The Creation and the Fall of Adam and Eve: Literal, Symbolic, or Myth?

By Mark Pretorius[1]

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to explain the deeper meaning determined in the reference to Adam and Eve, the two trees, and the serpent found in Genesis chapters 1 and 2. The intention is to demonstrate that these characters and events were not mythological anecdotes, but concrete descriptions of factual events and characters, which have a deeper and added significance and spiritual importance now. The optimism of this paper is to reach a conclusion which will appeal to many as a favourable counter to the quandary and mystification arising from the questions asked.

Introduction

The view that the book of Genesis is myth or allegory will most likely influence how one interprets associated passages of scripture. For example, how can one comprehend the significance of John 3:16 if one were to construe the narrative of the fall in Genesis 3:1-24 as myth or allegory? As the federal head, Adam symbolized all humankind before God in the Garden of Eden. When he sinned, it affected humanity for all future generations. Accordingly, interpreting this narrative as non-literal significantly dilutes the coming of Christ and his redemption of all humankind as the second federal head of the human race. This would affect related scriptural references that follow this imperative narrative, hence, presenting a distorted picture of redemption.

Consequently, one would likewise view hell as mythological. According to Kennedy (2006:57), Christianity’s Augustinian orthodoxy persuaded many people—over more than a millennia—that hell awaits any person not saved by Jesus Christ. For Kennedy, this was based on the second chapter of Genesis imaginatively describing the rebellion of Adam and Eve. He goes on to say that those scholars who reject the view of hell and the first primordial humans as fact, are to be admired for their insight and honesty.

The ramifications of decreeing the first two chapters of Genesis as myth has grave implications for believing the rest of the Bible. How would one distinguish which parts of the Bible are myth, and which parts describe factual events? Who has the authority to make such significant judgements?

According to Mitchell (1897:913-914), before one can attempt to answer these questions, one must first answer the question of whether the story of the fall, and the events that led up to it, is literal history or an allegory? Did the author of Genesis endeavour to describe the factual occurrence of a primary man and woman, or, simply hold a mirror up to human experience in general? However, before answering the propounded questions, it is necessary to present a brief synopsis of the emergent hermeneutical predispositions of Genesis, and specifically, the events surrounding the Garden of Eden.

1. Genesis as Narrative Fiction

Regrettably, it appears that numerous biblical scholars are becoming passive in their attitude against the proposal that the creation story is an allegory or mythological.[2] Indeed, some have now embraced the view conjectured by (chiefly) evolutionists—that the creation narrative is nothing but fiction. Marcus Borg (2003:49-50), for example, contends that,

the Genesis stories of creation, the Garden of Eden, the expulsion of Adam and Eve, Cain’s murder of Abel, Noah and the flood, and the Tower of Babel are what might be called ‘purely metaphorical narratives.’ They are not reporting the early history of the earth and humankind; they are not history remembered. Yet as metaphorical narratives, they can be profoundly true, even though not literally factual.

Borg (2003:52) further deliberates:

A metaphorical approach leads to a very different result. The Genesis stories of creation are seen as Israel’s stories of creation, not as God’s stories of creation. They therefore have no more of a divine guarantee to be true in a literal-factual sense than do the creation stories of other cultures. When they are seen as metaphorical narratives, not factual accounts, they are ‘myths’ in Thomas Mann’s sense of the word: stories about the way things never were, but always are. They are thus true, even though not literally true.

When referring to doctrinal complexities (e.g. the fall of man), some scholars likewise consider such doctrines fictional anecdotes among many originating in Genesis. Spangenberg (2007:274), for example, thinks that the fall of man is mythical narrative, not history. He further contends that there was an Adam; he was simply a character in a chronicle, like the serpent that tempted him.

Before expositing such views any further, it is important to define briefly the term ‘myth’, since it seems that the usage of the term by theologians is inconsistent.

According to Hamilton (1990:57), many scholars would be quite content to interpret the creation story and the fall as neither history nor myth. According to them, it is not history, in the sense that Genesis 1-3 describes past events that actually happened. But neither are they myth, at least in the historical-philosophical definition of the term ‘myth’. The following explanations by Eliade (1967:1), Kirk (1973:57), and Dundes (1984:45) will suffice. They define the term ‘myth’ as (a) a sacred narrative explaining how the world and humankind came to be in their present form, or, (b) a traditional story of purportedly historical events, serving to unfold part of the worldview of a people, or explain a practice. Subsequently, one may well interpret these scholarly views of Genesis from this perspective, instead of events as a fabricated narrative.

On this, noted scientist and theologian, Ian Barbour (2000:133), has likewise expressed his reservations on the Genesis account of events being literal. He remarks:

Because of evolutionary history, the fall of Adam cannot be taken literally. There was no Garden of Eden, no original state of innocence, free of death and suffering, from which humanity fell.

The fall can be taken as a powerful symbolic expression of human sinfulness, where sin is understood as self-centeredness and estrangement from God and other people, and, one might add, from the world of nature.

Unfortunately, the views that the first eleven chapters of 1-11 are mythological narratives, is prevalent in many evangelical, Presbyterian, and Reformed scholarly writings (e.g. Gunkel 1997; Jewett 1991; Lever 1970; Van Till, Snow, Stek, Davis and Young 1990; and Waltke 1988).[3] The most prominent and influential scholar advocating this view of Genesis was Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1956; 1997). One may infer that for Bonhoeffer, the activities surrounding Genesis 1-3 can be perceived as an aetiological narrative, that is, a language of origins unfettered from the constrictions of history and science (see Mettinger 2006:68).

However, in defence of these scholarly views specifically pertaining to ‘the fall’, none of the other biblical books refer to the narrative to explain the origin of sin and mortality. Hence, it is not atypical that there is a growing number of biblical scholars emphasising that original sin does not form part of Jesus’ message. Nonetheless, this does not connote the creation story of original sin as fictitious, as shall be illustrated by the events leading to the deed.

Conversely, those who study creation from a purely scientific and naturalistic perspective have put forth theories about the origin of life which are speculative, at best. As indicated by Hartley (2000:57), some of these theories are, to varying degrees, in greater conflict with the specific narrative of Genesis 1-2. Only as scientific research continues to aid better understanding of the mystery of the origin of life, will the continuity between the Genesis account of creation, and scientific theories of origins potentially increase. Ultimately, there can be no principal conflict between the two approaches—the theological approach and the scientific naturalist approach—for the world studied through the scientific method is the world created by God.

Furthermore, Hartley (2000:57) rightly expresses that given the tension between the biblical account of origin and those of science, biblical theology has preferably centred its exposition on God’s saving deeds, spurning substantially references to creation.

In the next segment, a systemised biblical and scientific elucidation of Adam and Eve (as literal beings) follows. This will make it possible to elucidate the various difficulties shrouding the narrative of the fall.

2. The Creation of Adam and Eve

Over and above the scriptural references to a literal creation of Adam and Eve in Genesis (1:26-28; 2:5-7, 15-4:1 and 4:25) new data from Mitochondrial DNA sampling yielded some curious results. The most compelling evidence to date for explaining the origin of humanity comes from collective research conducted by anthropologists, geneticists, and geochemists. This mitochondrial DNA evidence establishes that humans descended from one woman in a single location (cf. Horai et al 1995:532-36; Ruvulo et al 1993:111-535; Sherry et al 1994:761-75; Vigilant et al 1991:1503-7). Likewise, Y-chromosomal evidence confirms that humanity descended from one man, from the same location (cf. Pritchard et al 1999: 7360-65; Underhill et al 2000:358-61; Whitfield et al 1995:379-80). With obvious biblical overtones, according to Ross (2009:186), geneticists refer to humanity’s mitochondrial DNA ancestors as mitochondria Eve, and to the Y-chromosomal ancestor as Adam. Further to this, scientists call the location from where they originated, the Garden of Eden.

Expanding on this, one of the world’s leading scientists, Dr Francis Collins, head of the Human Genome Project, stated the following (2007:126): ‘Population geneticists, whose discipline involves the use of mathematical tools to reconstruct the history of populations of animals, plants or bacteria, look at these facts about the human genome and conclude that they point to all members of our species having descended from a common set of founders.’ To further cement this idea, Lioy (2011:31) rightly declares that everyone is organically connected, or ontologically united, to Adam (that is, biologically, spiritually, morally, and legally; [cf. Gen 2:24; 3:16-19; Ps 51:5; Rom 5:12-14; 1 Cor 15:21-22]). Lioy (2011:31) advances this suggestion when he expresses that Jesus, in quoting from Genesis 1:27 and 2:24 to emphasize the sanctity and inviolability of marriage, premised his argument on the fact that Adam and Eve were a real couple who lived at a distinct point in space-time history. This idea of a literal Adam and Eve is explored further in section 6. The question now is this: what took place in this garden, which led to the fall of humanity, as experienced today?

3. The Palistrophic Pattern

The recital of this narrative in Genesis chapters 2 and 3 is intriguing, as it is in seven sections, set in a palistrophic pattern.

