed upon the earth by divine creative act. This was man. Created in the image of God, he, though finite, had true knowledge, righteousness and holiness. He was thus the highest point of creation, its summary and summit, with the center of his life concentrated in the service and glorification of the eternal Godhead.[4]
This service of God, however, was not to be according to the vagaries of a completely undirected free-will. Man was placed under law. Not only was he subject to physical and biological laws, but also to intellectual, social and ethical laws in their widest sense.[5]
Man was given true knowledge, which means that he was able to think properly. As a creature made in the image of God he had implanted within his mind the laws of logic and ratiocination to which his thinking conformed. He was not left with a completely free and unguided intellect, but was given one which, although finite, was perfect. He was capable of thinking in accordance with the psychical laws established by God. He truly thought God’s thoughts after Him.[6]
In social life he was in the same position. As man was in time, he was subject to historical development and the laws of history. As he was not alone in the world, he must needs have means of communication, language, which brought him into the sphere of linguistics. And because he lived with others, he was subject to social and economic spheres. The first social laws established by God were those concerned with monogamous marriage. The family was to be the unit, the father ruling over the others, and the biological blood relationship forming the basis of the unit under the law of the family. Laws in the economic sphere were also established, man being given sovereignty over all non-rational creatures, and instructed to depend upon vegetable life for food. In this way, from the beginning, man’s social existence came under the laws of God.[7]
In the same way was governed man’s ethical life. His duty to his fellow men and to himself was based upon his duty to God. To this end man was given a test to see if he would obey God’s law faithfully on the simple ground that God commanded it, or whether he preferred to disobey God in the pride of his own heart. He was informed by God that as absolute as the laws of the physical spheres were those of the sphere of ethics. If he broke God’s ethical laws he would die.[8]
The question arises at this point, however, as to the means by which man obtained a knowledge of these laws. It came in three ways. In the first place man used his perfect intellect by which he could gain an understanding of many of the physical, biological and other laws of the world, as well as an appreciation of the important fact that all laws were upheld by the providence of God. In the second place man had a conscience, a cognitive faculty whereby, through intuition, he could know the difference between right and wrong. This was implanted within him to direct his relationships with his fellow man, and above all with his Creator. Finally, man was given by God special revelations concerning some specific facts and laws. In this way he had complete and perfect knowledge of the law of God.[9]
Thus in summing up the situation of man in his original pristine perfection, we find him a perfect, God-created being, living in complete harmony and pure communion with his Maker. He realized the sovereign position which God held over him, and to this he submitted, willingly obeying the law of God and doing all things to His glory.
Law Becomes Jurisprudence
How long man retained his perfection and obedience to God we cannot say, but that he fell is quite evident. He came to the place where he actually denied the sovereignty of God, and sinned by breaking the divine law. As soon as this took place, man died and the seeds of death were introduced into his physical existence. By his infraction of the law of God, man lost his righteousness, his subjective holiness and even his logical capacity to see God as his Creator and Lord. He lost the knowledge of, and the will to obey, the laws of God. But what was even more disastrous, because of the unity of the family physically, biologically, socially and ethically, this loss of original perfection was passed on to all those descending from Adam by ordinary generation. Even at birth, the descendant of Adam possesses within himself the seeds of spiritual and physical death which, unless restrained by God, will work themselves out with terrible results.[10]
That this original sin had such consequences is shown by the effects of the fall in the social and ethical spheres. Instead of man’s whole existence being centered in the glorification and enjoyment of his Creator, it became centered in man himself. Man exalted himself as the final aim, object and interpreter of the universe, relegating God to the position of a non-entity. The almost immediate result of this was murder (Genesis 4, 6). Man cared nothing for the fact that since his fellow man had been placed in creation by God, God alone could remove him. He exalted himself to the position of God, going so far as to destroy by murder what remained of the image of God in man. Without divine intervention and restraint, man’s lawlessness could result in nothing but chaos and destruction.
But man not only suffered from the effects of sin as a natural consequence of the fall; he suffered because of the punishment bestowed upon him directly by virtue of God’s retributive justice. True, it was according to the eternal plan of God that man fell, but man had been given such complete freedom that on his own responsibility alone he had rejected God’s sovereignty. Therefore, with perfect justice God could have punished man by dousing him in the night of eternity, leaving no human spark upon the earth. If, on the other hand, God did reach down to restrain the raging of His creatures, it was simply by His grace, not because of any merit or loveliness to be found in them. The effects of sin could be nullified only by divine intervention.[11]
The grace of God manifested to man since his fall has been of two distinct kinds: Special Grace and Common Grace. Special Grace came to man as a result of God’s eternal decree of election, whereby for His own glory He chose a multitude of His creatures to be His own peculiar people. They were to be brought into this blessed state through the Covenant of Grace by which the Second Person of the Trinity, as their representative, was to bear their sin.[12] As they had broken God’s law, they had to be punished by that law, and also be brought to obey it. The Kingdom of God had to be reestablished in their hearts.[13]
Yet God would not ride rough-shod over men, leaving them without free agency. Instead He gave unto them His law, that they might see their sinfulness, and then He sent the Redeemer, Jesus Christ, that He might bear their punishment. Before the Incarnation, the law itself pointed forward to the coming Sin-bearer, but since His coming we see more clearly God’s ways with men. None of this, however, would have been of any use had God not also provided for the changing of men’s hearts by turning them unto Him. Through the work of the Holy Spirit in man, God brings His elect people back to Himself. Having redeemed them from the punishment of the law, He gives them a desire to accept the Saviour and live according to the law.[14] This is the way of Special Grace.
At the same time grace has also been given to the non-elect, but it is not the Saving Grace which results in loving obedience to the law of God. Common Grace, as it is called, has on the other hand, the twofold task of emphasizing that man is inexcusable for disobeying God, and of bringing forth to the glory of God the gifts with which He has endowed man. It underlines man’s depravity by restraining his sin to such an extent that he should realize even from looking at this sin-stricken universe that there is a God who demands obedience. At the same time it enables man to develope the powers which he still possesses as retaining in part the image of God. God has thus seen fit to control man’s sinful heart in order that the church might be able to carry on its work of preaching the Gospel to all men in the historical process of calling out the elect.[15] In other words, Common Grace counteracts what would be the result of man’s “egoism”, in order that the work of Special Grace may be completed. The principal method employed to do this is that of the partial restoration of law over man, in order that the outward effects of sin might be curtailed. This is the basis of all jurisprudence.[16]
The agency by which the law regulating men’s relations to each other is formulated and enforced is the state. This social organization was established in its present form, that by “public law” it might nullify the effects of sin.[17] What form the state would have taken had sin not entered the world we do not know, nor is the matter relevant at this point. The historic character of the state was absolutely necessary, once man fell, to prevent chaos in creation.[18] Thus the state, while a divine institution with its own specific function, is without authority to take over the work of the church or of the family, and is subject to the laws established by God in its own sphere. For this reason Christian theism cannot accept or submit to any form of totalitarianism whether National Socialist, Fascist or Communist.[19] The state’s main function is that of co-ordinating the other spheres of social life within its purview in order that they may not lawlessly interfere with one another.[20] Yet at the same time we must remember that the members of the different spheres are members of the state so that all the various spheres are by it connected externally.[21]
The problem of Christian theistic political theory is too great to be dealt with here, but it might be well to state a few general principles. In the first place, since the state is a divine institution of Common Grace, the magistrate is to be regarded as holding a divinely created office, his laws being accepted and obeyed as the laws of the minister of God, except where they definitely interfere in spheres outside the magistrates’ jurisdiction.[22] There is no divinely appointed way whereby the magistrate may obtain office, but once he is in it, he must be recognized as holding it through the providence of God. However, it is usually true that the democratic method of magisterial appointment is the best yet devised to guarantee good rulers.[23] The only means by which a magistrate can be removed is by the action of those who have the authority to do so either by constitutional or prescriptive right. At the same time there is no such thing as a “social contract”, for ultimately the magistrate holds his authority not from the people but from God and can enforce his commands with the sword. Yet because of his subordination to God’s law, whether expressed by written constitution, precedent or only by public conscience, he should be restrained from unlawful actions, being subject to removal by force for failure to submit.[24]
The results which are to be expected from the work of the state are equity and justice in the relation between the social spheres, in order that peace may be preserved. By this means Common Grace forms the environment in which Special Grace functions. Thus the two realms, closely related and interdependent, are at the same time different and separate.[25]
In summing up the Christian theistic view of the means employed by God to restore men to obedience to His laws, we find that we can revert to the familiar figure of Augustine’s two cities. The City of God, the church, the body of the elect, is the divinely appointed agency in the realm of Special Grace whereby absolute restoration to obedience is accomplished. We do not of course hold the Thomistic view of the church but refer to it not as an organization but as an organism, the body of regenerated people who once again acknowledge the sovereign law of God. The laws given to this organism deal with the relations of its members to both God and man. However, being a spiritual body, its laws are not enforceable by physical power, but rather through the action of the-Holy Spirit within the conscience.
