By Mark J. Larson
[Mark J. Larson is Pastor, Catawba Valley Presbyterian Church, Granite Falls, North Carolina.]
The miracles recorded in the Bible have been a problem for many people in recent centuries. As Thornwell put it, “The supernatural has been the stone of stumbling and the rock of offence.”[1] This article discusses a number of challenges to miracles and includes assessments of those objections. The thinkers examined here are in the three philosophical movements of the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and atheistic naturalism.
Miracles in the Age of Reason
John Locke (1632-1704)
Though the eighteenth century was a period marked by unbelief about miracles, it is remarkable that the century began with a treatise by Locke in which he affirmed the legitimacy of the biblical miracles. Written in 1702, A Discourse of Miracles was published posthumously in 1706. Locke said miracles have three characteristics. They are “wrought by God himself”;[2] they are to be understood as “contrary to the established course of nature”;[3] and they are for the “attesting of divine revelation.”[4] They are “the basis on which divine mission is always established.”[5]
Locke recognized the existence of “lying wonders,” phenomena that are “above the force of natural causes and effects,” such as “the producing of serpents [and] blood and frogs, by the Egyptian sorcerers.” True miracles can be distinguished from lying wonders because “miracles … carry the evident marks of a … superior power.”
Voltaire (1694-1778)
Ironically Locke, a staunch advocate of miracles, became a stepping stone for Deism and its repudiation of miracles. The proponents of natural religion saw in Locke’s Christian rationalism a precursor of their own rationalistic approach. The French Deist Voltaire conceived of the cosmos as a smooth-running machine,6 which operates according to the laws of nature.7 “A miracle,” he said, “is the violation of mathematical, divine, immutable, eternal laws…. A law cannot be immutable and violable at the same time.”8 Something of Voltaire’s customary ridicule is reflected in this statement of his: “Let a dead man walk five miles carrying his head in his arms, and we’ll call that a miracle.”[9]
He suggested that as an interruption in the smooth-running cosmic machine, miracles are foolish. “Now isn’t it the most absurd piece of folly to imagine that the infinite Being would reverse the eternal working of the immense activity which makes the whole universe move, all for the sake of three or four hundred ants on this little mud pile?”[10] For God to do miracles means that He would be saying, “I am going to change … my immutable laws, to try to execute what I could not do with them.”[11] For God to act in such a way, Voltaire affirmed, “would be an admission of his weakness, not his power.”[12]
If miracles are violations of nature’s laws that cannot be violated, then they are rationally impossible. This, though, is not what a miracle is.[13] In a biblical miracle God may work without or above the laws of nature, as when Jesus turned water into wine (thereby working apart from the normal processes of fermentation). Or God may work against the laws of nature, as when Jesus raised Lazarus from the dead (thereby working against the principle of corruption in the natural order). In neither instance (nor in any other biblical miracle) was there a violation of the laws of nature. Schlesinger has rightly stated, “An event may be the source of marvel and elicit genuine religious response … without violating any natural law.”[14] Even more pointedly Lewis remarked, “The divine act of miracle is not an act of suspending the pattern to which events conform but of feeding new events into that pattern.”[15]
According to Voltaire any divine changes in the overall running of the cosmic machine would indicate weakness in God. However, God’s performance of miracles is not an admission of divine weakness, but of human weakness—the human need for divine authentication of true revelation.
Hermann S. Reimarus (1694-1768)
Reimarus was influenced by the English Deists, as seen in his attempt to eliminate miracles from the Gospels. The posthumous publication of his Fragments of an Unknown Writer (1774–1778) caused a raging controversy. In one treatise, Concerning the Intention of Jesus and His Teaching, Reimarus wrote that Jesus’ cry, “My God, My God, why have You forsaken Me” (Matt. 27:46), was an admission of His failure. God had not helped Him “to build up a worldly kingdom, and to deliver the Israelites from bondage.”[16] Also Reimarus essentially charged Matthew with fraud. According to Matthew 28:13 the Sanhedrin bribed the guards assigned to watch Jesus’ tomb and urged them to bear false testimony. “You are to say, ‘His disciples came by night and stole Him away while we were asleep.’ ” Reimarus, however, accused Matthew of lying, maintaining that “there must have been no guards there.”[17]In addition he basically accepted the Sanhedrin’s position about the surreptitious theft of Christ’s body, “that Jesus’ body was secretly stolen from the tomb at night and that it was buried in another place.”[18] “His few followers,” he alleged, “have so acted that … suspicion logically falls upon them.”[19] Reimarus declared, “It is quite clear that Matthew alone spun this story out of his head.”[20]
This allegation of the theft of Jesus’ body was not a new idea. In his Dialogue with Trypho Justin Martyr (ca. A.D. 100-165) indicted the Jews for their unbelief. “You have sent … men throughout all the world to proclaim that a … heresy had sprung from one Jesus, a Galilean deceiver, whom we crucified, but his disciples stole him by night from the tomb … and now deceive men by asserting that he has risen from the dead and ascended to heaven.”[21]
Reimarus’s siding with the Sanhedrin is questionable in light of how the Jewish high court is presented in the Gospels. For example “The whole council kept trying to obtain false testimony against Jesus” (26:59), and Pilate “knew that because of envy they had handed Him over” (27:18). However, why would Jesus’ followers have concocted such a scheme of deceit? Surely they became followers of Jesus because they were attracted to His message. Reimarus himself admitted, “The goal of Jesus’ sermons and teaching was a proper, active character, a changing of the mind, a sincere love of God and of one’s neighbor, humility, gentleness, denial of the self, and the suppression of all evil desires.”[22] It is inconceivable that the disciples would have given themselves to proclaim Jesus despite threats from the Sanhedrin, persecution, and even martyrdom. Even Bultmann, who did not accept the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, did not question the integrity of the disciples at this point. “The resurrection,” Bultmann affirms, “is not an event of past history. All that historical criticism can establish is the fact that the first disciples came to believe in the resurrection.”[23]
Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781)
Unlike Reimarus, Lessing did not question the integrity of the Gospel writers and their testimony regarding miracles.[24] “I do not,” he wrote, “for one moment deny that Christ performed miracles.”[25] Perhaps this position reflects something of his upbringing as the son of an orthodox Lutheran pastor. On the other hand Lessing was like Immanuel Kant in his elevation of human rationality—embracing the teaching of Jesus not on the basis of confirmatory miracles, but because of the authority of unaided reason.[26] The important thing, according to Lessing, is what one thinks about the Deity, but there is no obligation, he said, “to believe something against which … reason rebels.”[27] The heart of Lessing’s argument, though, relates to what has been called “Lessing’s Ditch.” He saw a disjunction between the “accidental truths of history” and the “necessary truths of reason.”[28] While the necessary truths of reason have an unqualified certainty, the accidental truths of history cannot provide unqualified certainty.[29] Thus because of this disjunction between two different classes of truth, a “ditch” is formed. “That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap.”[30]
Because Lessing believed that historical truth always lacked unqualified certainty, he felt unable to move from the realm of what is “only historically certain”[31] to the sphere of “metaphysical and moral ideas.”[32] The metaphysical realm is a “different class of truths.”[33] And so Lessing made statements such as this: “If on historical grounds I have no objection to the statement that this Christ himself rose from the dead, must I therefore accept it as true that this risen Christ was the Son of God?”[34] Lessing’s fundamental concern is that testimonial, historical truths always have an element of uncertainty about them. He even conjectured that “it still might be possible” that Alexander did not really conquer almost all Asia. Even Alexander’s exploits, for Lessing, do not have absolute certainty.
In response to Lessing’s thinking one can first acknowledge that it is appropriate to trust the evidence of one’s senses. As Augustine wrote, “The City of God … trusts the evidence of the senses in every matter; for the mind employs the senses through the agency of the body, and anyone who supposes that they can never be trusted is woefully mistaken.”[35] From the days of antiquity decisions of “great, permanent worth”[36] have also been made on the basis of multiple witnesses to the same event. “On the evidence of two or three witnesses a matter shall be confirmed” (Deut. 19:15). Juries constantly make decisions of “great, permanent worth” on the basis of testimonial evidence and at times on circumstantial evidence.
As to Christ’s miracles, there are multiple witnesses in the historical documents, including the unanimous testimony of the four Gospels, the Epistles, and Revelation. In addition the Old Testament announced that the coming Messiah would perform miracles. Thus for Jesus of Nazareth to be the Messiah He had to have performed miracles. As Origen wrote, referring to Isaiah 35:5–6, “That He healed the lame and the blind, and that therefore we hold Him to be the Christ and the Son of God, is manifest to us from what is contained in the prophecies: ‘Thus the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall hear; then the lame man leap as an hart.’ ”[37] The fact of prophetic expectation underscores the certainty of the historical testimony recorded in the Gospels. Irenaeus declared, “If, however, they [the heretics] maintain that the Lord, too, performed such works simply in appearance [like the pagan magicians], we shall refer them to the prophetical writings, and we prove from these … that all things were thus predicted regarding Him, and did take place undoubtedly.”[38]
The miraculous events recorded in the New Testament are established as certain not only on the evidence of two or three witnesses, but also because of the inspiration of the documents themselves. However, Lessing rejected the New Testament’s self-affirmation about its divine inspiration,[39] and he did not refer to the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which provides the certitude that the Bible is the revealed Word of God. Calvin taught that by the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit believers can “affirm with utter certainty … that it has flowed to us from the very mouth of God by the ministry of men.”[40] Therefore Lessing was wrong in saying that “reports of … miracles … are [only] as reliable as historical truths ever can be.”[41] Because the reports of miracles in the New Testament are of divine origin, they have an ultimate and absolute certainty about them.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
Kant is known for his exhortation to be courageous in the use of one’s reason. In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone[42] he presented “the kind of religion that could be acceptable in the Age of Reason.”[43] In this Deistic presentation of religion Kant said the morally perfect individual is “a person who would be willing not merely to discharge all human duties himself and to spread about him goodness as widely as possible … but even … to take upon himself every affliction, up to the most ignominious death, for the good of the world and even for his enemies.”[44] This description of human goodness is clearly informed by the biblical account of Jesus, but Kant never mentioned Jesus in this work. In fact he maintained that since the idea of the morally perfect person resides in human reason,[45] no need exists for a historical exemplification of actual moral perfection.[46 ]And yet he did allude to his belief that Jesus was perfect.[47] Kant conceded that some people need a living, concrete example of moral excellence to follow. But he said they ought not demand miracles to authenticate that person’s moral perfections. Rather than expecting that this morally perfect person “should have performed miracles,” Kant urged his readers to believe that real virtue can truly be exemplified in daily life, and this confidence has “moral worth.”[48]
Unlike Voltaire and Reimarus, Kant did not rule out miracles. He said they are “events in the world the operating laws of whose causes are, and must remain, absolutely unknown to us.”[49] And he even classified them. “One can conceive of either theistic or demonic miracles; the second are divided into angelic miracles (of good spirits) and devilish miracles (of bad spirits).”[50] Nevertheless he shared the general embarrassment of the Enlightenment Age about miracles.