A. God forms the man and places him in Eden (2-4b-17)

B. God makes a woman to complement the man (2:18-23)

C. The serpent and the woman talk (3:1-5)

D. The couple eats from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (3:6-8)

C. God interrogates the man and the woman (3: 9-13)

B. God pronounces punishment (3:14-21)

A. God expels the couple from the garden (3:22-24)

At the centre (D), as indicated by Hartley (2000:58), stands the report of these archetype humans electing to disobey God. The interchange between the man, woman, and the serpent provides dramatic movement, which primarily captures how motivation to disobey God rises from an inversion of the order of responsibility that God has established.[4]

From this palistrophic pattern, one gleans that God gave the first humans the ability to make choices. What constitutes choice is important, as it goes to show how sin emerged. In its most basic form, for any person to make a choice, the person’s act must be free, that is, it must not be determined causally Wellum (2002:259). Hence, a person could have always chosen otherwise. Basinger (1993:416) puts it this way: for a person to be free with respect to performing an action, they must have it within their power ‘to choose to perform action A or choose not to perform action A. Both A and not A could actually occur. However, which will actually occur has not yet been determined’ (see also Hasker 1983:32-44). God infused Adam with the ability to choose, and Adam chose wrong, as illustrated by his choice in D, the climax of the palistrophic pattern.

It is unwise to undervalue the significance of this unfolding pattern, as it substantiates a cogent illustration originating in Genesis 2-3 leading to the ruinous event, the banishment of the primary humans, and climaxing in the emerging Christ and his redemptive deed on the cross. However, one needs to delve deeper into what constituted the fall. This will require the careful consideration of connected scriptural references, references that cannot be disregarded by rendering the preceding events myth.

4. Adams Choice and the Fall

God gave Adam a choice. He could eat from every tree in the Garden of Eden, except one, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. ‘And the Lord God commanded the man, “You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will surely die’” (Gen 2:16-17). Adam had a choice, and he chose not to obey God.

This narrative is developed further in Genesis 3:1-6 and 23-24; two additional voices are introduced to the narrative:

Now the serpent was craftier than any of the wild animals the Lord God had made. He said to the woman, ‘Did God really say, “You must not eat from any tree in the garden? ”’ The woman said to the serpent, ‘We may eat fruit from the trees in the garden, but God did say, “You must not eat fruit from the tree that is in the middle of the garden, and you must not touch it, or you will die.”’ ‘You will not surely die’, the serpent said to the woman, ‘for God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil’. When the woman saw that the fruit of the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining wisdom, she took some and ate it. She also gave some to her husband, who was with her, and he ate it (Gen 3:1-6).

The immediate consequences of eating from the tree of knowledge become obvious. Their act of self-assertion shattered the harmony humans had enjoyed with God, each other, the animals, and the environment. This lead to the following decisive pronouncement by God: ‘So the LORD God banished him from the Garden of Eden to work the ground from which he had been taken. After he drove the man out, he placed on the east side of the Garden of Eden cherubim and a flaming sword flashing back and forth to guard the way to the tree of life’ (Gen 3:23-24).

The narrative evidently presupposes that Adam and Eve only had virtuous thoughts prior to the sin, even though it was not clear to them. In other words, they never understood anything contrary to good. According to Larkin (2010:34), however, Adam and Eve perceptibly developed a conscience upon partaking of the tree of good and evil. One could infer that it was the origin of dualistic thinking, that is, the origin of an evil conscience vis-à-vis a pure conscience. Thus, materialisation of dualistic thinking immediately begets additional difficulties. Adam and Eve now understood fear (a fear of God firstly), which led to remorse and an attempt to cover their sin.

It seems reasonable to assume the author of Genesis was proposing to give readers a literal explanation of the origin of sin. The rationale may be twofold, namely, (a) it lines up with his habit as observed in the rest of his work, and (b) the close relation between this narrative, and subsequent passages (intended for literal interpretation) warrant the standpoint taken.

To expand on this, it is necessary to explain the significance of the trees and the serpent, as they now emerge as key players in the narrative of the fall.

5. Literal, Symbolic or Myth?

To assume that the narrative of the fall is mythological, one would be forced, by default, to accept the entire creation story as myth. If one contests one portion of the Bible, is it not reasonable to question other portions too? How would one know which portions are true, and which are not, and what criteria is applied to make such a judgement? Furthermore, who sets the criteria? One cannot be selective in which portions are mythological and which are not. This inevitably leads to Bultmannian methodology (see Bultmann 1961, 1984), in which the criteria for demythologising the Bible become predetermined views of what is and is not reasonable to modern man.

Nevertheless, there are hermeneutical approaches that assist to bring out the sense behind the literal writing. This by no means diminishes the truth of Scripture, but rather, brings forth the veiled implications found in these sacred writings. Thus, in interpreting whether the trees in Genesis were factual or not, one has to respond with a ‘yes’.

This solicits several questions. Firstly, if the trees were factual, they appear to possess power to give eternal life, and impart death, depending from which tree one ate? A literal reading of Genesis 2:9 and 17 and 3:2-7 necessitate this.

But, this leads to additional questions. Logically, it seems these trees had the power that scripture ascribes to God alone. An impasse therefore becomes obvious: who had the power to give Adam life or take it away; a tree or God?[5] Evidently, something is amiss, or is it?

In the subsequent sections, I hope to elucidate on this professed dilemma, and clarify questions often asked on this ‘mystery’. The following four points provide the interpretive key:

1. One would need to accept the story of two trees in the Garden of Eden and the temptation Adam and Eve faced by the serpent’s lies as factual truth (properly understood), not myth.
2. The trees had no intrinsic power; they were merely visible symbols of God’s power.
3. The trees also symbolised God’s power of choice given to Adam and Eve; a choice to exercise their free will.
4. For their free will to be rightly free, the choices offered had to have the same appeal for it to be a fair choice. Thus, although both trees brought forth a desire to eat (as both were pleasing to the eye), they were forbidden to eat from the one.

To consolidate further the rationale for literal trees and a literal serpent, it is essential to reinforce the reasoning for a literal Adam, for he is the principal character in the narrative of the fall.

According to Duffield and Van Cleave (1983:140), liberal and neo-orthodox theologians generally interpret the first eleven chapters of Genesis as myth. However, the following elements make the literal interpretation more feasible:

1. Nowhere in the Bible is the narrative of Adam interpreted symbolically. If the creation and fall stories were allegories, the spiritualised interpretations would have been numerous.
2. There is no indication in the book of Genesis (between chapters eleven and twelve) that suggests a change from allegory to history. Noah is as much a real character as Abraham and Adam.
3. Parallels between Adam and Christ are made by the Apostle Paul. Since Christ is an historical person, it is not likely that he would be an antitype of a non-historical character (see Rom 5:14; 1 Cor 15:22-45.)
4. In two genealogies recorded in later books of the Bible, the name of Adam is listed alongside obvious historical characters (see 1 Chr 1-2; Luke 3:23-38). Adam is additionally included in the genealogy of Christ alongside others, like David, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.
5. Real geographical locations are included in the story of Adam, such as Assyria and the river Euphrates.
6. The fallen condition of man is very literal. An actual fallen state can hardly be attributed to a mythical event. Furthermore, the fact that humanity has made remarkable progress scientifically while simultaneously making no progress morally, ethically, and socially, clearly points out humanity’s sinful nature.

One should observe that, for the Apostle Paul, the primary human disobedience is a key element in his theology of redemption (Rom 5:12-14). One can reasonably conclude that Adam was a factual being, in a factual garden, having faced an actual test.

Considering all the evidence put forward hitherto, alternative options of a mythological Adam appear fairly diminished. It additionally initiates ideas that the rest of the story is also literal, but with symbolic and metaphorical meanings.

6. The Serpent: Fact or Myth?

The character of the serpent presents another potential theological complexity.[6] If the serpent was factual, did it symbolise something other than a creature which spoke and tempted?

If Adam was a literal being (as proposed in §5), one may conjecture reasonably that the trees were literal yet with a symbolic meaning. If one concludes this, then logic dictates the serpent was real—the context of the story compels this. But why does the narrative include a serpent, and not some other creature? What was the significance of God making use of a serpent?

Firstly, Moses (the implied author of Genesis and the Pentateuch) was born in Egypt and grew up in the royal household of Pharaoh. The first part of Acts 7:22 states: ‘And Moses was educated in all the learning of the Egyptians.’ According to Currid (1997:155) the author of Exodus and Numbers was familiar with Egyptian practices and beliefs. The Exodus and Numbers accounts, dealing with serpents, properly reflect ancient Egyptian customs of the New Kingdom Period. Thus, one can rightly perceive that the Hebrew people, who left Egypt with Moses in the exodus, were also accustomed to Egyptian culture and life.

Secondly, it is not a coincidence that the first five books of the Hebrew Scriptures incorporate several references to serpents, or to creatures frequently interpreted as serpents, using disparate Hebrew terms. For the Hebrew people in Egypt, surrounded by people who worshipped snakes as the attributes or personifications of various gods, the serpent would have been a prominent character, according to the Encyclopaedia Americana (1988:25, 100). It was a common phallic representation of pagan practices often used symbolically in parts of scripture. Thus, for the Hebrews, the serpent required no introduction.