The state, however, is an institution in the realm of Common Grace for the purpose of restoring God’s law only relatively, by enforcing it externally upon men, in order to restrain their sinful desires and actions. Thus although the state functions as the environment in which the church operates, it cannot interfere with the latter, either as an organism or as an organization. For the state deals not with conscience but with overt acts only. Moreover, its laws are not gained by means of special divine revelation. They are obtained directly through the working of divine providence in the sphere of Common Grace, and only indirectly from special revelation through the influence of the church. This latter, however, is not necessary in order that a state should exist, for there have been states such as China which have existed without the teaching of the Scriptures. Yet at the same time a knowledge of special revelation is necessary if the state is going to fulfill its work properly. This is where the church should act as a teacher.[26]
The Development of Jurisprudence
Before turning to a detailed consideration of the Christian theist’s theory of the development of jurisprudence, there are certain general considerations to which we must give a moment’s thought. As we have seen, jurisprudence to the Christian theist is not a natural thing, but was introduced as a result of sin. At the same time it is not part of the sphere of Saving Grace, but of Common Grace. Christian theism thus virtually accepts Cardozo’s statement that “logic and history, and custom, and utility and the accepted standards of right conduct are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law”.[27] However, these forces do not exist in a void, but are maintained and directed by the providence of God and are corrected by Him, when they tend to err, by the influence of Special Revelation. By this means does the law grow.[28]
When we turn to the actual forces by which the law comes into existence, we find that tradition comes first. By this we do not mean “precedent”, but would refer it to the development of law in early civilization. This tradition was a product or vestigial remnant of the law originally given to man, and preserved by word of mouth or perhaps in writing from the time of the dispersion over the earth. On such a basis probably rests the code of a law-giver such as Hammurabi. This would partially explain its similarity to, and differences from, the Mosaic law divinely revealed at Sinai. Such, of course, is not the usual evolutionary interpretation, but it seems to be as reasonable, if not more so, and is in complete accord with the Christian theistic position.[29]
Tradition of any kind, however, can have little influence unless it is in accord with human nature and its needs. Thus tradition’s continued existence depended upon human desire for law, and authority to establish right and equity. This is the ultimate basis for law. In other words, jurisprudence is based upon the demands of Natural Law which resides in the heart of every man. We must hasten to explain, however, that when we refer to “Natural Law”, we do not use the term in the way employed by the Thomists or by the rationalists of the Enlightenment. To the Christian theist, Natural Law goes back to the law of God implanted in the heart of man when created. It is dependent upon what remains in man of the image of God after the entrance of sin. Natural Law, therefore, is not a rational principle constituting part of man’s psychical existence which can be rationally deduced from human nature. It is the conscience-known, objective standard of justice, the sense of right and wrong, which God implanted in the heart of man. To quote Chenevire: “elle n’est donc pas constitutée par la nature humaine s’exprimant rationellement; elle est une loi imposée du dehors par Dieu à ses créatures”. And it is known instinctively, albeit indistinctly and incompletely because of sin, by man’s sin-damaged conscience.[30]
As Natural Law is a possession of all men, logically its first, although perhaps unconscious, manifestation comes in the relation of the individual to the individual. This is in direct opposition to the Austinian theory that law is nothing more than a series of isolated dooms pronounced by individual judges. As Cardozo points out, men in their relations to each other continue to live under law, even though unconscious of the fact that they are doing so. This appears for instance in the family relationship where the Natural Law of potestas patris familiae frequently remains in spite of the obstructions of time and space.[31]
All men, however, have not been given the same appreciation and consciousness of Natural Law, for by the grace of God some have been equipped in a particular way to put it into practical and applicable form. This appears in the case of such men as Hammurabi, Solon and many of the Roman jurisconsults and praetors. All these, without Special Revelation, except perhaps vague tradition, by means of conscience and ratiocination put into practical and permanent form jurisprudential systems which have exerted wide influence. They have had their successors who, while influenced to a certain extent by the sphere of Special Grace, have shown equal ability. As Cardozo says, there have always been some men trained in the law who have had insight and flashes of genius which have done much to mould and develope the law.[32]
Even these great law-givers of history, however, do not live in ivory towers interpreting Natural Law in their own hearts in order to give it to an expectant mankind. Rather they have always been men who were closely bound to, and interested in, their own contemporary social life. As Kuyper has said: “The law is embedded in life. .. . The study of law is the anatomy and therapy of God-established social relationships”.[33] Thus even the great law-givers are really only the interpreters of the effects of Natural Law as they appear in contemporary social existence. Man’s relation to man gradually hardens into custom by repetition, and custom hardens into law by promulgation and enforcement. We see this in the fact that throughout all laws of all times there are certain fundamentals innate in all forms of social life, which demonstrate law. There are of course variations in application, but underneath is the common denominator which rests upon man’s instinctive knowledge of right and wrong, Natural Law, and this is what appears in his social life.
Yet at the same time we must also realize that God in His grace has given to some nations and people greater faculties and facilities for developing law than He has to others. Our most striking example of this is the contrast between the Greeks and the Romans. While the former had the gift of speculation and reasoning, the latter seem to have had, to an amazing degree, the capacity for legislation and administration. No doubt much of this came from environment, history and the like, yet all these factors as well as special gifts are ultimately dependent upon the providence of God. In this way, certain nations become the great law-givers of the world, for they are best able to formulate rules which promote social welfare.[34]
But how does this law made by individuals and custom become effective to regulate social life? The first means of making it practicable is that of legislation, by which is meant the formal promulgation of statute law by the state or national government. This agency of law formulation may be either that of an individual or a group. Christianity gives no form of government its imprimatur of approval. Yet in weighing the relative merits of the two types the democratic form has usually been found to be the best. Since the work of the government is that of controlling relations between the spheres within the state, it is preferable that laws should be promulgated by all spheres in consultation. “The vice or imperfection of men”, as Calvin says, “renders it safer and more tolerable for the government to be in the hands of many, that they may afford each other mutual assistance and admonition, and that if anyone arrogate to himself more than is right, the many may act as censors to restrain his ambition.”[35] Thus for legislation which guarantees equity among spheres, democracy is usually the best form of government. From such a legislature laws come as formal statements of principles which can and must be enforced, if necessary, by physical means.
However, many problems of sphere-relationship often arise for which no statute has been made, or for which principles have been stated in only very general terms. Therefore, it is often necessary, in making decisions in specific cases, either to formulate new principles or to give particular applications to old ones. This is the work of the judge. By means of his judicial authority he interprets the general principles of statute law or, in cases for which no statute exists, he decides on general principles of equity and justice. In this second way, Natural Law which has usually come to expression through custom, is formulated and made effective for the maintenance of equity and peace in the state.[36]
But again there arises the problem of how the legislators or the judges are to decide what customary laws are to become statutes. How are they to decide the Tightness of a custom? Do they pick them arbitrarily, or is there a guide to right decisions?
