The Understanding Of Gisbertus Voetius And Rene Descartes On The Relationship Of Faith And Reason, And Theology And Philosophy

By B. Hoon Woo

[B. Hoon Woo is a Ph.D. student in systematic theology at Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, Mich.]

I. Introduction

In their studies of the 1640s debate between Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) and Rene Descartes (1596–1650), most modern scholars contend that Voetius was an Aristotelian theologian.[1] Ernst Bizer, who was one of the early proponents of this view, argues that what Voetius actually defended was “Aristotelianism and the validity of the traditional proof of God, but not the biblical concept of God.”[2] Bizer is convinced that Voetius defended “not just faith, but the whole traditional system of theology” (i.e., Aristotelianism), and that for Voetius, Christian faith and Aristotelianism were “manifestly one and the same thing.”[3] In a similar vein, Richard Popkin binds Schoock and Voetius under the name of Aristotelian.[4] Paul Hoffman argues that the Aristotelian faculty of the University of Utrecht was led by Voetius.[5] Among French scholars, Cornelia Serrurier and Henri Gouhier also observe the debate of Voetius and Descartes from the perspective of the conflict between Aristotelian philosophy and the New Philosophy.[6] Theo Verbeek and J. A. van Ruler, who have closely studied the debate, drive a wedge into this view. Verbeek maintains that Voetius was a rationalist, and that his Aristotelianism “allowed him to settle theological problems without having to consider the relation between faith and reason or to define the role of reason in interpreting the Bible.”[7] Verbeek comments on Voetius’s Aristotelianism, “Voetius is not surprised that everything theology needs happens to be found in Aristotle.”[8] Verbeek’s former student, van Ruler, albeit tempering the strength of this opinion, basically sides with him. Van Ruler argues that “Voetius holds that the Aristotelian philosophy is more in accordance with Holy Writ than are the philosophies of those who criticize Aristotle.”[9]

This article, however, will show that the above scholars’ assessment of Voetius is not quite right. Voetius was one of the strong advocates of the Reformed faith.[10] It is true that Voetius formulated his theology in a broad Aristotelian tradition, but one can hardly define the main characteristics of his theology as just Aristotelian. Voetius believed that if a philosopher worked with reason alone, the conclusion could be profoundly flawed. He argued that reason should have an ancillary status beneath theology, and therefore the use of reason should be limited in theological studies. His attitude toward philosophy is basically eclectic, and his Aristotelianism is “modified Christian Aristotelianism.”[11] By contrast, Descartes was not concerned with limiting the use of reason. Descartes is considered to be the first modern philosopher.[12] He used skeptical critique as his philosophical method in order to exclude any type of certainty except the thinking ego (ego cogitans). For Descartes, mathematical reasoning was the most certain way of finding truth. He argued that the conclusion of philosophy could be different from that of theology, and that theologians should not interfere with the work of philosophers.

In this article I will analyze Voetius’s and Descartes’s views of faith and reason and the relationship between theology and philosophy, and show that Voetius and Descartes were different in their understanding of these issues. The article will proceed from Voetius to Descartes following the order of their debate. The first section will examine Voetius’s conception of faith and reason in Selectarum disputationum theologicarum, Pars Prima, Chapters 1–3.[13] The second section will analyze the relationship of theology and philosophy in this work. The third section will deal with Descartes’s notion of faith and reason in his letter to Voetius (Epistola ad Voetium). The fourth section will investigate the relationship of theology and philosophy in the letter of Descartes to Voetius. This article will show how Voetius and Descartes were different in their understanding of faith, reason, and the relationship between theology and philosophy. In so doing, this study will also demonstrate that Voetius was not simply Aristotelian, and that what he defended against Descartes was not Aristotelianism but Christian doctrine traditionally understood.