Furthermore, God used this paganistic culture (of the Egyptians) against them (Exod 7:8-12). For example, the role of magic was significant in Egypt. This cannot be overlooked, especially in connection to their beliefs in serpents, and particularly, to the Exodus passage of Aaron’s rod and the magician’s serpents (Mircea 1987:49-50). Again, because the snake was significant to Pharaoh, his people, and the Hebrews, it required no introduction-it was a powerful symbol to them.

Although the symbol of a snake is predominantly associated with evil, there are occurrences where the symbol was a depiction for good. An example of this is the narrative of the Hebrew people, in which God sent fiery serpents among the people, in response to their criticism of the manna he provided (Num 21:6). Once the people of Israel repented, God told Moses to make a fiery serpent and set it on a pole. In this narrative, the serpent represented deliverance from sin, for anyone that looked upon this ‘statue’ lived. As stated in the New Unger’s Bible Dictionary (1988:185), the significance of looking on the bronze serpent and living, has a similar connotation. Healing is based on faith, not on the copper serpent itself. This is also emphasised in John 3:14— 15, where Jesus refers to this incident, reflecting that the Son of Man must be uplifted, that all who believe on him will have everlasting life.

According to Cooper (1978:146-148), the serpent symbolized both good and bad—life energy, resurrection, wisdom, power, cunning, death, darkness, evil, and corruption. One can observe the power of their paganistic culture exhibited clearly here, which presumably God turned and used for the Hebrews’ good (Num 21:9). In subsequent scriptural passages, it becomes apparent that the serpent is not just a snake, but customarily used to symbolise many types, especially the devil (e.g. Rev 20:2, 12:9, Luke 10:18; John 8:44). It may be tempting to conjecture this as the reason that God, when narrating the story to Moses, used the serpent symbolically. Equally, nothing here implies the serpent is non-literal. However, it certainly illustrates that, from the Israelites’ experience in pagan Egypt and its relation to snakes, the Hebrews would have readily understood the evil significance of the devil materializing in the form of a serpent, in order to tempt.

Furthermore, Genesis 3:1 clearly teaches that the serpent was a beast of the field which God had created. This implies that the serpent is not a supernatural being, further strengthening the case of a factual, rather than mythological serpent. One should also reflect on the following. Why would the narrator change from history to myth in a few sentences? When considering God and man in the narrative, the literality, as maintained by Murphy (1863:142-143), has never been questioned by those who acknowledge the event to be factual. Therefore, why would one now question the literality of the serpent?

It is therefore possible to infer that the serpent ‘who’ tempted Adam and Eve was factual, but also, symbolic of the devil himself. However, this poses another question: did the serpent have the power to tempt Adam and Eve to the point of them disobeying God? This is significant, as it demonstrates God’s character and willingness to help Adam and Eve to overcome their temptation. Since God is omniscient, God knew that Adam and Eve would disobey. This also raised a further question: if God is omnipotent and omniscient, why did he not prohibit the serpent, as the devil in the form of a serpent is no match for an omniscient and omnipotent God? Although this is a complex question to answer, the scriptures allude to God sanctioning sin to beget his providential design. This included permitting the serpent to persuade Adam and Eve to sin.

7. God’s Providence and the Sinful Acts of Humanity

The preceding statement necessitates the engagement of the following difficulty: the relationship between God’s work and the committing of sinful acts by humans. Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish between God’s normal working, in relation to human actions, and his working in relation to sinful acts. The scriptures make it clear that God is not the cause of sin. James records, ‘When tempted, no one should say, “God is tempting me”. For God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone; but each one is tempted when, by his own evil desire, he is dragged away and enticed’ (Jas 1:14). John declares: ‘For everything in the world—the cravings of sinful man, the lust of his eyes and the boasting of what he has and does, comes not from the Father but from the world’ (1 John 2:16).

But, if God does not cause the sinful actions of humans, what does it mean to say that humanity is under Gods influential providence? Strong (1907:423-425) declares that there are several ways in which God can, and does, relate to sin within his providence. He can prevent it, allow it, direct it, or limit it. In each case, God is not the cause of human sin, but acts in relation to it. The following illustration is helpful.

God does not always prevent sin. At times, he simply wills to allow it. Although it is not what he would desire to occur, he acquiesces in it. By not preventing the wilful sinning of humans, God essentially makes certain that humanity will indeed commit sin. Nonetheless, he does not cause them to sin, or render it necessary that they act in that fashion (see Acts 14:16, Rom 1:24-28).

God can also direct sin. While permitting certain sins to occur, God nevertheless directs them in such a way that good comes out of them. This is what Stauffer (1955:207) calls the law of reversal. Probably, the most dramatic recorded occurrence of this is the story of Joseph. Throughout the narrative of Joseph’s life, one sees the providential hand of God on him. When he did come face to face with his brothers, who had previously tried to kill him, he was able to declare: ‘So then, it was not you who sent me here, but God. He made me father to Pharaoh; lord of his entire household and ruler of all Egypt’ (Gen 45:8). Moreover, after the death of Jacob, he reiterated to them: ‘You intended to harm me, but God intended it for good to accomplish what is now being done, the saving of many lives’ (Gen 50:20). One should recognise here the remarkable nature of divine omnipotence. God often permits humans to do their worst, and still carry out his purposes. However, even when God permits sin to occur, he imposes limits beyond which it cannot go. This leads to the question, why God permitted the fall?

Although this paper specifically focuses on the literality of the characters in Genesis 2 and 3, the question, why God allowed the fall, requires succinct mention. This is a controversial question indeed. The momentous works of Calvin (Gerrish 2004), Luther (Tappert 1959), Augustine (Taylor 1982), or Barth (1969) testify to this fact. Of all the proposed solutions to the question, the answer of Williams (2007:229-230) seems most plausible. It is only through God permitting Adam to sin that he revealed specific attributes of his person. For example, there would have been no Calvary or demonstration of his unparalleled love, absolute holiness, mercy, and grace. Since deep love is only manifest under extreme conditions, it seems that God allowed this extreme condition (the fall) in order to manifest the full depth of his love towards humanity. Thus, God permitted the serpent to tempt Adam and Eve, much in the same way individuals are tempted today. To believe otherwise would surely be a criticism of God’s character as an omniscient, omnipotent being, and ascribe to the serpent more power than to God.

Certainly, human nature desires independence, power, and choice, as graphically illustrated by Adam and Eve. This is especially true in light of God decision to endow human beings with the power to make choices. The question, therefore, is this: from which tree do we choose to eat? The tree of good and evil that leads to banishment and death, or the tree of life found in Christ which leads to eternal life?

To illustrate this further, those who receive Christ as Saviour and Lord, are no longer in Adam but in Christ, the Last Adam, God’s new federal representative.

‘Most assuredly, I say to you, he who hears My Word and believes in Him who sent Me has everlasting life, and shall not come into judgement, but has passed from death into life’ (John 5:24). 

‘And so it is written, the first man Adam became a living being. The last Adam became a life-giving Spirit’ (1 Cor 15:45).

The events described in Genesis chapters 1 and 2 are not mythological. It is important for each Christian to understand and believe this, for such truth forms the foundation of other essential doctrines Without a proper understanding of the nature of God, the literal fall of the man Adam, the inability of man to win salvation through good works, and the principle of substitutionary sacrifice, one can never fully understand salvation through the gospel of Jesus Christ.

Conclusion

Many theologians and biblical scholars share the view that the Bible should be taken seriously, but not literally. The consequence of such sentiments is the view that Genesis is most likely mythological, or at best, an aetiological narrative which really only witnesses to a fundamental and enduring relationship between God and the world. However, such a view is incorrect, for scripture conveys religious ideas that one may accept independent of any cosmology, ancient or modern. In fact, current research on mitochondrial DNA confirms the existence of common descent (i.e. a literal first human couple).

The history of the fall recorded in Genesis chapters 2 and 3 is, for all intent and purpose, a literal history. It records facts which underlie the entire system of revealed truths. The Lord and the Apostles make references to the fall and Adam, not only as revealed truth, but also, as furnishing grounds for all God’s subsequent dispensations and dealings with humanity.

A correct theological understanding of the fall of Adam and Eve makes plain the fact that the characters in the narrative of the fall are literal characters, and not mythological. The subtlety of a humanistic view of sin, as argued by some professing to be Christians, is merely a veiled denial of original sin inherited by Adam’s disobedience in the Garden of Eden.

Any view which is in conflict with the impact of sin in a fallen world is not an option. The fallen condition of man is literal, and devastating. Man cannot take care of himself. God had to intervene through the coming of Christ.

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Notes

1. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the beliefs of the South African Theological Seminary.
2. The author is aware that one could (and many scholars do) consider the events of Genesis through the lens of the Literary Framework Theory, accordingly affirming the creation week structure and the events surrounding the fall to be more figurative than literal. Mortenson and Ury (2008:212) as an illustration, state that the creation week and similar events is intended to present Gods activities of creation, rather than a literal sequential one. The problem is, when applying this to the rest of Genesis 2 and 3 it may leave the narrative open to speculation, thus giving credence to the events as myth.
3. The rationale behind mentioning these scholarly works is simply to acknowledge that the ideas surrounding the interpretation of Genesis is still fragmentary, and open to much debate in varied religious assembles.
4. This will be revisited at the end of the paper to exemplify how the principles extracted from this narrative connect with modern human nature today.
5. Elohim is the generic term for God in Hebrew and emphasizes the power and creative aspects of God. God alone has this power.
6. There have been many proposals to identify the serpent, but the most common one is Satan. The idea of Satan as God’s cosmic foe, however, did not develop until much later, sometime in the postexilic era (see 1 Chr 21:1 and Zech 3:1-2). It must be noted that the author of Genesis did not connect the serpent and Satan (Hartley 2000:73).