In answer to these questions we find that supreme over all is the law of God. To this the legislator must yield obedience. Yet he is not forced to do so by outward constraint, but rather by custom which is usually the result of a gradually developed social consciousness in which he himself is involved. Custom, however, is also reinforced by the witness of the legislator’s conscience which emphasizes the difference between right and wrong. On the other hand, legislators who have to meet new situations usually turn for guidance to history, to see how others have dealt with similar situations, either by statute or judicial decision. Thus added to custom and conscience we have analogy and tradition. To all this is added the results of legislation and decision. If a statute or decision causes oppression, injustice and other social evils, it is to be reversed that true equity may prevail. The legislator or judge “is to exercise discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life”.[37]
At the same time, however, to the Christian theist this is not sufficient. The courts of the totalitarian countries show what happens when sin has full course, and when the realm of Special Grace is trodden under foot. Law then becomes but a tool of oppression and injustice. The reason for this is that Common Grace after all restrains the effects of sin in only a partial manner, so that the knowledge of Natural Law, as given in custom, conscience, history and results, is inadequate and faulty. It may be perverted. If jurisprudence is to maintain justice, the sphere of Special Grace must exert an influence, by bringing to bear the Revealed Law of God upon legislation and judicial decision.[38]
In giving a place to Special Revelation, we do not mean that the church is to dictate to the state. They are two independent spheres. Yet they do touch each other externally, for members of the church are also members of the state. It is even possible for an individual within the realm of Special Grace, to occupy a position of authority in that of Common Grace. In other words, it is possible for a Christian theist to become a legislator. This has been the situation in the Netherlands for some twenty years. Such a legislator, believing the law of God (summed up in the Decalogue) to be true justice, will exercise a Christian influence on legislation. He will not, of course, attempt to apply the law of God to the conscience, but only to outward acts; nor will he endeavour to use it in a way which would attempt to revive an Old Testament theocracy. He will use it as a set of basic principles for his guidance.[39]
Along with the Christian influence of the legislator on the formation of law, goes the influence of the church. This is not exercised by forcing the state to carry out its wishes, but by inculcating Christian principles in the hearts and minds of its members who, if true Christians, will soon exert a strong influence on the government. Or it may exert a direct influence on the legislators by so insisting on and so emphasizing the sovereignty of God and our duty to Him that the legislators themselves turn to the Revealed Law for guidance. Yet, in so doing, the legislators are not following the dictates of any one denomination, synod or pope. They are dependent upon their own understanding of the law given by God.[40]
It must be emphasized, however, that this ecclesiastical influence is to be informal, not official. Otherwise there would be a mixing of spheres which could not but result in confusion. At the same time it seems only reasonable that a state which acknowledges by its constitution, written or otherwise, that it professes obedience to the law and rights of God, should do something to make effective that sovereignty. This could be done by endeavouring to have appointed to official positions only those who profess to acknowledge the sovereignty of God, and by restraining those who attack that sovereignty. Only then could a state be called truly Christian, and only then would it find its proper focus in the sovereignty of God. But again, this must not be brought about by the church gaining control of the state, nor by “church establishment”. The church’s influence must be external and informal, or it will only lead to disaster.[41]
Thus, although the Christian theist at first appears to hold views on the development of jurisprudence similar to those of such modern legal authorities as Cardozo, Pound, Duguit, Jhering and others, he actually differs from them radically. They hold that the ultimate point of reference for all law is man. The Christian on the other hand believes that the only thing which makes law mean anything is the recognition of the sovereignty of God. He is the only source of law, and Special Grace is necessary to restrain and purify jurisprudence arising from Common Grace.
If this is not so, it seems that eventually we must hold that might makes right. Law becomes merely an historically generated universal which rests on a positivistic metaphysics, rather than on an absolute ethic. This leads to anarchy whose only antidote lies in human dictatorship — or the sovereignty of God. Christian theism leads to constitutionalism, humanitarian philosophy to totalitarianism. For with divine law rejected, human law becomes but the expression of man’s desire. The Germany of the twenties and thirties is a case in point.[42] Yet this difference between Christianity and humanism is not new, for ever since man became the servant of sin he has been attacking God’s right to be regarded as the only source of law and jurisprudence.
The History of Jurisprudence
This tendency of jurisprudence, if untouched by Christianity, to lead to self-destruction and dictatorship appears in its own history. The afore-mentioned factors have always played a part in its development, although they appear in different proportions at different times. Social organization, economic development, and political institutions have all played their part. Even more potent, however, has been the influence of the intellect, for by it have been shaped ideas of reality which either support or oppose God-given Natural Law. Not infrequently, the greater the development of humanistic philosophy, the more conscience has been suppressed; and had not Special Grace and Revealed Law exerted their influence, anarchy would have undoubtedly been the result.[43]
In studying the history of jurisprudence, we find that the earliest form of social organization was the family. Upon it was based the state, at first essentially patriarchal and tribal with the head of the original family ruling as absolute king. However, since this form of government had little capacity to restrain sin, man declined rapidly. Even the realm of Special Grace was affected by the decadence. Therefore God destroyed civilization with a flood, only one family being saved, the sole remnant of the realm of Special Grace.[44]
With the recommencement of civilization the laws of God were repeated for emphasis. Men were to fill the earth, and murder was to be punished by death. But since men again refused to acknowledge God’s sovereignty and obey His laws, He forcibly scattered them abroad over the earth. Coupled with this, God applied an even greater restraint upon man in the form of a more highly developed jurisprudence. By the time of Hammurabi, probably a contemporary of Abraham, the rather complex civilization which had developed possessed a very considerable body of laws.[45]
Parallel with the development of the realm of Common Grace, went the growth of that of Special Grace. This took place in the calling out of the people of Israel. To them was given the Revealed Law of God. For the next 2000 years the two realms of Common and Special Grace came into touch with each other at various points. The Jews seem to have encountered the ancient civilizations as the latter successively reached their peaks. Yet while Special Grace had little effect upon Common Grace, to those Jews not vitally connected with Special Grace the result was usually disastrous. They did not belong to the chosen people in an organic, but only in a formal, manner. Therefore, they frequently turned from the Revealed Law to that of Common Grace. They placed themselves under man-centered laws which, unless held in check by Special Revelation, eventually came to rest in scepticism, irrationality and atomistic legal philosophies.
That this was the ultimate end of legal theories arising solely from Common Grace is not surprising. Common Grace does not restrain sin absolutely, nor does it reach the core and cause of sin. Thus by 300 A. D. there had been a succession of civilizations all of which, uninfluenced by Special Grace, had developed purely rationalistic systems of law. Like the philosophical systems upon which they were based, they all eventually became sceptical, atomistic and anarchical. There was no sanction back of law, except that of human desire. Therefore, they all ended in placing ultimate authority in the hands of a dictator.[46]
The best example of this decadence is furnished by the Roman Law. At first it had been based upon an idea of some supreme moral law. With the growth of Stoicism, however, and the rise of scepticism, it turned more and more to the idea of the individual will as being final. The only possible means, therefore, of restraining anarchy was the establishment of a totalitarian dictator. The state assumed the right to interfere in every sphere of human activity. Even matters of conscience were under the emperor’s control as shown by the history of the church subsequent to 313 A. D.[47] Thus, down to the time of Justinian and the temporary disappearance of the Roman Law, there had been a tendency for jurisprudence based on Common Grace alone to come to the conclusion that there was no ultimate law. Legislation was merely the expression of human will — that of the emperor. In this way alone, it was felt, could the despair of scepticism be overcome.
Meanwhile the realm of Special Grace was beginning to develope. In 313 Christianity was given perfect freedom and by 325 it was practically the state religion. At the same time, the totally non-Christian character of Justinian’s code shows that Christianity did not have very much power, before 450 A. D. The church did not rise to a position of dominance until the dissolution of the Western Empire. But by that time it had come under the influence of pagan thought, particularly Neoplatonism and Augustine’s reflection of it in his De Civitate Dei. As a result of this, the Roman church attempted to take the place of the omnicompetent state. This is seen in the papal crowning of Charlemagne, the forgeries of the Donation of Constantine and the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches, the Investiture Controversy, the Crusades and the codification of the Canon Law. The last named was especially important when we remember that it took place just about the time of the rediscovery of the Roman Law. Since the latter, however, placed the state over the church, the pope forbade the study of it in order that the Jus Canonicum (Canon Law), which exalted church over state, might gain the predominance. This attitude soon received further support from Aquinas, who, in attempting to reconcile Christianity and Aristotle, made the state the servant of the church.[48]
Opposition to these views, however, developed among the Nominalists. Marsilio of Padua and William of Occam insisted that divine truth and human truth were mutually independent and equally valid. Man and God, the state and the church, were equal and entirely separate. In the Renaissance which followed shortly afterwards, man declared his independence of God. Man was self-sufficient. This attitude received further impetus from the revival of classical studies which rediscovered Greek and Roman humanism. Roman law became the great fountain-head of jurisprudence, and wherever it went, despotism raised its head. Law was no more the will of God given through His vicar on earth, the pope. It was, as Machiavelli claimed, the arbitrary will of the ruler who possessed absolute power.[49]
Restraint, however, was laid on this development by the strengthening of the realm of Special Grace in the Reformation. The key-note of this movement was an emphasis on the final authority of the Revealed Law of God as opposed to ecclesiastical tradition and on the responsibility of the individual, whether lord or subject, to obey the commands of God. It was because of this concept of law that Luther stressed the need for justification by faith. But he stopped short in his work by allowing the civil government to exercise very considerable control over the church, returning somewhat to the Roman concept of the state. The final work, however, was done by a lawyer, John Calvin, who insisted on the absolute sovereignty of God over all men, and on the separation of church and state as two independent spheres. Although he did not always govern his practices by his principles, by his emphasis on human responsibility and on separation of church and state he laid the ground for the rise of democratic government.[50]
The influence of the Reformation on legal thinking during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can be seen in the rise of constitutional government in countries holding Calvinistic doctrines: Switzerland, Holland, Scotland and England. In Roman Catholic and Lutheran lands there was no such development. Even when, due to preoccupation with theological controversies and the growth of ascetic Puritanism, the momentum of the Reformation began to wane in the latter part of the seventeenth century, the idea of God’s law as supreme continued to dominate legal and political thought.