II. Voetius’s Understanding Of Faith And Reason In Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, Pars Prima, 1–3

1. Definition And Classification Of Reason

When Voetius was a professor of theology at the University of Utrecht, one of his colleagues, the professor of theoretical medicine and botany, Henricus Regius (1598–1679), received the “New Philosophy” of Descartes and taught it to his students. At the same time, the “New Science” of Copernicus also gained supporters among the European academic society.[14] Both the New Philosophy and the New Science questioned the authority of the Christian faith. Voetius’s book Selectarum disputationum theologicarum was published against this intellectual background.[15] Not surprisingly, Voetius gave much space in his book to the relationship between faith and reason and the connection between theology and philosophy. The first three chapters of the first volume of Selectarum disputationum theologicarum were devoted specifically to these two topics.[16] Even though he did not mention the names of Descartes or Copernicus in the entire book, his intention was clear in warning against their thinking. He gives much more weight to the New Philosophy than to the New Science. Yet, the main purpose of his book was theological, so he opened the book with the ideas of the Socinians, who were regarded as rationalists among the members of the Protestant church.[17]

The Socinians, according to Voetius, argued that “not only Scripture, but also and above all, reason is the norm of religion and of what is to be believed.”[18] Smalcius, one of the Socinians, contended in his book Against Franzius, “Only through reason can a judgment be made on the possibility or impossibility of the articles of faith.”[19] Against these views, Voetius presents his ideas of faith and reason. He defines human reason (ratio humana) as “the capacity of the rational soul in man, by which he comprehends intelligible things and makes judgments [facultatem animae rationalis in homine, qua intelligibilia apprehendit & dijudicat].”[20] He argues that human reason also denotes “the light of natural knowledge [lumen cognitionis naturalis]” through metonymy and metaphor.[21] He divides “the light of natural knowledge” into two parts, external and internal. The internal light of natural knowledge is again twofold: either it is imprinted on all people from birth, that which is called common sense (communis sensus) and common notions (communes notiones), or else it is acquired and newly added to a person after birth.

Voetius also maintains that human reason can be considered either in the ideal—objectively and abstractly; or else concretely—subjectively and in a particular state. In the latter consideration, four states are imposed: (1) before the Fall as gifted with the image of God; (2) in the Fall as corrupt; (3) in grace as free, although imperfect; and (4) in glory as perfect, shining brightly with the light of glory.[22] Human reason that is considered as the ideal, or objectively and abstractly, means a work of God or a good creation of God; it is the human reason that was given from God when he made human beings.[23]

2. Reason And Scripture

The principle of faith is twofold for Voetius: an external principle and an internal principle. The former can also be called an objective principle, the latter a formal principle. The former is the Word of God; the latter is the illumination of the Holy Spirit or the supernatural light infused into the mind. The external principle of faith, the Word of God, must be primary and trustworthy in and of itself (autopiston).[24] All truths, articles, or conclusions of faith are derived from this external principle of faith. Thus, to Voetius, Holy Scripture is the primary and trustworthy source of all truths of the Christian faith. He maintains that human reason can be a principle as much as “it draws conclusions from the only, infallible principle of the Scriptures, and so by means of simple apprehension, of composition, of division, and of discursive reasoning it achieves the understanding of what is revealed supernaturally or spiritually.”[25] For Voetius, Scripture is the only and infallible principle, and human reason is a principle subordinate to it.

3. The Superiority Of Faith Over Reason

Voetius further argues that the supernatural truths of faith are beyond human reason in itself or as such, for through reason it is not possible to perceive them unless it is elevated and revealed through a higher light. He contends, however, that the supernatural truths do not conflict with human reason per se. If they conflict with reason, it is because of the accident of corruption and the depraved disposition that sticks to the human mind. Thus, the Christian faith and theology can be called completely rational, not because they demonstrate their truth necessarily with arguments in opposition to those who deny the basic assumptions of the Christian faith, but because they demonstrate their conclusions from the authority of Scripture and with arguments derived from Scripture, and because they at least refute those arguments by which unbelievers charge the Christian faith with contradiction and absurdity.[26] Voetius contends that “no human reason can be the principle by which or through which, or else on the ground of which or why we believe, or the foundation, law, or norm for what must be believed, under whose direction we are to judge.”[27] “On the contrary,” writes Voetius, “our faith opens to Holy Scripture when it pertains to the things that must be believed, and to the illumination of the Holy Spirit when it pertains to the act of faith.”[28] The faculty of reason of an unregenerate person is blind when it comes to the divine law. Voetius argues, with 1 Tim 3:16 and Matt 13:11, that the entire gospel is called a mystery. Thus, to him, the unspiritual person does not perceive anything of all those things without divine revelation. Voetius also maintains that even regenerate people “do not establish the what, how, and why on the basis of accurate definitions, but only that it is on the basis of the supernatural revelation of the Holy Spirit.”[29]

