Whose Theology Is This? Dave Hunt’s Misrepresentation Of Calvinism

By Mark R. Stevenson

Mark Stevenson is a faculty member at Emmaus Bible College and the Book Review Editor of The Emmaus Journal.

Introduction

The debate over divine sovereignty and human freedom has exercised the church for centuries. Every generation produces new voices that advance the polemics and keep the debate alive. Some voices offer more insight than others. Occasionally the controversy is conducted in a fair and even helpful manner. At other times, the disagreement becomes so heated that, sadly, damage is done to relationships and churches. In a manner of speaking, Christians struggle to maintain their sanctification when the subject turns to issues of Calvinism and Arminianism.

In recent years retired businessman Dave Hunt has entered the fray. Hunt has expended a great deal of energy in an attempt to debunk Calvinism. He has published several books [1] and numerous monthly newsletters [2] on the subject. My analysis of Hunt’s work is based primarily on the updated and expanded edition of his book What Love Is This? Calvinism’s Misrepresentation of God, released in 2004 and self-published by his ministry, “The Berean Call.” [3] Not surprisingly, the first edition was met with strong objections from Calvinists. As one reviewer put it, “The debate over God’s sovereignty in salvation has reached a new low with the publication of this book.” [4] Others called it, “the most egregious misrepresentation of Calvinism in print today.” [5] Such assessments need not be revised in connection with the expanded edition.

My thesis is that while Dave Hunt condemns Calvinism as unbiblical, often what he attacks is not historic Calvinism at all but his own distortion and misrepresentation of it. Furthermore, I contend that in his attempts to correct Calvinism’s “errors,” Hunt leaves a trail of theological problems unresolved.

I do not feel compelled to defend “Calvinism” as a system of theology—and certainly not Hunt’s portrayal of it. My loyalty is to Christ and the authority of Scripture. My concern however is that, in Hunt’s zeal to discredit Calvinism, he engages in tactics that do not promote understanding or healthy dialogue over important biblical issues, which in turn leads to further discord within the church. Thus, I will lay out a number of concerns regarding Hunt’s methodology and then take up a few representative theological concerns.

Methodological Concerns

Inflammatory Rhetoric

Dave Hunt’s apparent goal is to create strong feelings against Calvinism through misrepresentation and inflammatory rhetoric. For example, he says, “Never forget that the ultimate aim of Calvinism…is to prove that God does not love everyone, is not merciful to all, and is pleased to damn billions.” [6] No Calvinist would recognize such a gross distortion of his position.

Unfortunately Hunt repeatedly [7] employs such rhetorical hubris to malign Calvinism. For example, he summarizes the doctrine of total depravity in the following provocative manner: “Take a human understanding of ‘dead’, mix it together with the young John Calvin’s immature understanding of God’s Word, tainted by Augustinian philosophy, stir it all up, and out comes the theory of Total Depravity” (151). [8] Such amateurish banter is difficult to take seriously.

Again and again Hunt declares that Calvinism is not biblical. [9] For example, he announces, “No Calvinist has ever given a biblical explanation for Irresistible Grace” (368). Hunt may not agree with a Calvinist interpretation of certain texts, but to suggest that Calvinists do not even offer a biblical case for their position is simply absurd. [10]

Curious Use Of Sources

One of Hunt’s strategies to discredit Calvinism is to show how dependent Calvin was on Augustine and, in turn, how much influence Augustine had in shaping the Roman Catholic Church. Yet along the way, Hunt misleads his readers. For example, in introducing Augustine, he writes:

Although the Roman Catholic Church had not yet assumed its present form and power, the foundations were being laid in which Augustine played a leading role. [11] Already, on February 27, 380, the “Edict of the Emperor Gratian, Valentinian II, and Theodosius I” declared: 

We order those who follow this doctrine to receive the title of Catholic Christians, but others we judge to be mad and raving and worthy of incurring the disgrace of heretical teaching, nor are their assemblies to receive the name of churches. They are to be punished not only by Divine retribution but also by our own measures, which we have decided in accordance with Divine inspiration. [12]

It is not at all clear what Hunt is seeking to demonstrate by citing this particular edict; possibly the heavy-handedness of the state in enforcing religious dogmas at the time. Or perhaps the reader might conclude that “this doctrine” refers to some questionable Augustinian teaching. However, Augustine had not even converted to Christianity in 380. He was still teaching rhetoric in Carthage. [13] Furthermore, the edict is speaking about the doctrine of the Trinity. The statement that immediately precedes Hunt’s quotation reads:

This faith is that we should believe, in accordance with apostolic discipline and Gospel teaching, that there is one Godhead, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, in an equal Majesty and a holy Trinity. We order those who follow this doctrine to receive the title of Catholic Christians. [14]

Whatever Hunt’s purpose in citing a truncated portion of the edict, it does not demonstrate Augustine’s influence on the Roman Catholic Church! If anything, it demonstrates that precedence for the use of force in religious affairs had been set by the state well before Augustine approved of it.

Through extensive use of ellipses and disregard for the context of statements, Hunt often manipulates his sources in an attempt to bolster his point. A couple of examples will illustrate the disturbing pattern found throughout the book. First, Hunt quotes A. H. Strong to demonstrate “a non-Calvinist understanding of Scripture concerning human responsibility and ability.” He writes, “While seeming to affirm ‘inability’ due to total depravity, at the same time A. H. Strong insisted, ‘The sinner can…seek God from motives of self-interest…. The sinner can…give attention to divine truth’” (137).

Taken in context, Strong was simply clarifying that the doctrine of human inability does not mean humans are unable to make any moral choices; it means that they are unable to move in a proper Godward direction. Here are Strong’s comments in context:

In opposition to the plenary ability taught by the Pelagians, the gracious ability of the Arminians, and the natural ability of the New School theologians, the Scriptures declare the total inability of the sinner to turn himself to God or to do that which is truly good in God’s sight…. Yet there is a certain remnant of freedom left to man. The sinner can (a) avoid the sin against the Holy Ghost; (b) choose the less sin rather than the greater; (c) refuse altogether to yield to certain temptations; (d) do outwardly good acts, though with imperfect motives; (e) seek God from motives of self-interest. 

But on the other hand the sinner cannot (a) by a single volition bring his character and life into complete conformity to God’s law; (b) change his fundamental preference for self and sin to supreme love for God; nor (c) do any act, however insignificant, which shall meet with God’s approval or answer fully to the demands of the law. [15]

Hunt’s disregard for the context of Strong’s statements is reprehensible. As David Doran notes, “Hunt uses Strong to defend a position which Strong actually denied!” [16]

In another example, Hunt seeks to show that Calvin was “confused and unable to articulate his ideas well” in his discussions of “Total Depravity” (130). Apart from this obvious anachronism—the term “Total Depravity” did not come into use until after the Synod of Dort (1618–1619)—Hunt does not present Calvin’s position fairly or accurately. After citing a lengthy quotation from the Institutes, Hunt concludes: “Confusion and contradictions reign here. Is man totally depraved or isn’t he? And if he is, exactly what does that mean?” (131). However, when one examines the original passage in Calvin, it becomes obvious that Hunt has cut and pasted a series of phrases from Calvin stretched over eight pages, with no regard for the context of his remarks. [17] Through repeated ellipses and brackets, it is no wonder that Calvin is made to be confusing! Read in context, Calvin is very clear, often qualifying his statements so as not to be misunderstood. Essentially Calvin is arguing that human inability does not mean a complete loss of intelligence or reasoning power. Rather a distinction is made in the natural and spiritual realms. Calvin states: “The distinction is, that we have one kind of intelligence of earthly things, and another of heavenly things. By earthly things, I mean those which relate not to God and his kingdom, to true righteousness and future blessedness, but have some connection with the present life, and are in a manner confined within its boundaries.” [18]

The extensive end notes in What Love Is This? will impress many readers, but they are often only a façade of careful research. Despite the book jacket’s claim to Hunt’s “impeccable research and recognized scholarship,” his manipulative use of sources goes a long way in undermining his credibility. [19]

Poisoning The Well

Much of Hunt’s writing is taken up with ad hominem attacks against Augustine and Calvin. By the time Hunt actually discusses the theological issues, he has created such negative sentiments against these men that the reader is already predisposed to reject Calvinist positions on substantive theological questions.

For example, Hunt calls into question whether Calvin was really a Christian at all. He writes, “Today’s Calvinists avoid the uncomfortable fact that in all of his voluminous writings, Calvin never tells of being born again through faith in Christ” (41).

It is true enough that Calvin speaks very little of his own personal conversion. [20] The brief reference to his “sudden conversion” in the preface to his commentary on the Psalms [21] would not garner much excitement at a modern evangelical testimony meeting around the campfire. But it is no secret that Calvin was naturally timid and reticent to speak of his personal experiences.

Alexandre Ganoczy observes, “Nothing in Calvin’s writings allows us to recognize the concern for dating one’s personal ‘conversion’ that was so characteristic of later Pietists. Clearly, the young Calvin was more concerned about his gradually discovered ‘calling’ (vocatio) to reform the church than about a confessional change in the individual in the modern sense of the concept.” [22] Yet to question the veracity of Calvin’s faith because he does not “share his personal testimony” in the modern sense is unwarranted. Anyone familiar with Calvin’s “voluminous writings” could hardly question his God-centered faith and devotion. [23]

Hunt’s attempt to sour his readers against Calvin continues:

Most of those today, including evangelical leaders who hold Calvin in great esteem, are not aware that they have been captivated by the writings of a devout Roman Catholic, newly converted to Luther’s Protestantism, who had broken with Rome only a year before (42). 

At the time of writing his Institutes, Calvin, far from being an apostle like Paul, was at best a brand-new convert. Therefore, in writing the Institutes, Calvin sought, with his brilliant legal mind, to make up for what he lacked in spiritual maturity and guidance of the Holy Spirit (43).

Such statements fail to acknowledge that Calvin continued to work on the Institutes in the years and decades after the publication of the first edition. Indeed, the final edition appeared twenty-three years after the first and five years prior to Calvin’s death in 1564. Although Calvin never claimed to be an inspired apostle like Paul, his writings have been widely esteemed since their inception. Even Arminius, whom Hunt holds in high regard, could say:

I recommend that the Commentaries of Calvin be read…. For I affirm that in the interpretation of the Scriptures Calvin in incomparable, and that his Commentaries are more to be valued than anything that is handed to us in the writings of the Fathers…so much so that I concede to him a certain spirit of prophecy in which he stands distinguished above others, above most, indeed, above all. [24]

Hunt poisons the well further by insisting that Calvinists do not have compassion for the lost; if they do, it is inconsistent with their Calvinism. Writing of C. H. Spurgeon, Hunt says, “His evangelist’s heart often betrayed itself in statements expressing a compassion for the lost and a desire for their salvation—a compassion that contradicted the Calvinism he preached at other times” (47). Extending the charge further, Hunt writes, “Nor can the Calvinist have the slightest sympathy for those whom God has, for His good pleasure, doomed eternally” (364, cf. 385–387). Yet this is a non sequitur of pernicious portions. Somehow the logic is as follows: Calvinists believe that God must graciously initiate if anyone is to be saved. Therefore, Calvinists cannot have compassion for the lost, nor desire their salvation. That is like saying a person cannot have compassion for his neighbor who desperately needs a heart transplant because he believes only a doctor can perform the necessary surgery. Apparently Hunt wants his readers to assume that, due to their doctrinal commitments, Calvinists must be unloving and uncaring. It is disappointing that a Christian writer would stoop so low.