Human Freedom And God’s Providence: Is There Conflict?

By Mark Pretorius[1]

[Mark holds an MA. in Biblical Studies from the University of Johannesburg and a PhD. in Systematic Theology from the University of Pretoria. He currently serves as a Senior Assessor and Postgraduate Supervisor at the South African Theological Seminary.]

Abstract 

How can we reconcile human freedom with God’s providence? The key, in my view, is bottom-up and top-down causality. These particular terms state that all events in the world are the result of some previous event, or events. Accordingly, all of reality is already in a sense predetermined or pre-existent and, therefore, nothing new can come into existence. But how does this impact on our actions? Are we predetermined to walk a specific path and, if so, how is this accomplished by God without violating our human freedom?

1. Introduction

Scripture does not precisely define the nature of human freedom, but philosophers and theologians do discuss it. In general, scholars usually present two main notions of freedom: libertarianism and compatibilism. These are mutually exclusive conceptions of human freedom, but both are internally consistent. Supporting the notion that both views of freedom are coherent and defensible, Flint (1988:177-179) proposes that “ultimately the view of freedom that one ought to embrace should be the view that best fits the biblical data, not our pre-conceived notions of what human freedom is or ought to be”.

Before unpacking this seeming enigma regarding human freedom in current philosophical and theological literature, the two basic views need to be dealt with as they impact on one coming to a reasonable conclusion on this subject.

The one is an indeterministic notion, sometimes called libertarian free will or incompatibilism. The other is a deterministic notion, referred to as compatibilism or soft determinism. The view of freedom to which one subscribes has dramatic implications for how one construes the relationship between divine sovereignty, omniscience, and human freedom.

What follows is a breakdown of the differences and similarities between libertarianism and compatibilism, and a possible solution to combining human freedom with God’s providence.

2. Libertarianism And Compatibilism

Compatibilists view human actions as causally determined, yet free (Wellum (2002:260). In other words, in contrast to a libertarianistic view, a compatibilist view of freedom perceives the human will as decisively and sufficiently inclined toward one option (Peterson et al. 1991:59). The will is deemed to be free as long as it meets the following requirements:

1. the immediate cause of the action is a desire, wish, or intention internal to the agent;
2. no external event or circumstances compels the action to be performed; and,
3. the agent could have acted differently if he or she had chosen to (see Peterson et al 1991:26-28).

If these three conditions are met, then even though the human action is determined, it may still be considered free. Feinberg (1987:400) summarises this view well when he states:

If the agent acts in accord with causes and reasons that serve as a sufficient condition for his doing the act, and if the causes do not force him to act contrary to his wishes, then a soft determinist would say that he acts freely.

The question is: What then do philosophers and theologians mean by a libertarianistic view of freedom? Simply stated, the most basic sense of this view is that a person’s act is free if it is not causally determined. For libertarians, this does not mean that one’s actions are random or arbitrary. In the view of Wellum (2002:259), reasons and causes play upon the will as one chooses, but none of them is sufficient to incline the will decisively in one direction or another. Thus, a person could have chosen other than he did. Basinger (1993:416) puts it this way: for a person to be free with respect to performing an action, he must have it within his power “to choose to perform action A or choose not to perform action A. Both A and not A could actually occur. However, which will actually occur has not yet been determined” (see Hasker 1983:32-44).

How then would a person committed to libertarianism conceive of the relationship between divine sovereignty and human freedom? What is the relationship between a libertarian view of human freedom and the way one conceives of God’s sovereign rule over the affairs of humanity. Without using the word in a disparaging or negative sense, one must in some sense “limit” God’s sovereignty (Wellum 2002:260). Instead, “limit” is used in the sense that God freely chooses to limit Himself by virtue that He has chosen to create a certain kind of world which contains human beings with libertarian freedom. In this sense then, “limit” does not refer to a weakness or flaw in God, but rather to a self-imposed limit that is part of His plan, not a violation of it (see also Cottrell 1989:108-110).

Obviously, this view is in stark contrast to the compatibilist or soft determinist view. According to the determinist, if a person acts in accord with causes and reasons that serve as a sufficient condition for the person doing the act, and the causes do not force the person to act contrary to his wishes, then a soft determinist would say the person has acted freely. This leads one to the next point of discussion, namely, divine omniscience.

3. Divine Omniscience

Traditionally, Christian theologians and philosophers have sought to maintain that God has complete and infallible knowledge of everything past, present, and future (Wellum 2002:262). Accordingly, Morris (1991:87) writes:

Not only is God omniscient, He is necessarily omniscient, i.e. it is impossible that His omniscience collapse, fail, or even waver. He is, as philosophers nowadays often say, omniscient in every possible world. That is to say, He is actually omniscient, and there is no possible, complete and coherent story about any way things could have gone (no possible world) in which God lacks this degree of cognitive excellence.

However, as scholars have long been discussing, this view of God’s omniscience does appear to generate a thorny problem. Simply put: How can one possibly conceive to be free in ones actions if God knows exactly how one will act on every occasion in the future. Morris (1991:89) poses the problem in this way:

If God already knows exactly how we shall act, what else can we possibly do? We must act in that way. We cannot diverge from the path that He sees we shall take. We cannot prove God wrong. He is necessarily omniscient. Divine foreknowledge thus seems to preclude genuine alternatives and thus genuine freedom in the world.

Clearly, this is a valid question, especially if one brings into the equation the study of nature from a scientific perspective. For example, Karl Barth and others of the neo-orthodox persuasion used the idea of primary and secondary causes to defend divine sovereignty over nature. At the same time though, they kept the idea of free will as a God-given attribute of human nature. Furthermore, Barth (1958:148) asserted that God “rules unconditionally and irresistibly in all occurrences”. Nature is God’s “servant”, the “instrument of His purposes”. God controls, orders, and determines, for “nothing can be done except the will of God.” God foreknows and also predetermines and foreordains. “The operation of God is as sovereign as Calvinist teaching describes it. In the strictest sense it is predestination”. Clearly, Barth affirms, in the view of Barbour (2000:160), both divine sovereignty and creaturely autonomy. As such, God controls, and all creaturely determinations are “wholly and utterly at the disposal of His power”. As a consequence, the creature “goes its own way, but in fact it always finds itself on God’s way.” Thus the idea is that all causality in the world is subordinate to God. For Barth, when a human hand writes with a pen, the whole action is performed by both the hand and the pen—not part by hand and part by pen. Barth further declared that creaturely causes, like the pen, are real, but “have their part only by submission” to the divine hand that guides them (Barth 1958:42, 94, 106, 133).

To add to this, Farrer (1966:76, 90) writes that “God’s agency must actually be such as to work omnipotently on, in, and through creaturely agencies, without either forcing them or competing with them”. As a result, God acts through the matrix of secondary causes and is manifest only in their overall pattern. “He does not impose an order against the grain of things, but makes them follow their own bent and work out the world by being themselves”. Barbour (2000:161) puts it this way, “we cannot say anything about how God acts; there are no ‘casual joints’ between infinite and finite actions and no gaps in the scientific account. So, too, the free act of a person can at the same time be ascribed to the person and to the grace of God acting in human life”.

It is at this point that some scholars propose presentism as a plausible solution to the foreknowledge-freedom problem. Presentism is a logically consistent theory, but represents a departure from traditional Christian belief. It strong insists that God knows everything there is to know, that is, God is truly omniscient. However, presentism then adds this very critical point: it is precisely future free actions of people that are impossible to know. Swinburne (1993:175) sums it up thus: “omniscience is knowledge of everything true which is logically possible to know”. Given libertarianistic freedom, they insist, it is impossible for anyone, including God Himself, to truly know what people will do since there are no antecedent sufficient conditions which decisively incline a person’s will in one direction over another. The problem is: When upholding a libertarianistic view of human freedom, one denies that God can know the future free actions of human beings. Some refer to this as open-theism.

4. God And Determinism

On the opposite side of this thinking lies the deterministic view, the claim that everything is determined. But is the determinist right?

Before addressing the arguments for determinism, it is necessary to correct some misconceptions about the deterministic position. According to Hasker (1983:37), it must be most strongly emphasised that determinists do not deny that people make choices. If they did deny this, their position would be absurd, but they do not. Besides, the experience of choosing—seeing alternatives, weighing up desirability, and finally making up one’s mind—is not any different whether one is a libertarian or a determinist. Thus, while determinists believe that there are sufficient conditions which will govern their choices, they do not know at any given time what those determinants are, or how they will decide as a result of them. So, like everyone else, they simply have to make up their own minds. As a result, the difference between the liberterianistic and determinist lies in interpreting the experience of choice, not in the experience itself.

