Adam Versus Claims From Genetics

By Vern S. Poythress

[Vern S. Poythress is Professor of New Testament Interpretation at Westminster Theological Seminary.]

Did Adam and Eve exist? Does science say otherwise? The human genome project has produced voluminous data about the information contained in human DNA. Various news media and scientists tell us that this information demonstrates our ape ancestry. How do we evaluate these claims?

Evaluation is important for theological reasons. As the claims based on genetics have mounted, the theological discussion about Adam has heated up. From people with biblical and theological training we hear the argument that we must revise our understanding of the Bible and theology because we have to accept that evolution is an established fact.[1] In response, we hear the opposing argument that the Bible and theology call on us to retain the conviction that Adam was a historical individual whose fall into sin resulted in guilt and sin for all his descendants.[2] On both sides, people with training in biblical studies have understandably avoided discussing in detail the character of the scientific claims, and yet these have obviously greatly influenced the side that has abandoned the traditional understanding of Adam.[3] It is important to undertake a theologically informed evaluation of claims coming from genetics.

We cannot within a short compass examine all the claims and all the evidence in detail. But we can summarize some of the main points, and direct readers to more extensive information.

I. Ninety-Nine Percent Common DNA

We may begin with a commonly cited statistic, the 99 percent identity between human DNA and chimp DNA. In 2005 the Cornell University News Service reported: “Chimpanzees and humans share a common ancestor, and even today 99 percent of the two species’ DNA is identical.”[4] In 2010 the University of California at San Francisco News mentioned the same figure: “The genetic codes of chimps and humans are 99 percent identical.”[5] In 2005 the National Institutes of Health News reported, “Our closest living relatives share perfect identity with 96 percent of our DNA sequence.”[6]

But assessing these claims is more challenging than it may appear. Note that the NIH report mentions 96 percent instead of 99 percent. Why? The same NIH report also includes the figure of 99 percent further on in its description, so none of the figures is an error. It turns out that the 99 percent figure arises by using a number of restrictions: (1) ignore repetitive portions, (2) compare only sequences that can be aligned naturally with one another, and (3) consider only base-pair substitutions, not “indels” (see below).

Comparisons of this kind get technical, because there can be several kinds of correspondence and noncorrespondence between DNA strands. Let us lay out briefly some of the issues. At the level of molecular structure, DNA contains a “code” composed of four “letters,” namely, ACGT (the letters stand for four distinct bases, adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine). The DNA code uses a particular sequence of letters, such as ATTGTTCTCGGC, to specify the exact sequence of amino acids that are to be used to construct a protein.[7] Human DNA and chimp DNA align when one finds the same sequence of letters in both kinds of DNA:

Human: G-C-C-G-A-T-A-A-G-C-A-C

Chimp: G-C-C-G-A-T-A-A-G-C-A-C

A variation is called a “substitution” when there is a different letter at some one point in the sequence:

(The T does not match the G in the middle of the sequence.) A variation is called an “indel” (short for insertion/deletion) when one of the sequences has extra letters:

If the comparison focuses only on substitutions within aligned protein-coding regions, the match is 99 percent. Indels constitute roughly a 3 percent difference in addition to the one percent for substitutions, leading to the figure of 96 percent offered by the NIH.

II. Or Less

But we have only begun. The 96 percent figure deals only with DNA regions where an alignment or partially matching sequence can be found. It turns out that not all the regions of human DNA align with chimp DNA. A technical article in 2002 reported that 28 percent of the total DNA had to be excluded because of alignment problems, and that “for 7% of the chimpanzee sequences, no region with similarity could be detected in the human genome.”[8]

Even when there is alignment, the alignment with other primate DNA may be closer than the alignment with chimp DNA: “For about 23% of our genome, we share no immediate genetic ancestry with our closest living relative, the chimpanzee. This encompasses genes and exons to the same extent as intergenic regions.”[9] The study in question analyzed similarities with the orangutan, gorilla, and rhesus monkey, and found cases where human DNA aligns better with one of these than with chimpanzees.

III. The Challenge Of Interpreting Data

The data from the human genome project and similar projects for chimpanzees and other animals has to be interpreted. It does not interpret itself. What is the significance of the similarities? Do they in fact show that human beings have ape ancestry? Do they imply that we are little more than naked apes? Do they tell us who we are as human beings?

The reigning framework for the interpretation of genetic information and biological origin is Darwinism. Darwinism is much more than the observation that we can breed dogs or that we can study the effects of mutations in fruit flies.[10] Darwinism says that all kinds of living things came into being by purely gradualistic processes. In the popular mind, and indeed also among many scientists, Darwinism also involves the additional assumption that the process of change over time was unguided and purposeless—in other words, God, if he exists, is absent. When applied to the question of human origins, Darwinism implies that we are here by accident, and the kind of race that we are is an accident. Darwinism excludes design by a supernatural Designer; it also excludes in principle the idea of a sudden origin of a new kind of living thing through direct creation from nonliving material, or through multiple simultaneous mutations, or through large scale reorganization of living cells, or any kind of event that could realistically have taken place only through the presence of a Designer.

We must take into account the influence of Darwinism as a framework, because the framework guides how people interpret the significance of genetic similarities. The similarities exist—of that there is no doubt. But what do they mean?

IV. No Purpose?

First, we should distinguish two issues, the issue of purpose and the issue of gradual processes. They are distinct. According to the teaching of the Bible, God is continually involved in ruling the world providentially. He is intimately involved in regular, gradual processes; his presence is not confined to miracles or exceptions. The following verses in the Bible illustrate God’s involvement:

You [God] make springs gush forth in the valleys. (Ps 104:10)

You cause the grass to grow for the livestock
and plants for man to cultivate. (Ps 104:14)

You make darkness, and it is night. (Ps 104:20)

When you send forth your Spirit,
they [the next generation of animals] are created,
and you renew the face of the ground. (Ps 104:30)

In particular, God is active in the formation of human life in a mother’s womb:

For you formed my inward parts;
you knitted me together in my mother’s womb. (Ps 139:13)

God is active as primary cause in addition to the secondary causes that are involved in spring water, the growth of grass, the coming of darkness, the birth of animals, and the gestation and birth of human beings. God has purposes in all these events. Within the picture presented in the Bible, scientific analysis of the secondary causes describes how God brings about his purposes—he does so through gradual processes.

Now for the sake of argument let us suppose that the mainstream picture of gradualism is true, that is, purely gradual processes produced all living things. That picture is completely compatible with God having done it all for his own purposes.[11] When Darwinism says that the process is “purposeless,” it might mean merely that scientific research, narrowly conceived, is not competent to discern the purposes, but only the processes. But in the popular mind, Darwinism is much more: it implies that the purposelessness of the process is definitively established. And that claim overreaches the evidence and the competence of science. It is really a philosophical and religious claim. It makes sense only if a person already knows or believes that God does not exist or that God cannot have purposes that he is accomplishing in gradual processes. The belief is simply smuggled in; it is not an inference just from raw data.

Moreover, the belief about absence of purpose has the potential for feeding back into scientific investigation and influencing scientific interpretation. If there is no God or no purpose, gradualism is virtually the only option, and adherents may cling to it uncritically.[12]

V. Gradualism

Now consider the second issue, the issue of gradualism. According to the picture in the Bible, God can work as he wishes. Many times he works through gradual processes, as we have observed. The regularity of these processes reflects God’s faithfulness. But he is not a prisoner underneath these processes. His rule over the world is what establishes the processes in the first place.[13] He is free to work exceptionally, whenever he wishes. The experimental aspect of science is possible because of the regularities in God’s rule. But, rightly understood, science is subject to God and cannot presume to dictate to him what he has to do. It cannot forbid exceptions. Thus, exceptions are possible in the case of one-time, unrepeatable events, such as the origin of the universe, the origin of the first life, and the origin of human beings. The gradual processes that represent the usual means for God’s rule may have exceptions.

It has now become customary for mainstream representatives of Darwinism to say that the discussion of possible exceptions is not a matter of science but of religion. Of course it depends on how one defines science. But it also depends on how one defines religion. If Darwinism says that the events involving the origins of living things are purposeless, it is making a quasi-religious claim about the lack of God’s involvement. If it says that there are no exceptions to gradualism, it is also presuming that it knows beforehand how God will interact with life, and that too is a religious claim. Atheism is a “religion” in this sense, because it makes a claim about God, namely, that he does not exist. And Darwinism is a “religion” in this sense, because it makes claims about the involvement of God.

The important feature here is that within the mainstream of modern culture Darwinism is not seen as religious, but merely “neutral” and “scientific.” Why? Because the religious assumptions have already been incorporated into the “scientific” theory in the form of underlying assumptions about lack of purpose and gradualism. We are simply told that “this is how science is done.”[14] Because of the cultural prestige of science and scientists, many people simply accept the present state of things as if it were the only possibility. But once we question the underlying assumptions, it becomes clear that there are other possible ways of construing the meaning of science: science studies the regularities of God’s providential rule, and can do so without making assumptions that ban the idea of divine purposes or ban God’s exceptional acts.

VI. Interpreting The Evidence

Now we can return to consider the similarities between human DNA and chimp DNA. What is the meaning of this evidence? It depends on the framework that we have for interpreting the evidence. If our framework is Darwinism, with its purposelessness and gradualism, clearly the similarities confirm the standard picture of gradualism. We postulate a gradual series of mutations by which a common pool of ancestors gradually separated into a proto-human and a proto-chimp line. The evidence confirms the framework because we already have the framework.

If, on the other hand, we use a framework in which God has purposes, he may act either gradually or exceptionally. Whichever means he uses, the DNA is fundamentally his design. The similarities are the product of his intelligent design. Both the similarities and the differences have purposes in the mind of God (though we ought not to presume to claim detailed knowledge about all his purposes). They testify to his wisdom, whether he brought about the present situation by gradual processes or by one or more exceptional acts. We cannot presume to say just how he did it without looking both at the data and whatever we have come to know about God.

The most striking genetic similarities between humans and chimps lie in many of the protein coding regions within the DNA. That is understandable from the standpoint of design, because proteins are the backbone of chemical machinery inside a cell. Cells have to have machinery for metabolism, for cell division, for translating DNA into proteins, for dealing with toxins, and for responding to the environment. The machinery has to accomplish many of the same things in cells of many kinds, so it should not be surprising that there are similarities among proteins not only between man and chimpanzee but throughout the world of living things. God may have brought about these marvelous similarities through gradual processes, if he so chose; but it is up to him.[15]

Given the prevailing Darwinist framework, it is natural that media reports should concentrate on the striking similarities in protein coding regions, because these allegedly confirm the Darwinian framework. In popular reports, difficulties rising from dissimilarities in other regions of DNA are left in silence, with the expectation that these will be explained by the same framework some time in the future. Without any malicious intent, the evidence naturally selected to put in the forefront is the “confirming” evidence rather than evidence that is still problematic. But before ordinary people are bowled over by the claims, they should ask themselves whether the claims are colored by the assumptions of the framework.[16]

Does it make sense that God would create human beings with so much similarity to animals? Again, it is up to God how he wants to do it. If he wants to make similarities, he can do so—however many similarities he wants. We have to investigate, not presume beforehand to know how he would do it.