The seventeenth century, however, saw also the beginning of a change. Man instead of God began to assume the rôle of final law-giver. This view came to fruition in the eighteenth century with the ideas of the rationality and perfectibility of man. Law depends upon man and his environment, and on nothing else.[51] To this the church, instead of offering opposition, gave assent by producing German pietism and Wesleyan Methodism, both of which were built on a rejection of the doctrine of the Sovereignty of God. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ideology of both the American and French revolutions was humanistic, rationalistic and anti-Christian. Law and human rights found their source, not in a sovereign God, but in man, the rational and perfectible.
The consequences of this development have only gradually become apparent. Throughout the nineteenth and our own century the emphasis has been laid increasingly upon man as the source of law. Kant, Hegel, Kelsen, Krabbe, Duguit, Jhering, Stammler and others have all insisted that law comes entirely from man. Therefore there is nothing absolute about it. As stated by Fichte, “every man is by nature free, and no one but he has the right to impose a law upon him”. From such a position as this, there is no great distance to anarchy, and thence to dictatorship. It is the very heart and soul of Nazism. From the days of Luther the state in Germany has been the ultimate power, so that now, when anarchy threatens through men’s disregard of law, a dictator is set up. By his absolute will he is expected to restrain the demons of anarchy let loose through the denial of God’s sovereignty.[52]
History would seem to teach that this result is inevitable in any state which refuses to acknowledge a law above all states and governors. Democracy’s only hope, therefore, is a return to a constitutionalism based not merely on historic tradition but upon a belief in the sovereignty of God. Unless this is done it will be but a matter of time before all nations are reduced to totalitarian bondage.
To-day we are fighting against forces which are attempting to bring us into slavery to an omnicompetent dictator. We are doing all that we can to maintain our liberties. Yet the history of law and jurisprudence shows quite clearly that, once our hold upon the sovereignty of God is weakened, there is a real danger that dictatorship will arise from within even a democratic country. If we, therefore, are going to do our utmost for democracy, in its true sense, we must strive to revive the Christian theistic view of law in the democratic countries. Such an attempt was made by Dr. Abraham Kuyper in the Netherlands in the last century, and it may be that it is time for a similar attempt in the English-speaking world. Humanism and rationalism will lead us inevitably to dictatorship, but Christian theism leads to democracy since the Christian theist realizes his responsibility to God. He desires to live according to the principle, soli Deo gloria. This is the true source of democracy.
Notes
McGill University, Montreal.
ONE of the major questions which the world faces to-day is that of the nature of law. While men have usually realized that law is one of the great means of social control, by which and under which they must live, if they would live at all, yet there lies before us to-day as there has not done for over a hundred years, the problem of the origin and validity of law. Is law simply the expression of the will of an omnicompetent dictator? Is it the expression of the will of an omnicompetent people? Or, is it ultimately the expression of the will of an omnicompetent God?
To the first question Nazis and Fascists answer yes. To the second many of our humanistic democrats will give an affirmative answer. Yet in doing so they ultimately support human dictatorship for they make man the only source of law. Germany’s history since 1920 is a good instance of the consequences of the humanistic view. To Christians, however, law can have no meaning apart from the will of the sovereign God; and in these days of doubt and lawlessness it behooves them to set forth this view. Theirs is the only view which will really cut the ground from under the humanism which is driving even democratic nations into the totalitarian camp.
In the following pages an attempt will be made to outline, rather briefly, the Christian theistic philosophy of law. Although by no means as fully as possible an endeavour will be made to fulfill Cardozo’s definition when he said: “A philosophy of law will tell us how law comes into being, how it grows and whither it tends, genesis and development, and end or function, these things, if no others will be dealt with in its pages”.[1]
The Source and Origin of the Law
Although Christian theism teaches that God is the source of all reality, it does not hold the Hegelian view that the world is “a development of those principles or determinations which form the content of the divine mind”.[2] Rather, accepting the doctrine of the tri-unity of God, it insists that God and the world are absolutely different. God finds His complete expression in the interrelations of the Trinity, so that He is independent of temporal reality and history. These latter, being created by Him solely for His own glory, are upheld and preserved by none other than His sovereign power.[3]
In creating reality, God established certain independent but externally related spheres, each of which possesses its own laws. He made the spheres of number, space, physics and biology, within which lie both animate and inanimate creation. The laws of number, space and physics govern the non-organic realm, while along with these the laws of biology govern both the plant and animal kingdoms. Starting with the simplest sphere, that of number, all the spheres build upon those that precede, each adding something new.
The spheres of matter and animal life, however, were not the only ones created. Another creature of an altogether higher order was placed upon the earth by divine creative act. This was man. Created in the image of God, he, though finite, had true knowledge, righteousness and holiness. He was thus the highest point of creation, its summary and summit, with the center of his life concentrated in the service and glorification of the eternal Godhead.[4]
This service of God, however, was not to be according to the vagaries of a completely undirected free-will. Man was placed under law. Not only was he subject to physical and biological laws, but also to intellectual, social and ethical laws in their widest sense.[5]
Man was given true knowledge, which means that he was able to think properly. As a creature made in the image of God he had implanted within his mind the laws of logic and ratiocination to which his thinking conformed. He was not left with a completely free and unguided intellect, but was given one which, although finite, was perfect. He was capable of thinking in accordance with the psychical laws established by God. He truly thought God’s thoughts after Him.[6]
In social life he was in the same position. As man was in time, he was subject to historical development and the laws of history. As he was not alone in the world, he must needs have means of communication, language, which brought him into the sphere of linguistics. And because he lived with others, he was subject to social and economic spheres. The first social laws established by God were those concerned with monogamous marriage. The family was to be the unit, the father ruling over the others, and the biological blood relationship forming the basis of the unit under the law of the family. Laws in the economic sphere were also established, man being given sovereignty over all non-rational creatures, and instructed to depend upon vegetable life for food. In this way, from the beginning, man’s social existence came under the laws of God.[7]
In the same way was governed man’s ethical life. His duty to his fellow men and to himself was based upon his duty to God. To this end man was given a test to see if he would obey God’s law faithfully on the simple ground that God commanded it, or whether he preferred to disobey God in the pride of his own heart. He was informed by God that as absolute as the laws of the physical spheres were those of the sphere of ethics. If he broke God’s ethical laws he would die.[8]
The question arises at this point, however, as to the means by which man obtained a knowledge of these laws. It came in three ways. In the first place man used his perfect intellect by which he could gain an understanding of many of the physical, biological and other laws of the world, as well as an appreciation of the important fact that all laws were upheld by the providence of God. In the second place man had a conscience, a cognitive faculty whereby, through intuition, he could know the difference between right and wrong. This was implanted within him to direct his relationships with his fellow man, and above all with his Creator. Finally, man was given by God special revelations concerning some specific facts and laws. In this way he had complete and perfect knowledge of the law of God.[9]
Thus in summing up the situation of man in his original pristine perfection, we find him a perfect, God-created being, living in complete harmony and pure communion with his Maker. He realized the sovereign position which God held over him, and to this he submitted, willingly obeying the law of God and doing all things to His glory.
Law Becomes Jurisprudence
How long man retained his perfection and obedience to God we cannot say, but that he fell is quite evident. He came to the place where he actually denied the sovereignty of God, and sinned by breaking the divine law. As soon as this took place, man died and the seeds of death were introduced into his physical existence. By his infraction of the law of God, man lost his righteousness, his subjective holiness and even his logical capacity to see God as his Creator and Lord. He lost the knowledge of, and the will to obey, the laws of God. But what was even more disastrous, because of the unity of the family physically, biologically, socially and ethically, this loss of original perfection was passed on to all those descending from Adam by ordinary generation. Even at birth, the descendant of Adam possesses within himself the seeds of spiritual and physical death which, unless restrained by God, will work themselves out with terrible results.[10]
That this original sin had such consequences is shown by the effects of the fall in the social and ethical spheres. Instead of man’s whole existence being centered in the glorification and enjoyment of his Creator, it became centered in man himself. Man exalted himself as the final aim, object and interpreter of the universe, relegating God to the position of a non-entity. The almost immediate result of this was murder (Genesis 4, 6). Man cared nothing for the fact that since his fellow man had been placed in creation by God, God alone could remove him. He exalted himself to the position of God, going so far as to destroy by murder what remained of the image of God in man. Without divine intervention and restraint, man’s lawlessness could result in nothing but chaos and destruction.