Voetius rigorously limits the ability of reason in an unregenerate person in relation to divine knowledge. He argues that “the essence and attributes of the Godhead are never understood by the human mind immediately, adequately, as they are in themselves and therefore also not in a perfect manner, but only by the way of negation, causality, and eminence.”[30] An unregenerate person cannot understand even the witness of God’s works, let alone the Persons of the Trinity, the Savior Christ, and the whole mystery of redemption.[31] Even in the mind of a regenerated person, especially if still an infant, divine knowledge is known only imperfectly and in part because an innate darkness always clings to the mind. Therefore, Voetius concludes that “reason is not a principle of faith in God in which nothing false can be present.”[32]

Human beings, according to Voetius, cannot say that they believe in something because it is reasonable to them. Rather, they should begin with Scripture and say that they believe in this and judge in this way because God says it in the Scriptures.[33] “Human reason,” argues Voetius, “is not prior to, more known, or more certain than faith; thus it is not its principle.” He adds, “Reason does not precede faith; because reason is enlightened by faith.”[34] In the conclusion, Voetius offers an ad hominem argument against Socinus and his followers. Socinus denies all natural theology, or innate and acquired knowledge of God, and claims that whatever is or will be found among those who do not have Scripture is based on unskilled and therefore most fallible proof, that is, on mere tradition and human testimony. Therefore, it is impossible for Socinus to assert that human reason could ever be the infallible principle of the mysteries of faith. Thus, his view is self-contradictory.[35]

4. Not Only Through Scripture But Also Through Reason

After his criticism of the Socinians, Voetius moves on to the views of two Jesuits, Jean Gontery (1562–1616) and Francois Veron (1578–1649).[36] These two Jesuits argued that the Protestants “may only refute the papacy with the very words of Scripture, without any form of reasoning, discursive thought, and without drawing conclusions and without proof, and who go so far as to reject and remove all natural, accepted, learned, and useful logic from all the discussions and disputes.”[37] Voetius defends the view of the Protestants that even though for them Scripture is the only principle of faith, they do not ignore the function of human reason in the interpretation of Scripture.[38] He points out that Protestant theologians also acknowledge and receive adequately drawn consequences either from the Scriptures or from human reason. Here the term “consequences” (consequentiae) is very important and refers to the truths that are deduced from the principal truths of Scripture or the axioms. Voetius argues:

In elenctic theology, or in the refutation of falsities such as purgatory, indulgences, and so forth, we ought to use discursive thought and consequences even if a rigid opponent denies them, as well as proofs based on consequences derived not only from the words of Scripture but also from the axioms and principles of the light of nature known either naturally or by the study of philosophy or logic, so that the correct relationship of the middle term to the most important major becomes apparent.[39]

Voetius does not ignore the importance of the use of human reason in Reformed theology. When Protestant theologians have a debate with Roman Catholic theologians, they use discursive thought, consequences, and proofs based on consequences derived not only from Scripture but also from the axioms and principles of the light of nature. Voetius, however, emphasizes that each truth should be proven from Scripture alone, and he concedes that if the positions pertain to natural theology, they must be proved primarily from Scripture and secondarily from the light of nature.