The Bible does not offer details about chemical composition or other technical matters about the human body. God had the Bible written for all of us, to tell us about himself and about what is important for our practical living, not to overwhelm us with technical details that many people would not understand. But it is interesting that the Bible does give hints concerning similarities between human beings and the animal world. Genesis 2:7 says that, when God made man, “the man became a living creature.” The expression “living creature” is the same as the expression used in Gen 1:20, 21, and 24 to describe animals. Man is created from “dust from the ground” (2:7), which also hints at the common material stuff making up his body. Man made in the image of God is supreme over the animals (1:28), but he also has a definite solidarity with them. The language about “the image of God” underlines human uniqueness, but even here there is a subordinate similarity. The Bible indicates that Adam fathered a son “after his image” (Gen 5:3). This imaging process through fathering has analogies to animal reproduction, such as even ancient people could observe. The common pattern of fathering derives by analogy from God, who is God the Father in relation to his divine Son.[17] This divine original pattern is reflected in an analogical fashion in all the patterns of similarity that we see among living things.

VII. Miracles And Solidarity

We can illustrate the principle of solidarity in other kinds of cases. John 2:1–11 describes a miracle in which Jesus turned water into wine. If a scientist had been there to test the product, would the wine have tasted, smelled, and looked like ordinary wine? Would its chemical composition have been the same as wine? We do not know the details, but it is certainly a reasonable possibility that God would choose to work a miracle in such a way that the product would fit naturally into the world that he had already made.

Matthew 1:18–25 and Luke 1:34–37 indicate that Jesus was born of a virgin. If a scientist had been able to test a sample of DNA from Jesus’ cells, would he have found a normal human Y chromosome, such as is present in the human DNA of men but not women? The Bible does not speak directly about such details, but Heb 2:14, 17; 4:15, and other passages indicate that Jesus was fully human. (Other passages, of course, indicate that he is also fully divine. He is one person with two natures, a divine nature and a human nature. This is a great mystery.) It is reasonable to infer that Jesus’ full humanity extended even to details like the Y chromosome. If so, the Y chromosome is an example of a thorough-going DNA match that was not the product of ordinary mammalian reproductive processes. The match is the product of a miracle, and it has a clear divine purpose, namely, that Jesus should be fully human, in solidarity with the rest of humanity, so that he might represent us as our sin bearer and high priest: “Therefore he had to be made like his brothers in every respect, so that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people” (Heb 2:17).

(Of course some people may reject water becoming wine and the virgin birth because they reject miracles in principle. But that is another issue. If God is God, he can work miracles when he chooses.)

Jesus’ virgin birth is clearly a most exceptional case, but it shows that we must reckon with more than one possible account for DNA matches. The solidarity of human beings with animals and with primates belongs to a different order than solidarity within the human race, but the broad principle of solidarity remains.[18] John Bloom perceptively asks, “Does man have to be different to be proof that God made him directly?” The answer is no.[19]

VIII. Do Percentages Matter?

Now for the sake of argument, suppose that human DNA had matched chimp DNA in 99 percent of the cases all along the DNA strands, not merely in cases of single-base substitutions in aligned regions. What would that prove? Within a Darwinian framework, it might suggest that human beings are merely one more primate. But if God exists and is interested in human beings—if indeed he created human beings uniquely in his image, as the Bible indicates (Gen 1:26–27)—the essential character of human nature is not to be found in quantitative comparisons in the chemistry of DNA. A merely quantitative approach to human nature is part and parcel of a materialistic worldview, where virtually everything reduces in the end to matter and motion. On the other hand, if persons are significant, because God made them, it matters little what is their exact chemical make-up. What matters is that they are persons who can relate to God who is personal. The framework for interpretation is different, and that framework leads to a different assessment of the significance of humanity. The question of genetic similarity remains of interest to scientists, but it is entirely secondary to the question of human significance.[20]

IX. Junk DNA

About 1.2 percent of human DNA has code that is translated into proteins.[21] What about all the rest? When geneticists became aware of noncoding DNA, the Darwinist framework provided an explanation. Noncoding DNA was interpreted as giving us a record of broken evolutionary pieces that no longer had a function—it was “junk” DNA.[22] Francis Collins pointed to this “junk” as one evidence for the gradualistic character of human genetic origins.[23]

But further research has uncovered many positive functions in what was formerly termed “junk.” The ENCODE project (the “Encyclopedia of DNA Elements”) has endeavored to catalog systematically the noncoding DNA, and reports that more than 80 percent “have now been assigned at least one biochemical function.”[24] The leader of the ENCOD E project accordingly called for retiring the word “junk.”[25]

X. The Function Of The Framework

Is Darwinism in trouble? In one sense, no, because Darwinism has become a flexible framework. Is 98 percent of the genome alleged to be nonfunctional? No problem, because it confirms that Darwinian evolution is messy. Is at least 80 percent of it functional? No problem, because it confirms how efficient natural selection, mutations, and DNA rearrangements are in producing superb fitness and complex functionality.

Many kinds of evidence can be fit plausibly into the Darwinian framework, because the framework itself has evolved over a hundred years to provide space to accommodate evidence.[26] The pervasiveness of the framework makes it difficult for people to stand back far enough to ask crucial questions.[27] Should we exercise skepticism about reigning assumptions? Should we ask whether the framework as a whole needs questioning? A few people see problems. Nobel prize winner Robert B. Laughlin complains:

Most important of all, however, the presence of such corollaries [from mass behavior in solid state physics] raises the concern that much of present-day biological knowledge is ideological. A key symptom of ideological thinking is the explanation that has no implications and cannot be tested. I call such logical dead ends antitheories because they have exactly the opposite effect of real theories: they stop thinking rather than stimulate it. Evolution by natural selection, for instance, which Charles Darwin originally conceived as a great theory, has lately come to function more as an antitheory, called upon to cover up embarrassing experimental shortcomings and legitimize findings that are at best questionable and at worst not even wrong. Your protein defies the laws of mass action? Evolution did it! Your complicated mess of chemical reactions turns into a chicken? Evolution! The human brain works on logical principles no computer can emulate? Evolution is the cause! Sometimes one hears it argued that the issue is moot because biochemistry is a fact-based discipline for which theories are neither helpful nor wanted. The argument is false, for theories are needed for formulating experiments. Biology has plenty of theories. They are just not discussed—or scrutinized—in public. The ostensibly noble repudiation of theoretical prejudice is, in fact, a cleverly disguised antitheory, whose actual function is to evade the requirement for logical consistency as a means of eliminating falsehood.[28]

One basic problem is that gradualism has become a built-in, unchallengeable assumption of the theory. In cases where gradualism is difficult to manage, Darwinism papers over the difficulties by citing other kinds of confirmatory evidence, by assuring us that the theory is well-established (“fact”), that the presence of the final form demonstrates that there must be a gradualistic path leading to it,[29] and that the difficulties would dissolve if we had more information. Scientists trust in current scientific theories, and in many cases the trust is warranted. But such trust is a form of faith, and it is unwise to denounce those who find themselves unable to muster the same faith.

XI. Does Nonfunctionality Matter?

And now, for the sake of argument, suppose it were the case that 98 percent of the human genome were biochemically nonfunctional. Would this outcome be decisive for our understanding of human nature and human origins? No, because we do not know the mind of God. Nonfunctionality, if it had existed, would still have to be interpreted, and it takes a framework to do this interpretation. More than one framework is possible, as we have already pointed out. If the framework is Darwinism, then nonfunctionality confirms Darwinian claims about the purposeless character of evolution. If the framework includes an affirmation of God’s providential control—an affirmation found repeatedly in the Bible—then God has his purposes, whether or not we can discern them. Many of the ways of God are past finding out. The fact that we cannot figure out purposes does not mean that God does not have any.

And there is at least one possible purpose that is actually suggested by the Bible’s teaching on the creation of man—namely, solidarity. Man is created both to rule and to have solidarity with the animals and plants over which he rules. The solidarity may be extensive, and if some DNA were to prove not to have biochemical functionality, it might still include either reminders of the fall of man, or reminders that the original unfallen creation, though good, was a beginning point that would lead to something even better, a new heavens and a new earth (Rev 21:1). Thus, even if, for the sake of argument, we were to imagine for ourselves a world in which large amounts of DNA are nonfunctional from a narrow, biochemical point of view, it might still be the case that God could give it a “function” at a completely different level, as an expression of either solidarity or reminders of the fall or reminders of hope for the future. It is presumptuous to assume that, if we could find no function within narrow boundaries, we could draw firm conclusions about the purposes of God or lack of purpose.

XII. The Minimum Population Bottleneck

We should also consider arguments about population size. A number of claims have been made based on studies of the present genetic diversity in the human population. Statistical analysis allegedly shows that there never was a single original human pair, but a larger population; figures of 5,000 or 10,000 are sometimes encountered as minimal figures for any population “bottleneck” in human ancestry.

(A “bottleneck” is a point in time at which the population of a group temporarily falls to a small number. A population can fall suddenly if a famine or plague or other disaster suddenly wipes out most of the population.)

For example, a 1994 study by Francisco Ayala et al. focused on polymorphisms (multiple variations among aligned DNA sequences) that “are shared among contemporary species.”[30] Since the polymorphisms are shared by two or more species, they must have been passed on from a group of common ancestors, and the group must have been large enough to contain all of the variations in DNA sequences that match across species. The paper estimates that any population bottleneck must have included “several thousand individuals.”[31]

The result sounds impressive, but there are difficulties. The particular genomic area on which Ayala’s study focused was the major histocompatibility complex (MHC), which is involved in immune response. This particular area changes more rapidly over time than most other areas of the genome, because human beings and other animals are forced to adapt in their immune systems to new challenges from attacking parasites, bacteria, and other invaders. Moreover, new invasive threats may confront human beings and other animals simultaneously, and similar changes in the MH C may take place in more than one species in response to the challenges. So similarities in variations in the MHC of different species may result from common invasive challenges. A 2006 article reexamines the MHC evidence and concludes that

most MHC diversity is de novo generated [i.e., within the human species] and not the result of trans-species inheritance as initially thought (Figueroa et al. 1988; Lawlor et al. 1988). This result finally puts the MHC in line with the bulk of population and evolutionary genetics data, which firmly conclude that a narrow bottleneck [!] has occurred at the origin of our species (Cann et al. 1987; Hammer 1995), a fact inconsistent with massive flow of alleles from one species to the next as required by the trans-species postulate (Ayala et al. 1994).[32]

Notably, the quotation just given cites Ayala’s 1994 paper and implies that it is now obsolete.

Dennis Venema cites several lines of evidence concerning human population size.[33] One paper by Albert Tenesa et al. analyzes linkage disequilibrium.[34] We cannot enter into the details of the technical analysis. Tenesa’s paper depends on assumptions about constant rates of mutation and constant rates for chromosomal crossovers (recombinations). Even granted these assumptions, the study indicates that there is an effective limitation to how far one can probe into the past.[35] Information based on correlations between nearer locations on a chromosome probes further into the past, but the analysis always results in figures that represent a rough average over many generations in the human population. Consequently, the principal figures, like 3,100 for non-African populations and 7,500 for the African population, represent average populations over many generations.[36] They say nothing one way or the other about whether the size decreased rapidly to two individuals in the more distant past.

Another line of evidence uses cases where human DNA matches gorilla DNA more closely than chimpanzee DNA. Two supporting technical papers that Venema cites assume that common ancestry is the explanation for these similarities, and then use mathematical models to estimate the average and minimal population of the group of common ancestors for humans and chimpanzees. One paper gives as a principal figure a population of 52,000 to 96,000,[37] while the other gives 12,000 to 21,000.[38] If one grants all the assumptions leading to these figures, they describe the time at which lineages that would eventually lead to humans and to chimpanzees initially separated. They say nothing directly about whether there was a later bottleneck in the population size in the lineage leading to humans.[39] By leaving the question open, the paper does not in fact exclude the possibility of a bottleneck consisting in a single pair—Adam and Eve.