The uneasiness about miracles in the Age of Reason was preceded by “the century of genius,” the period of such seventeenth-century luminaries as Johann Kepler (1571–1630), Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), and Isaac Newton (1642–1727). The change from the medieval to a Newtonian cosmology was revolutionary. In the Newtonian scheme “gravity … abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies and of our sea.”[51] The new cosmology meant that the Aristotelian notion of a Prime Mover who causes motion throughout the universe[52] was no longer necessary.
Scientific discoveries in the seventeenth century tended to emphasize the regularity, continuity, and orderliness within the cosmos. “Every body continues in its state of rest or of motion in a right line unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.”[53] But this led to the idea that the universe is a machine, a closed mechanical system.[54] Newton’s view “gave rise to a severely mechanistic description of the universe in terms of rigid … concepts and laws.”[55] Perhaps the apex of this rigidly determinist and mechanical explanation of the universe is seen in the work of Pirre Simon de LaPlace (1749–1827), who attempted to explain the entire cosmos by the laws of physics and chemistry.[56]
this new science with such a changed cosmology would eventually impact the theological views of the time.[57] For many thinkers Deism seemed to be the rational position to embrace. In this perspective God created the world, imposed fixed laws of nature on it, and then backed off from it, never needing to interfere supernaturally in the affairs of the cosmos.
Several points may be given in response to the Newtonian and Deistic worldview. First, it should be noted that Isaac Newton was a theist who did believe in miracles. Newton felt the cogency and power of the teleological argument for God’s existence.[58] As to the central miracle of the Christian faith Newton expressed himself without hesitation. “And by the same power by which he gave life at first to every species of animals he is able to revive the dead, and has revived Jesus Christ our Redeemer.”[59]
Second, Deism and its denial of miracles is considerably weakened by the fact that the Newtonian science on which it rested was displaced in the twentieth century by Albert Einstein’s principles. The Newtonian “outlook on the universe,” Torrance argues, “has been overthrown.”[60] The old cosmology of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton no longer reigns. The “unitary outlook upon the universe brought about by relativity theory and quantum physics has displaced the older mechanistic view of the world as a closed materialist framework.”[61] While LaPlace alleged that the universe (the macrocosm) could be explained solely in terms of physics and chemistry, the fact is that one cannot even explain a man-made machine (the microcosm) exclusively according to the laws of physics and chemistry. The problem with the LaPlacian approach is that “any machine with which we are familiar embodies operational principles that are simply not explainable in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry that govern its component particulars—that is why we need sciences of engineering over and above the sciences of physics and chemistry.”[62]
“The point we have now reached,” Torrance writes, is “in the open-structured universe of general relativity and non-equilibrium thermodynamics.”[63] Recent scientific developments are a welcome change for historic Christianity. The new outlook in science makes room for faith in the classical biblical doctrine of miracles.
David Hume (1711-1776)
According to Hume, perhaps the most renowned skeptic of the eighteenth century, miracles are “utterly absurd,”64 nothing but a “superstitious delusion.”[65] Christian supernaturalism “cannot be believed by any reasonable person.”66 Miracles, he said, are quite simply “not to be found, in all history.”[67] Many philosophers remain impressed by Hume’s approach.[68]
Did Hume deny the possibility of miracles (the “hard” interpretation), or did he simply maintain that it is more rational to trust one’s own personal experience rather than believe human testimony about a miracle (the “soft” interpretation)? Apparently he took both a hard and a soft stand against miracles.[69] His denial that miracles are possible comes near the end of part one of his work An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, while part two focuses on the argument that miracles are not credible. “A miracle,” he wrote, “is a violation of the laws of nature.”[70] The questions then arise, Can miracles occur? Are miracles possible? Hume answered that “there is … a direct and full proof … against the existence of any miracle.”[71] What proof did he offer to establish his claim that miracles cannot occur? Basically he argued that miracles cannot occur because miracles do not occur. The laws of nature cannot be violated because violations of the laws of nature do not occur. He refers to “a firm and unalterable experience” that “has established these laws.” There is indeed “a uniform experience against every miraculous event.” The “direct and full proof” against miracles is the simple fact that miracles do not occur.[72]
Such reasoning, however, is a question-begging argument. Hume used the unproved conclusion (that miracles are not possible) and made it a datum of his argument (miracles do not happen). As Geisler points out, this is special pleading.[73]
The bulk of Hume’s discussion attempts to argue that miracles are not credible. Testimonial evidence, he wrote, has a variety of possible effects. Depending on a number of factors, it may amount to a proof or just probability.[74] If the testimony concerns “the extraordinary and the marvelous,” it is diminished significantly and becomes doubtful.[75] If the testimony, however, concerns the “miraculous,” the testimony is destroyed and the report is to be regarded as incredible.[76]
Why did Hume limit himself to testimonial evidence in considering the question of whether miracles have ever occurred? Flew contends that Hume concentrated on testimonial evidence “because his own conception of the historian” was of “a judge assessing, with judicious impartiality, the testimony set before him.”[77] That may or may not be the case. Do not historians, however, have the responsibility to consider other kinds of evidence as well? Swinburne points out that human testimony is only one kind of evidence bearing on the historical past. “We have four kinds of evidence about what happened at some past instant—our own apparent memories of our past experiences, the testimony of others about their past experiences, physical traces, and our contemporary understanding of what things are physically impossible or improbable.”[78]