What are the arguments for determinism? For some (perhaps many) determinists, determinism seems to have the status of an ultimate principle. For example, Leibniz (1996:66) found the principle of sufficient reason to be a necessary truth of reason. This particular principle states that for anything which occurs, there must be some sufficient reason that it occurs rather than something else. As such, Hasker (1983:38) asks: “And how can this be doubted? If there is no sufficient reason for something to happen, then this means that the reason that actually exists is insufficient, and if that were so, the event would not take place.”

However, Barrett (2004:146-147) believes differently. He states that the idea of divine providential action through hidden introduced active information—God subtly embeds within a person information to bring forth His will—is consonant with that of a gracious Creator who allows the creation to be itself and to have room to develop through the exercise of human free will, including the pathways of free procedures. This may also be accomplished via divinely installed guiding principles of chance and necessity. In Christian theology it is the Creator-Spirit who is thus creatively at work throughout space-time (see John 5:15; Rev 21:5). This Spirit of life is referred to by Taylor (1972:27-28) as the go-between God. He states:

God is ever at work in nature, in history and in human living, and wherever there is a flagging or corruption or self-destruction in God’s handiwork, He is present to renew and energize and create again … If we think of a Creator at all, we are to find Him always on the inside of creation. And if God is really on the inside, we must find Him in the process, not in the gaps. We know now that there are no gaps … If the hand of God is to be recognised in His continuous creation, it must be found not in isolated intrusions, not in any gaps, but in the very process itself.

Peacocke (1993:174-175) likens the role of the Creator to that of the composer

who, beginning with an arrangement of notes in an apparently simple subject, elaborates and expands it into a fugue by a variety of devices of fragmentation, augmentation and re-association … Thus might the Creator be imagined to enable (the unfolding of) the potentialities of the universe which He himself has given it, nurturing by His redemptive and providential actions those that are to come to fruition in the community of free beings—an improviser of unsurpassed ingenuity—a composer extemporizing a fugue on a given theme.

Although arguments such as these have considerable weight, many determinists believe the strongest reasons for their position come from the theory and practice of modern science. The most general scientific argument for determinism is found in the claim that determinism is a “methodological assumption”, a “necessary presupposition” of science (Hasker 1983:39). The scientist is seeking to understand, explain, and control nature; therefore, the way to reach this goal is by discovering and stating the universal laws to which natural processes conform. The scientist, to begin with, does not know what the laws are, that is, what he is trying to determine through investigation. However, it is absolutely essential to assume that such laws exist (i.e., the ones that determinism holds), for if he does not assume this, the whole endeavour makes no sense at all. And this applies as much to the science of human behaviour as to any other part of science. Thus Skinner (1962:257) states: “You can’t have a science about a subject matter which hops capriciously about. Perhaps we can never prove that man isn’t free; it’s an assumption. But the increasing success of a science of behaviour makes it more and more plausible.”

One should note that scientists can only presuppose determinism as a working hypothesis. As such, the claim that everything is determined is not a scientific conclusion, but rather a philosophical assumption. As Evans (1996:52) puts it:

No one has actually discovered the scientific laws that the determinists believe underlie all human behaviour. Though several generations of psychologists, sociologists, and social scientists of other stripes have laboured mightily, no one knows the laws of human behaviour that are in any way comparable to the laws discovered by the physical scientists.

5. God’s Actions

There is no doubt that the last twenty years has seen a remarkable renewal of interest in the relation of theology and science (see Sanders 2002). One particularly difficult tangle of issues has to do with the idea that God acts in the world, a belief which is deeply rooted in the theistic traditions. From a scientific view, Murphy (1996:4) defines these actions as a bottom-up and top-down causation.

The fundamental forces of physics underlie chemistry and biology, allowing emergent levels of order in the hierarchical structure of systems. Basic physical laws determine what happens at the microscopic level, and hence underlie functioning at the macroscopic levels, through bottom-up causation. The higher levels in turn, however, affect the processes at work at the lower levels through top-down causation (see also Peacocke 1993).

What is the relation between theological depictions of the world as the scene of divine action, and scientific descriptions of the world as an intelligible structure of natural law? Can God be understood to act entirely in and through the regular structures of nature or does a robust account of divine action also require the affirmation that God acts to redirect the course of events in the world, bringing about effects that would not have occurred had God not so acted? If one says the latter, then is one committed to the claim that God at least sometimes performs miracles, in the familiar (if truncated) modern sense of an event caused by God that “violates” the laws of nature?

No doubt a theistic biblical worldview involves a strong conception of divine sovereignty over the world and human affairs, even as it presumes human freedom and responsibility. While too numerous to list here, biblical passages affirming God’s sovereignty and divine action have been grouped by Carson (1981:24-35) under four main headings: (a) God is the creator, ruler, and possessor of all things, (b) God is the ultimate personal cause of all that happens, (c) God elects His people, and (d) God is the unacknowledged source of good fortune or success. As such, no one taking the many scriptural passages attesting to God’s actions in the world seriously can embrace currently fashionable libertarian revisionism, which denies God’s sovereignty over the contingent events of history.

However, there is no doubt according to Barrett (2004:142), that divine action is a long-standing topic of debate. If the world is no longer construed in terms of the mechanistic Newtonian picture but rather as a world of flexibility and openness to change, what is the manner and scope of divine action and wherein lies the causal joint? Where does God actually act? Furthermore, has God in eternity past determined the course of all future events? The key, in my view, is bottom-up and top-down causality.

6. Bottom-Up And Top-Down Causality

These particular terms state that all events in the world are the result of some previous event, or events. Accordingly, all of reality is already in a sense predetermined or pre-existent, and therefore nothing new can come into existence. This closed view of the universe sees all events in the world simply as effects of other prior effects—a sort of supervenience or emergence taking place—and has particular implications for morality, science, and theology. Ultimately, if determinism is correct, then all events in the future are as unalterable as are all events in the past. Consequently, human freedom is simply an illusion and the need of prayer, for example, is irrelevant in changing surrounding reality, as its course of action—in a sense—has already been determined. The question then is: how does this affect or impact on human freedom?

Regarding the question of determinism, Murphy (1995) has proposed that God determines all quantum indeterminacies but arranges that law-like regularities usually come about in order to make stable structures and scientific investigation possible, and to ensure that human actions have dependable outcomes, so that moral choices are thus possible. As such, orderly relationships do not constrain God, since He includes them in His purposes. Murphy holds that in human life God acts both at the quantum and at higher levels of mental activity, but does it in such a way that it does not violate human freedom.

An alternative would be to say that while most quantum events occur by chance, God influences certain quantum events without violating the statistical laws of quantum physics (see Russell 1998). However, a possible objection to this model is that it assumes bottom-up causality within nature once God’s action has occurred, and thus seems to concede the reductionism’s claim that the behaviour of all entities is determined by their smallest parts (or lowest levels). The action would be bottom-up even if one assumed that God directed His intents to the larger wholes (or higher levels) affected by these quantum events. However, most scholars in this field also allow for God’s action at higher levels, which then results in a top-down influence on lower levels, as well as quantum effects from the bottom-up.

In line with this, Peacocke (1993:215) says that without argument, God exerts a top-down causality on the world. In his view, God’s action is a boundary condition or constraint on relationships at lower levels that does not violate lower-level laws. Generally, boundary conditions may be introduced not just at the spatial or temporal boundaries of a system, but also internally through any additional specification allowed by lower-level laws. In human beings, God could influence the highest evolutionary level, that of mental activity, thereby modifying the neural networks and neurons in the brain.

Peacocke (1993:217) further maintains that divine action is effected in humans down the hierarchy of natural levels. As a result, one has at least some understanding of the relationships between adjacent levels. He suggests that God communicates His purposes through the pattern of events in the world. Thus, one can look on evolutionary history as acts of an agent who expresses intentions but does not follow an exact predetermined plan. Moreover, he says, God influences one’s memories, images, and ideas, just as ones thoughts influence the activity of neurons.

As such, ideas of top-down causation are invoked by both Peacocke (1993:157-165) and Polkinghorne (1998:60; 1994:31-32), but in different ways. Peacocke speaks of the relationship between Creator and creation in panentheistic terms, placing great emphasis on the immanence of God who is all the time creating in and through the processes of the world. These processes are themselves God’s action and are thus constrained to be what they are in all their subtlety and fecundity by virtue of the way God interacts with the world-as-a-whole. Sanders (2002:213) finds Peacocke’s position to be “the most promising current theory”, though he acknowledges that it operates at a high level of abstraction. Accordingly, knowing the interconnectedness of the world to the finest detail, one thus envisages God as being able to interact with the world “at a supervenient level of totality”—holistically—thereby bringing about particular events and patterns of events (i.e., His predetermined plan). To further expand on the concept of supervenience, Murphy (1996:23) states that it is a term coined by philosophers “to refer to the relation between properties of the same system that pertain to different levels of analysis”. However, Murphy does acknowledge that there are a variety of definitions of supervenience, meaning that the term can be used to describe how higher-level properties supervene on lower-level properties but are not reducible to them. Thus, for example, mental properties can be said to supervene on properties of the neurological system; moral properties supervene on psychological or sociological properties.