Another basic ploy of Hunt is to show that Calvin got his views regarding God’s sovereignty from Augustine who, for his part, had a heavy influence on Roman Catholicism. Therefore, Calvinism is basically Roman Catholicism in disguise—or at the very least, Calvinism is seriously tainted by Catholicism. The fallacies in this line of thinking are numerous. First, there is guilt by association. Roman Catholicism is bad. Augustine influenced Roman Catholicism. Therefore, Augustine is bad. Second, there is the fallacy sometimes called “damning the origin.” Calvin drew upon Augustine. Augustine was bad. Therefore, Calvin’s views are bad too. After a simplistic and highly selective summary of Augustine’s teaching that is devoid of any historical context, Hunt gets nasty:

Calvin drew from a badly polluted stream when he embraced the teaching of Augustine! How could one dip into such contaminating heresy without becoming confused and infected? Yet this bewildering muddle of speculation and formative Roman Catholicism is acknowledged to be the source of Calvinism—and is praised by leading evangelicals. One comes away dumbfounded at the acclaim heaped upon both Calvin and Augustine by otherwise sound Christian leaders (58).

Unfortunately such rancorous prose is standard fare in What Love Is This?

In his eagerness to discredit Calvin, Hunt ends up pushing too far. He states, “How could Augustine—and Calvin, who embraced and passed on many of his major errors—be so wrong on so much and yet be biblically sound as regards predestination, election, sovereignty, etc.?” (64). The problem here is that much of what Calvin taught Hunt would agree with: the authority and infallibility of Scripture; the deity of Christ; God as triune; justification by faith; substitutionary atonement, and so forth. To illustrate the absurdity of Hunt’s reasoning we might adjust his statement to say: “How could…Calvin…be so wrong on so much and yet be biblically sound as regards scriptural authority, the deity of Christ, the triune nature of God, justification by faith, and substitutionary atonement?”

There is no question that Augustine influenced both Roman Catholicism and Calvin, but as Warfield observed, “the Reformation, inwardly considered, was just the ultimate triumph of Augustine’s doctrine of grace over Augustine’s doctrine of the Church.” [25] Not surprisingly, Hunt distorts this important distinction.

Hunt tries to further show Calvin’s supposed Roman Catholic connections by suggesting he was dependent on the Latin Vulgate. He writes, “the Latin Vulgate also molded Calvin’s thoughts as expressed in his Institutes of the Christian Religion” (60). Apparently Hunt is unaware of the Reformers’ strong commitment to study ancient texts in their original languages (ad fontes). [26] Calvin’s education made this ad fontes commitment a serious priority for him. John Thompson captures the mood of sixteenth century scholarship when he writes:

A mastery of Latin alone was no longer enough to make one a respectable scholar: Greek and Hebrew were also required, and the growing competence of sixteenth-century scholars nourished, in turn, keener critical skills. For example, if these burgeoning sources, editions and tools reminded scholars and preachers that there were new discoveries to be made in their old Bibles, Erasmus’ early textual criticism of the New Testament undermined the magisterium of the Latin Vulgate and warned his readers they could not take even the wording of the Bible for granted, much less its theological content. [27]

Calvin’s commentaries reveal his exegetical method utilized the Hebrew and Greek texts. In reference to Calvin’s commentary on Ephesians, Randall Zachman observes, “Calvin makes repeated reference to issues of translation from Greek to Latin, usually taking exception to the translation of the Vulgate and Erasmus by insisting that his translation ‘fits the context better.’” [28]

Describing Calvin’s approach to biblical interpretation, Thompson writes:

The goal of all interpretation is to understand the mind or intention of the writer, and Calvin typically employed the best tools of his day— establishing historical contexts and background, searching for the precise meaning of terms in the original Hebrew or Greek…to make his case for what the biblical authors intended. [29]

Even in the Institutes, Calvin can be critical of the Vulgate. For example, in his refutation of the Roman doctrine of penance he writes: “Here I am ashamed to recall how frequently the old translator renders the word ‘to praise’ as ‘to confess’…, a commonplace to the most unlettered laymen.” [30]

Hunt’s allegation of “Calvinism’s Surprising Catholic Connection” [31] would have been particularly surprising to John Calvin. In response to the Council of Trent, where Roman Catholic doctrine was codified, Calvin wrote Antidote to Trent in which he refuted each of Trent’s canons. [32] Notably, Calvin expressed his disappointment with Trent that “instead of going to the original Greek and Hebrew texts of the Bible, it chose the Latin Vulgate as the authoritative version.” [33]

Need For More Balance On Calvin

Oxford Professor Alister McGrath writes, “The great stereotypes of the past, portraying Calvin as a bloodthirsty dictator and Calvinism as mindless moral rigorism, are—despite their occasional resuscitation in polemical writings— behind us.” [34] Unfortunately Hunt’s polemics work hard to restore “the great stereotypes of the past.” Rudolph Heinze says, “Calvin is one of those historic characters whom people tend either to love or to hate. Possibly even more than Luther, he has been an object of veneration by his loyal followers and vicious vilification by those who find his theology and his actions abominable.” [35] Hunt clearly falls into the latter camp. He consistently paints Calvin in the worst possible light. In discussing Calvin’s work in Geneva, Hunt appeals to the most sensational accounts presenting Calvin as an absolute tyrant, as bad as any pope. There is no discussion of the positive work that the Consistory [36] was able to achieve. [37] There is no attempt at balance or evenhandedness. There is no attempt to frame things within the historical context of the times. [38]

In an important essay entitled “The Calvin Legend,” Professor Basil Hall corrects some of the numerous misrepresentations of Calvin put forward by his detractors. His words aptly apply to Hunt’s portrait of Calvin in Geneva.

No notice is taken of the fact that the Council of Geneva in Calvin’s time introduced little in legislation that was new on the suppression of gambling, blasphemy, drunkenness, licentious dancing, luxury in dress, playing of games during the hours of public worship, and so on, for all this had been provided during the Episcopal government of Geneva before the Reformation. [39]

Hunt’s description of Calvin is further skewed by resorting to myths that have been demonstrated to be historically false. For example, he cites a sensationalized account of life in Calvin’s Geneva by Will Durant, in which, among other abuses, “a child was beheaded for striking its parents.” [40] The incident is a groundless legend. Responding to Aldous Huxley’s use of the story, Hall writes: “Not only is there no evidence for this imagined incident from the Genevan records; but there was no legal ground for its being possible under the criminal code under which Geneva was governed.” [41]

When Hunt does describe historical events, there is usually some form of distortion to further his vendetta against Calvin. In the 1540s the city of Geneva suffered from an epidemic of the plague. Many people died. By 1545 it was discovered that certain individuals had intentionally sought to spread the plague from house to house by devious means. The Genevan Council dealt harshly with the suspected perpetrators, torturing some for pertinent information and executing others. They believed the individuals were nothing short of sorcerers in league with the devil. Evidently Calvin did not oppose the Council’s action, but exhorted “his contemporaries to pursue sorcerers in order to ‘extirpate such a race.’” [42] Hunt holds this incident up as an example of Calvin following “the principles of punishment, coercion, and death that Augustine had advocated” (76). It is supposed to illustrate how Calvin routinely dealt “with those who disagreed with him” (78). Yet these were people who were believed to be intentionally spreading a deadly plague—the cause of great suffering and death to many in Geneva. To use this incident as an example of Calvin’s supposed cruelty is hardly appropriate.

In calling Calvin “the oppressor of Geneva” (79), Hunt assigns to him more power than the records indicate he actually had. The Genevan Council was not always as favorable to Calvin as Hunt mistakenly supposes. McGrath observes, “Time after time Calvin was thwarted in his designs by a shrewd council, anxious to preserve or enhance its own control over the city. In the late 1540s it became increasingly obvious that Calvin simply did not have the political status necessary to attain his objectives.” [43] Similarly Hall asks, “if Calvin had dictatorial control over Geneva affairs, how is it that the records of Geneva show him plainly to have been the servant of its Council which on many occasions rejected out of hand Calvin’s wishes for the religious life of Geneva, and [the Council] was always master in Genevan affairs?” [44]

Calvin is perhaps most remembered by his critics for the burning of the anti-Trinitarian Michael Servetus. Servetus had escaped from jail in France, where he had been condemned to death as a heretic. Intending to make only a brief stopover in Geneva on his way to Italy, he was recognized and arrested. Servetus was put on trial by the civil authorities in Geneva. Calvin’s role in the affair was something of a “chief witness for the prosecution.” [45] He brought accusations against Servetus and debated him in the course of the trial. Servetus was eventually condemned by the council to be burned to death at the stake. After the trial, Calvin went to visit Servetus urging him to repent. Furthermore, he requested that the council change Servetus’ sentence to beheading rather than burning, as a more humane form of execution, but the council was determined to conform to the customary way of dealing with heretics. [46]

In the end, it cannot be denied that Calvin supported the execution of Servetus. Even Calvin’s sympathizers admit that he was in the wrong. John Piper, for example, says of Calvin’s role in the Servetus case: “In this execution, his hands were as stained with Servetus’ blood as David’s were with Uriah’s.” [47]

Hunt returns to the Servetus incident throughout his book for the purpose of maligning Calvin. Not surprisingly, there is no sense of historical context and perspective in his discussion of the events. [48] Hunt’s account frequently contains subtle inaccuracies. For example, Hunt writes:

Calvin’s willingness for Servetus to be beheaded rather than burned at the stake was not necessarily motivated by kindness, but was an attempt to transfer responsibility to the civil authority. Beheading was the penalty for civil crimes; burning at the stake was for heresy. The charges, however, were clearly theological, not civil, and were brought by Calvin himself. 

The civil authority only acted at the behest of the church…. It was only his heresy that doomed him—and only because Calvin pressed the charges (81–82).

