Of Silence and Head Covering

By Noel Weeks

Paul’s teaching concerning covering of the head in 1 Cor 11:2–16 has been variously interpreted. In some circles the wearing of hats by Christian women has become a veritable test of orthodoxy; in others this passage has become the basis of the argument that the New Testament is conditioned by the mores of contemporary culture. As the modern confusion over the role of women in society influences the church, this passage will no doubt be made the basis for widely diverging views. There is a need therefore to seek to grasp the point of the apostle’s argument.

It is often asserted that Paul’s purpose was to make the church conform to local standards of decency. His teaching in this passage may have relevance for us in that the principle of seeking to avoid offense is applicable to us, but the specific details are not binding upon us. This interpretation of the whole passage finds no warrant in the text itself. In the previous chapter the apostle had argued against certain practices which could be misinterpreted within Corinthian society. In 14:23 he raises as an argument the effect that church behavior would have upon outsiders. In chapter 11 there is no such appeal. The argument consistently turns upon the created order. Being the created order, it is an order valid in all times and places.

It lies completely outside of my competence to judge whether veiling of the head by women was the universal practice among women in Paul’s day. Some evidence leads to the conclusion that it was not.[1] For the argument here being considered to be valid one would have to prove that it was a universal and not just a local Corinthian custom. For Paul is able to appeal to the uniform practice of the churches (11:16).

The strongest argument that may be raised for this position is that which appeals to Paul’s reference to “nature” in 11:14. Nature is taken to mean “the common sense of decency that is prevalent at a certain time.”[2] Even if this be granted it does not prove that the whole passage deals with prevailing custom. At the most one could argue that Paul makes appeal to the way custom reflects an understanding of an order which is itself grounded in creation. If this be the case, the teaching respecting hair length is more than a matter of temporary custom. Even though refracted through the mores of a particular culture, it is ultimately grounded in a created order and hence has more than temporary validity. Yet the statement that “nature” here means only a common sense of decency must itself be challenged. Paul uses “nature” to mean something different. In Rom 1:26 he calls homosexuality “against nature.” Here “nature” cannot mean the common sense of decency because the point of the passage is that man’s common sense of “decency” has been so perverted as to approve the practice. In Romans it clearly means the created state of affairs. Certainly this created state of affairs may influence local customs and standards, but the primary and most important factor is creation not custom. This understanding of “nature” fits the context of 1 Cor 11:14, which is clearly concerned with the created order.

In 1 Cor 14:33–36 Paul strictly commands that women are not to speak in the meetings of the church. The apparent conflict between this and chapter 11 is obvious. It is quite lame to suggest that in chapter 11 Paul gives rules for a practice which he will subsequently condemn. The two passages must be brought into harmony. Closer study reveals that the two passages are very closely related. The basis of the argument in both cases is the same. There is a common appeal to the uniform practice of the church (11:16 and 14:33). The teaching in both depends on the same O.T. passages. In chapter 14 this is not immediately obvious as the appeal to “the law” is not further defined. However, the parallel in 1 Tim 2:8–15 establishes that the appeal to the law is directed to that part of the law which gives the created order of man and woman. That is then the same teaching that underlies chapter 11. Paul’s failure to specify the precise section of the law meant in 14:34 creates a problem which will be resolved below.

One way of bringing the two into harmony is to suggest that chapter 11 deals with private gatherings of believers rather than the gatherings of the whole church. This would resolve the conflict and we may even infer that such gatherings existed. We would infer that the prophesying of Philip’s daughters (Acts 21:9) took place in some context other than that of the regular meetings of the church. If this were not the case Paul would be unable to appeal to the uniform practice of the church. There is at least the contrast between “in the church” and “at home” in 1 Cor 14:35.