We should, however, be careful to note what assumptions go into the paper near its beginning. The paper assumes that a purely gradualistic process led to the human race, and then tries to calculate, based on that assumption and others, what might be the average population size at the time at which the proto-chimp and proto-human lineages initially diverged. The built-in assumptions imply that a later bottleneck consisting in a single human pair would still be purely gradualistic in nature: the key pair would have arisen by normal processes of primate birth and growth, and would differ only gradualistically from their parents. The assumption of gradualism thus leads to an overall picture that differs from the biblical teaching on Adam and Eve. But the differences arise from the assumption of gradualism, not from the genetic evidence in itself.

Another paper uses genetic diversity among humans today to estimate average population size over the remote past, and offers nine different estimates in the region of 10,000.[40] But these numbers depend on models that assume a constant population size through many generations.[41] The figures are in fact giving us rough averages over long periods of time, so they say nothing about the possibility of two original individuals.

XIII. How Long Ago Did Adam And Eve Live?

The studies from population genetics do seem to suggest long periods for the past of human populations. Figures of 40,000 years, 100,000 years, or more crop up in various articles. How do we evaluate these large figures? To begin with, we should observe that these figures all depend on mathematical models that rely on assumptions about the past. The models assume that the past is like the present, and that the rates of mutation and other genetic processes remain the same. If we receive the Bible’s instruction, we must be cautious about such assumptions. The assumptions may be right, but then again they may not: the fall into sin resulted in a curse that may have had extended, multi-generational effects on mankind.

In addition, we should try to understand the information that the Bible is giving us with its genealogical records (primarily in Gen 5 and 10). In his famous chronological calculations, Archbishop Ussher assumed that the main genealogical records in Gen 5 and 10 had no gaps, that is, that they had omitted no names for intermediate generations. Using that assumption, he calculated backward to a date for creation in 4004 b.c. But the Bible does not say anywhere that its genealogies have no gaps. Moreover, the genealogy in Matt 1:2–16 places the name of Uzziah immediately after Joram (v. 8). When it does so, it omits the names of the intervening generations, Ahaziah, Joash, and Amaziah, which 2 Chr 22–25 mentions. Matthew 1:8 thus has a “gap.”

William Henry Green did an extensive analysis of biblical genealogies and concluded that they may contain gaps.[42] If they do, the gaps mean that we cannot use Ussher’s procedure of adding up the years in the genealogies to obtain a date for the creation of Adam and Eve. The Bible simply does not tell us how long ago it was. Thus, Adam and Eve may have lived further back in time.[43]

XIV. Three Sides To The Analysis

The question about Adam and Eve is challenging for several reasons. For one thing, research on the genomic information in primates and in other living things continues at a great pace. What looked like firm conclusions in the excitement at an early stage may be modified later. We need patience to assess the research.

In the midst of rapidly expanding research, popular claims made in the name of science easily fall victim to one of three failings: they overreach or exaggerate the implications of evidence, they misread the significance of technical research, or they argue in a circle by assuming the principle of purely gradualistic evolution at the beginning of their analysis.

In addition, the question about Adam and Eve contains several dimensions. It has a scientific side, because scientific reasoning about hominid bones[44] or DNA similarities or population genetics is being cited in favor of dismissing Adam and Eve.[45] For the most part we have focused on this scientific side. But the question also has a side focusing on biblical interpretation, since one of the questions is what the Bible teaches in the various passages that mention Adam or Eve or both.[46] It has a theological side, because theology undertakes the task of summarizing the teaching of the Bible as a whole, and asking about its implications for our own understanding of Christianity; for our understanding of ourselves as human beings (are we descended from Adam, whose one sin has resulted in universal human sin?); and for our living.[47]

XV. Commitments

I am a follower of Christ. So I do not come to this issue in a religiously neutral way.[48] But neither does anyone else. Science itself cannot be practiced without a prescientific faith or trust.[49] For example, scientists must believe (1) that the world displays regularities, (2) that human beings have minds so attuned to these regularities that they have a chance of discerning them, (3) that examination of the world and experimentation concerning its regularities are ethically legitimate, and (4) that scientists ought to and for the most part do remain honest in their examination of the world and their reports of their conclusions.

We can distinguish between approximate formulations of scientific laws by scientists and the real laws “out there,” the systems of regularities that scientists believe in even before they do their investigations. I have argued elsewhere that the real law is God’s speech, by which he rules the world.[50] All scientists actually rely on God. But, within our modern secularist environment, many scientists attempt to replace God by an impersonalist conception of law—law is just a kind of cosmic mechanism.

The difference is more than academic. If the laws are impersonal and mechanistic, there can be no exceptions to observed regularities. On the other hand, if God as a personal God is governing the world, his personal purposes may include several dimensions. He is faithful in his governance, and his faithfulness leads to the regularities. At the same time, he is personally involved in relation to human beings, and his personal involvements and personal commitments may lead to special acts in accord with special purposes. No one can stop him from working exceptionally if he wishes.

XVI. Understanding The Creation Of Human Beings

This view of God’s involvement has implications for Adam and Eve. It is up to God how he wants to go about creating the world. He is sovereign. He specifies all the laws that scientists later explore. He is not a victim or a prisoner of his own laws! He may if he wishes create new species through gradual processes; he may also create in unique ways.[51]

God gave us the Bible in order to guide us. This guidance includes instruction concerning our understanding of who we are as human beings and our understanding of sin as rebellion against God and a disruption of an initially good creation. Most significantly, it also includes the good news of redemption from the pit of sin, accomplished by Christ. If we understand God’s purposes in this way from the Bible,[52] we may continue to have confidence that he gave us a reliable account when he spoke about Adam and Eve. They did exist, and they were specially created—“in the image of God.” Because of Adam’s fall, we are all subject to sin (1 Cor 15:21–22; Rom 5:12–21). We must come to Christ for deliverance.