Taking the above into consideration, Barbour (2000:170) states that if quantum events have necessary but not sufficient physical causes, and if they are not completely determined by the relationships described by the laws of physics, their final determination might be made directly by God. What appears to be chance—which atheists take as an argument against theism—may be the very point at which God acts. Such interaction, then, amounts to the input of information of a pattern-forming nature; the energy content of which can be vanishingly small so that there is no breach in the causal network of natural law. Indeed, it is a form of top-down causation that Peacocke prefers to call whole-part influence. Thus, in the view of Murphy (1996:20), Peacocke has made an important contribution to the dialogue between theology and science by suggesting that theology be understood as the science at the top of the hierarchy, since it studies the most complex of all systems, the interaction between God and the entire universe. Like Sanders (2002), Murphy believes that Peacocke has made an important contribution with his model. For Peacocke, his concern is always to interpret the world’s happenings as naturalistically as possible, seeing this as a crucial task of theology in the scientific age. However, in the view of Barbour (2000:170), scientific research finds only law and chance, but perhaps in God’s knowledge all events are foreseen and predetermined through a combination of law and particular divine action. Since God’s action would be scientifically undetectable, it could be neither proved nor refuted by science. This would exclude any proof of God’s action of the kind sought in natural theology, but it would not exclude the possibility of God’s action affirmed on other grounds in a wider theology of nature.

Consequently, Polkinghorne (1998) also speaks of top-down causality through providing similarly energy-less active information, although he suggests a more direct input into the world’s processes—chaos concept. In my view, “chaos” is difficult to define. According to Gleick (1988:306), of the chaos scientists he interviewed “No one could quite agree on a definition of the word itself”. However, in the view of Polkinghorne, with the chaos concepts of butterfly effect and strange attractor in mind, it is conceivable that pattern-forming information can lead a system from one arrangement to another. Meaning, since any trajectory from one point within its strange attractor to another does not involve any change of total energy. Thus, Polkinghorne suggests, the divine will could be exerted within any macroscopic part of the world’s structure. Besides, he also believes that there is a greater dynamical openness for divine agency via chaotic systems than simply through holistic operation on the world-as-a-whole. However, Bak (1997:31) has challenged this theory. According to him, the chaotic theory is not robust, since the critical state only occurs in the ephemeral interface between disordered and ordered states. Furthermore, chaotic systems tend to oscillate back and forth due to the strange attractor and cannot build up unique systems slowly over time. In Bak’s (1997:31) words, “Chaos theory cannot explain complexity”. However, according to Polkinghorne (1998:36), when challenged, macroscopic physical systems—even in their chaotic mode—follow deterministic equations and therefore cannot be expected to offer any room for manoeuvre. Furthermore, he states, the equations can be understood as estimations to true physical reality, applicable in only those rare and specific situations in which a system can be treated as totally isolated from its environment.

Could divine causality perhaps function only through those who submit by faith to God. Meaning, if people render their wills to God, believing that He knows best, they can then say that no violation of human freedom is forthcoming, since it was freely given over to God to do as He pleases. Thus, when they freely render their wills over to God, He can freely exercise top-down-causality through them, to fulfil His will on the earth. Perhaps those who do not freely submit their wills are not in God’s will, so to speak; thus their prayers, for example, are not necessarily answered, specifically if they are not part of God’s providential plan for their and others’ lives? Therefore, the bottom-up causality will still affect their course of action, so God’s divine will is still coming about throughout creation, even though uncommitted minds or mental processors are in the equation.

To sum up, one could present it as follows: God could, in a sense, place laws of determinacy into cells at the quantum level. From this a determined emergence could occur throughout the different levels till it reaches the mental states (see Murphy 1996:23). From this mental state, ideas could emerge—one could call them God ideas (see Barbour 2000:170). It is at this level that one could either determine or reject, by an act of free-will, to go forward with the emerging ideas to bring about changes in the natural realm of reality. For Murphy (1996:25), this is where top-down action occurs; when human volition is involved. Consequently, this brings about the necessary causal changes with the capacity to influence that which sustains its very existence—the natural realm. Thus one has the combination of upward determinism and downward causation. This then brings about human experience, which then changes and adjusts human nature as God would have.

When using prayer as an example of how the process may work, one could say that prayer is the causal joint to start the process of bringing about His will on this earth as the person praying, to a large degree, is rendering their will to a higher power. In other words, as one submits to God, so the ideas and desires regarding what to pray subtly come on a person’s thoughts through emergent properties determined by God at the quantum level. When one prays out those ideas and thoughts that emerge, one is, in a sense, praying God’s determined will on the earth, and as a result, things begin to change in the physical.

7. Conclusion

Despite the expression of hope suggested by a libertarianistic view of human freedom, we must realise just how significant is this sense of risk that God supposedly accepts (Ware 2000:51). This is especially so when He chose to create the kind of world He has created. The fact is that the view in question brings into existence a kind of world in which He largely really only exercises a power of love and persuasion towards His volitional creatures. All their free decisions, unknown in advance by Him, have the potential of either advancing or violating His purposes. The success of these purposes rests, rather significantly, in others’ hands. One then has to say that not even God knows whether His purposes will be fulfilled. We must conclude, therefore, that a libertarianistic view of human freedom is not an option for a theistic view of God. Rather a soft-deterministic view, which merges the ideas of bottom-up and top-down causality, is the better option. In this way, human freedom is not violated, but works within the bounds of Gods providence and sovereignty to bring about His will on earth.

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Sanders J 1998. The God who risks: a theology of providence. Downers Grove: IVP.

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Notes

1. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the beliefs of the South African Theological Seminary.

How Does Prayer Affect God’s Plan? An Enquiry into God’s Providence with Special Reference to Prayer and Healing

By Mark Pretorius

[Mark Pretorius is the Senior Assessor at the South African Theological Seminary. He holds an MA. in Biblical Studies from the University of Johannesburg and is presently working towards a PhD. in Systematic Theology at the University of Pretoria.]

Abstract

If God is sovereign and His plans fixed, why pray? Does prayer change what God has purposed to do? If not, what is the point in praying? One could take these questions even further and say: if prayer has any effect on what happens, then it would seem that God’s plans are not fixed. On the other hand, if God has settled His plans and He will do what He is going to do, then does it matter whether we pray or not? Every committed Christian wants to believe that prayer makes a difference. Thus, this article has a twofold purpose. The first is to show that God’s providential plans and His command for Christians to pray are consistent with His purpose to bring about His plans through prayer. The second is to answer the question: does God heal when one prays, and specifically when it comes to intercessory prayer? Bringing clarity to these questions is important as it has a direct bearing on how we will view miracles and God’s willingness to answer prayer.

1. Introduction

The first question one might ask in a debate about the providential hand of God on His creation is: how should one, in this context, define providence? According to Tupper (1985:579), providence means that God “sees ahead” and “watches after” creaturely existence generally and each individual specifically. Williams (1996:117) defines providence as “the overseeing care and guardianship of God for all His creation.” As such, God is understood as one intimately concerned with His creation. In certain ways, God is central to the conduct of the Christian life, as it means Christians are able to live in the assurance that God is present and continuously active in their lives.

However, the role of prayer is a problem that has concerned thoughtful Christians when considering the nature of providence, and how it links up to miraculous events, and specifically, physical healing. Erickson (2001:430) states that the difficulty stems from the question, “What does prayer really accomplish?” On the one hand, if prayer has any effect on what happens, then it seems that God’s plan was not fixed in the first place. On the other hand, if God has settled His plan and He will do what He is going to do, then does it matter whether one prays or not? Every committed Christian wants to believe that prayer makes a difference. According to Ware (2000:164): “What is the point in praying, if prayer itself turns out to be superfluous and ineffectual?”

2. Providence in Prayer and Healing

One should note from the start of this discussion that the above question is simply one particular form of the larger issue of the relationship between human effort and divine providence. Barth (1958:148) defines divine providence in terms of the sovereignty of God when he states that God …

rules unconditionally and irresistibly in all affairs…. Nature is God’s ‘servant’, the instrument of His purposes…. God controls, orders, and decides, for nothing can be done except the will of God…. God foreknows and predetermines and foreordains.

Although this statement is true, it does appear from Scripture that God often works in some sort of partnership with humans. One could, in a sense say that God does not act unless humans do play their part. Thus, when Jesus ministered in His hometown of Nazareth, He did not perform any major miracles; all He did was heal a few sick people. Scripture states that Jesus “was amazed at their lack of faith” (Mark 6:6), suggesting the people of Nazareth simply did not bring their needy ones to Him for healing. Often the act of faith was necessary for the Lord to act, but it seems that this was lacking in Nazareth. To see it from another perspective, Bloesch (1978:31, 57) explains:

While God’s ultimate purposes are unchangeable..., His immediate will is flexible and open to change through the prayers of His people. A personal God, who loves and cares, can be solicited in prayer. Prayer can work miracles because God makes Himself dependent on the requests of His children.

Erickson (2001:431) rightly adds that when God wills the end, He also wills the means. Therefore, prayer does not change what God has purposed to do; it is simply the means by which He carries out His final objective.