Nash states, “Hume was wrong when he suggested that miracles are supported only by direct evidence cited in the testimony of people who claim to have witnessed them. There can also be indirect evidence for miracles.”79 Augustine set forth evidence of an indirect nature in support of Christ’s resurrection, namely, the widespread acceptance of the message that Christ rose again. “It is incredible that men of no birth, no standing, no learning, and so few of them, should have been able to persuade, so effectively, the whole world, including the learned men.”[80]
Hume nevertheless restricted himself to testimonial evidence alone, which, he said, means miracles are incredible. He relied on “the ultimate standard” of “experience and observation.”81 As Helm put it, “The pattern of Hume’s argument is clear; experience has priority.”[82] But “Is Hume correct in giving these respective weightings to experience and testimony?”[83]
Several problems can be noted in Hume’s view on miracles. First, he limited himself to only one kind of evidence for miracles—testimonial evidence. And regarding testimonial evidence he confined himself to only one way of assessing a truth claim—his own experience and observation. He gave no consideration at all to the test of coherence. The fact of the matter is, as Helm demonstrates, miracles are coherent with two elements of Scripture (prophecy—Luke 24:26; Acts 2:24; 1 Cor. 15:4; and the Bible’s overall message of God’s initiative in grace). In addition miracles are consistent with the nature of God, who continually does the unexpected.84 Hodge rightly stated, “The miracles recorded in the Scriptures are a competent part of the great system of truth therein revealed. The whole stands or falls together.”[85]
Second, Hume’s preference for his own experience over the testimony of others does not reflect the way humans actually acquire knowledge. As Helm observes, “We obtain a huge amount of our knowledge from the testimony of others, from parents, teachers, books, films and the like. One only needs to think of the vast amounts of history, archaeology, science, geography that we accept on trust from other sources.”[86] Actually people have a natural tendency to believe. It is “by a law of nature” that “we are compelled to receive” the testimony of good men “as to facts within their personal knowledge.”[87]
Third, Hume was willing to believe something only if it occurred with some frequency. He said that whatever is rare, such as a miracle, cannot be believed. However, on the basis of this standard the prevarications of a liar about ordinary phenomena are to be received as credible, while the statements of the upright regarding extraordinary events are to viewed as incredible. Thornwell aptly remarks, “Hume forgets that the credibility of testimony is in itself, not in the object for which it vouches.”88 Indeed, “the intrinsic probability of phenomena does not directly affect their credibility.”89 The proper way to assess testimonial evidence is to ascertain the sincerity of the witnesses and the causes of their convictions.[90] The testimony of a witness should be received and believed if the witness is sincere and if the facts to which he testifies are indeed the only possible explanation for his testimony.[91] Interestingly Jesus assumed that this is how many would respond to the testimony that the apostles would give about His resurrection. They would be satisfied on both of these points, and therefore they would believe. Responding to Thomas, who would not believe testimonial evidence alone, Jesus declared, “Blessed are they who did not see, and yet believed” (John 20:29).
When this method is applied to the apostles’ words about Jesus’ resurrection, their testimony is credible indeed. Who can doubt the sincerity of men who were willing to die for their belief in the risen Christ? The fact of Jesus’ resurrection is the only credible explanation for their testimony.
Hume, however, was unwilling to accept the fact of Jesus’ resurrection as the cause for the effect, namely, the testimony of the apostles. As Thornwell affirms, in the case of “sensible miracles, in which the witnesses give unimpeachable proofs of the sincerity of their own belief, it is incumbent upon the skeptic to show how this belief was produced under the circumstances in which the witnesses were placed before he is at liberty to set aside the facts.”[92] This very thing Hume failed to do.
In part two of his Enquiry Hume gave four arguments against miracles. First, he questioned the caliber of the witnesses to miracles and the place where the miracles reportedly happened. “There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning … of such undoubted integrity … of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind … and at the same time, attesting facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable.”[93]
Second, Hume rejected miracles because of “the folly of men,”[94] that is, the credulity of human beings.[95] Human nature, he alleged, is credulous, ready to believe foolish miracles.
Third, Hume said that testimony about miracles is usually found among backward and ill-informed people. “It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations.”[96] And when miracles supposedly occur, it is always “in remote countries.”[97]
Fourth, Hume argued that different, competing religions often appeal to miracles to support their truth claims. By doing so, rival claims cancel each other out.
In Hume’s first point, in which he challenged the quality of the witnesses to miracles and the locations where they reportedly occurred, Hume made a sweeping generalization. The witnesses of Jesus’ resurrection who are mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15:5–8—Cephas, the Twelve, the five hundred believers, James, and Paul—are “a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them above all suspicion of any design to deceive others.”[98] In addition the New Testament witnesses did attest to “facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render detection unavoidable.”[99] Paul said to King Herod Agrippa II in the presence of the Roman procurator Festus, “For the king knows about these matters, and I speak to him also with confidence, since I am persuaded that none of these things escape his notice, for this has not been done in a corner” (Acts 26:26).