Notes

1. Peter Enns, The Evolution of Adam: What the Bible Does and Doesn’t Say about Human Origins (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2012).
2. J. P. Versteeg, Adam in the New Testament: Mere Teaching Model or First Historical Man? (translated and with a foreword by Richard B. Gaffin, Jr.; Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2012); C. John Collins, Did Adam and Eve Really Exist? Who They Were and Why You Should Care (Wheaton: Crossway, 2011).
3. Enns, Evolution of Adam, ix-x; Richard B. Gaffin, Jr., foreword to Adam in the New Testament, by Versteeg, xii: “The scientific issues involved, certainly important and in need of careful attention, are not my concern here.”
4. Krishna Ramanujan, “Genetic Divergence of Man from Chimp Has Aided Human Fertility but Could Have Made Us More Prone to Cancer, Cornell Study Finds,” Cornell University News Service, May 13, 2005, http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/May05/Chimps.kr.html (accessed September 19, 2012).
5. Jeffrey Norris, “What Makes Us Human? Studies of Chimp and Human DNA May Tell Us,” UCSF News Center, June 28, 2010, http://www.ucsf.edu/news/2010/06/5993/what-makes-ushuman- studies-chimp-and-human-dna-may-tell-us (accessed September 19, 2012).
6. “New Genome Comparison Finds Chimps, Humans Very Similar at the DNA Level,” NIH News: National Institutes of Health, August 31, 2005, http://www.genome.gov/15515096 (accessed September 27, 2012).
7. But some DNA has functions other than coding for proteins. See below. Further explanations of DNA can be found in many places, e.g., Stephen C. Meyer, Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design (New York: HarperOne, 2009).
8. Ingo Ebersberger et al., “Genomewide Comparison of DNA Sequences between Humans and Chimpanzees,” American Journal of Human Genetics 70, no. 6 (June 1, 2002): 1490-97 [1492-93], http://www.cell.com/AJHG/abstract/S0002-9297%2807%2960701-0 (accessed September 19, 2012).
9. Ingo Ebersberger et al., “Mapping Human Genetic Ancestry,” Molecular Biology and Evolution 24, no. 10 (2007): 2266, http://mbe.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/10/2266.full.pdf (accessed September 19, 2012); referenced by Casey Luskin, “Study Reports a Whopping ‘23% of Our Genome’ Contradicts Standard Human-Ape Evolutionary Phylogeny,” Evolution News, June 3, 2011, http://www.evolutionnews.org/2011/06/study_reports_a_whopping_23_of047041.html (accessed September 19, 2012).
10. For a clear exposition of different meanings of “evolution,” one may see John C. Lennox, God’s Undertaker: Has Science Buried God? (Oxford: Lion, 2009), 100-108.
11. Similarly Alvin Plantinga distinguishes between unguided and guided evolutionary processes (Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], 16-17, 39, 55, 63).
12. Lennox, God’s Undertaker, 96-99.
13. Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-Centered Approach (Wheaton: Crossway, 2006), esp. ch. 1.
14. On “methodological naturalism,” see ibid., ch. 19.
15. Because of “redundancy” (“degeneracy”) in the DNA code, two distinct codons, consisting of triplets such as CTT and CTA, may code for the same amino acid, such as leucine. In spite of the fact that distinct codons could code for the very same amino acid, distinct species tend to reuse the same codon at the same position in analogous proteins. This evidence is not explained merely by appeals to common protein function. So an additional explanation is called for, and of course Darwinism supplies it in the form of common descent and gradual modification.
16. On the importance of frameworks of interpretation, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition (4th ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
17. See Poythress, Redeeming Science, ch. 18.
18. John Bloom mentions the wine in John 2 and suggests further illustrations of special action that authenticate the special character of the product: the president of a firm personally signs a letter typed by his secretary; or, in the ancient Near East, a king might personally make the first brick for a temple (“On Human Origins: A Survey,” http://www.asa3.org/ASA/education/origins/ humans-jb.htm [accessed September 26, 2012]).
19. Ibid. (italics original).
20. The Bible focuses on man’s religious status and relationship to God. This focus is appropriate because it is vital to our understanding of God himself, human sin, and Christ’s redemption. In addition, our personal relation to God really does constitute what is most weighty and distinctive about humanity in comparison to animals. A number of authors, observing the importance of religious status, have theorized that a sudden appearance of religious consciousness or a sudden transition to relatedness to God or a sudden initial act of divine revelation is compatible in principle with a gradualistic origin of humanity at the biological level. They distinguish sharply between religious relationship and biological history. In reply we may indeed acknowledge that in theory many possible biological stories for how God brought man into existence might be minimally compatible with the general principle that man is made in the image of God (Gen 1:26-27). But Gen 2:7 and 2:21-22 are more specific. These verses along with the entire context make points about man’s religious relation to God, but in my judgment they resist being interpreted as if they had no implications about processes (see Poythress, Redeeming Science, 249-51).
21. The ENCODE Project Consortium, “An Integrated Encyclopedia of DNA Elements in the Human Genome,” Nature 489 (September 6, 2012): 71, http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v489/n7414/pdf/nature11247.pdf (accessed September 25, 2012).
22. Jonathan Wells, The Myth of Junk DNA (Seattle: Discovery Institute Press, 2011), 19-27.
23. Francis Collins, The Language of God (New York: Free Press, 2006), 136-37. It should be noted that Collins, because he is a Christian, believes in divine purpose. Moreover, he has now changed his mind and stopped using the term “junk DNA” (Wells, Myth of Junk DNA, 99).
24. Magdalena Skipper, Ritu Dhand, and Philip Campbell, “Presenting ENCODE,” Nature 489, no. 45 (September 6, 2012), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v489/n7414/full/489045a. html (accessed September 25, 2012); see also The ENCODE Project Consortium, “An Integrated Encyclopedia of DNA.” The issue is discussed further in Casey Luskin, “Junk No More: ENCODE Project Nature Paper Finds ‘Biochemical Functions for 80% of the Genome,’” Evolution News and Views (September 5, 2012), http://www.evolutionnews.org/2012/09/junk_no_more_en_1064001. html (accessed September 25, 2012). In addition, we may note that many geneticists tend to interpret biochemical function narrowly to mean a coding function: the sequence of ACGT bases is functional if it is translated into RNA that has a function, or if it is recognized as a “promoter” or regulatory region that influences the expression of neighboring DNA. But in addition to these functions, parts of the DNA may serve “structural” functions, such as forming a key environment for the centromere, serving as spacers, and influencing DNA folding into chromatin (Wells, Myth of Junk DNA, 62-63, 72-77).
25. Ewan Birney, quoted in an interview by Stephen S. Hall, “Journey to the Genetic Interior,” Scientific American 307, no. 4 (October 2012), 82.
26. A biblically informed Christian framework can also flexibly accommodate many forms of biological data. The difference is that the Christian framework does not claim to establish its case by appeals to biology, but rather by appeals to biblical testimony, to history, and to the universal evidence for God (Rom 1:18-25).
27. There is also an ideological taboo against criticism (Lennox, God’s Undertaker, 94-96, 99).
28. Robert B. Laughlin, A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 168-70.
29. Lennox, God’s Undertaker, 112.
30. Francisco J. Ayala et al., “Molecular Genetics of Speciation and Human Origins,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA 91, no. 15 (July 19, 1994): 6787-94 [6787], http://www.ncbi. nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC44284/?tool=pubmed (accessed September 26, 2012).
31. Ibid., 6787.
32. Takashi Shiina et al., “Rapid Evolution of Major Histocompatibility Complex Class I Genes in Primates Generates New Disease Alleles in Humans via Hitchhiking Diversity,” Genetics 173 (July 2006): 1569; see also Ann Gauger, “The Science of Adam and Eve,” in Ann Gauger, Douglas Axe, and Casey Luskin, Science and Human Origins (Seattle: Discovery Institute Press, 2012), 105-22.
33. Dennis R. Venema, “Genesis and the Genome: Genomics Evidence for Human-Ape Common Ancestry and Ancestral Hominid Population Sizes,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 63, no. 3 (2010): 166-78, http://www.asa3online.org/PSCF/2010/08/20/genesis-and-the-genome-genomicsevidence-for-human-ape-common-ancestry-and-ancestral-hominid-population-sizes (accessed September 26, 2012).
34. Albert Tenesa et al., “Recent Human Effective Population Size Estimated from Linkage Disequilibrium,” Genome Research 17 (2007): 520-26, http://genome.cshlp.org/content/17/4/520 (accessed September 26, 2012).
35. “. . . pairwise r2 was calculated . . . only for SNP pairs between 5 kb and 100 kb apart . . . to avoid the influence of gene conversion on observed LD at SNPs that are closer [and that might otherwise probe more remote times]” (ibid., 521).
36. Ibid., 524.
37. Feng-Chi Chen and Wen-Hsiung Li, “Genomic Divergences between Humans and Other Hominoids and the Effective Population Size of the Common Ancestor of Humans and Chimpanzees,” American Journal of Human Genetics 68 (2001): 444-56, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1235277/ (accessed September 27, 2012).
38. Ziheng Yang, “Likelihood and Bayes Estimation of Ancestral Population Sizes in Hominoids Using Data From Multiple Loci,” Genetics 162, no. 4 (2002): 1811-23, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12524351 (accessed September 26, 2012).
39. In fact, Chen and Li explicitly mention the issue of a bottleneck at a later time: “The human lineage apparently has undergone a significant reduction in effective population size since its separation from the chimpanzee lineage” (“Genomic Divergences,” 455).
40. Zhongming Zhao et al., “Worldwide DNA Sequence Variation in a 10-kilobase Noncoding Region on Human Chromosome 22,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 97, no. 21 (October 10, 2000): 11354-58, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC17204/ (accessed September 26, 2012). This paper is one of many that use data from present-day human genetic diversity.
41. Zhao et al. (ibid., 11355) uses two models: (1) G. A. Watterson, “On the Number of Segregating Sites in Genetical Models without Recombination,” Theoretical Population Biology 7 (1975): 257; and (2) Fumio Tajima, “Evolutionary Relationship of DNA Sequences in Finite Populations,” Genetics 105 (October 1983): 438, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1202167/ (accessed September 26, 2012). Subsequent to writing my article, I have also had my attention drawn to another technical article, Stephen T. Sherry et al., “Alu Evolution in Human Populations: Using the Coalescent to Estimate Effective Population Size,” Genetics 147, no. 4 (1997): 1977-82, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1208362/ (accessed January 21, 2013), which also depends on Watterson’s 1975 model (p. 1978 col. 2) and shares the same limitations.
42. William Henry Green, “Primeval Chronology,” BSac 47 (1890): 285-303.
43. Gen 4:2 describes Cain and Abel as engaging in agriculture and sheep herding. This description has suggested to some interpreters that the text is referring to the Neolithic period (around 10,000 b.c.), when archeologists can see evidence of these activities. But Cain and Abel may have lived earlier. They may have taken the first steps, and yet have had their steps aborted by subsequent human decline due to sin. For a discussion of still other options for interpretation of Gen 4-5, one may consult any number of OT commentaries. Derek Kidner succinctly discusses the genealogies (Genesis: An Introduction and Commentary [London: InterVarsity, 1967], 82-83).
44. On the assessment of fossils, see Casey Luskin, “Human Origins and the Fossil Record,” in Science and Human Origins; also Bloom, “On Human Origins: A Survey.”
45. For critical appraisals of mainstream media claims, one may also look to websites like “Evolution News and Views” (http://www.evolutionnews.org/) and “Reasons to Believe” (www.reasons.org), which respond to current news.
46. Gaffin, “Foreword”; C. John Collins, Genesis 1-4: A Linguistic, Literary, and Theological Commentary (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2006).
47. See Gaffin, “Foreword,” ix-xxv.
48. Vern S. Poythress, “Evaluating the Claims of Scientists,” New Horizons (March 2012): 6-8, http://www.opc.org/nh.html?article_id=739 (accessed September 26, 2012); also at http://www.framepoythress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/2012Evaluating.pdf (accessed September 26, 2012).
49. Michael Polanyi analyzes the element of personal commitment at length in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
50. Poythress, Redeeming Science, esp. ch. 1.
51. On the broader question of the origin of various kinds of life, see ibid., ch. 18; on the creation of Eve, see ibid., 249-51.
52. Discussions on biblical authority and purposes are of course voluminous. See particularly John M. Frame, The Doctrine of the Word of God (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2010).

The Understanding Of Gisbertus Voetius And Rene Descartes On The Relationship Of Faith And Reason, And Theology And Philosophy

By B. Hoon Woo

[B. Hoon Woo is a Ph.D. student in systematic theology at Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, Mich.]

I. Introduction

In their studies of the 1640s debate between Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) and Rene Descartes (1596–1650), most modern scholars contend that Voetius was an Aristotelian theologian.[1] Ernst Bizer, who was one of the early proponents of this view, argues that what Voetius actually defended was “Aristotelianism and the validity of the traditional proof of God, but not the biblical concept of God.”[2] Bizer is convinced that Voetius defended “not just faith, but the whole traditional system of theology” (i.e., Aristotelianism), and that for Voetius, Christian faith and Aristotelianism were “manifestly one and the same thing.”[3] In a similar vein, Richard Popkin binds Schoock and Voetius under the name of Aristotelian.[4] Paul Hoffman argues that the Aristotelian faculty of the University of Utrecht was led by Voetius.[5] Among French scholars, Cornelia Serrurier and Henri Gouhier also observe the debate of Voetius and Descartes from the perspective of the conflict between Aristotelian philosophy and the New Philosophy.[6] Theo Verbeek and J. A. van Ruler, who have closely studied the debate, drive a wedge into this view. Verbeek maintains that Voetius was a rationalist, and that his Aristotelianism “allowed him to settle theological problems without having to consider the relation between faith and reason or to define the role of reason in interpreting the Bible.”[7] Verbeek comments on Voetius’s Aristotelianism, “Voetius is not surprised that everything theology needs happens to be found in Aristotle.”[8] Verbeek’s former student, van Ruler, albeit tempering the strength of this opinion, basically sides with him. Van Ruler argues that “Voetius holds that the Aristotelian philosophy is more in accordance with Holy Writ than are the philosophies of those who criticize Aristotle.”[9]

This article, however, will show that the above scholars’ assessment of Voetius is not quite right. Voetius was one of the strong advocates of the Reformed faith.[10] It is true that Voetius formulated his theology in a broad Aristotelian tradition, but one can hardly define the main characteristics of his theology as just Aristotelian. Voetius believed that if a philosopher worked with reason alone, the conclusion could be profoundly flawed. He argued that reason should have an ancillary status beneath theology, and therefore the use of reason should be limited in theological studies. His attitude toward philosophy is basically eclectic, and his Aristotelianism is “modified Christian Aristotelianism.”[11] By contrast, Descartes was not concerned with limiting the use of reason. Descartes is considered to be the first modern philosopher.[12] He used skeptical critique as his philosophical method in order to exclude any type of certainty except the thinking ego (ego cogitans). For Descartes, mathematical reasoning was the most certain way of finding truth. He argued that the conclusion of philosophy could be different from that of theology, and that theologians should not interfere with the work of philosophers.

In this article I will analyze Voetius’s and Descartes’s views of faith and reason and the relationship between theology and philosophy, and show that Voetius and Descartes were different in their understanding of these issues. The article will proceed from Voetius to Descartes following the order of their debate. The first section will examine Voetius’s conception of faith and reason in Selectarum disputationum theologicarum, Pars Prima, Chapters 1–3.[13] The second section will analyze the relationship of theology and philosophy in this work. The third section will deal with Descartes’s notion of faith and reason in his letter to Voetius (Epistola ad Voetium). The fourth section will investigate the relationship of theology and philosophy in the letter of Descartes to Voetius. This article will show how Voetius and Descartes were different in their understanding of faith, reason, and the relationship between theology and philosophy. In so doing, this study will also demonstrate that Voetius was not simply Aristotelian, and that what he defended against Descartes was not Aristotelianism but Christian doctrine traditionally understood.