Although Thiessen (1979:129) states that some hold that prayer can have no real effect on God, since He has already decreed just what He will do in every instance, he does argue that this is an extreme position. One must not ignore James 4:2, “You do not have because you do not ask.” One could say, God does some things only in answer to prayer, He does other things without anyone’s praying, and He does some things contrary to the prayers offered. In His omniscience God has already taken all these things into account, and in His providence He sovereignly works out everything in accordance with His own purpose and plan. Thiessen further argues:

If we do not pray for the things that we might get by prayer, we do not get them. If He wants something done for which no one prays, He will do them without anyone praying. If we pray for things contrary to His will, He refuses to grant them. Thus, there is a perfect harmony between His purpose and providence, and man’s freedom.

In this regard, we need to consider the contentious issue concerning whether God heals when one prays.

The twentieth and early twenty-first century has seen a remarkable growth in interest in the subject of the spiritual healing of the body. This growth has arisen in three related but distinct stages of movements (see Erickson 2001:852–853). Firstly, the Pentecostal movement, which arose and grew in the United States in the early part of the twentieth century, and stressed the return of certain of the more spectacular gifts of the Holy Spirit. Then, about the middle of the century, the Neo-Pentecostal or Charismatic movement began; it had many of the same emphases. In the 1980’s and onwards the “Third Wave” arose. These movements put greater stress on the miracles of spiritual healing than does Christianity in general. Often they make no real attempt to give a theological explanation or basis for these healings. As such, when one raises the question, the answer often given is that healing, no less than forgiveness of sins and salvation, is to be found within the atonement. The argument is that Christ died to carry away not only sin, but sickness as well. Among the major advocates of this view was A. B. Simpson, founder of what is today known as the Christian and Missionary Alliance.

One of the striking features of the view that Christ’s death brings healing for the body, according to Simpson (1880:30–31), is the idea that the presence of illness in the world is a result of the fall. When sin entered the human race, a curse (actually a series of curses) was pronounced on humanity; diseases were part of that curse. Since illness is a result of the fall, not simply of the natural constitution of things, it cannot be combated solely by natural means. Being of spiritual origin, it must be combated in the same way the rest of the effects of the fall are combated—by spiritual means, and specifically by Christ’s work of atonement. Intended to counter the effects of the fall, His death covers not only guilt for humanity’s sin, but also humanity’s sickness. Healing of the body is therefore part of a Christian’s great redemption right. And if that is the case, then when one prays for a healing, whatever the sickness might be, healing should take place.

However, the research that has been undertaken on the relationship between prayer and healing over several decades does not confirm the above contention. The following is a breakdown of these findings.

3. Historical Aspects of Prayer and Medicine

In various interviews and surveys undertaken over several decades by prominent scientists and medical doctors (see Meyers and Benson 1992; Angel 1985; Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good 1978; and Engel 1977), it was found that most people believe that not only does the mind affect the body (a view with which most scientists would agree), but there are also supernatural forces that have an intense effect on one's physical and emotional well-being (a view with which most scientists would disagree).

From a scientific perspective, the important question is: how should one deal with reports of miraculous healings and the belief that prayer can affect healing? Is there a special connection between belief in the supernatural and physical well-being? With the accelerating technical advances of Western medicine, there are increasing patient complaints against the medical community for their exclusionary focus on the biomedical model of disease. According to these surveys, it would seem that many patients, particularly if their disease is severe, want metaphysical as well as medical interventions; that is, they want a direct link from their medical care to God.

In a later study, and in response to these findings, McCullough (1995:15–29), in a review of the prayer literature, considered the following four areas of prayer research:

1. prayer and subjective well being;
2. prayer as a form of coping;
3. prayer and psychiatric symptoms;
4. intercessory prayer.

He reported that both the frequency of prayer and the presence of mystical and religious experience during prayer were predictive of subjective well being on many indexes. It was, however, stated that several confounds in the studies reviewed rendered the data interpretation problematic. Variables such as religious commitment and socio-demographics were not controlled. Thus, if one prays often but has little commitment to religious belief, the positive affects on subjective well being may be predicted to diminish.

McCullough further observed that prayer is used more often for symptoms that have been treated with medication, and have been discussed with a physician, than those that have not. One obvious problem found is that prayer as an effective coping response is confounded with medical treatment. Thus, as one experiences the effect of the medical treatment, there may be a tendency to credit change to prayer.

What about intercessory prayer, or the act of praying for another? Sir Francis Galton (1872:125–135) was the first to apply statistical analysis in trying to determine the effects of intercessory prayer. While his data collection method was flawed, he inferred that intercessory prayer was not a significant predictor of life span or social class. Since Galton's study in 1872, there have been six empirical studies looking into the effect of intercessory prayer. Collipp (1969:201–204), Elkins, Anchor and Sandler (1979:81–87), Joyce and Weldon (1965:367–377), O'Laoire (1997:38–53), and Wirth and Barret (1994:61–67) all studied the effect of prayer on various medical conditions and found no statistically significant effect for intercessory prayer. Green (1993:2752), however, did find positive expectancy (the belief in the effectiveness of prayer) in relation to intercessory prayer to have a significant effect on patient anxiety levels. Thus, for those patients who had a high expectancy for the effectiveness of prayer to reduce anxiety, anxiety was reduced.

These studies do not validate or deny the effect of prayer. The question remains unanswered: does prayer work?

4. Does Prayer Work?

One might ask, should medical doctors or psychologists advise their patients to pray? According to Sloan, Bagiella and Powell (1999:664–667), ”it is premature to promote faith and religion as adjunctive medical treatments.” They state that the existing research on the effect of prayer is so flawed that it simply does not warrant belief in prayer for physical and emotional well being. However, in my view, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that expectancies for desired outcomes, social connectedness, and deep religious positive expectancies may be effective buffers for the stressors associated with various medical conditions. As such, any intervention that improves patient well being is valuable.

It is unfortunate that many of the studies undertaken in the area of prayer and healing were based on empirical data that tended to disregard the omnipotence and omni-benevolence of God. It was also not indicated whether any of the subjects interviewed, or the scientists conducting the experiments, had a trusting faith in God, even though they did pray. To date, I have not found any major research undertaken by evangelicals to counter claim these findings. Sadly, many scholars, even those in the theological disciplines, are sceptical when it comes to anything related to healing or any miraculous events. Bultmann (1958:16), for example, asserted that miracles were “mythology.” He wrote, “Modern men take it for granted that the course of nature and history … is nowhere interrupted by the intervention of supernatural powers.”

The question remains as to why the Bible would instruct Christians to pray in all circumstances, if God were not going to answer any of their prayers, especially prayers for healing. It was stated that the data presented was flawed, and that much research is still needed in this area. However, the question arises: is that a good enough answer in the light of the negative statements made within these studies regarding the relationship between prayer and healing?

In all fairness, it must be said that science deals with facts. Facts, according to Barton (1999:17), are the instruments the natural scientist uses to build a coherent framework for understanding the world. The problem is that as this framework has developed, it has come into conflict with religion and will continue to be in conflict with religion in future studies that it undertakes until common ground is reached between the two disciplines. As science is exposed to new data, it is subject to change; therefore, it is continuously evolving. There are no absolutes at this time in the scientific world, especially in its understanding of prayer. No scientist quoted in this study can claim that his or her observations have acquired the status of ultimate truth. In this vein, the following letter sums up the general consensus regarding the limitations of science.

In a letter written to the scientific magazine Nature, Donald MacKay (1997:502) from the Department of Communications and Neuroscience at the University of Keele in the United Kingdom wrote:

In scientific laws we describe, as best we can, the pattern of precedent we observe in the sequence of natural events. While our laws do not prescribe what must happen, they do prescribe what we ought to expect on the basis of precedent. If by a “miracle” we mean an unprecedented event …, then science says that miracles ought not be expected on the basis of precedent. What science does not (and cannot) say … is that the unprecedented does not (or cannot) occur …. We cannot dogmatically exclude the ever present possibility that the truth about our world is stranger than we have imagined.

Although science has achieved enormous success as a way of knowing the structures and processes of the material world, natural science, it appears, leaves no place for divine action. However, it must also be stated that it is a human moral trait to seek explanations. As such, scientists could claim that they are conducting research simply for the sake of understanding how nature operates, whether that is in the field of religion or any other discipline that deals with unexplainable events (e.g., quantum physics). Thus, those who study natural science need to understand that if breakthroughs are to be achieved in the dialogue between science and religion, scientific methods, as advanced as they are, hold no intrinsic guarantee that these methods can lead to ultimate truth. This is specifically so when it comes to unexpected happenings, such as when one prays and things happen.

To expand on this statement, Bloesch (1978:58) writes:

Evangelical prayer is based on the view that a sovereign God can and does make himself dependent on the requests of His children. He chooses to realise His purposes in the world in collaboration with His people. To be sure, God knows our needs before we ask, but He desires that we discuss them with Him so that He might work with us as His covenant partners toward their solution. There is, of course, a time to submit as well as a time to strive and wrestle with God in prayer, but this should come always at the end of prayer and never at the beginning. Moreover, our submission is not a passive resignation to fate but a relinquishing of our desires and requests into the hands of a living God to answer as He wills.