Hunt fails to recognize that heresy was a crime punishable by the civil authorities in the sixteenth century. [49] Furthermore, Hunt portrays Calvin as a dictator controlling a puppet civil council. In reality, the council was not at all favorably disposed to Calvin at the time. McGrath clarifies the situation:

The trial, condemnation and execution (including the selection of the particular mode of execution) of Servetus were entirely the work of the city council, at a period in its history when it was particularly hostile to Calvin. The Perrinists [a group on the council opposed to Calvin] had recently gained power, and were determined to weaken his position. Their prosecution of Servetus…was intended to demonstrate their impeccable orthodoxy, as a prelude to undermining Calvin’s religious authority within the city. The Consistory—the normal instrument of ecclesiastical discipline, over which Calvin had considerable influence—was bypassed altogether by the council in its efforts to marginalize Calvin from the affair. [50]

Hunt also mistakenly claims, “In fact, Servetus was only one of many such victims of Calvinism carried to its logical conclusion” (84). First, Servetus was not condemned for denying “Calvinism,” but the Trinity. It is true that Servetus was also condemned for rejecting infant baptism, as were many Anabaptists. But infant baptism is not a necessary component of Calvinism, as testified by the many Baptists who are also Calvinists. Second, it is simply untrue that many people were burned at the stake for rejecting Calvinism. Third, “Calvinism carried to its logical conclusion” does not lead to burning people at the stake. Only Hunt’s extreme prejudice against Calvinism results in such abrasive rhetoric. Once again, it is worth quoting McGrath at length to gain some historical perspective (not to vindicate Calvin’s actions):

Nor is it entirely clear why the [Servetus] affair should be thought of as demonstrating anything especially monstrous concerning Calvin. His tacit support for the capital penalty for offences such as heresy which he (and his contemporaries) regarded as serious makes him little more than a child of his age, rather than an outrageous exception to its standards. Post-Enlightenment writers have every right to protest against the cruelty of earlier generations; to single out Calvin for particular criticism, however, suggests a selectivity approaching victimization. To target him in this way—when the manner of his involvement was, to say the least, oblique—and overlook the much greater claims to infamy of other individuals and institutions raises difficult questions concerning the precommitments of his critics. Servetus was the only individual put to death for his religious opinions in Geneva during Calvin’s lifetime, at a time when executions of this nature were a commonplace elsewhere. [51]

While Calvin’s actions were wrong, a fair-minded attempt should be made to understand them. Historian Roland Bainton points out that for Calvin, heresy and blasphemy ought to be punished because “either one was an affront to God.” Thus, “the purpose was to vindicate the honor of God by silencing those who sully His holy name.” [52] In Calvin’s mind, “the honor of God was at stake.” [53] But should not the example of Christ have given him pause, as Hunt points out? It certainly should have. Unfortunately, Calvin followed the reasoning common to his times. In his own words he stated: “Admittedly Christ did not use the sword, but Peter acted in the spirit of Christ when he destroyed Ananias.” [54]

The fact is that whatever Calvin’s faults (and we do not deny them), Hunt’s attacks on him—as with all ad hominem argumentation—do not address the theological issues in question; they only serve to bias readers against Calvin, and by extension, Calvinism. Does Hunt mean to suggest that if modern Calvinists were consistent with their theology they would advocate burning heretics at the stake? [55] Such a view is unthinkable today. Thus, there is no connection between a belief in the sovereignty of God in salvation and burning heretics at the stake. So why does Hunt spend so much effort on the matter? We are back to the old tactic of poisoning the well. Given the angry tone that Hunt sustains against Calvin and Calvinism throughout the book, one wonders what his approach to “heretics” would be if he were a child of the sixteenth century. [56]

Timothy George strikes a far more balanced perspective when he says, “We do no service to the truth by depicting Calvin as either angelically good or diabolically evil. He was, as Luther declared all Christians to be, at one and the same time both a sinner and a saint.” [57]

Questioning Hunt’s Objectivity

In rejecting the charge that he has caricatured Calvin in any way, Hunt claims, “On the contrary, I have simply given the historical facts, which none of my critics have been able to refute” (90). Hunt then praises Arminius for being “a consistent Christian in his writings and kind and considerate in his treatment of others. Nowhere in his writings or actions does one find anything of the sarcasm, derision, and contempt for contrary opinions that characterized Calvin’s writings” (90). However, on the very next page, Hunt quotes Arminius’s remarks on the pope:

[Arminius] joined in calling the pope “the adulterer and pimp of the Church, the false prophet…the enemy of God…the Antichrist…the man of sin, the son of perdition, the most notorious outlaw…[who] shall be destroyed at the glorious advent of Christ,” and urged all true believers to “engage in…the destruction of Popery, as they would…the kingdom of Antichrist.”

So much for being “kind and considerate in his treatment of others”! So much for not showing “contempt for contrary opinions”! Apparently Hunt considers the pope worthy of such language. But is it not a little inconsistent for Hunt to praise such sentiments in Arminius but ignore similar ones in Calvin, who was equally strong in his rejection of “popery”? [58]

Hunt’s evaluation of Arminius is glowing: “Arminius stood uncompromisingly for sound doctrine” (91). Yet it must be noted that although Hunt repeatedly rails on Calvin for his belief in infant baptism, he somehow fails to mention that Arminius also endorsed the same practice. [59]

In the end, Hunt’s ad hominem argumentation is not helpful. The vast majority of Calvinists have arrived at their conclusions not from a study of John Calvin, whom many have not even read, but from a study of Scripture. James White expresses the sentiments of so-called Calvinists when he says:

I believe what I believe not because John Calvin taught it but because the consistent exegesis of the text of Scripture leads me inevitably to the truths of the doctrines of grace. Trying to respond to my position by engaging in an attack upon the character and teachings of Augustine or Calvin shows a fundamental misunderstanding of my position…. I believe what I do because of the text of Scripture, not because I follow a particular individual’s teaching. [60]

Theological Concerns

I am not the only reviewer to notice Hunt’s extensive use of straw men in his polemic against Calvinism. [61] That Hunt believes he is accurately representing Calvinism by the straw men he trots out is astonishing. He quotes the following statement by William Shedd:

The charges that have been made…from time immemorial are, that Calvinism represents God as a tyrannical sovereign who is destitute of love and mercy for any but an elect few, that it attributes to man the depravity of devils, deprives him of moral freedom, and subjects him to the arbitrary cruelty of a Being who creates some men in order to damn them (137). [62]

Instead of acknowledging with Shedd the gross caricature of Calvinism such a portrayal represents, Hunt responds: “As we are amply documenting, this accusation is true” (137–138). What Hunt presents as historic, normative Calvinism is usually some form of hyper-Calvinism—a position which, in one way or another, emphasizes divine sovereignty to the exclusion of genuine human responsibility. [63] Hunt repeatedly dismisses hyper-Calvinism as an illegitimate category. [64] For example, he writes: “It would only be reasonable for a Calvinist to think, ‘I’m one of the elect. Let those whom God has damned be damned; there’s nothing I can do for them. To be concerned would be to complain against God for predestining them to their just fate’” (417). Hunt believes that such a description is simply consistent Calvinism. In reality what Hunt has described is rank hyper-Calvinism; historic Calvinism consistently repudiates such sentiments. [65]

Furthermore, Hunt presents all Calvinists as cold supralapsarians. [66] He repeatedly makes statements like, “the predestination of the non-elect to eternal torment, far from being hyper-Calvinism, is a basic tenet that flows inevitably from its five points” (142–143). Again, “the Calvinist…denies any contradiction in the idea that the God of infinite love is pleased to predestine billions to eternal torment” (269). However this is not normative Calvinism. As John Frame points out, “most Reformed theologians have been infralapsarian.” [67] That is, God’s gracious decree to elect certain people for salvation logically follows the human race’s fall into sin. God does not actively predestine people to eternal damnation; rather he leaves them to the condemnation their sin and rebellion rightfully deserve. [68]

In what follows, I will critique Hunt’s handling of a few theological issues. Due to restraints of time and space it is not possible to address all his points. The ones I do discuss are simply representative and illustrative of Hunt’s basic approach.

Total Depravity

Hunt seems to believe that unless theological terms are found directly in the Bible, then the doctrines these terms attempt to summarize are probably not biblical. He commences his discussion of the five points of Calvinism as follows:

Of the ten words making up the acronym TULIP, four (total, depravity, unconditional, and irresistible) are not even found in the Bible, and two (limited and perseverance) are each found only once. As for the phrases expressed by each letter…none of them appears anywhere from the beginning of Genesis to the end of Revelation. 

We have, therefore, good cause to be at least cautious in approaching these key Calvinist concepts. The burden of proof is upon their promoters to show that these ideas, in spite of their absence from Scripture, are indeed taught there (113, emphasis original).

This line of reasoning is supposed to demonstrate that the various points of Calvinism are merely the expression of human opinion. [69] Yet it hardly needs to be mentioned that no theologian claims divine inspiration for theological terminology! Various terms are used in an attempt to summarize biblical teaching. [70] Some terms do this better than others—and many Calvinists acknowledge that the phrases of TULIP are not the best. [71] Hunt concedes the legitimacy of theological terms when he admits, “‘Trinity’ likewise does not occur, but it is clearly taught [in Scripture]” (113).

Regarding total depravity, it is clear that Hunt does not understand the Calvinist position when he writes: “[God] would be presented in Scripture as pleading with those to repent and turn to Him whom He had created so hopelessly depraved that they could not possibly repent” (129, emphasis added). I know of no Calvinist who teaches that God created humans “hopelessly depraved.” Depravity and spiritual inability come as a result of the fall. But Hunt simply will not let up. He misrepresents the Calvinistic position by saying, “It is as if God has thrown into the ocean billions of people whom He has so created that they cannot swim a stroke”(270). [72] But again, Calvinists—even supralapsarians— do not teach that God created man in a fallen condition.

Furthermore, Calvinists have been careful to explain that total depravity does not mean humans are as thoroughly corrupt as they possibly could be. Steele and Thomas write:

The adjective “total” does not mean that each sinner is as totally or completely corrupt in his actions and thoughts as it is possible for him to be. Instead, the word “total” is used to indicate that the whole of man’s being has been affected by sin. The corruption extends to every part of man, his body and soul; sin has affected all (the totality) of man’s faculties—his mind, his will, etc. [73]

Of course this does not leave humans in “a state of brutish irrationality,” [74] nor does it suggest that people are “entirely destitute of virtue.” [75] Hunt acknowledges that Calvinists qualify their position in this way (see page 148), but since it does not fit nicely into his caricature, he dismisses such qualifications as another example of how Calvinists trap themselves in contradictions. He concludes, “No matter how horrifyingly the Bible presents the evil of the human heart, never does it teach Calvinism’s peculiar Total Depravity” (155).

There are at least two key problems with Hunt’s discussion of total depravity. First, in his view, the human will appears to escape unscathed from the effects of mankind’s fall into sin. The will retains its full powers. Second, Hunt shows no awareness of the concept of compatibilism and misrepresents the Calvinist position on the will accordingly. We will take up these two problems in order.

1. Hunt On Human Ability

A corollary to total depravity in Calvinistic thought is total inability. Again, this is inability in the spiritual realm; it does not deny that humans can do good in society in certain ways. But when it comes to the spiritual realm, humans, in their fallen condition, are unable to do anything that is ultimately pleasing to God; they are spiritually dead and blind and thus unable to see, receive, choose, or delight in the things of God. Apart from Christ they are, in the language of Paul, slaves to sin (Rom. 6:17, 20). Their wills are in bondage to their desires, and their desires do not run in a Godward direction.

Hunt, however, rejects such an assessment of the human condition. He does not deny human sinfulness, but he does deny that sin has impaired human ability to make spiritual decisions. In Hunt’s view the will is entirely free to reject Christ or to embrace him. Hunt avoids outright Pelagianism [76] by insisting that the Holy Spirit must bring conviction of sin. But ultimately it is within the individual’s power to choose God or reject him. Such ability is not the product of prevenient grace in the Arminian sense; [77] it is simply part of the human constitution. The fall did not rob man of this fundamental ability. [78] Several of Hunt’s own statements will illustrate his position.

• It is neither stated in Scripture, nor does it follow reasonably, that anyone, as a result of his depravity, even if his every thought is evil, is thereby unable to believe the glad tidings of the gospel and receive Christ as his Savior. (118)
• The plain language of Scripture proclaims that God truly desires to convince, to convict, and to save all who are lost— and that they all have the capacity to turn to Him if they so desire. (140)
• Surely man has both the ability and responsibility to cooperate with God’s grace and power in whatever he does! (227)
• Never does the Bible say that men are by nature incapable of believing the gospel or of seeking God. (421)

In response we will limit our discussion, in the interests of space, to two biblical texts that challenge Hunt’s position and briefly evaluate his handling of them. [79]

A. Ephesians 2:1–5

First, there is Paul’s statement in Ephesians 2:1 that outside of Christ, people are dead in trespasses and sins. It seems obvious from this text that unbelievers lack spiritual life and thus cannot exert powers in a realm to which they are dead. Paul indicates God must bring to life those who are dead in transgressions (Eph. 2:5; Col. 2:13), for those without spiritual life can hardly make spiritual decisions.