As to his second reason for rejecting miracles, Hume identified faith (a belief which has reasonable grounds) with credulity (the tendency to believe apart from evidence). True, some people are credulous. The New Testament evidence suggests, however, that the early believers were not gullible. The apostles did not immediately believe “those who had seen Him after He had risen” (Mark 16:14). The testimony of the women that Christ had risen seemed like nonsense (Luke 24:11). Thomas adamantly declared, “Unless I see … I will not believe” (John 20:25). The early Christians believed only on the basis of the evidence presented to them by Jesus Himself. Appearing to the disciples, “He showed them His hands and His feet,” and He ate broiled fish in their presence (Luke 24:40–43). He “presented Himself alive” to the disciples after His suffering “by many convincing proofs” (Acts 1:3). As Augustine commented, “If it is incredible [that Christ be risen], then surely it is even more incredible that so incredible a thing should be so credited!”[100]
In his third reason for rejecting testimony concerning miracles, Hume, as Nash observes, resorted to a sweeping generalization that is not supported by evidence.[101] It is quite incredible that the people who conveyed to Western civilization the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition, which became the “traditional morality”[102] and the basis of Western law, should be characterized as ignorant and barbarous. The Jews, in fact, were enlightened, in contrast to many peoples of the ancient Near East. Moses asked, “What great nation is there that has statutes and judgments as righteous as this whole law which I am setting before you today?” (Deut. 4:8). Paul took a similar position, inquiring, “Then what advantage has the Jew?” To this question he answered, “Great in every respect. First of all, that they were entrusted with the oracles of God” (Rom. 3:1–2).
What response can be given to Hume’s charge that miracles always happen in “remote countries”? True, ancient Palestine was remote both chronologically and geographically from eighteenth-century Scotland. But it certainly was not geographically remote from the other major cities of the Mediterranean world in the first century, such as Rome or Corinth. In fact in Corinth the miraculous was not at all distant. As Paul wrote the congregation there, “The signs of a true apostle were performed among you with all perseverance, by signs and wonders and miracles” (2 Cor. 12:12). By their very nature miracles were associated with the great revelatory epochs of past redemptive history—the revelation given by Moses (Exod. 4:1–9), the prophets (1 Kings 17:17–24), and Christ along with the apostles (Acts 2:22; 14:3).[103] Their purpose, as Owen remarked, was “to confirm the ministry of them by whom they were wrought.”[104] Or to put focus more on the Scriptures themselves, they occurred, Turretin contended, “for the purpose of inducing a belief in the divinity of the Bible.”[105] The intended result has indeed been effected. “By unheard-of and extraordinary miracles,” Calvin affirmed, “the dignity of his word has been excellently enough disclosed.”[106] Miracles indeed are remote from most people; but this must be the case! They do not happen indiscriminately throughout history; they “belong to revelation periods, and appear only when God is speaking through accredited messengers.”[107] Lewis strikingly wrote, “How likely is it that you or I will be pres-ent when a peace-treaty is signed [or] when a dictator commits suicide? That we should see a miracle is even less likely.”[108]
In Hume’s fourth reason for dismissing testimonial evidence concerning miracles he wrongly assumed that all supernatural phenomena are to be classified as miraculous. He ignored the distinction in Christian theology between miracula, which can be done only by God, and mirabilia (“wonders”), which can be performed by spirit beings, either holy angels or fallen demonic spirits. As Augustine recognized. “The pagan marvels were the work of demons.” He further commented on the motive of such unclean spirits, referring to “the arrogance of their foul pride which made them ambitious to be the gods of the pagans.”[109] This distinction between miracles and wonders arises from the biblical text itself. Through demonic power the magicians of Egypt, like Moses in the first plague, were able to change water into blood (Exod. 7:22). In the second plague, when Moses brought up frogs on the land of Egypt, “the magicians did the same with their secret arts” (8:7). After that point, however, the magicians could not duplicate God’s miracles. Beginning with the third plague the Egyptian wonder workers showed their weakness: “The magicians tried with their secret arts to bring forth gnats, but they could not” (v. 18). As Thornwell observes, “Cases like these have nothing of ambiguity in them. They reveal, at a glance, the very finger of God.”[110] Focusing on Jesus’ miracles, Turretin made a similar observation. “They were not common signs and wonderful such as could be wrought by human or diabolical act; but grand, unusual and such as could be performed by divine power alone.”[111]
The Scriptures indicate, however, that because of human weakness, there may be times when it is difficult to distinguish between a genuine miracle and a mere wonder. Referring to Jesus’ warning in Mark 13:22–23, Augustine stated, “For against those whom I may call marvel-workers, my God has put me on my guard, saying, ‘In the last times there shall arise false prophets, doing signs and wonders, to lead into error, if it were possible, even the elect: Lo, I have foretold it to you.’ ”[112] How can a person distinguish between miracula and mirabilia? The Bible says this can be done by noting the doctrines of the alleged miracle workers (Deut. 13:1–3). If their doctrines correspond to the truths of canonical Scripture, their supernatural work may be regarded as a miracle. If not, it is nothing more than a wonder. “Nor are they to be received except insofar as the doctrine (in confirmation of which they are wrought) is conformable with the word of God; otherwise they may be rejected as spurious.”[113]
Miracles in Schleiermacher’s Romantic Theology
The shift from extreme rationality to intense emotion, and from God as distant to immanent, is seen in the theology of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834). Raised in the tradition of Pietism, as was Kant, Schleiermacher wrote about “the divine life and activity of the universe.”[114] Revelation, for Schleiermacher, has to do with original ideas about God arising in the human soul.[115] Such a revelatory disclosure of the Deity to the individual will be accompanied by emotions, particularly the feeling of absolute dependence.[116] The uniqueness of Jesus relates to both of these issues, revelation and divine consciousness. In addition Jesus was further distinguished from others by having the essence of piety within Himself, a God-consciousness.[117]