Elenctic theology, according to Voetius, does not derive its faith conclusions from its principles without discursive reasoning, but it deduces theological theses from the analogy of faith because it is all the more argumentative.[40] Voetius is convinced that the elenctic theology of the apostles and prophets is argumentative, and that the divinely inspired authors made use of certain forms and expressions that pertain to argumentation.[41] Even Christ, the prophets, and the apostles prove their doctrines and refute falsities “through consequences” (per consequentias).[42] Most doctrines of the Christian religion are not contained literally in Scripture, but can be derived by discursive reasoning or else by equivalent expressions in Scripture. For Voetius, the following doctrines are derived from Scripture only through the use of consequences: that the three Persons of the Godhead are really distinct, that the Son is equal in essence (homoousion) with the Father, that two natures are essentially in the one Person of Christ without confusion, and so forth.[43] These doctrines are elicited by the drawing of conclusions from their principles in which they are already potentially and virtually contained. Voetius contends that no disputation is possible without refutation and contradiction, and that no judgment is made about contradiction without the rules of consequences and without the principles of reason that are from God. God gives human beings not only his truth but also the method to get the truth. The consensus and practice of the church have permitted the use of logical reasoning and consequences to refute atheists, pagans, Jews, and heretics. Voetius attests to his view of the works of the church fathers and medieval theologians.[44] Therefore, for Voetius, there is no tension between the Protestant insistence on “Scripture alone” (sola Scriptura) and the importance he places on the usefulness of reason. He refutes both Socinianism, which displays a great confidence in human reason, and Veron’s criticism that the Protestants confront Roman Catholicism with biblical texts only without making use of rational considerations. Voetius dismisses both views and offers a middle position: Holy Scripture is the only principle of faith and theology, and human reason plays an instrumental, not normative, role in the pursuit of truth.[45]

III. Voetius’s Understanding Of The Relation Of Theology And Philosophy In Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, Pars Prima, 1–3

1. Philosophy, Scripture, And The Illumination Of The Holy Spirit

On the unity of truth, Voetius argues that “naturally revealed philosophical truth does not contradict theological truth.”[46] Both biblical truth and reason are good gifts of God. Voetius, however, imposes a right order between them. He asserts that all truths of faith are derived from Scripture, which he calls “the external principle of faith.”[47] Scripture is the primary source of all truths of Christian faith. Voetius regards the articles of saving faith not as presupposed, but as formal. This means that the articles of saving faith can be known only through the illumination of the Holy Spirit or supernatural light. Even those articles of faith that are common to natural theology and sound philosophy should be learned from the Scriptures and through the illumination of the Holy Spirit.[48] They are such things as the existence of God, God’s justice, that he is the governor of the universe, the immortality of the soul, and so forth. Therefore, for Voetius, Scripture and the illumination of the Holy Spirit have superiority to reason even in the realm of natural theology. Natural theology does not leave out Scripture, but presupposes it. It is not an independent theology apart from Scripture but a part of biblical theology.[49] Furthermore, Voetius contends that “there is a very great distinction between grace and nature, between the special revelation of grace or supernatural light and God’s general revelation or the light of nature, between philosophy and theology or faith.”[50] Therefore, there is no conflict between biblical truth and human reason because the latter is subjected to the former. All truth of faith is known from Scripture and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, and confirmed by human reason. Scripture is the primary principle, and human reason can be a derivative principle of it.

2. Philosophy In Theological Studies

Voetius holds a positive view of the usefulness of philosophy for theology. One of the theses he defends is, “The light of nature does not fight with the light of grace, nor philosophy with theology. Therefore, a-theological, and also doing injury to God and His truth, are those who condemn philosophy.”[51] Philosophy as such is not a source of heresy, but it can constructively contribute to theology.[52] God recommends to human beings “the knowledge that is attained by reason and by the senses that serve reason,” and this knowledge is “nothing other than philosophy.”[53] Philosophy provides orthodox theology a sound logic and discursive thought.[54] Elenctic theology can oppose corrupt reasoning with the assistance of philosophy. Thus, Voetius defends the use of philosophy and logic in theology and repudiates Veron’s “Biblicist” method.[55] He argues that it belongs to the tradition of the orthodox church to use logic and philosophy in theology. Even Roman Catholic theologians use logic and philosophy to demonstrate their views.[56] Nevertheless, Voetius stipulates the function of philosophy in the study of theology when he asserts:

We convince Christians that the Scriptures are the only principle in our theology. We use metaphysics and philosophy so that we might support the rules of logical consequences, and so that we might designate false conclusions and tricks, which are drawn from the corrupt and perverse reason of pseudo-philosophy.[57]

Here again, Voetius argues that Scripture is the only principle in Christian theology. However, he contends that theologians can use philosophy to formulate theology in a better way. Theologians can deduce logical conclusions from “consequences” with the help of philosophy, and philosophy can contribute to theological reasoning in elenctic theology.