It is not altogether clear what Hunt understands spiritual deadness to entail. Whatever it means, Hunt is convinced there can be no comparison with physical death. [80] He writes:

The physically dead can do nothing, not even commit sin; so they could hardly present a proper analogy of spiritual death. The spiritually “dead” are able to live active lives, get an education, earn a living, defy God, and continue to sin—or submit to the conviction of the Holy Spirit, repent of their sins, and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ as their Savior (278).

Again he claims, “The Bible teaches that the spiritually dead can understand the gospel and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ unto salvation” (404, emphasis original). Hunt arrives at this conclusion through a comparison with Romans 6. Responding to James White’s statement that “the fallen sons of Adam are dead in sin, incapable of even the first move toward God,” [81] Hunt cries: “Where does the Bible say ‘incapable of even the first move toward God’? It doesn’t! We are just as clearly told that Christians are ‘dead to sin’ (Rom. 6:2, 7, 11, etc.). Does that mean that they are therefore ‘incapable of the first move toward’ sin? Certainly not” (151).

To link Ephesians 2 with Romans 6 is like comparing apples to oranges. In Romans 6 Paul is describing Christians who have died (to sin) and been raised with Christ. The result is they are no longer slaves to sin. Thus they are dead to sin in the sense of no longer being ruled by sin; sin is no longer their master; they have been “freed from sin and enslaved to God” (6:22).

Ephesians 2 is addressing Christians’ condition before they were given spiritual life. In that condition they were slaves to sin; indeed, they were dead in sin. Hunt’s failure to make the crucial Pauline distinction between being dead in sin and dead to sin [82] leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of fallen human nature.

B. 1 Corinthians 2:14

The person without the Spirit of God, in his natural condition, finds the things of God foolish and unintelligible, and thus he does not accept them. Indeed, Paul says that he “is not able to understand” (ESV, οὐ δύναται γνῶναι) them. The note of inability is unmistakable, yet Hunt is determined to miss it. He writes of this text:

Paul is not referring to the gospel that is to be preached “to every creature” (Mark 16:15). He is addressing believers and referring to “the hidden wisdom…the deep things of God,” which are only revealed by the Spirit of God to those who are indwelt by and walking in obedience to the Holy Spirit (527).

Paul may be addressing believers in the composition of the epistle, but in 2:14 the “natural man” clearly refers to the unbeliever who lacks the Spirit. [83] Moreover, that the gospel is at least a key element of what Paul means by “the things of the Spirit of God” is obvious from 2:1–5 where he emphasizes that his preaching was not in human wisdom “but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power, so that your faith would not rest on the wisdom of men, but on the power of God” (2:4–5). Furthermore, the fact that the things of the Spirit of God are “foolishness” to the natural man recalls 1:18–31 where the message of the cross (i.e. the gospel) is rejected as “foolishness to those who are perishing.” [84]

At the end of the day, Hunt goes to great lengths to preserve spiritual ability in fallen humans because he believes God’s commands presuppose human ability. In other words, if God commands us to love him with heart, soul, mind, and strength, then we must have the ability to comply, or else God is unreasonable. But it must be remembered that, even after the fall, God’s commands reflect his character. If divine commands were issued on the basis of human ability rather than human obligation, God would have to compromise his own righteous standards. [85] In fact, God’s commands reveal human inability in order to point us to Christ (Gal. 3:24). As Augustine said, “God commands what we cannot do that we may know what we ought to seek from him.” [86]

2. Compatibilism

In Hunt’s description of Calvinism, human beings are reduced to mere puppets pulled along on a string by a sovereign God. He writes, “Calvinism denies to man any real choice concerning anything he thinks or does” (158, emphasis original). Of course, this is another unfortunate caricature. Calvinists believe Scripture assumes a compatibilist view of human freedom. That is, human agency and responsibility are compatible with divine sovereignty. [87] Paul Helm explains:

According to this view, people perform free acts when they do what they want to do, not when they have the power of self-causation, or some other version of indeterminism. That is, they are not constrained or compelled in their actions, but what they do flows unimpededly from their wants, desires, preferences, goals and the like. [88]

Thus according to compatibilism, although God remains sovereign in all things (e.g. Eph. 1:11), this does not mean humans are somehow forced into acting contrary to their nature. In fact, humans remain accountable precisely because their actions are voluntary and in accord with their desires. Ultimately compatibilism is driven by the vast testimony of Scripture regarding the relationship between God and humans in history. [89]

Many biblical texts juxtapose God’s sovereignty and human responsibility in a way that demands some kind of compatibility. For example, the account of Joseph being sold into slavery was, on the one hand, a conspiracy by his brothers conceived out of jealousy and hatred for Joseph (Gen. 37). There is no sense in which the biblical text reduces the brothers to mere puppets who can thereby escape any responsibility for their actions. [90] No, they acted willingly. But at the same time Joseph understood God’s sovereignty in the events when he declared to his brothers: “It was not you who sent me here, but God” (45:8). When Joseph initially identified himself to his brothers he said, “I am your brother Joseph, whom you sold into Egypt” (45:4). So on the one hand, the brothers were responsible for selling Joseph into slavery, yet God had sovereignly planned the event for his purposes.

A key difference is found with regard to motivation. Joseph again said to his brothers, “As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good in order to bring about this present result, to preserve many people alive” (50:20). The entire biblical account assumes a compatibilist framework.

Peterson and Williams’ summary is difficult to avoid: “Human beings act from their own hearts and motives, uncoerced by forces external to their own moral characters. But through it all, God sovereignly acts to bring about his will.” [91]

Another powerful illustration of compatibilism is found in the description of events surrounding the crucifixion. Part of the church’s prayer in Acts 4 contain these words: “For truly in this city there were gathered together against Your holy servant Jesus, whom You anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose predestined to occur” (Acts 4:27–28). Carson’s comments on this text are worth repeating:

A moment’s reflection discloses that anything other than a compatibilist approach to these events destroys the gospel itself. Christians cannot possibly believe that the cross began as a nasty conspiracy by wicked politicians, with God riding in on a white charger at the last moment to turn their evil into good: that would mean that the plan of redemption was not a plan after all. Nor can they believe that God’s sovereign control of the events excused all the human players: if Herod, Judas, Pontius Pilate, and other leaders were not involved in a conspiracy of which they were wretchedly culpable, it is hard to imagine how any human being in God’s world could be thought culpable of anything—and in that case, why offer an atoning sacrifice for actions for which there could be no guilt? [92]

One final example of biblical compatibilism will have to suffice. [93] In Acts 27, Paul is aboard a ship caught in a fierce storm. Although an angel had assured him that no one would perish (v. 24), Paul still found it necessary to declare: “Unless these men stay in the ship, you cannot be saved” (v. 31). This example clearly illustrates how divine sovereignty (a) does not absolve human responsibility, and (b) employs secondary causes such as sincere warnings as means to bring about the desired end. [94]

Hunt manifests no understanding of compatibilism when he says, “It hardly seems reasonable that our perception of making choices…could be an illusion and that we are mere puppets of God’s foreordination” (197). Once again, whether intentionally or not, Hunt has distorted the Calvinist’s position.

We cannot leave this discussion of compatibilism without examining the alternative position, often called libertarian or contra-causal freedom. The position is described by Bruce Reichenbach:

To say that a person is free means that, given a certain set of circumstances, the person could have done otherwise than he did. He was not compelled by causes either internal to himself (genetic structure or irresistible drives) or external (other persons, God) to act as he did. Though certain causal conditions are present and indeed are necessary for persons to choose or act, if they are free these causal conditions are not sufficient to cause them to choose or act. The individual is the sufficient condition for the course of action chosen. [95]

Libertarian freedom is a central and controlling feature of Hunt’s own theological position. [96] He writes, “The will takes into consideration all factors, and no matter how compelling any influences (i.e., facts, reasons, circumstances, emergencies, contingencies, etc.) may have been, the will still makes its own choice—often irrationally” (200).

But libertarian freedom encounters several significant problems. First, there is the large swath of biblical texts that assume compatibilism. Libertarian freedom, as we have seen, cannot give an adequate account of this material without softening divine sovereignty at some juncture.

Second, according to libertarian freedom, all of an individual’s desires, inclinations, and circumstances may point him toward a particular choice, but arbitrarily he can choose the opposite. In other words, free persons must have the power to choose contrary to their inclinations. If that is true, there is no explanation for why a given choice is made. [97] In contrast, Jonathan Edwards, in his classic treatise on the will, states, “A man never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires.” [98] Edwards indicates that the determining factor in every choice is the “strongest motive” present at that moment. [99]

To illustrate, let’s suppose that Harold skips breakfast to make it to work on time. By mid-morning his stomach is growling. A colleague pops his head into Harold’s office and announces there are fresh doughnuts in the lunch room, compliments of the management. Harold typically lacks all self-control when it comes to doughnuts and is especially hungry on this occasion. Libertarian freedom says that even though Harold wants a doughnut, he can refrain because he is free. Edwards would say Harold’s strongest desire determines what choice he will make. If he refrains, his desire to refrain from the doughnut at that moment is stronger than his desire to eat the doughnut. Perhaps Harold is on a diet and is committed to losing thirty pounds. His desire to lose weight in that instance is greater than his desire to enjoy the doughnut.

Edwards argues that the nature of freedom does not lie in the power of contrary choice or self-determination, but in acting in accordance with one’s nature or inclinations. [100] The will always chooses according to its desires; its desires or motives, however, are governed by its nature. Thus when it comes to the question of soteriology, Calvinists understand Scripture to teach that people outside of Christ are governed by a fallen, sinful nature which, apart from grace, never desires Christ and is radically opposed to God.

Throughout What Love Is This? Hunt appeals to the invitations of Scripture for sinners to come to Christ (“whosoever will may come”) as proof of libertarian freedom. Calvinists do not deny the sincerity of such invitations, but they do deny such invitations prove Hunt’s version of free will. Perhaps another illustration will prove helpful. Let’s suppose someone has a deadly disease, and a doctor has recently discovered a remedy to cure this particular disease. The doctor offers the person the cure but the sick man is philosophically opposed to traditional medicine; he is convinced only the natural remedies of “alternative medicine” have any therapeutic value. In fact, he is so strongly opposed to traditional medicine that one could even say he hates it. Does that make the doctor’s offer invalid? No. And the sick man remains responsible for his decision to reject the medicine.

Thus when Hunt says, “the entire Bible from Genesis to Revelation gives the clear impression that those with whom God pleads could of their own volition repent and turn to Him if they so desired” (136), he fails to recognize that fallen humanity lacks both the inclination and desire to turn to God. Only divine grace can awaken such desires.

Unconditional Election

Despite Hunt’s repeated claims that not a “single verse” of Scripture supports Calvinistic positions, Acts 13:48 clearly gives him trouble. The context speaks of Gentiles who heard Paul and Barnabas preaching the gospel in Pisidian Antioch. In Hunt’s preferred KJV, the text states “and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed.” Hunt suggests that “all major translations” render the Greek word τάσσω as “ordained,” when in fact, most modern translations render the word “appointed.” [101] If taken at face value, the text has a strong predestinarian sense. [102] However Hunt attempts to avoid the straightforward meaning of the text in several ways.