II. Voetius’s Understanding Of Faith And Reason In Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, Pars Prima, 1–3

1. Definition And Classification Of Reason

When Voetius was a professor of theology at the University of Utrecht, one of his colleagues, the professor of theoretical medicine and botany, Henricus Regius (1598–1679), received the “New Philosophy” of Descartes and taught it to his students. At the same time, the “New Science” of Copernicus also gained supporters among the European academic society.[14] Both the New Philosophy and the New Science questioned the authority of the Christian faith. Voetius’s book Selectarum disputationum theologicarum was published against this intellectual background.[15] Not surprisingly, Voetius gave much space in his book to the relationship between faith and reason and the connection between theology and philosophy. The first three chapters of the first volume of Selectarum disputationum theologicarum were devoted specifically to these two topics.[16] Even though he did not mention the names of Descartes or Copernicus in the entire book, his intention was clear in warning against their thinking. He gives much more weight to the New Philosophy than to the New Science. Yet, the main purpose of his book was theological, so he opened the book with the ideas of the Socinians, who were regarded as rationalists among the members of the Protestant church.[17]

The Socinians, according to Voetius, argued that “not only Scripture, but also and above all, reason is the norm of religion and of what is to be believed.”[18] Smalcius, one of the Socinians, contended in his book Against Franzius, “Only through reason can a judgment be made on the possibility or impossibility of the articles of faith.”[19] Against these views, Voetius presents his ideas of faith and reason. He defines human reason (ratio humana) as “the capacity of the rational soul in man, by which he comprehends intelligible things and makes judgments [facultatem animae rationalis in homine, qua intelligibilia apprehendit & dijudicat].”[20] He argues that human reason also denotes “the light of natural knowledge [lumen cognitionis naturalis]” through metonymy and metaphor.[21] He divides “the light of natural knowledge” into two parts, external and internal. The internal light of natural knowledge is again twofold: either it is imprinted on all people from birth, that which is called common sense (communis sensus) and common notions (communes notiones), or else it is acquired and newly added to a person after birth.

Voetius also maintains that human reason can be considered either in the ideal—objectively and abstractly; or else concretely—subjectively and in a particular state. In the latter consideration, four states are imposed: (1) before the Fall as gifted with the image of God; (2) in the Fall as corrupt; (3) in grace as free, although imperfect; and (4) in glory as perfect, shining brightly with the light of glory.[22] Human reason that is considered as the ideal, or objectively and abstractly, means a work of God or a good creation of God; it is the human reason that was given from God when he made human beings.[23]

2. Reason And Scripture

The principle of faith is twofold for Voetius: an external principle and an internal principle. The former can also be called an objective principle, the latter a formal principle. The former is the Word of God; the latter is the illumination of the Holy Spirit or the supernatural light infused into the mind. The external principle of faith, the Word of God, must be primary and trustworthy in and of itself (autopiston).[24] All truths, articles, or conclusions of faith are derived from this external principle of faith. Thus, to Voetius, Holy Scripture is the primary and trustworthy source of all truths of the Christian faith. He maintains that human reason can be a principle as much as “it draws conclusions from the only, infallible principle of the Scriptures, and so by means of simple apprehension, of composition, of division, and of discursive reasoning it achieves the understanding of what is revealed supernaturally or spiritually.”[25] For Voetius, Scripture is the only and infallible principle, and human reason is a principle subordinate to it.

3. The Superiority Of Faith Over Reason

Voetius further argues that the supernatural truths of faith are beyond human reason in itself or as such, for through reason it is not possible to perceive them unless it is elevated and revealed through a higher light. He contends, however, that the supernatural truths do not conflict with human reason per se. If they conflict with reason, it is because of the accident of corruption and the depraved disposition that sticks to the human mind. Thus, the Christian faith and theology can be called completely rational, not because they demonstrate their truth necessarily with arguments in opposition to those who deny the basic assumptions of the Christian faith, but because they demonstrate their conclusions from the authority of Scripture and with arguments derived from Scripture, and because they at least refute those arguments by which unbelievers charge the Christian faith with contradiction and absurdity.[26] Voetius contends that “no human reason can be the principle by which or through which, or else on the ground of which or why we believe, or the foundation, law, or norm for what must be believed, under whose direction we are to judge.”[27] “On the contrary,” writes Voetius, “our faith opens to Holy Scripture when it pertains to the things that must be believed, and to the illumination of the Holy Spirit when it pertains to the act of faith.”[28] The faculty of reason of an unregenerate person is blind when it comes to the divine law. Voetius argues, with 1 Tim 3:16 and Matt 13:11, that the entire gospel is called a mystery. Thus, to him, the unspiritual person does not perceive anything of all those things without divine revelation. Voetius also maintains that even regenerate people “do not establish the what, how, and why on the basis of accurate definitions, but only that it is on the basis of the supernatural revelation of the Holy Spirit.”[29]

Voetius rigorously limits the ability of reason in an unregenerate person in relation to divine knowledge. He argues that “the essence and attributes of the Godhead are never understood by the human mind immediately, adequately, as they are in themselves and therefore also not in a perfect manner, but only by the way of negation, causality, and eminence.”[30] An unregenerate person cannot understand even the witness of God’s works, let alone the Persons of the Trinity, the Savior Christ, and the whole mystery of redemption.[31] Even in the mind of a regenerated person, especially if still an infant, divine knowledge is known only imperfectly and in part because an innate darkness always clings to the mind. Therefore, Voetius concludes that “reason is not a principle of faith in God in which nothing false can be present.”[32]

Human beings, according to Voetius, cannot say that they believe in something because it is reasonable to them. Rather, they should begin with Scripture and say that they believe in this and judge in this way because God says it in the Scriptures.[33] “Human reason,” argues Voetius, “is not prior to, more known, or more certain than faith; thus it is not its principle.” He adds, “Reason does not precede faith; because reason is enlightened by faith.”[34] In the conclusion, Voetius offers an ad hominem argument against Socinus and his followers. Socinus denies all natural theology, or innate and acquired knowledge of God, and claims that whatever is or will be found among those who do not have Scripture is based on unskilled and therefore most fallible proof, that is, on mere tradition and human testimony. Therefore, it is impossible for Socinus to assert that human reason could ever be the infallible principle of the mysteries of faith. Thus, his view is self-contradictory.[35]

4. Not Only Through Scripture But Also Through Reason

After his criticism of the Socinians, Voetius moves on to the views of two Jesuits, Jean Gontery (1562–1616) and Francois Veron (1578–1649).[36] These two Jesuits argued that the Protestants “may only refute the papacy with the very words of Scripture, without any form of reasoning, discursive thought, and without drawing conclusions and without proof, and who go so far as to reject and remove all natural, accepted, learned, and useful logic from all the discussions and disputes.”[37] Voetius defends the view of the Protestants that even though for them Scripture is the only principle of faith, they do not ignore the function of human reason in the interpretation of Scripture.[38] He points out that Protestant theologians also acknowledge and receive adequately drawn consequences either from the Scriptures or from human reason. Here the term “consequences” (consequentiae) is very important and refers to the truths that are deduced from the principal truths of Scripture or the axioms. Voetius argues:

In elenctic theology, or in the refutation of falsities such as purgatory, indulgences, and so forth, we ought to use discursive thought and consequences even if a rigid opponent denies them, as well as proofs based on consequences derived not only from the words of Scripture but also from the axioms and principles of the light of nature known either naturally or by the study of philosophy or logic, so that the correct relationship of the middle term to the most important major becomes apparent.[39]

Voetius does not ignore the importance of the use of human reason in Reformed theology. When Protestant theologians have a debate with Roman Catholic theologians, they use discursive thought, consequences, and proofs based on consequences derived not only from Scripture but also from the axioms and principles of the light of nature. Voetius, however, emphasizes that each truth should be proven from Scripture alone, and he concedes that if the positions pertain to natural theology, they must be proved primarily from Scripture and secondarily from the light of nature.

Elenctic theology, according to Voetius, does not derive its faith conclusions from its principles without discursive reasoning, but it deduces theological theses from the analogy of faith because it is all the more argumentative.[40] Voetius is convinced that the elenctic theology of the apostles and prophets is argumentative, and that the divinely inspired authors made use of certain forms and expressions that pertain to argumentation.[41] Even Christ, the prophets, and the apostles prove their doctrines and refute falsities “through consequences” (per consequentias).[42] Most doctrines of the Christian religion are not contained literally in Scripture, but can be derived by discursive reasoning or else by equivalent expressions in Scripture. For Voetius, the following doctrines are derived from Scripture only through the use of consequences: that the three Persons of the Godhead are really distinct, that the Son is equal in essence (homoousion) with the Father, that two natures are essentially in the one Person of Christ without confusion, and so forth.[43] These doctrines are elicited by the drawing of conclusions from their principles in which they are already potentially and virtually contained. Voetius contends that no disputation is possible without refutation and contradiction, and that no judgment is made about contradiction without the rules of consequences and without the principles of reason that are from God. God gives human beings not only his truth but also the method to get the truth. The consensus and practice of the church have permitted the use of logical reasoning and consequences to refute atheists, pagans, Jews, and heretics. Voetius attests to his view of the works of the church fathers and medieval theologians.[44] Therefore, for Voetius, there is no tension between the Protestant insistence on “Scripture alone” (sola Scriptura) and the importance he places on the usefulness of reason. He refutes both Socinianism, which displays a great confidence in human reason, and Veron’s criticism that the Protestants confront Roman Catholicism with biblical texts only without making use of rational considerations. Voetius dismisses both views and offers a middle position: Holy Scripture is the only principle of faith and theology, and human reason plays an instrumental, not normative, role in the pursuit of truth.[45]

III. Voetius’s Understanding Of The Relation Of Theology And Philosophy In Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, Pars Prima, 1–3

1. Philosophy, Scripture, And The Illumination Of The Holy Spirit

On the unity of truth, Voetius argues that “naturally revealed philosophical truth does not contradict theological truth.”[46] Both biblical truth and reason are good gifts of God. Voetius, however, imposes a right order between them. He asserts that all truths of faith are derived from Scripture, which he calls “the external principle of faith.”[47] Scripture is the primary source of all truths of Christian faith. Voetius regards the articles of saving faith not as presupposed, but as formal. This means that the articles of saving faith can be known only through the illumination of the Holy Spirit or supernatural light. Even those articles of faith that are common to natural theology and sound philosophy should be learned from the Scriptures and through the illumination of the Holy Spirit.[48] They are such things as the existence of God, God’s justice, that he is the governor of the universe, the immortality of the soul, and so forth. Therefore, for Voetius, Scripture and the illumination of the Holy Spirit have superiority to reason even in the realm of natural theology. Natural theology does not leave out Scripture, but presupposes it. It is not an independent theology apart from Scripture but a part of biblical theology.[49] Furthermore, Voetius contends that “there is a very great distinction between grace and nature, between the special revelation of grace or supernatural light and God’s general revelation or the light of nature, between philosophy and theology or faith.”[50] Therefore, there is no conflict between biblical truth and human reason because the latter is subjected to the former. All truth of faith is known from Scripture and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, and confirmed by human reason. Scripture is the primary principle, and human reason can be a derivative principle of it.

2. Philosophy In Theological Studies

Voetius holds a positive view of the usefulness of philosophy for theology. One of the theses he defends is, “The light of nature does not fight with the light of grace, nor philosophy with theology. Therefore, a-theological, and also doing injury to God and His truth, are those who condemn philosophy.”[51] Philosophy as such is not a source of heresy, but it can constructively contribute to theology.[52] God recommends to human beings “the knowledge that is attained by reason and by the senses that serve reason,” and this knowledge is “nothing other than philosophy.”[53] Philosophy provides orthodox theology a sound logic and discursive thought.[54] Elenctic theology can oppose corrupt reasoning with the assistance of philosophy. Thus, Voetius defends the use of philosophy and logic in theology and repudiates Veron’s “Biblicist” method.[55] He argues that it belongs to the tradition of the orthodox church to use logic and philosophy in theology. Even Roman Catholic theologians use logic and philosophy to demonstrate their views.[56] Nevertheless, Voetius stipulates the function of philosophy in the study of theology when he asserts:

We convince Christians that the Scriptures are the only principle in our theology. We use metaphysics and philosophy so that we might support the rules of logical consequences, and so that we might designate false conclusions and tricks, which are drawn from the corrupt and perverse reason of pseudo-philosophy.[57]

Here again, Voetius argues that Scripture is the only principle in Christian theology. However, he contends that theologians can use philosophy to formulate theology in a better way. Theologians can deduce logical conclusions from “consequences” with the help of philosophy, and philosophy can contribute to theological reasoning in elenctic theology.