But man not only suffered from the effects of sin as a natural consequence of the fall; he suffered because of the punishment bestowed upon him directly by virtue of God’s retributive justice. True, it was according to the eternal plan of God that man fell, but man had been given such complete freedom that on his own responsibility alone he had rejected God’s sovereignty. Therefore, with perfect justice God could have punished man by dousing him in the night of eternity, leaving no human spark upon the earth. If, on the other hand, God did reach down to restrain the raging of His creatures, it was simply by His grace, not because of any merit or loveliness to be found in them. The effects of sin could be nullified only by divine intervention.[11]
The grace of God manifested to man since his fall has been of two distinct kinds: Special Grace and Common Grace. Special Grace came to man as a result of God’s eternal decree of election, whereby for His own glory He chose a multitude of His creatures to be His own peculiar people. They were to be brought into this blessed state through the Covenant of Grace by which the Second Person of the Trinity, as their representative, was to bear their sin.[12] As they had broken God’s law, they had to be punished by that law, and also be brought to obey it. The Kingdom of God had to be reestablished in their hearts.[13]
Yet God would not ride rough-shod over men, leaving them without free agency. Instead He gave unto them His law, that they might see their sinfulness, and then He sent the Redeemer, Jesus Christ, that He might bear their punishment. Before the Incarnation, the law itself pointed forward to the coming Sin-bearer, but since His coming we see more clearly God’s ways with men. None of this, however, would have been of any use had God not also provided for the changing of men’s hearts by turning them unto Him. Through the work of the Holy Spirit in man, God brings His elect people back to Himself. Having redeemed them from the punishment of the law, He gives them a desire to accept the Saviour and live according to the law.[14] This is the way of Special Grace.
At the same time grace has also been given to the non-elect, but it is not the Saving Grace which results in loving obedience to the law of God. Common Grace, as it is called, has on the other hand, the twofold task of emphasizing that man is inexcusable for disobeying God, and of bringing forth to the glory of God the gifts with which He has endowed man. It underlines man’s depravity by restraining his sin to such an extent that he should realize even from looking at this sin-stricken universe that there is a God who demands obedience. At the same time it enables man to develope the powers which he still possesses as retaining in part the image of God. God has thus seen fit to control man’s sinful heart in order that the church might be able to carry on its work of preaching the Gospel to all men in the historical process of calling out the elect.[15] In other words, Common Grace counteracts what would be the result of man’s “egoism”, in order that the work of Special Grace may be completed. The principal method employed to do this is that of the partial restoration of law over man, in order that the outward effects of sin might be curtailed. This is the basis of all jurisprudence.[16]
The agency by which the law regulating men’s relations to each other is formulated and enforced is the state. This social organization was established in its present form, that by “public law” it might nullify the effects of sin.[17] What form the state would have taken had sin not entered the world we do not know, nor is the matter relevant at this point. The historic character of the state was absolutely necessary, once man fell, to prevent chaos in creation.[18] Thus the state, while a divine institution with its own specific function, is without authority to take over the work of the church or of the family, and is subject to the laws established by God in its own sphere. For this reason Christian theism cannot accept or submit to any form of totalitarianism whether National Socialist, Fascist or Communist.[19] The state’s main function is that of co-ordinating the other spheres of social life within its purview in order that they may not lawlessly interfere with one another.[20] Yet at the same time we must remember that the members of the different spheres are members of the state so that all the various spheres are by it connected externally.[21]
The problem of Christian theistic political theory is too great to be dealt with here, but it might be well to state a few general principles. In the first place, since the state is a divine institution of Common Grace, the magistrate is to be regarded as holding a divinely created office, his laws being accepted and obeyed as the laws of the minister of God, except where they definitely interfere in spheres outside the magistrates’ jurisdiction.[22] There is no divinely appointed way whereby the magistrate may obtain office, but once he is in it, he must be recognized as holding it through the providence of God. However, it is usually true that the democratic method of magisterial appointment is the best yet devised to guarantee good rulers.[23] The only means by which a magistrate can be removed is by the action of those who have the authority to do so either by constitutional or prescriptive right. At the same time there is no such thing as a “social contract”, for ultimately the magistrate holds his authority not from the people but from God and can enforce his commands with the sword. Yet because of his subordination to God’s law, whether expressed by written constitution, precedent or only by public conscience, he should be restrained from unlawful actions, being subject to removal by force for failure to submit.[24]
The results which are to be expected from the work of the state are equity and justice in the relation between the social spheres, in order that peace may be preserved. By this means Common Grace forms the environment in which Special Grace functions. Thus the two realms, closely related and interdependent, are at the same time different and separate.[25]
In summing up the Christian theistic view of the means employed by God to restore men to obedience to His laws, we find that we can revert to the familiar figure of Augustine’s two cities. The City of God, the church, the body of the elect, is the divinely appointed agency in the realm of Special Grace whereby absolute restoration to obedience is accomplished. We do not of course hold the Thomistic view of the church but refer to it not as an organization but as an organism, the body of regenerated people who once again acknowledge the sovereign law of God. The laws given to this organism deal with the relations of its members to both God and man. However, being a spiritual body, its laws are not enforceable by physical power, but rather through the action of the-Holy Spirit within the conscience.
The state, however, is an institution in the realm of Common Grace for the purpose of restoring God’s law only relatively, by enforcing it externally upon men, in order to restrain their sinful desires and actions. Thus although the state functions as the environment in which the church operates, it cannot interfere with the latter, either as an organism or as an organization. For the state deals not with conscience but with overt acts only. Moreover, its laws are not gained by means of special divine revelation. They are obtained directly through the working of divine providence in the sphere of Common Grace, and only indirectly from special revelation through the influence of the church. This latter, however, is not necessary in order that a state should exist, for there have been states such as China which have existed without the teaching of the Scriptures. Yet at the same time a knowledge of special revelation is necessary if the state is going to fulfill its work properly. This is where the church should act as a teacher.[26]
The Development of Jurisprudence
Before turning to a detailed consideration of the Christian theist’s theory of the development of jurisprudence, there are certain general considerations to which we must give a moment’s thought. As we have seen, jurisprudence to the Christian theist is not a natural thing, but was introduced as a result of sin. At the same time it is not part of the sphere of Saving Grace, but of Common Grace. Christian theism thus virtually accepts Cardozo’s statement that “logic and history, and custom, and utility and the accepted standards of right conduct are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law”.[27] However, these forces do not exist in a void, but are maintained and directed by the providence of God and are corrected by Him, when they tend to err, by the influence of Special Revelation. By this means does the law grow.[28]
When we turn to the actual forces by which the law comes into existence, we find that tradition comes first. By this we do not mean “precedent”, but would refer it to the development of law in early civilization. This tradition was a product or vestigial remnant of the law originally given to man, and preserved by word of mouth or perhaps in writing from the time of the dispersion over the earth. On such a basis probably rests the code of a law-giver such as Hammurabi. This would partially explain its similarity to, and differences from, the Mosaic law divinely revealed at Sinai. Such, of course, is not the usual evolutionary interpretation, but it seems to be as reasonable, if not more so, and is in complete accord with the Christian theistic position.[29]
Tradition of any kind, however, can have little influence unless it is in accord with human nature and its needs. Thus tradition’s continued existence depended upon human desire for law, and authority to establish right and equity. This is the ultimate basis for law. In other words, jurisprudence is based upon the demands of Natural Law which resides in the heart of every man. We must hasten to explain, however, that when we refer to “Natural Law”, we do not use the term in the way employed by the Thomists or by the rationalists of the Enlightenment. To the Christian theist, Natural Law goes back to the law of God implanted in the heart of man when created. It is dependent upon what remains in man of the image of God after the entrance of sin. Natural Law, therefore, is not a rational principle constituting part of man’s psychical existence which can be rationally deduced from human nature. It is the conscience-known, objective standard of justice, the sense of right and wrong, which God implanted in the heart of man. To quote Chenevire: “elle n’est donc pas constitutée par la nature humaine s’exprimant rationellement; elle est une loi imposée du dehors par Dieu à ses créatures”. And it is known instinctively, albeit indistinctly and incompletely because of sin, by man’s sin-damaged conscience.[30]
As Natural Law is a possession of all men, logically its first, although perhaps unconscious, manifestation comes in the relation of the individual to the individual. This is in direct opposition to the Austinian theory that law is nothing more than a series of isolated dooms pronounced by individual judges. As Cardozo points out, men in their relations to each other continue to live under law, even though unconscious of the fact that they are doing so. This appears for instance in the family relationship where the Natural Law of potestas patris familiae frequently remains in spite of the obstructions of time and space.[31]
All men, however, have not been given the same appreciation and consciousness of Natural Law, for by the grace of God some have been equipped in a particular way to put it into practical and applicable form. This appears in the case of such men as Hammurabi, Solon and many of the Roman jurisconsults and praetors. All these, without Special Revelation, except perhaps vague tradition, by means of conscience and ratiocination put into practical and permanent form jurisprudential systems which have exerted wide influence. They have had their successors who, while influenced to a certain extent by the sphere of Special Grace, have shown equal ability. As Cardozo says, there have always been some men trained in the law who have had insight and flashes of genius which have done much to mould and develope the law.[32]
Even these great law-givers of history, however, do not live in ivory towers interpreting Natural Law in their own hearts in order to give it to an expectant mankind. Rather they have always been men who were closely bound to, and interested in, their own contemporary social life. As Kuyper has said: “The law is embedded in life. .. . The study of law is the anatomy and therapy of God-established social relationships”.[33] Thus even the great law-givers are really only the interpreters of the effects of Natural Law as they appear in contemporary social existence. Man’s relation to man gradually hardens into custom by repetition, and custom hardens into law by promulgation and enforcement. We see this in the fact that throughout all laws of all times there are certain fundamentals innate in all forms of social life, which demonstrate law. There are of course variations in application, but underneath is the common denominator which rests upon man’s instinctive knowledge of right and wrong, Natural Law, and this is what appears in his social life.