First, he cites three paraphrases which “give a decidedly non-Calvinistic rendering” (263). For example, The Living Bible has “as many as wanted eternal life, believed.” That Hunt would cite paraphrases as credible authorities in translation questions demonstrates how desperate his case is.

Second, Hunt appeals to two commentators (including Alford) who translateτάσσω (tassō) as “disposed.” “As many as were disposed to eternal life believed.” [103] Yet this meaning is not listed in the Bauer-Danker lexicon, [104] nor is it appropriate in the other occurrences of τάσσω in the New Testament. [105]

Third, Hunt notes that τεταγμένοι (tetagmenoi) is a perfect participle of τάσσω, “indicating an influence upon the Gentiles toward eternal life and believing the gospel.” He then states, “that this is a present influence and, as Barnes says, ‘not…an eternal decree,’ is generally agreed” (264, emphasis original). Yet the Greek construction is a periphrastic pluperfect (ἦσαν τεταγμένοι, ēsan tetagmenoi). [106] The pluperfect does not indicate a present influence. Porter categorizes the pluperfect as “a form which tends to be used in past-time contexts.” [107] Granted, God’s appointment of these Gentiles to eternal life does result in their acceptance of the gospel at a given point in time, but the appointment to eternal life itself is a past action from our perspective. Hunt’s ignorance of Greek is further exposed when he states that τεταγμένοι is in the “passive middle voice” (264). The word must be passive or middle; it cannot be both. [108]

Fourth, Hunt offers the following novel theory:

The Dead Sea Scrolls, as well as comments from early church writers, indicate that the first 15 chapters of Acts were probably written first in Hebrew. The Greek would be a translation. Some scholars claim that going back to a “redacted Hebrew” version, based upon word-for-word Greek-Hebrew equivalents, would render Acts 13:48 more like “as many as submitted to, needed, or wanted salvation, were saved” (264).

Hunt provides no documentation for this theory. The Dead Sea Scrolls, of course, do not contain NT documents. Furthermore, while some scholars believe the first half of Acts contains a number of “Semitisms,” no scholar that I am aware of thinks Luke originally composed Acts in Hebrew. Bruce Metzger explains a theory proposed by C. C. Torrey that perhaps Hunt confusedly refers to.

Torrey advanced the theory that the Gospels and [the first half of the book of] Acts were translated from Greek into an Aramaic “Targum” towards the end of the first century, and that this “Targum,” being mistaken for the original Semitic text of these books, was very soon afterwards retranslated into Greek with constant reference to the existing Greek text. This retranslation, Torrey held, was the basis of the Western text in the Gospels and Acts. [109]

Metzger comments that most scholars have rejected the theory “as too complicated to be probable.” [110] Thus it would be very interesting to know where Hunt comes up with his “word-for-word Greek-Hebrew” rendering.

Finally, Hunt makes a significant concession when he writes, “even if ‘ordained’ were the correct meaning, these Greeks still would have had to believe the gospel and accept Christ” (264). No Calvinist would dispute that point. As Storms points out, “faith…is the fruit of God’s gracious appointment.” [111] Regardless of the clarity of the text, Hunt is sure that it cannot mean what it says. He writes, “Whatever the differing opinions of translators and commentators, this one verse cannot undo what hundreds of others establish” (263).

Eventually Hunt must deal with the question: but what does predestination mean? His answer is as follows: “Predestination and election are biblical teachings—but they are never unto salvation…. Election/predestination is always unto specific blessings that accompany salvation, but not to salvation itself” (265, emphasis original). This, however, seems like a distinction without a difference, for what is salvation but deliverance from a state of condemnation to a state of blessing? Indeed, what is salvation except those who were conformed to the likeness of Adam (Rom. 5:12–21) being brought into conformity to the image of God’s Son (Rom. 8:29); those who were God’s enemies (Rom. 5:10) being adopted as children of God (Eph. 1:5); those who were dead in trespasses and sins (Eph. 2:1) becoming holy and blameless before God (Eph. 1:4)?

Furthermore Hunt’s statement that election and predestination “are never unto salvation” is challenged by Paul’s statement to the contrary in 2 Thessalonians 2:13: “But we should always give thanks to God for you, brethren beloved by the Lord, because God has chosen you from the beginning for salvation through sanctification by the Spirit and faith in the truth.” Note the specific purpose of God’s choice of the Thessalonians is “for salvation,” and that salvation is secured by means of the work of the Spirit and belief in the truth (i.e. the gospel). Strangely, Hunt never discusses this important verse. [112]

The Basis Of Predestination/Election

According to Hunt, “election/predestination is always said in the Bible to result from God’s foreknowledge. [113] Those whom He foreknew would believe He predestined to special blessings” (247, emphasis original). First, Hunt is mistaken, for there are a number of texts that do not mention foreknowledge in connection with the doctrine of election (Acts 13:48; Rom. 9:6–23; Eph. 1:3–6, 11; 1 Thess. 1:4; 2 Thess. 2:13).

Second, Hunt describes foreknowledge as God foreseeing who “would believe.” This, of course, is the classic Arminian position: God looks down the corridors of time, sees who will believe the gospel and, on that basis, elects them. But notice such a move must import the concept of faith (Hunt’s “would believe”) into the text. The biblical texts do not state that God foresaw faith in the chosen ones; it simply says He foreknew them. [114] “For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined” [115] (Rom. 8:29, cf. 1 Pet. 1:1–2). A relational knowledge is highlighted, not a factual one. A knowledge verb must be defined in connection with its object. [116] It is one thing to say “I know that John will write a book.” It is something different to say “I know John.” God foreknew the elect in this relational sense; he set his love upon them or “befriended” [117] them. Predestination is not based on foreseen faith; rather, as Baugh puts it, “God predestines us on the basis of his gracious commitment to us before the world was.” [118]

Furthermore, the Bible makes clear that election is never based on some foreseen quality or response in those who are chosen. God tells Israel that he did not choose them because they were a great and powerful nation but simply because he loved them (Deut. 7:7–8; 4:37). Paul, speaking of God’s choice of Jacob over Esau, is even more explicit:

For though the twins were not yet born and had not done anything good or bad, so that God’s purpose according to His choice would stand, not because of works but because of Him who calls, it was said to her, “the older will serve the younger.” Just as it is written, “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated” (Rom. 9:11–13).

Thus it becomes problematic to maintain that God chose the elect based on something he previously knew about them (i.e. their faith). Hunt’s charge that “the Calvinist is desperately twisting the Scripture in order to maintain his theory” (280) simply rings hollow.

A Problematic “Solution”

Hunt takes a good deal of comfort in God’s prescience. God knows in advance who will exercise faith in response to the gospel, and on that basis he predestines them to blessings that accompany salvation. God also knows in advance who will reject the gospel and thus suffer eternal judgment. Therefore, God is not implicated in the fate of the wicked.

By contrast, Hunt recoils at his understanding of the Calvinist position, which he describes in the following words: “God could have irresistibly imposed grace upon Adam and Eve and spared mankind the suffering and evil that resulted from their rebellion. Why didn’t He? What love is this?”(362, emphasis original). However, Hunt fails to wrestle with some problems that arise from his own free-will solution. For example, if God in his prescience foresaw that a countless number of people would reject his love and mercy and suffer the eternal consequences in hell, why would he go ahead and create such a world? Would it not be more “loving” not to create at all?

There are other problems with the free-will defense. To illustrate, let’s suppose a young man is out for a swim at the local swimming hole and begins to drown. The lifeguard sees his predicament and rushes to provide everything necessary for the poor man’s deliverance: a lifesaver and rope to pull him in, a boat to take him to safety, oxygen, etc. The lifeguard approaches the man and cries out, “I want to save you. Please, take this rope and I will pull you in.” But the man replies, “No thanks. I, of my own free will, reject your offer!” Would it be loving of the lifeguard to say: “Fair enough, I will not violate your free will, even though I have the ability to pull you into the boat and rescue you. I will respect your humanity and let you die”? Such a response would be utterly irresponsible; why should we consider it virtuous in Hunt’s portrayal of God? In fact at one point Hunt himself writes, “Genuine compassion for a derelict would not just leave him there but would do all that could be done to rescue him” (465). On this reading either God is not able to overcome human free will or he is not compassionate enough to rescue people from their foolish choices.

The Love Of God

One of the central charges in What Love Is This? is that Calvinism seriously distorts God’s love to the extent of actually maligning the benevolent character of God. He writes, “Calvinists speak out of both sides of their mouths in order to avoid the valid charge that Calvinism denies God’s love for all mankind” (464). The problem with Hunt’s approach is that he has absolutized one dimension of the love of God and demanded that this is the only sense in which God’s love must be understood. [119] Specifically, Hunt argues that God must love unbelievers (the non-elect) in precisely the same way he loves believers (the elect), or his love is a mere sham.

Certainly there is a glorious universal dimension to the love of God. [120] Indeed, Calvinism is at its worst when it tries to define the “world” in John 3:16 as somehow referring only to the elect. [121] Truly God is a benevolent Lord who cares for all his creatures (Ps. 145:9, 15–16; Matt. 5:45); who invites sinners to turn to him (Matt. 11:28; Rev. 22:17); who takes no delight in the punishment of the wicked (Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11; Matt. 23:37–38).

But all of that does not negate the other dimensions of God’s love. As Carson points out, there is God’s intra-Trinitarian love which is not directed to the members of the Godhead in any redemptive sense. [122] And biblically it is impossible to deny God’s particular, efficacious love for His people—for the elect. When the Lord declares that he has loved Jacob but hated Esau (Mal. 1:2–3), one has to admit at least some particularity in God’s love, or the passage is meaningless. When Paul declares that in all types of trials “we overwhelmingly conquer through Him who loved us” (Rom. 8:37), the “us” is defined in the context of Romans 8 as “God’s elect” (Rom. 8:33). Thus, faithfulness to Scripture demands affirming a certain selectivity to the love of God, while at the same time extolling God’s genuine love for all mankind. Nevertheless, Hunt insists Calvinists are trapped in a contradiction and “the depths of complete irrationality” (465) when they endeavor to maintain this biblical balance.

Does God Limit His Mercy?

Closely related to this is the question of whether God limits his mercy in any sense. Hunt emphatically says no. After listing a series of biblical texts that highlight the greatness of God’s mercy, Hunt comments: “Do any of these scriptures even hint that God limits His grace and mercy to a select group? Not one scripture says so!” (140). Hunt has obviously missed Paul’s point in Romans 9, “For He says to Moses, ‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion’” (9:15).

Picking up the original passage in Exodus 33:19, Hunt comments, “[God] does not say…that He will be gracious and merciful to some and not to others— but that grace and mercy are by His initiative” (257). However Paul uses the Exodus text to say that it is precisely God’s prerogative to show mercy to some and not to others. He writes, “So then it does not depend on the man who wills or the man who runs, but on God who has mercy” (9:16). After citing the example of Pharaoh, Paul concludes: “So then He has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires”(9:18).