Unlike the Enlightenment thinkers, Schleiermacher maintained that Christ did do miracles. In this sense Jesus was like the Old Testament prophets who performed miracles for the purpose of authentication.118 In the case of Jesus, however, His miracles were not to be the basis of messianic belief (although they might elicit or confirm faith).[119] Instead Jesus’ miracles reflected His general intention of doing good.[120] His miracles, then, “can be called miracles only in a relative sense.”[121] Schleiermacher distanced himself from the classic perspective that a miracle involves an immediate operation of God’s power. Christ did miracles, he wrote, because of His intense God-consciousness. One could therefore expect that Jesus would also have a deep consciousness of nature and its secrets. His human spirit had the capability of working on external nature.[122] Christ’s miracles, for Schleiermacher, can be viewed as miracles only because people do not fully understand the relationship between the human spirit and the physical, material realm of nature. The human spirit influences the natural realm, and the human will impacts the natural order. Jesus’ influence on nature can therefore be called miraculous. In this definition miracles are miraculous only in a relative sense. According to Schleiermacher in Jesus’ miracles He worked with nature, not apart from or against nature. Christ “will be able,” he said, “to manifest also a peculiar working … upon external Nature.”[123] He spoke about “the susceptibility of physical Nature to the influence of the spirit and of the causality of the will acting upon physical Nature.”[124]
The influence of Lessing is perhaps reflected in Schleiermacher’s position that miracles could have only an immediate value rather than a long-range (apologetic) value. While Christ’s miracles were needed at the time in which they occurred (for those who needed healing, for example), they are not necessary for people today.125 Schleiermacher also affirmed that more important than Jesus’ miracles was His moral character. “What takes the place of miracles for our time,” he says, “is our historical knowledge of the character, as well as of the scope and duration, of Christ’s spiritual achievements.”[126]
Schleiermacher treated the New Testament witness to Christ’s miracles with greater respect than did the Enlightenment representatives. However, he stressed that the miracles performed by Christ were designed only to teach that He had a profound consciousness of nature and its secrets. But the Gospel of John presents seven noteworthy miracles for the purpose of affirming the identity of the One who did the signs. “These have been written so that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God” (John 20:31).
Though Schleiermacher toned down what happened in biblical miracles by saying that Christ was working with nature, the miracle in Cana, for example, was a divine work apart from nature’s regular fermentation process. Furthermore, when Jesus raised Lazarus from death, He was working against the corrupting force of nature.
As to the value of Christ’s miracles it is true that a miracle’s impressiveness is largely immediate, but its impact is not exclusively immediate. Christ’s miracles did have an immediate impact, as seen, for example, in his raising Lazarus from the dead. “On account of him [Lazarus] many of the Jews … were believing in Jesus” (12:11). But the apostle also assumed that written reports of Jesus’ miracles would have the same result (20:31). Thus His miracles still have an apologetic value.
Schleiermacher wrote, “In Christ’s miracles we have nothing which definitely raises them, in and by themselves, above other similar miracles of which we have stories from many times and places.”[127] However, the sheer quantity of Jesus’ miracles does raise them above those of all the other miracle workers of Scripture. John 21:25 makes this very point: “And there are also many other things which Jesus did, which if they were written in detail, I suppose that even the world itself would not contain the books that would be written.”
Miracles in Atheistic Naturalism
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872)
Feuerbach was one of Georg Hegel’s better known students. After studying at Heidelberg University, Feuerbach came to deny God and he embraced the naturalism of the ancient Greeks. His atheistic philosophy of religion is presented in The Essence of Christianity, in which he attempted to describe the real essence of what lies behind the phenomena of the Christian religion.[128] His embrace of philosophical naturalism is seen in his admiration of nature. “To him that feels that Nature is lovely, it appears as an end in itself, it has the ground of existence in itself—in him the question ‘Why does it exist?’ does not arise.”[129] How then did Feuerbach explain the universal existence of religion—the fact that nearly everyone is religious? Reminiscent of Hume,[130] Feuerbach affirmed that God is only the projection of human nature for the purpose of worship.
“The divine being is nothing else than … human nature purified, freed from … limits … made objective … and revered.”[131] According to Feuerbach this is the essence of every religion, including Christianity.
Regarding miracles Feuerbach, unlike Kant, recognized that miracles are not inconsequential for the Christian faith. “Faith is the belief in miracle; faith and miracles are absolutely inseparable.”132 Feuerbach identified two essential elements in a miracle. First, contrary to Schleiermacher, he said a miracle is a phenomenon that is contrary to nature. “Dust is changed into lice, a staff into a serpent, rivers into blood, a rock into a fountain…. And all these contradictions of Nature happen for the welfare of Israel, purely at the command of Jehovah.”133 The second characteristic of a miracle, Feuerbach said, is that “it effects an immediate identity of the wish and its fulfillment.”134 This indeed is “the mystery of miracle,” that “miraculous power realizes human wishes in a moment.”135 For Feuerbach, miracles are irrational and therefore must be rejected.136 He explains miracles psychologically, as being explanable in terms of human “feeling and imagination.”[137]
It is true, as Feuerbach stated, that biblical miracles often met human desires or needs. Examples include Jesus’ cleansing of a leper (Matt. 8:2–3), His curing a woman with an issue of blood (Luke 8:44), and His healing a nobleman’s son (John 4:47, 50).
In saying that miracles are rationally inconceivable, Feuerbach compared a miracle to “the attempt to construct a circle with a straight line.”[138] Yet he did not discuss how miracles are irrational.