Yet at the same time we must also realize that God in His grace has given to some nations and people greater faculties and facilities for developing law than He has to others. Our most striking example of this is the contrast between the Greeks and the Romans. While the former had the gift of speculation and reasoning, the latter seem to have had, to an amazing degree, the capacity for legislation and administration. No doubt much of this came from environment, history and the like, yet all these factors as well as special gifts are ultimately dependent upon the providence of God. In this way, certain nations become the great law-givers of the world, for they are best able to formulate rules which promote social welfare.[34]
But how does this law made by individuals and custom become effective to regulate social life? The first means of making it practicable is that of legislation, by which is meant the formal promulgation of statute law by the state or national government. This agency of law formulation may be either that of an individual or a group. Christianity gives no form of government its imprimatur of approval. Yet in weighing the relative merits of the two types the democratic form has usually been found to be the best. Since the work of the government is that of controlling relations between the spheres within the state, it is preferable that laws should be promulgated by all spheres in consultation. “The vice or imperfection of men”, as Calvin says, “renders it safer and more tolerable for the government to be in the hands of many, that they may afford each other mutual assistance and admonition, and that if anyone arrogate to himself more than is right, the many may act as censors to restrain his ambition.”[35] Thus for legislation which guarantees equity among spheres, democracy is usually the best form of government. From such a legislature laws come as formal statements of principles which can and must be enforced, if necessary, by physical means.
However, many problems of sphere-relationship often arise for which no statute has been made, or for which principles have been stated in only very general terms. Therefore, it is often necessary, in making decisions in specific cases, either to formulate new principles or to give particular applications to old ones. This is the work of the judge. By means of his judicial authority he interprets the general principles of statute law or, in cases for which no statute exists, he decides on general principles of equity and justice. In this second way, Natural Law which has usually come to expression through custom, is formulated and made effective for the maintenance of equity and peace in the state.[36]
But again there arises the problem of how the legislators or the judges are to decide what customary laws are to become statutes. How are they to decide the Tightness of a custom? Do they pick them arbitrarily, or is there a guide to right decisions?
In answer to these questions we find that supreme over all is the law of God. To this the legislator must yield obedience. Yet he is not forced to do so by outward constraint, but rather by custom which is usually the result of a gradually developed social consciousness in which he himself is involved. Custom, however, is also reinforced by the witness of the legislator’s conscience which emphasizes the difference between right and wrong. On the other hand, legislators who have to meet new situations usually turn for guidance to history, to see how others have dealt with similar situations, either by statute or judicial decision. Thus added to custom and conscience we have analogy and tradition. To all this is added the results of legislation and decision. If a statute or decision causes oppression, injustice and other social evils, it is to be reversed that true equity may prevail. The legislator or judge “is to exercise discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life”.[37]
At the same time, however, to the Christian theist this is not sufficient. The courts of the totalitarian countries show what happens when sin has full course, and when the realm of Special Grace is trodden under foot. Law then becomes but a tool of oppression and injustice. The reason for this is that Common Grace after all restrains the effects of sin in only a partial manner, so that the knowledge of Natural Law, as given in custom, conscience, history and results, is inadequate and faulty. It may be perverted. If jurisprudence is to maintain justice, the sphere of Special Grace must exert an influence, by bringing to bear the Revealed Law of God upon legislation and judicial decision.[38]
In giving a place to Special Revelation, we do not mean that the church is to dictate to the state. They are two independent spheres. Yet they do touch each other externally, for members of the church are also members of the state. It is even possible for an individual within the realm of Special Grace, to occupy a position of authority in that of Common Grace. In other words, it is possible for a Christian theist to become a legislator. This has been the situation in the Netherlands for some twenty years. Such a legislator, believing the law of God (summed up in the Decalogue) to be true justice, will exercise a Christian influence on legislation. He will not, of course, attempt to apply the law of God to the conscience, but only to outward acts; nor will he endeavour to use it in a way which would attempt to revive an Old Testament theocracy. He will use it as a set of basic principles for his guidance.[39]
Along with the Christian influence of the legislator on the formation of law, goes the influence of the church. This is not exercised by forcing the state to carry out its wishes, but by inculcating Christian principles in the hearts and minds of its members who, if true Christians, will soon exert a strong influence on the government. Or it may exert a direct influence on the legislators by so insisting on and so emphasizing the sovereignty of God and our duty to Him that the legislators themselves turn to the Revealed Law for guidance. Yet, in so doing, the legislators are not following the dictates of any one denomination, synod or pope. They are dependent upon their own understanding of the law given by God.[40]
It must be emphasized, however, that this ecclesiastical influence is to be informal, not official. Otherwise there would be a mixing of spheres which could not but result in confusion. At the same time it seems only reasonable that a state which acknowledges by its constitution, written or otherwise, that it professes obedience to the law and rights of God, should do something to make effective that sovereignty. This could be done by endeavouring to have appointed to official positions only those who profess to acknowledge the sovereignty of God, and by restraining those who attack that sovereignty. Only then could a state be called truly Christian, and only then would it find its proper focus in the sovereignty of God. But again, this must not be brought about by the church gaining control of the state, nor by “church establishment”. The church’s influence must be external and informal, or it will only lead to disaster.[41]
Thus, although the Christian theist at first appears to hold views on the development of jurisprudence similar to those of such modern legal authorities as Cardozo, Pound, Duguit, Jhering and others, he actually differs from them radically. They hold that the ultimate point of reference for all law is man. The Christian on the other hand believes that the only thing which makes law mean anything is the recognition of the sovereignty of God. He is the only source of law, and Special Grace is necessary to restrain and purify jurisprudence arising from Common Grace.
If this is not so, it seems that eventually we must hold that might makes right. Law becomes merely an historically generated universal which rests on a positivistic metaphysics, rather than on an absolute ethic. This leads to anarchy whose only antidote lies in human dictatorship — or the sovereignty of God. Christian theism leads to constitutionalism, humanitarian philosophy to totalitarianism. For with divine law rejected, human law becomes but the expression of man’s desire. The Germany of the twenties and thirties is a case in point.[42] Yet this difference between Christianity and humanism is not new, for ever since man became the servant of sin he has been attacking God’s right to be regarded as the only source of law and jurisprudence.
The History of Jurisprudence
This tendency of jurisprudence, if untouched by Christianity, to lead to self-destruction and dictatorship appears in its own history. The afore-mentioned factors have always played a part in its development, although they appear in different proportions at different times. Social organization, economic development, and political institutions have all played their part. Even more potent, however, has been the influence of the intellect, for by it have been shaped ideas of reality which either support or oppose God-given Natural Law. Not infrequently, the greater the development of humanistic philosophy, the more conscience has been suppressed; and had not Special Grace and Revealed Law exerted their influence, anarchy would have undoubtedly been the result.[43]
In studying the history of jurisprudence, we find that the earliest form of social organization was the family. Upon it was based the state, at first essentially patriarchal and tribal with the head of the original family ruling as absolute king. However, since this form of government had little capacity to restrain sin, man declined rapidly. Even the realm of Special Grace was affected by the decadence. Therefore God destroyed civilization with a flood, only one family being saved, the sole remnant of the realm of Special Grace.[44]
With the recommencement of civilization the laws of God were repeated for emphasis. Men were to fill the earth, and murder was to be punished by death. But since men again refused to acknowledge God’s sovereignty and obey His laws, He forcibly scattered them abroad over the earth. Coupled with this, God applied an even greater restraint upon man in the form of a more highly developed jurisprudence. By the time of Hammurabi, probably a contemporary of Abraham, the rather complex civilization which had developed possessed a very considerable body of laws.[45]
Parallel with the development of the realm of Common Grace, went the growth of that of Special Grace. This took place in the calling out of the people of Israel. To them was given the Revealed Law of God. For the next 2000 years the two realms of Common and Special Grace came into touch with each other at various points. The Jews seem to have encountered the ancient civilizations as the latter successively reached their peaks. Yet while Special Grace had little effect upon Common Grace, to those Jews not vitally connected with Special Grace the result was usually disastrous. They did not belong to the chosen people in an organic, but only in a formal, manner. Therefore, they frequently turned from the Revealed Law to that of Common Grace. They placed themselves under man-centered laws which, unless held in check by Special Revelation, eventually came to rest in scepticism, irrationality and atomistic legal philosophies.