It is also important to observe in Romans 9 that Paul anticipates objections to the doctrine of election: Is there injustice with God? (9:14); if God has mercy on whom He desires and hardens whom he desires, why does he still find fault for those who resist his will? (9:18–19). Paul answers that there certainly is no injustice with God; and that it is presumptuous for the creature to assume the place of judge over the ways of the Creator. The point is that if God showed mercy to all in exactly and only the same way, these objections would never be raised. Again, if election was based on foreseen faith, then the question of injustice simply would not occur. We must conclude that if one’s understanding of election does not allow for the possibility of these objections, then one does not have Paul’s doctrine of election. [123]

Hunt makes the mistake of assuming that God must show mercy to everyone in the same sense or he is not merciful at all. He insists, “All Scripture contradicts the false doctrine that God would withhold mercy from anyone…. Surely the very ‘gracious and merciful God’ (Nehemiah 9:31) would be no less than always merciful to all” (270). Unless one is prepared to argue for universalism, it is difficult to see how God is “always merciful to all.” Hunt simply fails to understand the fact that “God withholds mercy from those who have defied Him in no way threatens His character.” [124]

What are the implications for evangelism? Hunt believes, “Such a theory logically leads to apathy toward evangelism, though many Calvinists do not succumb to the practical consequences of their belief” (417). Indeed, many of the finest gospel preachers have been Calvinists (e.g. George Whitefield, Charles Spurgeon, and Martyn Lloyd-Jones). [125] Calvinism does not “logically lead to apathy toward evangelism.” In fact, the opposite is true. [126] Knowing that God has chosen a great multitude for salvation and knowing that he has established the preaching of the gospel as the means to bring them to faith is actually a tremendous incentive for evangelism (Acts 18:9–10). [127]

Hunt repeatedly asserts that in Calvinism, people are saved apart from the instrumentality of the gospel. He says, for example, “Calvinism’s elect have been predestined from a past eternity, and it is God’s sovereign act of regeneration, not the gospel, which alone can ‘bring in His elect’” (370, emphasis original). But this statement mistakenly imagines that regeneration takes place without the gospel. On the contrary, as Sam Storms cautions, “One must not assume that the ordained end (the salvation of the soul) will occur apart from the prescribed means (the preaching of the good news).” [128]

Hunt vigorously rejects a Reformed ordo salutis wherein regeneration precedes faith. If such an arrangement assumes a significant temporal distinction between regeneration and faith, as appears to be the case among some Reformed paedobaptists, [129] then Hunt has a legitimate objection. In my view, one cannot argue biblically that infants may be regenerated at baptism and come to saving faith later in life. [130]

But this is not what Calvinists generally mean when they discuss the relationship between regeneration and faith. The Calvinist’s point is that when a sinner is confronted with the gospel and responds in the obedience of faith, God has been at work in his heart to enable the positive response. While pondering the claims of the gospel, the Holy Spirit issues an inner, effectual call that awakens (regenerates) the sinner and simultaneously grants him faith to believe and be saved (Acts 16:14; Eph. 2:1–9; Phil. 1:29; 2 Pet. 1:1; Acts 11:18; 2 Tim. 2:24–25). The temporal sequencing of theses events is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish. Many prefer to speak of a logical order rather a chronological one. [131] Grudem writes:

When we say that [regeneration] comes “before” saving faith, it is important to remember that they usually come so close together that it will ordinarily seem to us that they are happening at the same time. As God addresses the effective call of the gospel to us, he regenerates us, and we respond in faith and repentance to this call. So from our perspective it is hard to tell any difference in time. [132]

God’s Purposes And God’s Desires

For centuries, theologians have seen a distinction in the way the Bible talks about the will of God. [133] On the one hand, there is God’s “decretive” will, which refers to those things he has eternally purposed to bring about (creation, the cross, the return of Christ, etc.). On the other hand there is what is sometimes called God’s “preceptive” or “moral” will, which reflects God’s commands and desires. This latter category would include God’s expectations for humanity as outlined in the Ten Commandments or the imperatives of the epistles. It also includes God’s desire for humans to repent and be saved.

Hunt belittles the concept of distinguishing between God’s will of decree and God’s desires. [134] He writes, “Such inner conflict between purpose and desire is impossible for God! How could God ‘desire’ yet not purpose or decree it?” (142). He mocks the idea of God having “two wills” as “double-talk!” (143). [135] For Hunt, the will of God must be defined exclusively in the sense of God’s commands or desires. He writes, “We can only conclude that God does not prevent His own desire from being fulfilled. His desire is expressed in the gospel, which man can believe or not believe, accept or reject” (146). Therefore humans, through free will, are able to thwart God’s will and overthrow His purposes. Hunt reasons, “without violating or lessening His sovereignty, God’s will is continually being resisted and rejected as a result of the rebellion of Satan and man” (170–178).

Ultimately then, God is unable to bring about his will. But how are we to understand biblical texts that say God always accomplishes his will? Ephesians 1:11 speaks of the God “who works all things after the counsel of His will.” Daniel 4:35 says God “does according to His will in the host of heaven and among the inhabitants of earth; and no one can ward off His hand or say to Him, ‘What have You done?’” The psalmist confesses, “Our God is in the heavens; He does whatever He pleases” (Ps. 115:3). Again, Scripture maintains “no purpose of Yours can be thwarted” (Job 42:2), and God declares, “My purpose will be established, and I will accomplish all My good pleasure” (Isa. 46:10). Such texts compel us to see some distinction in God’s will.

It is legitimate to ask: If God desires the salvation of all people, as 1 Timothy 2:4 plainly says, why does it not happen? Both Calvinists and Arminians must conclude that God is ultimately committed to something even greater than saving everyone. The Arminian (or non-Calvinist) answer is that preserving human free will is more valuable to God than saving all. In contrast, Piper writes, “The answer given by Calvinists is that the greater value is the manifestation of the full range of God’s glory in wrath and mercy (Rom. 9:22–23) and the humbling of man so that he enjoys giving all credit to God for his salvation (1 Cor. 1:29).” [136]

Hunt finds the Calvinist answer objectionable and questions how the punishment of the wicked could possibly glorify God “in his mercy” (374). Schreiner, commenting on Romans 9:22–23, explains:

When the vessels of mercy perceive the fearsome wrath of God upon the disobedient and reflect on the fact that they deserve the same, then they appreciate in a deeper way the riches of God’s glory…and the grace lavished upon them. The mercy of God is set forth in clarity against the backdrop of his wrath…. Thereby God displays the full range of his attributes: both his powerful wrath and the sunshine of his mercy. The mercy of God would not be impressed on the consciousness of human beings apart from the exercise of God’s wrath, just as one delights more richly in the warmth, beauty, and tenderness of spring after one has experienced the cold blast of winter. [137]

This is not to suggest that these are particularly easy answers. God has not revealed how all the tensions between his sovereignty and human responsibility are worked out. But we must submit ourselves to what Scripture actually says, not what we would like it to say. We do well to remember that even if we cannot put everything together in a comfortable, logical system, God’s holy wisdom and goodness tower infinitely above our finite, fallen minds. We do well to bow before him and not be surprised if, at times, his revelation confronts us with mysteries that remind us that he is God and we are not. [138]

Conclusion

In Roger Nicole’s guidelines for polemic theology, he suggests that we owe our opponents the basic courtesy of articulating their views accurately—to the extent that if they were to hear (or read) our description of their position, they would be satisfied. Nicole writes, “I try to represent [my opponents] so faithfully and fully that an adherent to that position might comment, ‘This man certainly does understand our view!’” Nicole adds, “Thus I have earned the right to criticize.” [139] On this criterion, Hunt has not earned the right to criticize. His distortion of historic Calvinism would not be recognized by actual Calvinists.

Unfortunately we must conclude that Hunt simply does not advance the dialogue between Calvinists and non-Calvinists. He does not promote understanding or healing in the longstanding debate over God’s sovereignty. He has misrepresented Calvinism in a way calculated to create further hostility toward those who embrace certain of its doctrines as biblical. In short, the book is all heat and no light. In many ways it is simply irresponsible.

We must acknowledge that, at times, overzealous Calvinists have treated fellow Christians who do not share their views in an unbecoming way— sometimes causing unnecessary rifts in local churches. Those Calvinists who are more mature have issued warnings against such behavior, arguing that it is not only wrong but inconsistent with true, biblical Calvinism. [140] But Hunt’s book demonstrates the fault is not always on the side of the Calvinist. Non-Calvinists can be uncharitable and condescending in their treatment of Calvinists; sometimes it is the non-Calvinists who cause disunity in the church. The sad fact is that both sides are prone to caricature and misrepresent each other. The way ahead lies not in vilifying one another, but in dealing graciously with those with whom we disagree. This certainly includes making an earnest attempt to accurately understand one another’s point of view. It would also include refraining from accusations to the effect that one’s opponent doesn’t care about the gospel, or the glory of God, or the like. [141] With this sanctified attitude we can pray that, even if we never resolve our differences this side of eternity, we can nevertheless unite in fellowship around the Lordship of Christ and manifest the kind of love to one another that will let the world know we are his disciples.