While plausible, this resolution does not do justice to the context. The impression is that 11:2 begins a new section which deals with public worship. Certainly 11:17ff is concerned with public worship and there is the strongest connection between vv. 2 and 17. There is no indication in the text itself that some special sort of private gathering of believers is in view. It is most natural to take the man’s praying and prophesying to refer to the context in which that would normally take place. And that is the meetings of the congregation. The interpretation of 11:10 is very difficult, but the most plausible explanation is that which sees here a reference to the gathering of the angels with the church in worship (cf. Heb 12:22–24). This indicates that the context is public worship. Even while the exact details may be uncertain it is clear that the apostle is treating prayer and prophecy as functions involving authority. The form of authority is specifically the authority which exists in the man-woman relationship. If we posit some informal Christian gathering such as the meeting together of Christian women, the reference to the man’s authority exercised in prayer and prophecy seems rather irrelevant.

Prophecy is clearly a function in which one individual leads the group. From the fact that prayer is consistently mentioned in parallel with it we may infer that the prayer being referred to is that of one individual leading the group. The passage says nothing about the decorum of women in the meetings of the Christian congregation except in so far as they lead the group in prophecy or prayer. The contradiction with chapter 14 is thus patent.

The common interpretation is that Paul specifies what a woman must wear when she prays or prophesies. Besides bringing the passage into conflict with chapter 14 this explanation does not do justice to his argument. What exactly is the covering required? There are two possibilities. Either it is simply long hair or it is some covering besides long hair. The former explanation depends upon v. 15. The woman’s hair is given to her for (ἀντί) a covering. The sense of ἀντί is generally that of substitution.[3] Her hair is in the place of a covering. Hence the covering required is long hair and nothing more. This explanation does not accord with vv. 5, 6. If the covering is merely long hair, there would be no need to argue that being uncovered is the same as being shaven. To take off the covering would be to shave the head. And there is no suggestion that the women in Corinth were shaving their heads. Or if the passage were teaching the inappropriateness of short hair for women, then all the discussion about prayer and prophecy would be irrelevant. If Paul believes that short hair is unbecoming for a woman, then surely it is not unbecoming only for a woman who leads in prayer and prophecy.

The alternative is to argue that some covering is involved besides the hair.[4] Once again the problem of the logic of v. 5 arises. If there is a covering in addition to the hair, why is its removal the equivalent of being shaven? This question is particularly difficult if we pay due regard to Paul’s use of the preposition ἀντί in v. 15. Surely this position would leave Paul open to the counter argument that hair itself was all that was necessary for a covering.

Even leaving v. 15 aside, we must inquire why uncovering is equivalent to being shaven. The only logical answer on this position is that Paul is arguing that once the process of uncovering has been begun it should proceed to its logical conclusion. Yet this actually reverses the order of Paul’s argument. He does indeed argue that she should proceed to shave her head. But she should do this because uncovering is already equivalent to being shaven. He is not arguing that she has begun the process that leads to shaving. He is, on the contrary, arguing that she has already shaved her head. It is “one and the same thing” as being shaven. Certainly this objection is not fundamentally different from that based on v. 15. In both cases the uncovering of the head in view seems to ignore the fact that the woman still has her hair.

The conflict with chapter 14 has been repeatedly mentioned. Yet on this interpretation a similar contradiction is brought into chapter 11 itself. It is conceded that prayer and prophecy are seen as authority functions. Yet Paul is made to allow those authority functions to women. It is, of course, suggested that the wearing of a covering removes the problem. This explanation is read into the passage by the force of habitual interpretation. The passage nowhere defines this to be the purpose of the covering. Indeed the passage is more concerned with the consequences of removing the covering than it is with the purpose of wearing it.

There is an explanation which resolves these anomalies and contradictions. The argument is that there is a relationship of authority and submission within the creation which is in turn patterned on the relationship which exists between Creator and creature and within the Godhead itself. Man is the head of the woman. When he acts, as is public praying or prophesying, in a role which shows his authority it would be wrong for him to attempt to hide and obscure that headship. He should not cover his head, as then he would be denying his authority and bringing dishonor upon his head. To rule and yet to hide the symbol of rule is foolish.