Voetius’s view of philosophy is consistent with his notion of human reason. He argues for the usefulness of human reason and philosophy in faith and theology. It is worth noting, however, that he confirms the superiority of Scripture and the illumination of the Holy Spirit over human reason and philosophy. Without Scripture and illumination, human reason and philosophy cannot find the truth of God; with the help of sound reason and philosophy, Christians can attain to more sound doctrines and can more decisively uncover the falsity of heresies and pseudo-philosophy. The truth of orthodox theology is consistent with that of solid philosophy.[58] In his Introductio ad philosophiam sacram, Voetius contends that no philosophy can be accepted without reservations, but only the best insights should be taken into the service of Christianity. He opts for philosophical eclecticism and regards traditional Christian Aristotelianism as appropriate for the study of theology. Voetius, however, does not adhere to the philosophical thought of Aristotle himself.[59] He does not regard Aristotelianism as a fixed body of doctrines, but as a collection of methods and contents that was passed on by tradition.[60] For Voetius, consistency with Scripture is the norm for selecting any philosophical affiliation. Thus, it can be concluded that when Voetius defended “Christian Aristotelianism” against the New Philosophy, the cause for which he fought was not the philosophy itself, but the scriptural truths that the tradition of the orthodox church preserved through Scripture, theology, reason, and philosophy.[61] It was not the main concern of Voetius that the New Philosophy departed from accepted philosophy. Rather, his genuine concern was that the New Philosophy departed from the traditional theology that used the concepts and theories of the accepted philosophy.[62]

3. Corrupt Theology And Solid Scholastic Theology

In Selectarum disputationum theologicarum, Voetius deals with the methodology and contents of scholastic theology.[63] He offers five origins of corrupt theology (corrupta Theologia) as follows: (1) ignorance of languages, especially of Greek and Hebrew, which God used to write Scripture; (2) ignorance of history and ancient culture, especially of church history; (3) ignorance of the discipline of theology, which includes grammar, philology, philosophy, Aristotelian logic and physics, ethics, metaphysics, language, and the discipline of Lombard; (4) defect of the practice and exercise of piety, and of care of the church; and (5) ignorance of important texts, which include the works of the church fathers, the texts of church history, and exegetical works of Scripture.[64] Voetius underscores both academic specialty and practical piety in the study of theology. For him, theology is most of all “a practical science” (scientia practica).[65] He underlines that theological students should be pious and eager to take care of the church “because many [theological] teachers are purely speculative and contemplative [Erant enim maximam partem Doctores pure speculativi & umbratici].” It is also notable that Voetius places stress on the philosophical study in theology. Although Aristotelian logic and physics are not satisfactorily translated, they are important in theological studies. Some parts of Aristotelian ethics and metaphysics should be studied with theology. “This philosophical lesson,” maintains Votius, “still has not died out anywhere to this present day [hic cursus Philosophicus, qui etiamnum hodie alicubi nondum exolevit].” Thus, for Voetius, Aristotelian philosophy is one of the necessary factors in theological studies.

Following his treatment of the origins of corrupt theology, Voetius explains the custom of scholastic theology (usus Theologiae Scholasticae). He admonishes theological students accordingly: (1) acuteness in logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and politics, and in addition, acuteness in theological method, which is well demonstrated by Thomas Aquinas; (2) learning of terminologies and distinctions; (3) skill in controversy, grammar, oratory, and poetics; (4) pleasurable phraseology and style; and (5) logic in analysis of texts and subtle judgment in the use of Scripture.[66] Here again, Voetius maintains that philosophy is necessary in scholastic theology, and that most philosophical problems are still unsolved. Solid theology offers sound answers about the mystery of theological issues against corrupt views. Philosophy is useful for this purpose. Voetius is convinced that solid scholastic theology is philosophical and academic as well as biblical and pious.