That this was the ultimate end of legal theories arising solely from Common Grace is not surprising. Common Grace does not restrain sin absolutely, nor does it reach the core and cause of sin. Thus by 300 A. D. there had been a succession of civilizations all of which, uninfluenced by Special Grace, had developed purely rationalistic systems of law. Like the philosophical systems upon which they were based, they all eventually became sceptical, atomistic and anarchical. There was no sanction back of law, except that of human desire. Therefore, they all ended in placing ultimate authority in the hands of a dictator.[46]
The best example of this decadence is furnished by the Roman Law. At first it had been based upon an idea of some supreme moral law. With the growth of Stoicism, however, and the rise of scepticism, it turned more and more to the idea of the individual will as being final. The only possible means, therefore, of restraining anarchy was the establishment of a totalitarian dictator. The state assumed the right to interfere in every sphere of human activity. Even matters of conscience were under the emperor’s control as shown by the history of the church subsequent to 313 A. D.[47] Thus, down to the time of Justinian and the temporary disappearance of the Roman Law, there had been a tendency for jurisprudence based on Common Grace alone to come to the conclusion that there was no ultimate law. Legislation was merely the expression of human will — that of the emperor. In this way alone, it was felt, could the despair of scepticism be overcome.
Meanwhile the realm of Special Grace was beginning to develope. In 313 Christianity was given perfect freedom and by 325 it was practically the state religion. At the same time, the totally non-Christian character of Justinian’s code shows that Christianity did not have very much power, before 450 A. D. The church did not rise to a position of dominance until the dissolution of the Western Empire. But by that time it had come under the influence of pagan thought, particularly Neoplatonism and Augustine’s reflection of it in his De Civitate Dei. As a result of this, the Roman church attempted to take the place of the omnicompetent state. This is seen in the papal crowning of Charlemagne, the forgeries of the Donation of Constantine and the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches, the Investiture Controversy, the Crusades and the codification of the Canon Law. The last named was especially important when we remember that it took place just about the time of the rediscovery of the Roman Law. Since the latter, however, placed the state over the church, the pope forbade the study of it in order that the Jus Canonicum (Canon Law), which exalted church over state, might gain the predominance. This attitude soon received further support from Aquinas, who, in attempting to reconcile Christianity and Aristotle, made the state the servant of the church.[48]
Opposition to these views, however, developed among the Nominalists. Marsilio of Padua and William of Occam insisted that divine truth and human truth were mutually independent and equally valid. Man and God, the state and the church, were equal and entirely separate. In the Renaissance which followed shortly afterwards, man declared his independence of God. Man was self-sufficient. This attitude received further impetus from the revival of classical studies which rediscovered Greek and Roman humanism. Roman law became the great fountain-head of jurisprudence, and wherever it went, despotism raised its head. Law was no more the will of God given through His vicar on earth, the pope. It was, as Machiavelli claimed, the arbitrary will of the ruler who possessed absolute power.[49]
Restraint, however, was laid on this development by the strengthening of the realm of Special Grace in the Reformation. The key-note of this movement was an emphasis on the final authority of the Revealed Law of God as opposed to ecclesiastical tradition and on the responsibility of the individual, whether lord or subject, to obey the commands of God. It was because of this concept of law that Luther stressed the need for justification by faith. But he stopped short in his work by allowing the civil government to exercise very considerable control over the church, returning somewhat to the Roman concept of the state. The final work, however, was done by a lawyer, John Calvin, who insisted on the absolute sovereignty of God over all men, and on the separation of church and state as two independent spheres. Although he did not always govern his practices by his principles, by his emphasis on human responsibility and on separation of church and state he laid the ground for the rise of democratic government.[50]
The influence of the Reformation on legal thinking during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can be seen in the rise of constitutional government in countries holding Calvinistic doctrines: Switzerland, Holland, Scotland and England. In Roman Catholic and Lutheran lands there was no such development. Even when, due to preoccupation with theological controversies and the growth of ascetic Puritanism, the momentum of the Reformation began to wane in the latter part of the seventeenth century, the idea of God’s law as supreme continued to dominate legal and political thought.
The seventeenth century, however, saw also the beginning of a change. Man instead of God began to assume the rôle of final law-giver. This view came to fruition in the eighteenth century with the ideas of the rationality and perfectibility of man. Law depends upon man and his environment, and on nothing else.[51] To this the church, instead of offering opposition, gave assent by producing German pietism and Wesleyan Methodism, both of which were built on a rejection of the doctrine of the Sovereignty of God. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ideology of both the American and French revolutions was humanistic, rationalistic and anti-Christian. Law and human rights found their source, not in a sovereign God, but in man, the rational and perfectible.
The consequences of this development have only gradually become apparent. Throughout the nineteenth and our own century the emphasis has been laid increasingly upon man as the source of law. Kant, Hegel, Kelsen, Krabbe, Duguit, Jhering, Stammler and others have all insisted that law comes entirely from man. Therefore there is nothing absolute about it. As stated by Fichte, “every man is by nature free, and no one but he has the right to impose a law upon him”. From such a position as this, there is no great distance to anarchy, and thence to dictatorship. It is the very heart and soul of Nazism. From the days of Luther the state in Germany has been the ultimate power, so that now, when anarchy threatens through men’s disregard of law, a dictator is set up. By his absolute will he is expected to restrain the demons of anarchy let loose through the denial of God’s sovereignty.[52]
History would seem to teach that this result is inevitable in any state which refuses to acknowledge a law above all states and governors. Democracy’s only hope, therefore, is a return to a constitutionalism based not merely on historic tradition but upon a belief in the sovereignty of God. Unless this is done it will be but a matter of time before all nations are reduced to totalitarian bondage.
To-day we are fighting against forces which are attempting to bring us into slavery to an omnicompetent dictator. We are doing all that we can to maintain our liberties. Yet the history of law and jurisprudence shows quite clearly that, once our hold upon the sovereignty of God is weakened, there is a real danger that dictatorship will arise from within even a democratic country. If we, therefore, are going to do our utmost for democracy, in its true sense, we must strive to revive the Christian theistic view of law in the democratic countries. Such an attempt was made by Dr. Abraham Kuyper in the Netherlands in the last century, and it may be that it is time for a similar attempt in the English-speaking world. Humanism and rationalism will lead us inevitably to dictatorship, but Christian theism leads to democracy since the Christian theist realizes his responsibility to God. He desires to live according to the principle, soli Deo gloria. This is the true source of democracy.
Notes
- B. H. Cardozo: The Growth of the Law, New Haven, 1927, p. 24.
- W. Windelband: A History of Philosophy, New York, 1895, p. 611.
- Charles Hodge: Systematic Theology, New York, 1893, vol. I, chaps. V, VI; Westminster Confession, chap. II; Abraham Kuyper: Calvinism, Grand Rapids, 1931, p. 131.
- The Christian theist rejects evolution as leading ultimately to irrationality and destroying all law, cf. H. Dooijeweerd: De Christelijke Staatsidee, Rotterdam, 1936, pp. 13-15. This “sphere philosophy” was originated by Abraham Kuyper, and has been fully developed by H. Dooijeweerd in his De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (3 vols.) and summarized in J. W. Spier: Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Enschede, 1938.
- Dooijeweerd: De Christelijke Staatsidee, pp. 37ff.; Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. I, chap. III; G. Vos: Old and New Testament Biblical Theology, Philadelphia, 1934, chap. III; Hodge; op. cit., vol. II, pp. 1-116.
- Genesis 1–3; A. Kuyper: Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, Kampen, 1916, vol. I, pp. 38-46; A. v. C. P. Huizinga: The Calvinist View of the State, Breda, pp. 5, 7.
- Gen. 1:28–31; Vos: op. cit., chap. III; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 37ff.
- Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, p. 5; Gen. 2.
- Vos: op. cit., pp. 19-21; Westminster Confession, chap. VII; M. E. Chenevire: La Pensée Politique de Calvin, Genve et Paris, c. 1937, pp. 91ff.
- Romans 5:12–21; Westminster Confession, chap. VI; Calvin: op. cit., bk. I, chap. IV.
- Ephesians 2:5–7.
- Hodge: op. cit., vol. II, pp. 354ff.; Westminster Confession, chap. VII; John 17:6, 9, 11, 12, 20, 24.
- Vos: op. cit., chap. IV; Hodge: op. cit., vol. II, pp. 544ff.; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 13f., 26ff.