The case of the woman is different. She cannot rule. In the interpretation of v. 5 the sense of the dative ἀκατακαλύπτω is crucial. It is generally taken as a dative of accompanying circumstances. The comitative dative is historically linked with the instrumental dative.[5] There are a number of cases in the New Testament in which both senses of the dative are possibly implied.[6] If we translate v. 5 as “Every woman praying or prophesying, by means of the unveiling of the head, dishonors her head,” we obtain a different sense and one in line with Paul’s argument.[7]

The man cannot cover his head when he engages in an authoritative function. For a woman to engage in prayer or prophecy would place her in the same position as the man. That is, she would be forced to exercise headship and thus uncover her head. An uncovering of her head accompanies her act of prayer and prophecy. Error in interpretation has arisen because vv. 4 and 5 have been taken as strictly parallel. A careful examination will show that while there is a similarity in thought there is a difference in structure because the point of each is different. The argument of v. 4 is that a man may not pray or prophecy with head covered. Verse 5 begins the argument that a woman may not pray or prophecy.

If the woman is to take the place of a man, then she must bring dishonor on her head. How does a woman uncover her head? The logical equivalent of uncovering the head for a woman would be shaving the head. This is what Paul argues. If the woman is to seek to take the man’s place, then she must uncover her head and thus be in the position of being shorn. But every woman realizes that to be shorn is a shame. Hence let her realize that to pray or prophesy is to be put to shame and remain with a covering on her head. If she wants to pray or prophecy, then she should literally as well as symbolically uncover her head by shaving it.

As a final argument Paul appeals to the created order. Women have been given long hair so that they might always have a covering. Men have not been given long hair and long hair is a shame to them. Clearly the woman would not do anything which would remove her natural glory. Hence she should realize that praying or prophesying in an authoritative position is contrary to her created function and glory.

This interpretation brings chapter 11 into line with chapter 14. In 14:34 Paul gave no indication of the passage of the law to which he was alluding because shortly before in chapter 11 he had dwelt at length upon that very teaching of the law. There was no need to explicate as the readers would refer to the previous teaching.

There is uncertainty among commentators as to whether 11:1 belongs to what precedes or what follows. Even if we allow that it naturally belongs to what precedes, its sentiments are clearly appropriate for what follows. It may well have formed the transition in Paul’s mind between the two parts of the letter. Certainly Paul is conscious of passing on traditions which are geographically (11:16, 14:33) and temporally (11:23) uniform. This uniformity in the case considered above is itself related to a created order which naturally holds as long as this creation remains. Hence to interpret this passage as teaching that the order of N.T. worship was an indifferent matter dependent upon local custom is to go contrary both to the spirit and letter of Paul’s teaching. On the contrary the apostle expected a meticulous preservation of the traditions throughout the church.

Notes

1. The arguments of W. M. Ramsay on this question have been influential. Yet he cites Dion Chrysostom to the effect that the custom of women going veiled in Tarsus was an oriental and non-Greek custom. Ramsay sees Paul’s teaching as arising out of the influence of his upbringing in Tarsus. See The Cities of St. Paul (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1907), pp. 201-205. This explanation must be rejected. The words of Dion Chrysostom indicate that veiling of women was not Greek custom. One could argue that the Corinthian church was following oriental Jewish custom, but clearly there is no sense in speaking anymore of a common standard of decency.
2. F. H. Von Meyenfeldt, The Meaning of Ethos (Hamilton, Ont.: A.R.S.S., 1964), p. 35.
3. W. F. Arndt & F. W. Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 72f. Note also the comments of W. Hendriksen, The Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1961), pp. 88f.
4. The exact nature of this must remain undefined. What is clear is that it is something covering the head. There is no reference to the face. In this respect the common comparison with modern Islamic criteria of female modesty is irrelevant.
5. A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research. (London, Hodder & Stoughton, n.d.), p. 526.
6. ajnakekalummevnw/ proswvpw/ in 2 Cor 3:18 is a good example. Other examples are found in Acts 11:23 and Phil 1:18.
7. There is no need to press the instrumental dative. It may well be a comitative dative. The important point to grasp is the sense in which uncovering of the head accompanies a woman’s praying or prophesying.