As previously mentioned, some theologians are sceptical when it comes to the issue of praying for change. Moltmann, for example, broke with monotheism and embraced a Hegelian form of panentheism (see Heiler 1958). Panentheists believe the providential plan of God regarding prayer is more to change the one who prays than to change circumstances. Moltmann (2001:247–249) contends; one can no longer pray to God but only in God, that is, in the Spirit of God. Prayer, in many cases, has come to be reinterpreted as soliloquy, that is, reflection on life or meditation on the ground of being. In the same vein, others (e.g., Tillich 1957 and Schleiermacher 1963), believe that prayer should only take the form of gratitude, resignation, or meditation, rather than a petition to alter the ways of God. In some circles, prayer is understood as a consciousness-raising experience which brings one into tune with the infinite.

According to Hannah (1979:347), although prayer is a form of meditation and reflection, it is also a means of sanctifying grace. It results, in his view, in altering the person; that is, it affects the person’s spiritual maturity. Calvin (1970:146–147) expands on this by eloquently arguing that prayer changes the one who prays.

The necessity and utility of this exercise of prayer no words can sufficiently express. Assuredly it is not without cause our heavenly Father declares that our only safety is in calling upon His name, since by it we invoke the presence of His providence to watch over our interests, of His power to sustain us when weak and almost fainting, of His goodness to receive us into favour, though miserably loaded with sin, in fine, call upon Him to manifest himself to us in all His perfection. Hence, admirably peace and tranquillity are given to our conscience; for the straits by which we were pressed being laid before the Lord, we rest fully satisfied with the assurance that none of our evils are unknown to Him, and that He is able and willing to make the best provision for us.

Regarding this, Dabney (1972:716) simply writes, “Prayer is not intended to produce a change in God, but in us.” To argue that prayer changes the one who prays is most likely not to be challenged. It is readily apparent that people change when they spend time with God.

This is very much in line with the findings undertaken by Green (1993:2752) and Sloan, Bagiella and Powell (1999:664–667), who stated that for those patients who had a high expectancy for the effectiveness of prayer to reduce anxiety, anxiety levels were indeed reduced and may also have been effective buffers for the stressors associated with various medical conditions.

In my view, what these scholars and researchers fail to recognise, is that prayer is an essential part of Christian living, especially intercessory prayer. Paul, writing to Timothy, states the following in 1 Timothy 2:1–2, “I urge that supplication, prayers, intercession, and thanksgiving be made for all men, for kings and all who are in high positions.” While no sharp distinction can be drawn between “supplications” and “intercessions,” petitionary prayers are to be offered on behalf of others. But this does not, unfortunately, answer the question—does God heal someone at his or her own request, or at the request of others, as in the case of intercessory prayer? To answer this question one would first need to determine how a miracle would or could take place, especially in the area of healing.

5. Miracles of Healing

Nichols (2002:711) states that miracles usually occur within a context of faith and prayer, but one would not want to limit God’s miraculous activity only to contexts of faith and prayer. For example, Erickson (2001:432) writes that some theorise that miracles recorded in the Bible were probably a suspension of natural laws. An example of this is the case of the axe head that floated (2 Kings 6:6). The theory suggests that for a brief period of time, in that cubic foot or so of water, the law of gravity was suspended. In effect, God turned off the law of gravity until the axe head was recovered. The problem with such examples is that the breaking of such laws of nature usually introduces complications requiring a whole series of compensating miracles. For one thing, there is no hint in the narratives to explain the following question: if God suspended the laws of gravity to float the axe head, how would everything else connected to the miracle react?

From a theological perspective, one would rather say that when miracles occur (whether that is an answer to prayer for healing or any similar related requests), natural laws are countered by supernatural forces (see Lewis 1947:59–61). In this view, the laws of nature are not suspended, but continue to operate. In the process a supernatural law is introduced, negating the effect of the natural law (e.g., a sickness that has attacked the body because of the fallen state of humanity). There are two other possible ways of understanding how God may act in a miracle of healing. The first is the traditional way, namely, God responds to prayer, faith, and holiness. If a righteous person (or group of people) prays in faith to God for a healing, God may respond.

A second way is this: perhaps God’s activity, or “energy,” to use a modern analogy is always and everywhere available, like an extended field or supporting context. Pannenberg (1994:83), for example, argues that the Spirit of God may be viewed (analogically) as a dynamic field, a field that can be accessed only by those who open themselves to God in faith, holiness, and prayer.

The first model, in the view of Nichols (2002:712), envisages God’s action in terms of personal response; the second represents it as a field or context phenomenon; the field is always present but only some access it. One could say that both of these models are necessary to understand miracles, just as both particle and wave models are necessary to understand subatomic particles or the nature of light. The models are complementary, and either one without the other is incomplete. The first model explains the fact that many miracles do seem to be responses to prayer, but by itself it is open to the objection: why God does not heal everyone who prays? The reason may be that to access the divine energy, a person must surrender to God in faith and prayer. If few people are doing this, it underlines the importance of my earlier question: “Did the people involved in the experiments have a trusting faith in God?” It is not that God plays favourites and rewards those who grovel. It is rather that those who are not deeply surrendered to God cannot access God’s power because they are not “tuned in.” For God to act fully in one’s life, one would need to be receptive.

If there is divine activity in miracles, however, can one explain how it influences physical processes?

Unfortunately, it is difficult at present to understand the mechanism of physical processes. According to Nichols (2002:712), it may be that God acts at the quantum level as the determiner of indeterminacies. Quantum states, which are indeterminate, are determined by divine activity to influence physical processes. Robert Russell (1998) has proposed this model of divine activity as a way of explaining theistic evolution and special providence. Although this might account for an accelerated healing, it is hard to see how it could account for more dramatic miracles like the resurrection.

One could answer this question in broad terms by saying that theologically, and even logically, God cannot be completely separate from the created order. If God were transcendent, He could not influence the world and the world could not influence Him. This is not the Christian idea of God; rather, it is the Deist idea, a result of viewing the universe as a self-enclosed mechanical system that leaves God on the outside. God’s essence is to exist; God is the act of existence from which all other existent things draw their existence. There is therefore continuity as well as a discontinuity between God and creation. Rahner (1965:53–61) has advanced the notion that matter/energy and what theologians call finite spirit exist in a kind of continuity. If so, (finite) spirit (such as the soul), could influence matter directly, and God, in turn, could influence the soul. (This is how Aquinas explains the resurrection.) Nichols (2002:713), however, argues against this, and states that God never acts as one force alongside other physical forces. Rather, God acts in creation immediately, to empower nature to transcend itself. Therefore, according to Erickson (2001:434), there should really be no problem when one faces events that run contrary to what natural laws dictate. Twenty-first century science is more likely than was the twentieth century to recognise natural laws as merely statistical reports of what has happened. From a purely empirical standpoint, one has no logical grounds on which to base whether the course of nature is fixed, or whether it can be successfully opposed.

It was stated in the beginning of this paper that God, in His omniscience, has taken all these things into account, and in His providence, He sovereignly works them out in accordance with His own purpose and plan. Regarding this, Hodge (1976:91) aptly argues,

The scriptures assure us, and all Christians believe, that prayer for material as well as for spiritual good is as real a means affecting the end sought as is sowing seed a means of getting a crop, or as is studying a means of getting learning, or as are praying and reading the Bible a means of sanctification. But it is a moral not a physical cause. Its efficiency consists in its power of affecting the mind of God and disposing Him to do for us what He would not do if we did not pray.

Furthermore, Packer (1997:29) clearly and rightly addresses this contentious area of God’s providence and healing in the following way:

Petitions for healing or anything else are not magic spells, nor do they have the effect by putting God under pressure and twisting His arm…. Non-Christian prayers for healing may surprise us by leading to healing; Christian prayers for healing may surprise us by not being answered that way. There are always surprises with God. But with God’s children ‘ask and you will receive’ is always true, and what they receive when they ask is always God’s best for them long-term, even when it is a short-term disappointment. Some things are certain, and that is one of them.

6. Conclusion

In concluding, one might again ask the question: how does prayer affect God’s providential workings in creation—whether that is in the area of healing or any other suspension or alteration of natural laws? To a scientist and to a theologian, miraculous events might, of course, simply be illusions; events that are really fabrications, coincidences, or the results of some mysterious power of the mind or even an unknown law of nature and not of any divine activity. In other words, there are no miracles; theologically speaking, there are only unusual events. This, of course, is a hypothesis that remains to be proven. But, if part of the cause of a miraculous event is divine providence, then to a scientist, a miracle, whether it is a supernatural causal event or a healing taking place within a person, will appear simply as an inexplicable event, a mystery that seems to go beyond what can be explained by natural causality.

If, on the other hand, divine providence is suggested as the main factor in Divine activity, then miracles should be of interest to all those who are trying to understand how God acts in the world. To the believer, then, the providence of God is not an abstract conception. It is the believer’s conviction that he or she is in the hands of a wise and powerful God, who will accomplish His purposes in the world—whether it be through the answering or not answering of the prayer for healing or for any other need.

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