Feuerbach maintained that the doctrine of Christ’s resurrection springs from a psychological need for an emotionally satisfying belief. “The resurrection of Christ is ‘the satisfied desire of man for an immediate certainty of his personal existence after death—personal immortality as a sensible, indubitable fact.’”[139] However, many of the doctrines presented in the New Testament are not at all psychologically satisfying, including, for example, human depravity, the final judgment, and eternal damnation.
Antony Flew (1923-)
Like Hume, Antony Flew wants to assess truth claims regarding miracles by relying on contemporary experience, observation, and confirmability. An example of his approach is reflected in his assessment of the healing of Mademoiselle Thibaut and the disbelief of De Sylva as to her miraculous cure. Flew describes the testimony of the witnesses who supported the miracle versus the categorical rejection of De Sylva in this way: “The two crucial and conflicting propositions are of very different and quite disproportionate orders of logical strength, of confirmation and confirmability. For the … proposition asserted by the putative witnesses … were of the form … on one particular occasion, this or that actually happened…. But the … propositions that rule out the alleged miraculous occurrences … must be open and general. They … can … be tested and retested anywhere and at any time.[140]
Flew differs from Hume in his application of historical criticism to the New Testament, in which he attempts to distinguish between “fiction … tales and legends” and “the facts as they really happened.”[141] The nineteenth century, as exhibited in the work of individuals like David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874), was marked by the endeavor to apply “the canons of scientific historical research to the New Testament in order to separate fact from fiction, legend, and myth.”[142]
Flew evidences a strong commitment to the historical-critical approach, regarding it as “a breakthrough to which historians of ideas do not always give due place among the other intellectual revolutions of this period.”[143] “It is always theoretically (i.e., logically) possible,” he says, “that any historical proposition claimed as known might in fact be false.”[144] This applies to the Bible as well as other historical documents. Thus “the criteria by which we must assess historical testimony,” Flew maintains, “must inevitably rule out any possibility of establishing, upon purely historical grounds, that some genuinely miraculous event has indeed occurred.”[145] Perhaps the major assumption of historical criticism, which Flew embraces, is “that the present relics of the past cannot be interpreted as historical evidence at all, unless we presume that the same fundamental regularities obtained then still obtain today.”[146]
Flew also alleges that it cannot be known when and if there really is an overriding of the natural order.[147] And if there is such an overriding, how can anyone know whether God is responsible for it? After all, “the defining characteristics of the theist’s God preclude all possibility of inferring … what such a God might reasonably be expected to do.”[148] For the theist, “the ways of his God must necessarily be beyond our unaided understanding and conjecture.”[149]
Flew maintains that the propositions of history (human testimony regarding events that have occurred before eyewitnesses) differ from the propositions of science (which may be confirmed as true by additional observation and experimentation). True, the propositions of history, since they concern past events, cannot be verified in a laboratory. But is it true that the propositions of history—particularly those of eyewitnesses—have less strength than those of science? Is it true that the testimonial evidence given by trustworthy witnesses is of a “disproportionate” order of strength in comparison with the propositions of science? What about the weight given in the United States judicial system, even in capital crime cases, to testimonial evidence? The fact that matters of significance such as the life or death of a defendant can be based on human testimony shows the error of playing down testimonial evidence.
As to Flew’s faith in the historical-critical method, it should be pointed out that the historical results hypothesized by historical criticism cannot be corroborated. The presentation of Jesus in the New Testament as a miracle-working Messiah, however, is fully in accord with the messianic expectations of the Old Testament. Thus the New Testament presentation is corroborated by the Old Testament. Flew claims that no one can know when and if the natural order has been overridden and whether God is the cause of such events. Thornwell answers this claim in this way.
When we turn to the miracles of the Bible, we feel intuitively that they are of a character in themselves and on a scale of magnitude which renders the supposition of secondary causes ridiculously absurd. The scenes at the Red Sea, the cleaving of the waters, the passing over of the Israelites on dry land between the fluid walls, the pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night, the daily supply of manna from the skies—effects like these carry the evidence of their original on their face. There is no room for doubt. And so, in the New Testament, the conversion of water into wine; the stilling of the tempest; the raising of the dead; the instant cure, without means or appliances, of inveterate diseases; the feeding of thousands with a few loaves, which involves the highest possible exercise of power, that of creation; and above all, the resurrection of Jesus Himself—cases like these have nothing of ambiguity in them. They reveal, at a glance, the very finger of God. The supernatural and the contranatural are so flagrant and glaring that he that runs may read.[150]
Conclusion: The Indispensable Miracle
The intellectual winds of the last three centuries have blown in a direction contrary to belief in miracles. Science, in terms of the Newtonian revolution of the seventeenth century, has been a major contributing factor to skepticism about the supernatural. Historical criticism, a major intellectual revolution of the nineteenth century, is another reason for widespread unbelief concerning the miraculous. Philosophical naturalism rules out any possibility of supernatural intervention in the natural order. Theological positions such as Deism, agnosticism, and atheism stand opposed to interruptions in the laws of nature.
This article has illustrated the intellectual climate of the West in which many have found it difficult to believe in miracles. However, the various positions examined all have some deficiences. The biblical doctrine of miracles has been shown to be rational and credible. As Paul asked, “Why is it considered incredible among you people if God does raise the dead?” (Acts 26:8). Even beyond the issue of their intellectual respectability the reality of miracles is central to the entire Christian faith. Again, as Paul noted, “And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is worthless; you are still in your sins!” (1 Cor. 15:17).