- Galatians 4:21–29; II Corinthians 5; John 1:12; Hodge: op. cit., vol. III, pp. 3ff.; Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 78ff., Dooijeweerd: op. cit., p. 19; Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, pp. 47ff.; Calvin: op. cit., bk. IV, chap. XX, §§ xiv f.
- C. Van Til: “Common Grace” in Proceedings of the Calvinistic Philosophy Club, 1941, Midland Park, N. J., 1941; P. G. Berkhout: “General Revelation and The Holy Spirit” in Calvin Forum, Grand Rapids, 1942, vol. VIII, p. 41.
- V. H. Rutgers: “Le Calvinisme et l’État Chrétien” in Études sur Calvin et le Calvinisme, Paris, 1935, p. 152; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 39f.; Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, pp. 12f., 22, 216.
- By the use of the term “public law” no attempt is being made to distinguish between public and private law as the terms are understood in jurisprudence, but rather the purpose is to designate the laws of the state for the regulation of sphere as over against sphere, as distinct from the laws within those spheres. Cf. Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 52f.; Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, pp. 96-99, 128, 259f.
- The Christian view here differs from that of some modern legal philosophers who maintain that while law is logically necessary it is not physically so in order that the world may be preserved from chaos. Cf. R. Stammler: The Theory of Justice, New York, 1925, pp. xxxii, 21ff. with V. H. Rutgers: “The Reformed Faith and its Ethical Consequences in the State” in Proceedings of the Fourth Calvinistic Congress, Edinburgh, 1938, p. 120; Rutgers: “Le Calvinisme et l’État chrétien” in Études sur Calvin et le Calvinisme, p. 155; Kuyper: Calvinism, p. 130; Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 141-143; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 47f.
- Calvin: op. cit., bk. IV, chap. XX, §§ i f.; Kuyper: op. cit., pp. 146-151; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 17-21, 49–51. In this position the Christian theists definitely reject the Aristotelian-Nazi theory of state supremacy.
- Calvin: op. cit., bk. IV, chap. XX, § ix; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 53-56; Hans Baron: Calvins Staatsanschauung und das konfessionelle Zeitalter, München, 1924, p. 12.
- Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 18f.; Kuyper: Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, vol. I, pp. 128f.
- Rom. 13:1–6; Calvin: op. cit., bk. IV, chap. XX, § iv; Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 150ff.; Huizinga: op. cit., p. 8; D. A. Anema: “The Sovereignty of God and Political Relations” in Second International Conference of Calvinists, s’-Gravenhage, 1935, p. 62; Rutgers: “The Reformed Faith and its Ethical Consequences in the State” in Proceedings of the Fourth Calvinistic Congress, p. 124.
- Calvin: op. cit., bk. IV, chap. XX, § viii; Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 191-193; Troeltsch: The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, New York, 1931, vol. II, pp. 613ff.; Kuyper: Calvinism, pp. 132f., Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, vol. I, pp. 259f.
- Calvin: op. cit., bk. IV, chap. XX, § xi f., xxiv-xxxii; Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 162-165, 276; E. Doumergue: Le Caractre de Calvin. 2e ed. Neuilly, 1931, pp. 146, 154f.; Rutgers: “Le Calvinisme et l’État chrétien”, pp. 162-164; Kuyper: Calvinism, pp. 160f.; Anema: op. cit., p. 58; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 48ff. This view is very different from that of Duguit or Stammler who in putting law above the state make it the product of society, not the command of God. Cf. Duguit quoted in Cardozo: The Growth of the Law, p. 48; Stammler: The Theory of Justice, pp. 40ff.
- Kuyper: Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, vol. I, pp. 37f.; Rutgers: “The Reformed Faith and its Ethical Consequences in the State”, p. 119.
- Kuyper: Calvinism, pp. 162-168, Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, vol. I, pp. 15ff.; Rutgers: op. cit., p. 123.
- B. N. Cardozo: The Nature of the Judicial Process, New Haven, 1928, p. 112.
- Kuyper: Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, vol. I, pp. 6f., 81–84.
- The apodictical statement of Berolzheimer, that “the resemblance of this code (Hammurabi’s) to the Mosaic legislation is so striking as to deprive the laws of Moses of their originality and claim to an inspired origin”, is by no means proven simply by the resemblance. Berolzheimer himself admits that the spirit of the Hebrew laws is altogether different from that of the Babylonians as shown by the former’s stress on monotheism. We have no evidence that Moses copied Hammurabi, even though the latter lived five hundred years earlier. Resemblance would seem to be better explained by the fact that in the same types of society, with a continuing tradition and sense of justice, the same result would be obtained, except that in the divinely promulgated laws at Sinai God would be given His true position in the center of man’s life. Cf. F. Berolzheimer: The World’s Legal Philosophies, Boston, 1912, pp. 35, 41.
- Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 62f., cf. pp. 61-74; Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, pp. 26, 56-58. While the Christian theist, in holding this position, agrees formally with Stammler in his idea of natural law with a variable content, yet the difference is very pronounced, for Stammler bases the law upon reason and experience, which are linked up with the “social ideal”. The Christian theist, on the other hand, declares that his idea of justice rests upon the remains of the original law given to man. Cf. Stammler: op. cit., pp. 76ff., 152ff.; Berolzheimer: op. cit., pp. 410ff.; A. Brecht: “The Myth of Is and Ought” in Harvard Law Review, vol. LIV, pp. 829ff.
- Cardozo: op. cit., pp. 125-129.
- Cardozo: The Growth of the Law, p. 90; Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, p. 32.
- Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, p. 78.
- Rutgers: op. cit., p. 123; Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, pp. 17-22, 26, 35–37, 74–76. In definition of “social welfare” we cannot do better than quote Cardozo: “It may mean what is commonly spoken of as public policy, the good of the collective body. In such cases, its demands are often those of mere expediency and prudence. It may mean, on the other hand, the social gain that is wrought by adherence to standards of right conduct which find expression in the mores of the community. In such cases, its demands are those of religion or of ethics or of the social sense of justice, whether formulated in creed or system, or immanent in the common mind” (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 71). Cf. R. Pound: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, New Haven, 1925, pp. 67f. This social welfare remains within the sphere of the state, and does not intrude into others beyond its authority. Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 49f.
- Calvin: op. cit., bk. IV, chap. XX, § viii; Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, pp. 76-78, Calvinism, pp. 132f., 152–154; Doumergue: op. cit., pp. 150-152.
- Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 172f. This is a view which has never been touched on to any extent by Christian philosophers. It is a fact with which one must deal, and it is easy to fit it into the Christian theistic view. Yet, at the same time, we must always remember that all knowledge of justice has its source in the triune God. Cf. Pound: op. cit., chap. III.
- Cardozo: The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 141. The members of the sociological school such as Pound, Cardozo et al. hold this position. Kuyper does also, but at the same time makes God’s law supreme. Kuyper: Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, vol. I, pp. 70ff.
- Calvin: op. cit., bk. IV, chap. XX, § iv: Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 78-90; Rutgers: “Le Calvinisme et l’État chrétien”, pp. 162-164; Troeltsch: op. cit., vol. II, pp. 594-599. Perfection must always be the Christian’s aim.
- See the aims of Abraham Kuyper’s Antirevolulionaire Partij in his “Ons Program” and Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde.
- R. T. Stevenson: John Calvin, the Statesman, Cincinnati and New York, 1907, pp. 126f., 132, 142–144; Kuyper: Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, vol. I, pp. 79-81; Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 100f.; Troeltsch: op. cit., vol. II, p. 602.
- Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 48ff.
- Cf. H. Rauschning: The Revolution of Nihilism, New York, 1940.
- Chenevire: op. cit., pp. 191-193.
- Gen. 6ff.; Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, pp. 67-69, 128f.
- Cf. A. Kocourek and J. H. Wigmore: Sources of Ancient and Primitive Law, Boston, 1915, pp. 387ff., 446ff.; Vos.: op. cit., chaps. V, VI; Kuyper: op. cit., vol. I, pp. 47ff.
- Berolzheimer: op. cit., pp. 74ff.
- F. Lot: The End of the Ancient World, London, 1931, pp. 171-237; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 53f.
- Berolzheimer: op. cit., pp. 93ff.; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 16ff.
- Berolzheimer: op. cit., pp. 108ff.; Windelband: op. cit., pp. 337ff.; Dooijeweerd: op. cit., p. 22.
- Dooijeweerd: op. cit., pp. 25ff.; Calvin: op. cit., bk. IV, chap. XX.
- C. H. McIlwain: Constitutionalism, Ithaca, 1940, chaps. V, VI; cf., also, Hobbes: Leviathan; Locke: Essay on Civil Government; Montesquieu: L’Esprit des Lois, et al.
- Berolzheimer: op. cit., chaps. V, VI.
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