Voetius’s view of philosophy is consistent with his notion of human reason. He argues for the usefulness of human reason and philosophy in faith and theology. It is worth noting, however, that he confirms the superiority of Scripture and the illumination of the Holy Spirit over human reason and philosophy. Without Scripture and illumination, human reason and philosophy cannot find the truth of God; with the help of sound reason and philosophy, Christians can attain to more sound doctrines and can more decisively uncover the falsity of heresies and pseudo-philosophy. The truth of orthodox theology is consistent with that of solid philosophy.[58] In his Introductio ad philosophiam sacram, Voetius contends that no philosophy can be accepted without reservations, but only the best insights should be taken into the service of Christianity. He opts for philosophical eclecticism and regards traditional Christian Aristotelianism as appropriate for the study of theology. Voetius, however, does not adhere to the philosophical thought of Aristotle himself.[59] He does not regard Aristotelianism as a fixed body of doctrines, but as a collection of methods and contents that was passed on by tradition.[60] For Voetius, consistency with Scripture is the norm for selecting any philosophical affiliation. Thus, it can be concluded that when Voetius defended “Christian Aristotelianism” against the New Philosophy, the cause for which he fought was not the philosophy itself, but the scriptural truths that the tradition of the orthodox church preserved through Scripture, theology, reason, and philosophy.[61] It was not the main concern of Voetius that the New Philosophy departed from accepted philosophy. Rather, his genuine concern was that the New Philosophy departed from the traditional theology that used the concepts and theories of the accepted philosophy.[62]

3. Corrupt Theology And Solid Scholastic Theology

In Selectarum disputationum theologicarum, Voetius deals with the methodology and contents of scholastic theology.[63] He offers five origins of corrupt theology (corrupta Theologia) as follows: (1) ignorance of languages, especially of Greek and Hebrew, which God used to write Scripture; (2) ignorance of history and ancient culture, especially of church history; (3) ignorance of the discipline of theology, which includes grammar, philology, philosophy, Aristotelian logic and physics, ethics, metaphysics, language, and the discipline of Lombard; (4) defect of the practice and exercise of piety, and of care of the church; and (5) ignorance of important texts, which include the works of the church fathers, the texts of church history, and exegetical works of Scripture.[64] Voetius underscores both academic specialty and practical piety in the study of theology. For him, theology is most of all “a practical science” (scientia practica).[65] He underlines that theological students should be pious and eager to take care of the church “because many [theological] teachers are purely speculative and contemplative [Erant enim maximam partem Doctores pure speculativi & umbratici].” It is also notable that Voetius places stress on the philosophical study in theology. Although Aristotelian logic and physics are not satisfactorily translated, they are important in theological studies. Some parts of Aristotelian ethics and metaphysics should be studied with theology. “This philosophical lesson,” maintains Votius, “still has not died out anywhere to this present day [hic cursus Philosophicus, qui etiamnum hodie alicubi nondum exolevit].” Thus, for Voetius, Aristotelian philosophy is one of the necessary factors in theological studies.

Following his treatment of the origins of corrupt theology, Voetius explains the custom of scholastic theology (usus Theologiae Scholasticae). He admonishes theological students accordingly: (1) acuteness in logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and politics, and in addition, acuteness in theological method, which is well demonstrated by Thomas Aquinas; (2) learning of terminologies and distinctions; (3) skill in controversy, grammar, oratory, and poetics; (4) pleasurable phraseology and style; and (5) logic in analysis of texts and subtle judgment in the use of Scripture.[66] Here again, Voetius maintains that philosophy is necessary in scholastic theology, and that most philosophical problems are still unsolved. Solid theology offers sound answers about the mystery of theological issues against corrupt views. Philosophy is useful for this purpose. Voetius is convinced that solid scholastic theology is philosophical and academic as well as biblical and pious.

In sum, for Voetius, Scripture is the only and infallible principle, and human reason is a secondary principle subordinate to Scripture. The supernatural truths of faith transcend human reason but do not conflict with human reason per se. Christian faith and theology can be called completely rational. The ability of reason in an unregenerate person in relation to divine knowledge is definitely limited because an innate darkness always clings to it. Nevertheless, Voetius does not neglect the usefulness of reason in the study of theology. Theologians derive many Christian doctrines from its principles through the discursive reasoning of an argumentative method. Human reason is required more in elenctic theology. The tradition of the orthodox church used both scriptural truth and human reason to refute heresies. According to Voetius’s doctrine of the unity of truth, revelation has authority over philosophy, and the truth of revealed religion and that of natural knowledge should concur.[67] There is no tension between biblical truth and philosophical truth, Voetius maintains, inasmuch as the conclusion of philosophy should follow the truth of Scripture. Solid scholastic theology begins with Scripture and develops with philosophy.

IV. Descartes’s Understanding Of Faith And Reason In His Epistola Ad Voetium

1. Request For A Reasonable Critique

Descartes wrote a long open letter to Voetius, which was published by Elzevirs of Amsterdam in May of 1643. The original Latin text was entitled Epistola Renati Descartes ad Celeberrimum Virum D. Gisbertium Voetium (“Letter from Rene Descartes to that distinguished gentleman M. Gisbertus Voetius”).[68] The letter was intended as a reply to two works in which Voetius had attacked Descartes: the Confraternitas Mariana (1642) and the Admiranda Methodus (1643).[69]

In the argument of his letter to Voetius, Descartes expresses discontent that some people fought against him not by reasoning but only through disparagement, and that Voetius attacked him not by reasoning but by authority alone.[70] Descartes claims that his opponents depended on a higher power to attack him, but that it was not allowed for him to use reason in the debate.[71] For Descartes, Voetius charged him not because he, Descartes, had a bad cause, but because he abandoned the teaching to which all the church holds.[72] Descartes maintains that his adversary forsook rational truth for faith. Thus, Descartes asks readers not to believe what his enemies say, but to believe those words that they can confirm either by testimony or by reason.[73] For him, human reason is the criterion by which one can judge the truth of an assertion. Even the authority of the church, without reasoning, cannot be the principle from which one can make a sound argument.

2. The Use Of Reason In Education

Descartes argues that he cannot find any reasoning in all the works of Voetius that he has read.[74] He asserts that they may be useful in “learning,” but not in “education.” He distinguishes between the learned (doctus) and the educated (eruditus). Learning, to Descartes, means the reception of traditional knowledge; so he calls Voetius “the most learned man” (doctissimum). By “educated” Descartes means those “who have polished their intelligence and character by study and cultivation” (qui studio & cultura ingenium moresque suos perpolivit).[75] He is convinced that such education is to be acquired “not by the indiscriminate reading of any book whatever, but by a frequent and repeated reading of only the best, by discussion with those who are already educated, when presented with the opportunity, and, finally, by continually contemplating the virtues and pursuing the truth.”[76] Simple memorization helps very little in the educational pursuit of wisdom. Descartes holds:

Those who seek learning from standard texts and indexes and concordances can pack their memories with many things in a short time, but they do not emerge as wiser or better people as a result. On the contrary, there is no chain of reasoning in such books, but everything is decided either by appeal to authority or by short summary syllogisms, and those who seek learning from these sources become accustomed to placing equal trust in the authority of any writer . . . , so little by little they lose the use of their natural reason and put in its place an artificial and sophistical reason.[77]

For Descartes, the traditional way of education leads the student to lose and distort their power of reasoning. The true use of reason is the basis of all education, all intelligence, and all human wisdom.[78] “The true use of reason,” maintains Descartes, “does not consist in isolated syllogisms, but only in the scrupulous and careful inclusion of everything required for the knowledge of the truths we are seeking.”[79] Thus, for Descartes, a traditional education makes the student grow careless and lose the use of reason. The Voetian way of learning only forms an artificial and sophistical reason in the mind of the student. Descartes asserts that the independent use of reason is the most important factor in education. Teachers should develop the power of reasoning in the student. Moreover, Descartes argues that one should “accept as true only what is so clear that it leaves no room for doubt.”[80] Faith cannot be the presupposition in education. Everything should be doubted before it becomes clear and distinct knowledge. This is why he is accused of being a skeptic or an atheist.[81]

3. The Autonomy And Priority Of Reason

Descartes intends to restore the importance of the use of reason and the autonomy of reason.[82] In order to confirm the supremacy of reason over faith, he gives primacy to the intellect and its power to independently achieve truth.[83] The subordination of reason to faith means that, in the event of a clash between them, faith is to take precedence as being more certain and authoritative.[84] Descartes argues that “the ideas of revealed religion are obscure because they are against the formal reason which consists of the natural light.”[85] He boldly maintains that an infidel who embraces Christian faith on the grounds of fallacious reasonings, and without the light of grace, would commit a sin in not using reason rightly.[86]

Descartes argues that Christians should have no difficulty in believing religious mysteries because the immense power of God can create many things beyond human understanding. He also explains how this contradiction is to be understood. He maintains that anyone who teaches that Scripture contradicts natural reason does so only to “show indirectly that he has no faith in Scripture. For as we were born men before we were made Christians, it is beyond belief that any man should seriously embrace opinions which he thinks contrary to right reason that constitutes a man, in order that he may adhere to the faith by which he is a Christian.”[87] The theological implication of the Cartesian doubt renews the old struggle between faith and reason. The theological argument of Descartes’s works and his request for reasoning in the letter to Voetius is intended to restore the autonomy of reason. His resolve to achieve clarity and to accept nothing but clear ideas, as Hiram Canton rightly puts it, is already an implicit rejection of faith and authority.[88] By contrast, correcting the Cartesian trust of human reason, Voetius insists that the human mind is open to error; thus, human reason cannot be the norm for the pursuit of truth.