Notes

1. Dave Hunt, What Love Is This: Calvinism’s Misrepresentation of God (Sisters, OR: Loyal Publishers, 2002); Dave Hunt and James White, Debating Calvinism: Five Points, Two Views (Sisters, OR: Multnomah, 2004); Dave Hunt, What Love Is This? Calvinism’s Misrepresentation of God, 2nd ed. (Bend, OR: The Berean Call, 2004); Dave Hunt, A Calvinist’s Honest Doubts Resolved by Reason and God’s Amazing Grace (Bend, OR: The Berean Call, 2005).
2. Hunt’s newsletters may be accessed online at: http://www.thebereancall.org/Newsletter/ index.php
3. This edition runs 533 pages of text; 576 total pages.
4. David M. Doran, “A Review Article: What Love Is This?”Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal8 (Fall 2003), 101.
5. David N. Steele, Curtis C. Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn, The Five Points of Calvinism: Defined, Defended, and Documented, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2004), 114.
6. Hunt and White, Debating Calvinism, 21.
7. Hunt repeats the same rhetorical arguments over and over again ad nauseam in What Love Is This? In some cases he repeats the same quotation multiple times throughout the book. The result is a tome that is very tedious to work through.
8. All page references are from the expanded edition of What Love Is This?
9. Hunt confidently asserts, “The Calvinist cannot produce for any part of TULIP a clear, unambiguous statement from any part of Scripture!” (421, emphasis original).
10. Steele, Thomas, and Quinn, for example, offer ten pages of biblical texts to support their explanation of Irresistible Grace. Steele, Thomas, and Quinn, The Five Points of Calvinism, 5264.
11. In the first edition of the book, Hunt claimed that after embracing Christianity, Augustine “entered the Roman Catholic Church.” Dave Hunt, What Love Is This? Calvinism’s Misrepresentation of God (Sisters, OR: Loyal Publishing, 2002), 33.
12. Hunt, 35–36, citing Sidney Z. Ehler and John B. Morrall, eds. Church and State Through the Centuries: A Collection of Historic Documents with Commentaries (1967 reprint; New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1954), 7.
13. For a chronological summary of Augustine’s life see James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: ANew Biography (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), xiii-xiv.
14. Ehler and Morrall, Church and State Through the Centuries, 7.
15. Augustus H. Strong, Systematic Theology (Old Tappen, NJ: Fleming H. Revell, 1907), 640.
16. Doran, “A Review Article: What Love Is This?” 107.
17. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 2.2.12–22. Hunt quotes from the Beveridge translation throughout What Love Is This?
18. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.13.
19. See footnote 52 for Hunt’s use of secondary sources.
20. For a discussion of Calvin’s “conversion” see William J. Bouwsma, John Calvin: A Sixteenth Century Portrait (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 10–12.
21. The account is reproduced with a brief introduction in Hugh T. Kerr and John M. Mulder, eds., Famous Conversions(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994 [1983]), 24–28.
22. Alexandre Ganoczy, trans. David L. Foxgrover and James Schmitt, “Calvin’s Life,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin, ed. Donald K. McKim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10.
23. On Calvin’s spirituality see Ford Lewis Battles, ed., The Piety of John Calvin: AnAnthology Illustrative of the Spirituality of the Reformer (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978).
24. Cited in V. Shepherd, “Jacobus Arminius,” in Biographic Dictionary of Evangelicals, Timothy Larsen, ed., (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 19.
25. Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, Calvin and Augustine, ed. Samuel G. Craig (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1956), 322.
26. The Reformers “loss of confidence in the reliability of the Vulgate” is well documented. See Alister E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1990), 56–58. In another work, McGrath observes, “For the humanists, whatever authority scripture might possess derived from the original texts in their original languages, rather than the Vulgate, which was increasingly recognised as unreliable and inaccurate.” Alister McGrath, The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1990), 137 (note the whole chapter, 122–139).
27. John L. Thompson, “Calvin as a Biblical Interpreter,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin, 58.
28. Randall C. Zachman, John Calvin as Teacher, Pastor, and Theologian (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 150.
29. Thompson, “Calvin as a Biblical Interpreter,” 61.
30. Calvin, Institutes, 3.4.9.
31. The title of chapter 4 in What Love Is This? pp. 51-66.
32. John Calvin, “Acts of the Council of Trent, with the Antidote,” in Tracts and Treatises in Defense of the Reformed Faith, trans. Henry Beveridge, ed. Thomas F. Torrance, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), 3:17–188.
33. Richard C. Gamble, “Calvin’s Controversies,” in McKim, Cambridge Companion to John Calvin, 191.
34. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin, xiii.
35. Rudolph W. Heinze, Reform and Conflict: From the Medieval World to the Wars of Religion, A.D. 1350-1648 (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2005), 170. George adds, “Few people in the history of Christianity have been as highly esteemed or as meanly despised as John Calvin. Most Christians, including most Protestants, know only two things about him: He believed in predestination, and he sent Servetus to the stake. From these two facts, both true, emerges the common caricature of Calvin as the grand inquisitor of Protestantism, the cruel tyrant of Geneva, a morose and bitter and utterly inhuman figure.” Timothy George, Theology of the Reformers (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1988), 167.
36. The Consistory was a group of pastors and elders responsible for ecclesiastical discipline in Geneva.
37. See Heinze, Reform and Conflict, 185.
38. On the importance of understanding Calvin in his times see William J. Bouwsma, “The Quest for the Historical Calvin,” in Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 77 (1986), 47–57.
39. Basil Hall, “The Calvin Legend,” in John Calvin, ed. G. E. Duffield (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 13.
40. Hunt, 73, citing Will Durant, The Story of Civilization (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), VI:474.
41. Hall, “The Calvin Legend,” 10.
42. Bernard Cottret, Calvin: A Biography, trans., M. Wallace McDonald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 181.
43. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin, 106.
44. Hall, “The Calvin Legend,” 10.
45. Ronald S. Wallace, Calvin, Geneva and the Reformation: AStudy of Calvin as Social Reformer, Churchman, Pastor and Theologian (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), 77.
46. Wallace, Calvin, Geneva and the Reformation, 77.
47. John Piper,The Legacy of Sovereign Joy: God’s Triumph of Grace in the Lives of Augustine, Luther, and Calvin (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2000), 35.
48. Richard Gamble’s words certainly apply to Hunt, “In much of the popular literature concerning Calvin, certain misconceptions are tacitly accepted without a critical analysis of historical sources and historical circumstances.” Gamble, “Calvin’s Controversies,” 197.
49. McGrath writes, “The sixteenth century knew little, if anything, of the modern distaste for capital punishment, and regarded it as a legitimate and expedient method of eliminating undesirables and discouraging their imitation. The city of Geneva was no exception.” McGrath, A Life of John Calvin, 115.
50. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin, 116.
51. Ibid., 115-116.
52. Roland H. Bainton, Hunted Heretic: The Life and Death of Michael Servetus, 1511–1553 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953), 170. The Unitarian Universalist Historical Society issued an updated edition published by Blackstone Editions in 2005, edited by Peter Hughes. It is curious that Hunt cites an English sentence from the French translation of Bainton [Michel Servet, hérétique et martyr (Geneva: Droz, 1953)]. It would appear that Hunt has simply lifted the quotation from Cottret (Calvin: ABiography), since the passage from Bainton is cited by Cottret (222). Yet he does not acknowledge he has taken the quotation from Cottret, perhaps to give the impression that he is quoting directly from the French translation. Hunt references the quotation twice (41, 429). It is Hunt’s common practice to cite French language sources directly without acknowledging that he has taken them straight out of Cottret. For another example, see Hunt and White, Debating Calvinism, 228, 236 n.3; cf. Cottret, Calvin, 77.
53. Bainton, Hunted Heretic, 181.
54. Cited by Bainton, Hunted Heretic, 170. Bainton does not provide documentation for this statement.
55. It makes one wonder when Hunt asserts, “Calvin was a victim of his times? No, a victim of his theology!” (399).
56. I certainly do not mean to be ungracious to Hunt here, but I find it not a little ironic that Hunt condemns Calvin for having an “unchristian ‘biting and mocking tone of ridicule’” (81) when such a tone is characteristic of Hunt throughout his book. A humbler approach acknowledges with Piper, “It would be naive to say that we never would have done what they did under their circumstances, and thus draw the conclusion that they have nothing to teach us.” Piper, The Legacy of Sovereign Joy, 36–37.
57. George, Theology of the Reformers, 168.
58. See for example John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeil, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 4.7.
59. See The Works of James Arminius, trans. James Nichols and William Nichols (1828; reprint ed., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986), 2:441.
60. Hunt and White, Debating Calvinism, 239.
61. See Doran, “A Review Article: What Love Is This?” 116–117, and James White in Hunt and White, Debating Calvinism, 293.
62. The quotation is taken from W. G. T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure and Mixed (1896; reprint ed., Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1986), 15.
63. See Phillip R. Johnson, “A Primer on Hyper-Calvinism,” (1998), www.spurgeon.org/~phil/ articles/hypercal.htm
64. He writes, “Calvinists who accuse others of being “hyper” actually believe the same thing, but attempt to cover up that fact with double-talk” (138). Such a statement is not only untrue, it is outright pernicious. See also pages 114, 142. On page 129 Hunt says, “That label [hyper-Calvinist] is a ploy by ‘moderates’ to escape the horrible truth!”
65. See Iain H. Murray,Spurgeon v. Hyper-Calvinism: The Battle for Gospel Preaching (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 1995) and John Murray, “The Free Offer of the Gospel,” in Collected Writings of John Murray, vol.4: Studies in Theology (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 1982 [1948]), 113–132.
66. Supralapsarianism maintains that God decreed both election and reprobation prior to the fall. See F. H. Klooster, “Supralapsarianism,” in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd ed., ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 1155.
67. John M. Frame, “Infralapsarianism,” in Encyclopedia of the Reformed Faith, ed. Donald K. McKim (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), 193.
68. Some Reformed theologians think the whole discussion of supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism is misguided for it “runs great risk of engaging in speculation into matters God has kept secret.” John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2002), 337. In a similar way, Bavinck thought “neither the supra- nor the infralapsarian view of predestination is able to do full justice to the truth of Scripture, and to satisfy our theological thinking.” Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, trans. William Hendricksen (1951, reprint ed., Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1977), 392.
69. Again Hunt declares, “Indisputably, the phrases represented by the first four letters in the acronym TULIP never appear in the Bible. That fact speaks volumes” (421).
70. “The question of supreme importance is not how the system under consideration came to be formulated in five points, or why it was named Calvinism, but rather whether it is supported by Scripture. The final court of appeal for determining the validity of any theological system is the inspired, authoritative Word of God.” Steele, Thomas, and Quinn, The Five Points of Calvinism, 17, emphasis original.
71. Speaking of the TULIP phrases Boice notes, “These are not the wisest or the most accurate ways of speaking about these doctrines; however, they are the most common way, and the acronym is a convenient handle for remembering them.” James Montgomery Boice and Philip Graham Ryken, The Doctrines of Grace (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2002), 19.
72. Again, “Allegedly, God had created all men incapable of choosing to seek Him and of believing the gospel” (363).
73. Steele, Thomas, and Quinn, The Five Points of Calvinism, 18–19, emphasis original. Perhaps the term “pervasive” depravity would be more fitting. Reymond says, “Every part of [man’s] being—his mind, his will, his emotions, his affections, his conscience, his body—has been affected by sin (this is what is meant by the doctrine of total depravity). Robert L. Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 450.
74. Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, 452.
75. Loraine Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1932), 61.
76. Pelagianism (from Augustine’s fifth century opponent Pelagius) denies original sin and maintains that humans, apart from grace, have the inherent ability and freedom to obey God. Pelagianism was condemned by church councils in 418 and 431. A more moderate semi-Pelagianism maintains that the human will was weakened by the fall, but remains free. The semi-Pelagian view is synergistic in the sense that human will and divine grace work together in salvation: humans normally take the initiative and God responds with his grace. It is difficult not to charge Hunt with semi-Pelagianism when he writes: “Clearly Paul is declaring that God’s grace is not irresistible but must be wedded to human will and effort” (p. 379).
77. Most Arminians agree that humans are in bondage to sin and unable to choose the spiritually good. However they believe God provides to all prevenient grace which restores what was lost inAdam’s sin, viz. the ability to choose salvation. For a critique of prevenient grace see Thomas R. Schreiner, “Does Scripture Teach Prevenient Grace in the Wesleyan Sense?” The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 2:365–382.