In sum, for Voetius, Scripture is the only and infallible principle, and human reason is a secondary principle subordinate to Scripture. The supernatural truths of faith transcend human reason but do not conflict with human reason per se. Christian faith and theology can be called completely rational. The ability of reason in an unregenerate person in relation to divine knowledge is definitely limited because an innate darkness always clings to it. Nevertheless, Voetius does not neglect the usefulness of reason in the study of theology. Theologians derive many Christian doctrines from its principles through the discursive reasoning of an argumentative method. Human reason is required more in elenctic theology. The tradition of the orthodox church used both scriptural truth and human reason to refute heresies. According to Voetius’s doctrine of the unity of truth, revelation has authority over philosophy, and the truth of revealed religion and that of natural knowledge should concur.[67] There is no tension between biblical truth and philosophical truth, Voetius maintains, inasmuch as the conclusion of philosophy should follow the truth of Scripture. Solid scholastic theology begins with Scripture and develops with philosophy.

IV. Descartes’s Understanding Of Faith And Reason In His Epistola Ad Voetium

1. Request For A Reasonable Critique

Descartes wrote a long open letter to Voetius, which was published by Elzevirs of Amsterdam in May of 1643. The original Latin text was entitled Epistola Renati Descartes ad Celeberrimum Virum D. Gisbertium Voetium (“Letter from Rene Descartes to that distinguished gentleman M. Gisbertus Voetius”).[68] The letter was intended as a reply to two works in which Voetius had attacked Descartes: the Confraternitas Mariana (1642) and the Admiranda Methodus (1643).[69]

In the argument of his letter to Voetius, Descartes expresses discontent that some people fought against him not by reasoning but only through disparagement, and that Voetius attacked him not by reasoning but by authority alone.[70] Descartes claims that his opponents depended on a higher power to attack him, but that it was not allowed for him to use reason in the debate.[71] For Descartes, Voetius charged him not because he, Descartes, had a bad cause, but because he abandoned the teaching to which all the church holds.[72] Descartes maintains that his adversary forsook rational truth for faith. Thus, Descartes asks readers not to believe what his enemies say, but to believe those words that they can confirm either by testimony or by reason.[73] For him, human reason is the criterion by which one can judge the truth of an assertion. Even the authority of the church, without reasoning, cannot be the principle from which one can make a sound argument.

2. The Use Of Reason In Education

Descartes argues that he cannot find any reasoning in all the works of Voetius that he has read.[74] He asserts that they may be useful in “learning,” but not in “education.” He distinguishes between the learned (doctus) and the educated (eruditus). Learning, to Descartes, means the reception of traditional knowledge; so he calls Voetius “the most learned man” (doctissimum). By “educated” Descartes means those “who have polished their intelligence and character by study and cultivation” (qui studio & cultura ingenium moresque suos perpolivit).[75] He is convinced that such education is to be acquired “not by the indiscriminate reading of any book whatever, but by a frequent and repeated reading of only the best, by discussion with those who are already educated, when presented with the opportunity, and, finally, by continually contemplating the virtues and pursuing the truth.”[76] Simple memorization helps very little in the educational pursuit of wisdom. Descartes holds:

Those who seek learning from standard texts and indexes and concordances can pack their memories with many things in a short time, but they do not emerge as wiser or better people as a result. On the contrary, there is no chain of reasoning in such books, but everything is decided either by appeal to authority or by short summary syllogisms, and those who seek learning from these sources become accustomed to placing equal trust in the authority of any writer . . . , so little by little they lose the use of their natural reason and put in its place an artificial and sophistical reason.[77]