V. Descartes’s Understanding Of The Relation Of Theology And Philosophy In His Epistola Ad Voetium

1. Philosophy Against Orthodox Theology

The judgment of the Academy of Utrecht (Academia Ultrajectina), of which rector Voetius was a part, condemned the philosophy of Descartes as “forging various false and absurd opinions, and in so doing, fighting against orthodox theology.”[89] When Descartes asked at what point his philosophy became an opponent of orthodox theology, Voetius wrote the book Admiranda Methodus in response. Descartes could not find any rational argument in the allegations of the book but only discovered what he determined to be more savage false accusations added to the previous judgment.[90]

In his response to Voetius, Descartes argues that he always regarded common theologians most virtuous and truly Christian.[91] He claims that not any word of his works damages the cause of orthodox theology.[92] He is quite convinced that his philosophy should not be regarded as heretical.[93] He argues that his faith does not differ from that of traditional religion,[94] stating that this view is the same as that of Henricus Regius, who asserts that the New Philosophy does not have anything against the teachings of traditional philosophy, scholastic theology, or other related science, including medicine.[95]

2. Philosophy Independent Of Theology

Descartes contends that without the cognition of old theology, one can easily understand philosophical truth.[96] For Descartes, Regius offers purely philosophical questions, which in fact have nothing to do with theology.[97] Descartes tends to avoid discussion of theological issues and follows the orthodox position of the Roman Catholic Church. He separates philosophy and theology. For him the two are simply unconnected.[98] Thus, Descartes denies that his philosophy and the method of doubting could ever have any detrimental effects on theology. Regarding his rejection of various proofs for the existence of God, he points out that the famous Jesuit scholar Gregory of Valentia (c. 1551–1603) also criticized Thomas Aquinas’s proofs for the existence of God and showed those proofs to be invalid.[99] Thus, Descartes argues that philosophy has its own independent space for the study of truth. He adds that even his letter to Voetius does not attempt any theological objection against him. He claims that he simply tried to demonstrate that the judgment of the Academy of Utrecht was unjust.[100]

Descartes’s philosophical letters, however, show that his philosophy has a common ground with theology. In his 1641 letter to Regius, Descartes criticizes the view of theologians on substance. According to Descartes, theologians argue that no created substance is the immediate principle of its operation. He understands that by this they mean that no creature can operate without the concurrence of God, and not that it needs some created faculty, distinct from itself, by which to operate. To Descartes, however, “it would be absurd to say that such a created faculty could be the immediate principle of an operation, while the substance itself could not.”[101] Thus, Descartes’s philosophy does have a theological connotation, as his letter confirms.

Descartes maintains that his book Meditations is the primary cause for the debate, but that the faculty of Utrecht University could not understand the book. He asserts that he did not present any atheistic argument in the book.[102] Voetius, however, does not accept this view. He basically objects to Descartes for disrupting the relation between faith and reason by means of hyperbolical doubt, which is the basic method of Meditations. For Voetius, Cartesian doubt is in fact nothing other than skepticism. Voetius argues that skepticism occurs if someone “rejects, derides, or doubts all certainty of knowledge.”[103] To him, skepticism is an act of bad faith. The fundamental motive behind Voetius’s accusation of Cartesian doubt is to combat vain curiosity, which he asserts is a seed of unbelief.[104]

In sum, Descartes tried to restore the autonomy of reason. He asserted that his philosophy was not developed in opposition to orthodox theology, but in fact he confirmed the supremacy of reason over faith. By contrast, Voetius emphasized that there is no one who is free from errors, no more than one who is free from misery or sin.[105] For Voetius, any philosophy that is not based on Scripture and the illumination of the Holy Spirit is vain.

VI. Conclusion

In his long letter to Voetius, Descartes mentioned Aristotelianism only twice;[106] by contrast, the topics of theology, faith, and atheism were put on the table hundreds of times. Both Descartes and Voetius acknowledged that the issue they treated was most of all theological. Voetius pursued the faith-seeking-understanding program whereas Descartes repudiated the faith-lacking-understanding project. The primary concern of Voetius was not to preserve Aristotelianism but to keep the biblical truth that, as he put it, was received from orthodox tradition. Descartes insisted that the article of faith did not fall under the regime of human reason because faith was something one could not fully grasp with reason. He argued that whoever embraced the articles of faith from incorrect reasoning would commit a sin no less grave than those who rejected them. What Descartes desperately defended was the autonomy of human reason and its proper use. In his philosophical enterprise, faith seemed to hinder the autonomy and the use of reason. He believed that his method of doubt would provide a firm road to perfect knowledge. Voetius, however, argued that human reason was surrounded by error and sin, so that perfect knowledge was impossible for humans. He maintained that human beings would be able to learn the truth from divine revelation, which was the only principle in the pursuit of truth. Therefore, for Voetius, Cartesianism was primarily confronted with scriptural truth, not with Aristotelianism.