Notes
- James Henley Thornwell, “Miracles,” in The Collected Writings of James Henley Thornwell, vol. 3 (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1974), 221.
- John Locke, “A Discourse of Miracles,” in The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. I. T. Ramsey (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958), 82.
- Ibid., 79.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 86.
- Voltaire, “Miracles,” in Philosophical Dictionary, trans. Peter Gay (New York: Basic, 1962), 392.
- Ibid., 393.
- Ibid. 392.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 393.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Paul Helm, “The Miraculous,” Science and Christian Belief 3 (1991): 93.
- George N. Schlesinger, “Miracles,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997), 360.
- C. S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 72.
- Hermann S. Reimarus, Concerning the Intention of Jesus and His Teaching, in Reimarus Fragments, ed. Charles H. Talbert, trans. Ralph S. Fraser (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), 150.
- Ibid., 162.
- Ibid., 161.
- Ibid., 164.
- Ibid., 165.
- Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, cviii.
- Reimarus, Concerning the Intention of Jesus and His Teaching, 69.
- Rudolph Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, ed. Hans-Werner Bartsch (London: SPCK, 1972), 1:42.
- Gotthold Lessing, On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power, in Lessing’s Theological Writings, trans. Henry Chadwick (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1956), 55.
- Ibid., 53.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 54.
- Ibid., 53.
- Ibid., 54.
- Ibid., 55.
- Ibid. (italics added).
- Ibid., 54.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Augustine, The City of God 19.18.
- Lessing, On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power, 54.
- Origen, Against Celsus 2.48.
- Irenaeus, Against Heresies 2.32.4.
- Lessing, On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power, 55.
- John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), 1.7.5.
- Lessing, On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power, 53.
- Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Green and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York, 1792; reprint, New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 55.
- Merold Westphal, “The Emergence of Modern Philosophy of Religion,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 113.
- Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 55.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 56.
- Ibid., 54.
- Ibid., 56.
- Ibid. (italics his).
- Ibid., 81 (italics his).
- Isaac Newton, in Newton’s Philosophy of Nature: Selections from His Writings, ed. H. S. Thayer (New York: Hafner, 1953), 45.
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Q. 2, Art. 3.
- Newton, Newton’s Philosophy of Nature, 25.
- Thomas F. Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 15.
- Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Frame of Mind (Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1989), 109.
- Pirre Simon de LaPlace, quoted in Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, 16.
- James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Vatican II (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 13.
- Newton, in Newton’s Philosophy of Nature, 42.
- Ibid., 66-67.
- Thomas F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 205–6.
- Douglas Kelly, Creation and Change (Fearn, UK: Mentor, 1997), 19.
- Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, 16.
- Ibid., 17.
- David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1945), 123.
- Ibid., 115.
- Ibid., 138.
- Ibid., 122.
- Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (London: Macmillan, 1970), 11.
- Richard Purtrill holds to the same interpretation (“Defining Miracles,” in In Defense of Miracles, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1997], 65).
- Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 120.
- Ibid. (italics his).
- Ibid. (italics his).
- Norman Geisler, “Miracles and the Modern Mind,” in In Defense of Miracles, 65.
- Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 117.
- Ibid., 118-19.
- Ibid., 120-21.
- Antony Flew, “Neo-Humean Arguments about the Miraculous,” in In Defense of Miracles, 49.
- Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle, 33.
- Ronald Nash, Faith and Reason (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988), 233 (italics his).
- Augustine, The City of God 22.5.
- Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 117.
- Helm, “The Miraculous,” 94.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 88.
- Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 1:635.
- Helm, “The Miraculous,” 94.
- Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:634–35.
- Thornwell, “Miracles,” 258.
- Ibid., 259.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 260.
- Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 122.
- Ibid., 135.
- Ibid., 122.
- Ibid., 125.
- Ibid., 127.
- Ibid., 122.
- Ibid.
- Augustine, The City of God 22.5.
- Nash, Faith and Reason, 238.
- Alan Donogan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 65.
- Robert Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nashville: Nelson, 1998), 409.
- John Owen, A Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit, vol. 3 of The Works of John Owen, ed. William H. Goold (reprint, Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1965), 146.
- Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison Jr. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992), vol. 1, Second Topic, Q. IV.
- Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 4.19.6.
- Benjamin Warfield, Miracles (reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 25–26.
- Lewis, Miracles, 201.
- Augustine, The City of God 22.10.
- Thornwell, “Miracles,” 248.
- Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. 2, Thirteenth Topic, Q. II.
- Augustine, On the Gospel of St. John, Tractate XIII.
- Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. 3, Eighteenth Topic, Q. XIII.
- Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. and ed. Richard Crouter (reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 53.
- Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (reprint, Edinburgh: Clark, 1989), 51.
- Ibid., 12.
- Ibid., 385.
- Ibid., 441.
- Ibid., 448.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 72.
- Ibid.
- Ibid. (italics his).
- Ibid. (italics his).
- Ibid., 448.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 449.
- Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (New York: Harper, 1957), 112.
- Ibid.
- David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), 58.
- Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 14.
- Ibid., 126.
- Ibid., 113 (italics added).
- Ibid., 130.
- Ibid., 129.
- Ibid., 130.
- Ibid., 133.
- Ibid., 130.
- Ibid., 135.
- Antony Flew, Atheistic Humanism (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1993), 75–76.
- Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 4.
- Ibid., 9.
- Antony Flew, God: A Critical Enquiry (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1984), 138.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 139.
- Ibid., 140.
- Ibid., 143.
- Ibid., 145.
- Ibid., 146.
- Thornwell, “Miracles,” 247–48.