For Descartes, the traditional way of education leads the student to lose and distort their power of reasoning. The true use of reason is the basis of all education, all intelligence, and all human wisdom.[78] “The true use of reason,” maintains Descartes, “does not consist in isolated syllogisms, but only in the scrupulous and careful inclusion of everything required for the knowledge of the truths we are seeking.”[79] Thus, for Descartes, a traditional education makes the student grow careless and lose the use of reason. The Voetian way of learning only forms an artificial and sophistical reason in the mind of the student. Descartes asserts that the independent use of reason is the most important factor in education. Teachers should develop the power of reasoning in the student. Moreover, Descartes argues that one should “accept as true only what is so clear that it leaves no room for doubt.”[80] Faith cannot be the presupposition in education. Everything should be doubted before it becomes clear and distinct knowledge. This is why he is accused of being a skeptic or an atheist.[81]

3. The Autonomy And Priority Of Reason

Descartes intends to restore the importance of the use of reason and the autonomy of reason.[82] In order to confirm the supremacy of reason over faith, he gives primacy to the intellect and its power to independently achieve truth.[83] The subordination of reason to faith means that, in the event of a clash between them, faith is to take precedence as being more certain and authoritative.[84] Descartes argues that “the ideas of revealed religion are obscure because they are against the formal reason which consists of the natural light.”[85] He boldly maintains that an infidel who embraces Christian faith on the grounds of fallacious reasonings, and without the light of grace, would commit a sin in not using reason rightly.[86]

Descartes argues that Christians should have no difficulty in believing religious mysteries because the immense power of God can create many things beyond human understanding. He also explains how this contradiction is to be understood. He maintains that anyone who teaches that Scripture contradicts natural reason does so only to “show indirectly that he has no faith in Scripture. For as we were born men before we were made Christians, it is beyond belief that any man should seriously embrace opinions which he thinks contrary to right reason that constitutes a man, in order that he may adhere to the faith by which he is a Christian.”[87] The theological implication of the Cartesian doubt renews the old struggle between faith and reason. The theological argument of Descartes’s works and his request for reasoning in the letter to Voetius is intended to restore the autonomy of reason. His resolve to achieve clarity and to accept nothing but clear ideas, as Hiram Canton rightly puts it, is already an implicit rejection of faith and authority.[88] By contrast, correcting the Cartesian trust of human reason, Voetius insists that the human mind is open to error; thus, human reason cannot be the norm for the pursuit of truth.

V. Descartes’s Understanding Of The Relation Of Theology And Philosophy In His Epistola Ad Voetium

1. Philosophy Against Orthodox Theology

The judgment of the Academy of Utrecht (Academia Ultrajectina), of which rector Voetius was a part, condemned the philosophy of Descartes as “forging various false and absurd opinions, and in so doing, fighting against orthodox theology.”[89] When Descartes asked at what point his philosophy became an opponent of orthodox theology, Voetius wrote the book Admiranda Methodus in response. Descartes could not find any rational argument in the allegations of the book but only discovered what he determined to be more savage false accusations added to the previous judgment.[90]

In his response to Voetius, Descartes argues that he always regarded common theologians most virtuous and truly Christian.[91] He claims that not any word of his works damages the cause of orthodox theology.[92] He is quite convinced that his philosophy should not be regarded as heretical.[93] He argues that his faith does not differ from that of traditional religion,[94] stating that this view is the same as that of Henricus Regius, who asserts that the New Philosophy does not have anything against the teachings of traditional philosophy, scholastic theology, or other related science, including medicine.[95]

2. Philosophy Independent Of Theology

Descartes contends that without the cognition of old theology, one can easily understand philosophical truth.[96] For Descartes, Regius offers purely philosophical questions, which in fact have nothing to do with theology.[97] Descartes tends to avoid discussion of theological issues and follows the orthodox position of the Roman Catholic Church. He separates philosophy and theology. For him the two are simply unconnected.[98] Thus, Descartes denies that his philosophy and the method of doubting could ever have any detrimental effects on theology. Regarding his rejection of various proofs for the existence of God, he points out that the famous Jesuit scholar Gregory of Valentia (c. 1551–1603) also criticized Thomas Aquinas’s proofs for the existence of God and showed those proofs to be invalid.[99] Thus, Descartes argues that philosophy has its own independent space for the study of truth. He adds that even his letter to Voetius does not attempt any theological objection against him. He claims that he simply tried to demonstrate that the judgment of the Academy of Utrecht was unjust.[100]