Notes

1. For the debate between Voetius and Descartes, see Arnoldus Cornelius Duker, School-gezag en eigen-onderzoek: Historisch-kritische studie van den strijd tusschen Voetius en Descartes (Leiden: D. Noothoven van Goor, 1861); Josef Bohatec, Die cartesianische Scholastik in der Philosophie und reformierten Dogmatik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Teil 1: Entstehung, Eigenart, Geschichte und philosophische Auspragung der cartesianischen Scholaslik (1912; repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1966); Gustave Cohen, Ecrivains francais en Hollande dans la premiere moitie du 17e siecle (Paris: Champion, 1920); Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis, ed., Descartes et le cartesianisme hollandais: Etudes et documents (Paris and Amsterdam: Presses universitaires de France, 1951); Cornelia Serrurier, Descartes: L’homme et le penseur (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1951); Paul Dibon, L’enseignement philosophique dans les universites neerlandaises a l’epoque pre-cartesienne (1575-1650) (Amsterdam: Institut Francais d’Amsterdam, 1954); C. Louise Thijssen-Schoute, Nederlands cartesianisme (Amsterdam: HES, 1954); Hans-Martin Barth, Atheismus und Orthodoxie: Analysen und Modelle christlicher Apologetik im 17. Jahrhundert (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971); Thomas A. McGahagan, “Cartesianism in the Netherlands, 1639-1667: The New Science and the Calvinist Counter-Reformation” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1976); Tom Sorell, Descartes (Past Masters; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Rene Descartes and Martin Schoock, La Querelle d’Utrecht: Rene Descartes et Martin Schoock (ed. Theo Verbeek; Paris: Impressions nouvelles, 1988); J. van Oort, De Onbekende Voetius: Voordrachten wetenschappelijk symposium, Utrecht, 3 maart 1989 (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1989); Marjorie Glicksman Grene, Descartes among the Scholastics (Aquinas Lecture; Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991); Theo Verbeek, “Descartes and the Problem of Atheism: The Utrecht Crisis,” Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis 71 (1991): 211-23; Theo Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy, 1637-1650 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992); J. A. van Ruler, The Crisis of Causality: Voetius and Descartes on God, Nature, and Change (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); Roger Ariew and Marjorie Glicksman Grene, eds., Descartes and His Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Aza Goudriaan, “Die Rezeption des cartesianischen Gottesgedanken bei Abraham Heidanus,” Neue Zeitschrift fur systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 38 (1996): 166-97; Tad M. Schmaltz, Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism in Early Modern Europe (London: Routledge, 2005); Roger Ariew, Descartes among the Scholastics (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2011).
2. Ernst Bizer, “Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,” JTC 2 (1965): 24.
3. Ibid., 38.
4. Richard Henry Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (rev. ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 198; Richard Henry Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle (rev. ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 162.
5. Paul Hoffman, Essays on Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 18.
6. Serrurier, Descartes: L’homme et le penseur, 137; Henri Gaston Gouhier, La pensee metaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1962), 346-50.
7. Verbeek, “Descartes and the Problem of Atheism,” 211-23, at 223.
8. Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 7.
9. van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, 34.
10. For the life and thought of Voetius, see Arnoldus Cornelius Duker, Gisbertus Voetius (3 vols.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1897); van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, ch. 1; Andreas J. Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676): Sein Theologieverstandnis und seine Gotteslehre” (Ph.D. diss., Utrecht University, 2007), 35-59.
11. For “Christian Aristotelianism” and the eclecticism of early modern philosophy, see Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725 (4 vols.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006), 1:360-82.
12. For the life and thought of Descartes, see Adrien Baillet, La Vie de M. Descartes (2 vols.; Paris, 1691); Serrurier, Descartes: L’homme et le penseur; Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1968); Sorell, Descartes; Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
13. Gisbertus Voetius, Selectarum disputationum theologicarum (5 vols.; Utrecht: J. a Waesberge, 1648-1669), vol. 1. Hereafter this work will be abbreviated SDTh with volume and page number. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. For a Dutch translation of the first chapter of SDTh, see W. J. van Asselt et al., eds., Inleiding in de gereformeerde scholastiek (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1998), 184-200; for an English translation, see W. J. van Asselt et al., eds., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism (trans. Albert Gootjes; Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2011), 225-47. I refer with some modifications to this translation by Gootjes.
14. Voetius was the first man to promote vigorous debate against Copernicanism in the Netherlands (Rienk H. Vermij, Secularisering en natuurwetenschap in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw: Bernard Nieuwentijt [Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1991], 65). For a detailed narrative of the debate between Copernicanism and Voetianism, see Rienk H. Vermij, The Calvinist Copernicans: The Reception of the New Astronomy in the Dutch Republic, 1575-1750 (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2002), Parts 3 and 4.
15. On the disputes of Voetius and his opponents who argued for the New Philosophy, see van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, 9-35; and Descartes and Schoock, La Querelle d’Utrecht, 69-123.
16. Voetius, SDTh 1:1-47. The first chapter (“De ratione humana in rebus fidei”) was delivered in February 1636, in his first days as professor at Utrecht University. The second chapter (“De theologia scholastica”) was presented in February 1640, and the third chapter (“Quousque se extendat autoritas Scriptura”) dealt with the authority of the Bible in July 1636. For this information, see Gijsbert Voet, D. Gysberti Voetii: Selectarum disputationum fasciculus (ed. Abraham Kuyper; Amsterdam: J. A. Wormser, 1887), 1, 10; and van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, 22 n. 38.
17. Aza Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625-1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus Van Mastricht and Anthonius Driessen (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006), 37. On the relationship between Socinianism and other philosophers in the early modern period, see Zbigniew Ogonowski, “Der Sozinianismus aus der Sicht der grosen philosophischen Doktrinen des 17. Jahrhunderts,” in Socinianism and Its Role in the Culture of the 16th to the 18th Centuries (ed. Lech Szczucki, Zbigniew Ogonowski, and Janusz Tazbir; Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publisher, 1983), 115-23. M. Schneckenburger writes, “Er [Socinianism] ist die erste Form, unter welcher sich in der protestantischen Kirche der Rationalismus geregt hat, er ist gewissermassen eine Nachgeburt des alten Pelagianismus [Socinianism is the first form under which rationalism has emerged in the Protestant church, and it is, in a certain sense, an afterbirth of the old Pelagianism]” (Matthias Schneckenburger, Vorlesungen uber die Lehrbegriffe der kleineren protestantischen Kirchenparteien [ed. Karl Bernhard Hundeshagen; Frankfurt: H. L. Bronner, 1863], 30).
18. Voetius, SDTh 1:1.
19. Valentinus Smalcius, Refutatio thesium Wolfgi Franzii de praecipuis religionis christianae capitibus (Rakow: Sternacius, 1614), preface.
20. Voetius, SDTh 1:1.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 1:2.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 1:3: Haec tanquam principium quod conclusiones fidei ex unico infallibili scripturarum principio educit, atque adeo actibus simplicis apprehensionis, compositionis, divisionis, & discursus tou gnōstou supernaturalis seu spiritualis intelligentia peragit (author’s emphasis; I transliterate the Greek word).
26. Ibid. Voetius refers to Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, qu. 1, art. 8. He also writes, “A similar defense of the faith can be seen in Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Arnobius, Lactantius, Augustine, Theodoret, Cyril of Alexandria, and so forth; in the medieval writers Thomas Against the Pagans, and the other scholastics, if one with discretion and discernment takes the more solid excerpts; as well as Savonarola in The Triumph of the Cross; Raymond of Sabunde in On Natural Theology; Cardinal Cusanus, Dionysius the Carthusian and others who wrote against the Muslims; and finally, more recent writers such as Louis Vives, Agostino Steuco, Charron, the scholastics who treat quaestiones and the commentators on Lombard and Thomas; but especially Du Plessis in his excellent treatise On the Truth of the Christian Religion” (SDTh 1:3).
27. Ibid., author’s emphasis: His pramissis dicimus nullam rationem humanam esse principium quo seu per quod, aut ex quo seu cur credamus, aut fundamentum aut legem, aut normam credendorum ex cuius prascripto judicemus.
28. Ibid., 1:4: sed contra resolvi fidem nostram, ut notat credenda, in S. Scripturam; ut notat actum credendi, in illuminationem Spiritus Sancti.
29. Ibid. (author’s emphasis).
30. Ibid.: Quia essentia & attributa Deitatis ab humana mente immediate, adaequate, ut sunt in se, atque adeo perfecte non comprehenduntur: sed tantum per viam negationis, causalitatis, eminentiae.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.: Non est itaque principium fidei divinae, cui non potest subesse falsum.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.: Ratio humana non est prior notior, certior fide; ergo non est ejus principium. . . . [Ratio] ergo non est prior. Quia per fidem ratio illustratur.
35. Ibid., 1:5.
36. On Gontery and Veron, see van Asselt et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 234-35, nn. 27, 29. Voetius consistently writes these names in this disputation as “Gunterus” and “Verron.”
37. Voetius, SDTh 1:5-6.
38. Ibid., 1:6.
39. Ibid., 1:7 (emphasis mine): Sententia nostra est, in Theologica Elenctica, seu in refutatione falsitatis e.g. purgatorii, indulgentiarum, & c. discursu, & consequentiis utendum esse, & siquidem praefractus adversarius eas neget, etiam probationibus consequentiarum, non tantum ex sacris litteris, sed etiam ex axiomatis & principiis luminis naturalis sive naturaliter sive technice ex Philosophia & Logica notis, ut appareat apta connexio medii termini cum majori extremo.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 1:8, 44.
42. Ibid., 1:7-8. Voetius refers to the following scriptural texts: Matt 22:44; John 5:39, 26; Acts 2; 3; 15:8-9, 16-17; 17:16-18; 18:28; 26:22; and 1 Cor 15.
43. Ibid., 1:8.
44. Ibid., 1:9.
45. Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 36-37.
46. Voetius, “De errore et haeresi, pars sexta” [G. Baxcamp, 22 November 1656] (SDTh 3:750).
47. Voetius, SDTh 1:2.
48. See van Asselt et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 228. Based on the Latin, I describe Voetius’s intention more clearly than the English translation does. Objectum fidei divinae hic intelligimus formale, non prasuppositum: h. e. articulos fidei salvificae oikeious, proprios & stricte dictos, non vero prasuppositos, qui ipsi cum Theologia naturali, & cum sana Philosophia sunt communes.
49. On natural theology of this period, see Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard Kessler, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 598-638; and John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982).
50. Voetius, SDTh 1:5. Voetius references the following texts: 1 John 1:9; Rom 1:19; 2:14-15; Ps 147:20; Acts 14:16-17; and Eph 2:12-13.
51. Voetius, “Assertiones theologicae de praeiudiciis verae religionis” [D. van Boxtel], repr. in Gisbertus Voetius, Thersites heautontimorumenos (Utrecht: A. ab Herwiick & H. Ribbius, 1635), 347: Lumen naturae cum lumine gratiae, Philosophia cum Theologia non pugnant. Itaque atheologoi sunt, insuper in Deum et veritatem ejus injurii, qui Philosophiam condemnant. Cited in Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 30 n. 5.
52. Voetius, “De errore et haeresi, pars sexta” (SDTh 3:750-58).
53. Ibid., 3:750.
54. Cf. ibid., 1:7.
55. Ibid., 1:9.
56. Ibid., 1:10.
57. Voetius, Thersites heautontimorumenos, 127: Scripturis tanquam unico principio Christianis Theologiam nostram persuademus, Metaphysicam et Philosophiam adhibemus ut regulas consequentiarum fulciamus, ut sophismata ac strophas ex corrupta ac perversa ratione ex pseudo-philosophia depromptas delegamus. Translation mine.
58. Voetius, SDTh 4:757-58: . . . hac philosophia probe percepta ad solidam eruditionem theologicam . . .
59. Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 36, 54.
60. Theo Verbeek, “From ‘Learned Ignorance’ to Scepticism: Descartes and Calvinist Orthodoxy,” in Scepticism and Irreligion in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (ed. Richard Henry Popkin and Arie Johan Vanderjagt; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 44.
61. Along these same lines, Vermij writes, “Cartesianism was offensive [to Voetius] not only because it ran counter to received philosophy, but also because it appeared problematic from a religious and theological point of view” (Vermij, Calvinist Copernicans, 162).
62. Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 33. Even though Goudriaan rightly points out that Voetius’s concern was both theological and philosophical, he fails to demonstrate that the main concern was theological.
63. Voetius, SDTh 1:ch. 3. On Voetius’s definition of theology, see Gisbertus Voetius, Diatribae, de theologia, philologia, historia et philosophia, sacra (Utrecht: S. de Vries, 1668), 2-9.
64. Voetius, SDTh 1:25-26.
65. Beck argues that for Voetius, theology is a practical science. He writes, “Die Theologie ist fur Voetius in ihrer Eigenart praktische Wissenschaft (scientia practica)” (Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius,” 428). Thus, for Beck, Voetius sides with Duns Scotus rather than with Thomas Aquinas, who sees theology as “a mixed discipline of theoretical and practical science [eine Mischdisziplin aus theoretischer und praktischer Wissenschaft]” (429).
66. Voetius, SDTh 1:26.
67. Voetius argues that “the light of nature does not fight with the light of grace, nor philosophy with theology [Lumen Natura cum lumine gratia, Philosophia cum Theologia non pugnat]” (ibid., 3:750).
68. For the Latin edition and a French translation, see Rene Descartes, OEuvres de Descartes (ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery; 11 vols.; Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1957), 8b:1-198 (hereafter AT); also Descartes and Schoock, La Querelle d’Utrecht, 321-99.
69. See Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny; 3 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3:220 n. 3 (hereafter CSMK).
70. Descartes, AT 8b:4: . . . hi non rationibus, sed solis obtrectationibus me impugnant . . . [Voetius] quia me non rationibus, sed sola authoritate aggrediebatur. All English translations of Descartes’s Latin and French works are mine except where noted otherwise.
71. Ibid.: Quamvis enim ab iis qui suprema utuntur potestate, rationem judicati petere non liceat.
72. Ibid., 8b:8: Additque rationem, non quod causam malam judicet, vel defenfionem non aequam & bonam, sed quod ista quaestio generaliter ad omnes Ecclesias pertineat.
73. Ibid., 8b:15: ac mihi non esse amicum, & ideo nullam fidem iis quae de me dixeris esse adhibendam, nisi ea certis testimoniis aut rationibus confirmes.
74. Ibid., 8b:42: multa legi ex scriptis tuis, atqui nullam unquam in iis reperi ratiocinationem.
75. Ibid. The previous three quotations in the text are also from this page.
76. Ibid. For an English translation of this passage, see CSMK 3:221-22. The translators offer only a five-page excerpt of Descartes’s letter to Voetius.
77. Descartes, AT 8b:43; CSMK 3:222.
78. Descartes, AT 8b:43; CSMK 3:222.
79. Descartes, AT 8b:43; CSMK 3:222. Neque enim, ut scias, verus ille usus rationis, in quo omnis eruditio, omnis bona mens, omnis humana sapientia continetur, in disjundis syllogifmis confiftit, sed tantum in circumspeca & accurata complexione eorum omnium, quae ad quaesitarum veritatum cognitionem requiruntur.
80. Descartes, AT 8b:169-70; CSMK 3:223. Et nova ista criteria non alia assertis, quam quod ea tantum ut vera velim amplecti, quoe tam clara sunt, ut nullam dubitandi relinquant occasionem.
81. Descartes, AT 8b:170, 175; CSMK 3:223. Descartes argues that Voetius compares him to the atheist Cesare Vanini, who was condemned for atheism and burned at Toulouse in 1619.
82. For Descartes on reason, see Harry G. Frankfurt, “Descartes’ Validation of Reason,” American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 149-56; Hiram Caton, “Will and Reason in Descartes’s Theory of Error,” The Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 4 (1975): 87-104; Frederick P. Van de Pitte, “Descartes’ Role in the Faith-Reason Controversy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (1980): 344-53; Louis E. Loeb, “The Priority of Reason in Descartes,” The Philosophical Review 99 (1990): 3-43; John W. Yolton, Philosophy, Religion, and Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1990); Thomas M. Lennon, The Plain Truth: Descartes, Huet, and Skepticism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2008); Russell Shorto, Descartes’ Bones: A Skeletal History of the Conflict Between Faith and Reason (New York: Doubleday, 2008).
83. Caton, “Will and Reason,” 96; Van de Pitte, “Descartes’ Role,” 345.
84. Caton, “Will and Reason,” 96.
85. Descartes, AT 7:148: propter quam rebus fidei assentimur, sit obscura; nam contra haec ratio formalis consistit in lumine [naturale].
86. Ibid.: Nec sane Turcae aliive infideles ex eo peccant, cum non amplectuntur religionem Christianam, quod rebus obscuris, ut obscurae sunt, nolint assentiri, sed vel ex eo quod divinae gratiae interius illos moventi repugnent, vel quod, in aliis peccando, se gratia reddant indignos.
87. Ibid., 8b:353-54.
88. Caton, “Will and Reason,” 99.
89. Descartes, AT 8b:4: Cumque, anno superiore, judicium quoddam nomine Academiae Vltrajectinae, cujus tunc Rector erat, edidisset, in quo meam Philosophiam eo praetextu condemnabat, quod fingeret varias, falfas, & absurdas opiniones ex ea consequi, pugnantes cum orthodoxa Theologia (Descartes’s emphasis). The judgment is from March 17, 1642, and is reproduced in Descartes’s letter to P. Dinet (see ibid., 7:590).
90. Ibid., 8b:5.
91. Ibid., 8b:14: vulgare Theologis; quod ego virtutem maximam & vere Christianam semper putavi.
92. Ibid., 8b:17.
93. Ibid., 8b:17, 32.
94. Ibid., 8b:111. He also confirms that the most important virtue in Christianity is love (charitas) (112). He asks his opponents for love in dealing with this issue (115).
95. Ibid., 8b:33-34.
96. Ibid., 8b:93.
97. Ibid., 8b:132.
98. Descartes’s axiom that “one truth can never be in conflict with another” (una veritas alteri adversary nunquam possit) should be interpreted from this perspective (ibid., 7:581). See also Theo Verbeek, “Tradition and Novelty: Descartes and Some Cartesians,” in The Rise of Modern Philosophy: The Tension Between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz (ed. Tom Sorell; Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 170.
99. Descartes, AT 8b:176.
100. Ibid., 8b:180.
101. Descartes, AT 3:372; CSMK 3:182. On Descartes’s notion of substance, see R. S. Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics (London: Routledge, 1993).
102. Descartes, AT 8b:165, note a.
103. Voetius, SDTh 1:126: . . . omnem scientiae certitudinem explodit, ridet, in dubium trahit . . .
104. Cf. Verbeek, “From ‘Learned Ignorance’ to Scepticism,” 33-34, 43.
105. Voetius, SDTh 3:701.
106. Descartes, AT 8b:14, 19. Descartes argues that the first seven pages of Voetius’s book Philosophia Cartesiana offer only common arguments against the innovators and a praise of Aristotle (14), and that his opponents allow only the reasoning that comes from Aristotelian principles (18-19).