78. Here Hunt departs from both Arminius and John Wesley. Arminius wrote: “In this [fallen] state, the free will of man towards the true good is not only wounded, maimed, infirm, bent, and weakened; but it is also imprisoned, destroyed, and lost. And its powers are not only debilitated and useless unless they be assisted by grace, but it has no powers whatsoever except such as are excited by divine grace. For Christ has said, ‘Without me ye can do nothing.’” Cited by Carl Bangs, Arminius: AStudy in the Dutch Reformation (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1985), 341. Wesley said: “I believe that Adam, before his fall, had such freedom of will, that he might choose either good or evil; but that, since the fall, no child of man has a natural power to choose anything that is truly good. Yet I know (and who does not?) that man has still freedom of will in things of an indifferent nature.” The Works of John Wesley 3rd ed (1872; reprint, Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1984), 10:350. Cited in Schreiner, “Does Scripture Teach Prevenient Grace in the Wesleyan Sense?” 2:368.
79. For many additional texts that describe the fallen human condition see Steele, Thomas, and Quinn, The Five Points of Calvinism, 20–26.
80. As, for example, with Hoehner: “As those who are physically dead cannot communicate with the living, so also those who are spiritually dead cannot communicate with the eternal living God and thus are separated from God…. They are dead and need to be made alive.” Harold W. Hoehner, Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 308.
81. James R. White, The Potter’s Freedom: A Defense of the Reformation and a Rebuttal of Norman Geisler’s Chosen But Free, (Amityville, NY: Calvary Press, 2000), 75.
82. The difference is between the dative of sphere (ὑμᾶς ὄντας νεκροὺς… ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν, Eph. 2:1) and the dative of reference (οἵτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, Rom. 6:2). See Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 154.
83. Garland says, “The ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος (psychikos anthrōpos [natural man]) is not a reference to the weak Christian but represents natural physical existence that is dependent on human faculties without the aid of the Holy Spirit.” David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 100. Hunt seems to confuse the ψυχικός of 2:14 with the σαρκικός (sarkikos) of 3:1–3 (see What Love Is This?119). But, as Schweizer (TDNT,9:663) observes, the unbeliever is ψυχικός and the believer “who is making no progress” is σαρκικός.
84. Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 270.
85. “If God dealt with man today according to his ability to obey, he would have to reduce his moral demands to the vanishing point.” Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, 454.
86. On Grace and Free Will, 16.32.
87. For an extended discussion of compatibilism and related issues see John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2001), 625–775.
88. Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 67.
89. Robert A. Peterson and Michael D. Williams, Why I Am Not an Arminian (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 137.
90. D. A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994 [1981]), 10.
91. Peterson and Williams, Why I Am Not an Arminian, 147.
92. D. A. Carson, “Reflections on Assurance,” The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, 406.
93. For more examples see D. A. Carson, How Long, O Lord? Reflections on Suffering and Evil (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990), 202–212.
94. See John H. Fish III, “God’s Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: An Important Lesson from Acts 27, ” Emmaus Journal 10 (2001), 237–249.
95. Bruce Reichenbach, “God Limits His Power,” in Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 102.
96. Hunt is certainly not alone in viewing libertarian freedom as a basic axiom to any credible system of thought. Both classic Arminianism and Open Theism build the superstructure of their theological systems on the foundation of libertarian freedom. Millard Erickson states that for existentialism, libertarian freedom “is simply a presupposition, an unquestioned starting point in light of which all of thought and life must be constructed.” Erickson continues, “Jean-Paul Sartre’s atheism is well known. What is less widely known and understood, however, is the basis for the atheism. There cannot be a god, for if there were, he would be a major encroachment on my freedom. I know, however, that I am free. Therefore, there is no God.” Millard J. Erickson, The Evangelical Left: Encountering Postconservative Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997), 92.
97. Donald Carson asks, “Would we not have to deduce on this basis, that God himself is not free because his holy character precludes the possibility of his sinning?” Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility, 207.
98. Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 139.
99. Ibid., 142.
100. Ibid., 159.
101. ESV, NASB, NET, NIV, NKJV, TNIV.
102. Bruce says, “There is no good reason for weakening the predestinarian note here.” F. F. Bruce, The Book of Acts, NICNT, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 267 n. 111. Barrett is more emphatic: “The present verse is as unqualified a statement of absolute predestination…as is found anywhere in the NT.” C. K. Barrett, The Acts of the Apostles, ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 1:658. Ironically, William MacDonald, who endorsed Hunt’s book (see What Love Is This? book cover) writes of Acts 13:48, “This verse is a simple statement of the sovereign election of God. It should be taken at its face value and believed.” William MacDonald, Believer’s Bible Commentary (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1995 1 vol. ed.), 1623.
103. Henry Alford, The New Testament for English Readers (Chicago: Moody Press, 1942), 745.
104. BDAG (991) lists the following for τάσσω: (1) arrange, put in place; (2) order, fix, determine, appoint. Hunt’s comment that “the exact meaning of tetagmenoi is in dispute” (265) is not warranted, as all the major translations verify.
105. Matthew 28:16; Luke 7:8; Acts 15:2; 22:10; 28:23; Romans 13:1; 1 Corinthians 16:15.
106. The pluperfect periphrastic is formed by an imperfect finite verb (ἐιμί) and a perfect participle.
107. Stanley E. Porter, Idioms of the Greek New Testament (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992), 42. Wallace adds, “the force of the pluperfect tense is that it describes an event that, completed in the past, has results that existed in the past as well (in relation to the time of speaking). The pluperfect makes no comment about the results existing up to the time of speaking. Such results may exist at the time of speaking, or they may not; the pluperfect contributes nothing either way.” Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 583.
108. Arminian scholar Howard Marshall parses τεταγμένοι as a passive. He observes: “A number of scholars have argued that ἦσαν τεταγμένοι can be translated as a middle form with the meaning ‘as many as had ranged themselves for eternal life’ [Knowling, Blaiklock]. There are no parallels for this rendering. In the New Testament the middle voice of τάσσω has the same meaning as the active voice (Acts 28:23; Matthew 28:16), and the postulated sense would require the reflexive pronoun (1 Corinthians 16:15).” I. Howard Marshall, Kept by the Power of God (Minneapolis: Bethany, 1969), 238 n. 7.
109. Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament 2nd ed. (London: United Bible Societies, 1994), 231–232.
110. Ibid., 232.Dodd suggests that the author of Acts drew upon Aramaic sources when relating the speeches of Peter in the early chapters of Acts (2:14–36, 38–39; 3:12–26; 4:8–12; 10:34–43). But this is a far cry from Hunt’s suggestion that Luke originally composed Acts in Hebrew, nor does it have anything to do with 13:48. See C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1937), 22–24.
111. C. Samuel Storms, Chosen for Life: An Introductory Guide to the Doctrine of Divine Election (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), 71.
112. There are several problems with Hunt’s treatment of Romans 9 (pp. 327-337) which I do not have space to deal with at length. Suffice it to say, Hunt’s claim that the passage has nothing to do with salvation ignores the context of Romans 9–11 (e.g. cf. Rom. 9:3 with 10:1 and 11:11). With regard to Hunt’s insistence that Romans 9 only concerns nations and has no relevance for individuals see Thomas R. Schreiner, “Does Romans 9 Teach Individual Election unto Salvation?” The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, 1:89–106. More recently see Thomas R. Schreiner, “Corporate and Individual Elecltion in Romans 9: A Response to Brian Abasciano,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 49:2 (June 2006): 373-386.
113. Hunt again states, “Foreknowledge is always given as the reason for predestination (Romans 8:29; 1 Peter 1:2)” (265).
114. “The classic Arminian interpretation of Romans 8:29, that God’s foreknowledge of faith is in view, is clearly reading one’s theology into the text. Paul does not say: ‘whose faith he foreknew,’ but ‘whom he foreknew.’” S. M. Baugh, “The Meaning of Foreknowledge,” The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, 1:194.
115. The object of the verb προέγνω (foreknew) is an unqualified οὓς (whom).
116. BDAG (866) definesπρογινώσκω “1. have foreknowledge (of) τίsomething” and “2. choose beforehand τινά someone.” Romans 8:29 is listed in the second category.
117. Frame, The Doctrine of God, 72.
118. Baugh, “The Meaning of Foreknowledge,” 194.
119. For a discussion on the various aspects of God’s love and the dangers of absolutizing any one aspect, see D. A. Carson, The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2000), particularly chapter one.
120. See J. I. Packer, “The Love of God: Universal and Particular,” The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, 2:413–427, and John MacArthur, Jr., The Love of God (Dallas: Word Publishing, 1996).
121. For example, Arthur W. Pink, The Sovereignty of God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1972 [1930]), 314. Phillip Johnson argues that a denial of any sort of love in God for the non-elect is hyper-Calvinism. Johnson, “A Primer on Hyper-Calvinism,” www.spurgeon.org/~phil/articles/ hypercal.htm
122. Carson, The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God, 21.
123. Jewett, commenting on Arminius’ view of predestination based on foreseen faith, writes: “But is his claim to have ‘explained’ predestination by basing it on foreknowledge justified? I would suggest that it is. We may not agree that his doctrine is biblical, that his exegesis is sound, but we can hardly doubt that it makes sense in its own right, that it resolves the problem.” Precisely. It resolves the problem in such a way that Paul would have no need to deal with the anticipated objections he raises in Romans 9. Paul K. Jewett, Election and Predestination(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 77.
124. Doran, “A Review Article: What Love Is This?” 124. Again Hunt writes, “The Calvinist’s grace could hardly be called grace for another reason: it is only grace for the elect” (409). We confront another non sequitur, for the elect certainly do experience grace (Eph. 1:7–8). Grace is not determined by the number of people to which it is extended. Neither is God somehow obligated to exercise grace on every sinner who has defied him.
125. Yet Hunt insists, “Certainly, however, the zeal of such men and women in bringing the gospel to the world could not be because of their Calvinism but onlyin spite of it” (30, emphasis original).
126. For a helpful discussion of this issue see J. I. Packer, Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1961), 24. See also John Benton, Evangelistic Calvinism: Why the Doctrines of Grace Are Good News (Carlisle: Banner of Truth Trust, 2006).
127. Boice writes, “Rather than making evangelism unnecessary, the doctrine of election actually requires it as the appointed means of salvation.” Boice and Ryken, The Doctrines of Grace, 209.
128. C. Samuel Storms, “Prayer and Evangelism under God’s Sovereignty,” in The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, 1:226.
129. Difference of opinion exists among Reformed paedobaptists. See Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 4th ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1941), 639–642.
130. Apparently this is what Hoeksema envisioned when he wrote: “We may even take for granted that in the sphere of the covenant of God he usually regenerates his elect children from infancy.” Herman Hoeksema, Reformed Dogmatics, 2nd ed. (Grandville, MI: Reformed Free Publishing, 2005), 2:39.
131. G. N. M. Collins, “Order of Salvation,” in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 870. For an extensive defense of the logical, but not chronological, priority of regeneration to faith, see Mark A. Snoeberger, “The Logical Priority of Regeneration to Saving Faith in a Theological Ordo Salutis,” Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal 7 (Fall 2002): 49-93.
132. Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 702.
133. See, for example, Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol.1, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1992), 220–225.
134. Yet even Arminian scholar Howard Marshall insists, “We must certainly distinguish between what God would like to see happen and what he actually does will to happen, and both of these things can be spoken of as God’s will.” I. Howard Marshall, “Universal Grace and Atonement in the Pastoral Epistles,” in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1989), 56.
135. Hunt condescendingly dismisses Piper’s compelling essay on this issue (e.g. “Are we being led into madness where words have lost their meaning?” 374). See John Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God? Divine Election and God’s Desire for All to Be Saved,” The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, 1:107–131.
136. Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 1:124. Similarly Grudem says, “So in a Reformed system God’s highest value is his own glory, and in an Arminian system God’s highest value is the free will of man.” Grudem, Systematic Theology, 684.
137. Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 523.
138. Packer, Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God, 24.
139. Roger Nicole, “Polemic Theology: How to Deal with Those Who Differ from Us (With a Supplement),” EmJ 14 (Winter 2005): 202.
140. See Ian Hamilton, “Proud Calvinism,” The Banner of Truth 496 (January 2005), 16–20; James N. McGuire, “A Kinder, Gentler Calvinism,” Reformed Quarterly 19:2 (Summer 2000) reprinted as Appendix A in Steele, Thomas, and Quinn, The Five Points of Calvinism, 141–146; Boice and Ryken, The Doctrines of Grace, chapter 8 “The True Calvinist,” 179–199.
141. One can wish that every Christian would read and heed Roger Nicole’s excellent essay, “Polemic Theology: How to Deal with Those Who Differ from Us (With a Supplement),” EmJ 14 (2005): 197-216.