Descartes’s philosophical letters, however, show that his philosophy has a common ground with theology. In his 1641 letter to Regius, Descartes criticizes the view of theologians on substance. According to Descartes, theologians argue that no created substance is the immediate principle of its operation. He understands that by this they mean that no creature can operate without the concurrence of God, and not that it needs some created faculty, distinct from itself, by which to operate. To Descartes, however, “it would be absurd to say that such a created faculty could be the immediate principle of an operation, while the substance itself could not.”[101] Thus, Descartes’s philosophy does have a theological connotation, as his letter confirms.

Descartes maintains that his book Meditations is the primary cause for the debate, but that the faculty of Utrecht University could not understand the book. He asserts that he did not present any atheistic argument in the book.[102] Voetius, however, does not accept this view. He basically objects to Descartes for disrupting the relation between faith and reason by means of hyperbolical doubt, which is the basic method of Meditations. For Voetius, Cartesian doubt is in fact nothing other than skepticism. Voetius argues that skepticism occurs if someone “rejects, derides, or doubts all certainty of knowledge.”[103] To him, skepticism is an act of bad faith. The fundamental motive behind Voetius’s accusation of Cartesian doubt is to combat vain curiosity, which he asserts is a seed of unbelief.[104]

In sum, Descartes tried to restore the autonomy of reason. He asserted that his philosophy was not developed in opposition to orthodox theology, but in fact he confirmed the supremacy of reason over faith. By contrast, Voetius emphasized that there is no one who is free from errors, no more than one who is free from misery or sin.[105] For Voetius, any philosophy that is not based on Scripture and the illumination of the Holy Spirit is vain.

VI. Conclusion

In his long letter to Voetius, Descartes mentioned Aristotelianism only twice;[106] by contrast, the topics of theology, faith, and atheism were put on the table hundreds of times. Both Descartes and Voetius acknowledged that the issue they treated was most of all theological. Voetius pursued the faith-seeking-understanding program whereas Descartes repudiated the faith-lacking-understanding project. The primary concern of Voetius was not to preserve Aristotelianism but to keep the biblical truth that, as he put it, was received from orthodox tradition. Descartes insisted that the article of faith did not fall under the regime of human reason because faith was something one could not fully grasp with reason. He argued that whoever embraced the articles of faith from incorrect reasoning would commit a sin no less grave than those who rejected them. What Descartes desperately defended was the autonomy of human reason and its proper use. In his philosophical enterprise, faith seemed to hinder the autonomy and the use of reason. He believed that his method of doubt would provide a firm road to perfect knowledge. Voetius, however, argued that human reason was surrounded by error and sin, so that perfect knowledge was impossible for humans. He maintained that human beings would be able to learn the truth from divine revelation, which was the only principle in the pursuit of truth. Therefore, for Voetius, Cartesianism was primarily confronted with scriptural truth, not with Aristotelianism.

Notes

1. For the debate between Voetius and Descartes, see Arnoldus Cornelius Duker, School-gezag en eigen-onderzoek: Historisch-kritische studie van den strijd tusschen Voetius en Descartes (Leiden: D. Noothoven van Goor, 1861); Josef Bohatec, Die cartesianische Scholastik in der Philosophie und reformierten Dogmatik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Teil 1: Entstehung, Eigenart, Geschichte und philosophische Auspragung der cartesianischen Scholaslik (1912; repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1966); Gustave Cohen, Ecrivains francais en Hollande dans la premiere moitie du 17e siecle (Paris: Champion, 1920); Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis, ed., Descartes et le cartesianisme hollandais: Etudes et documents (Paris and Amsterdam: Presses universitaires de France, 1951); Cornelia Serrurier, Descartes: L’homme et le penseur (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1951); Paul Dibon, L’enseignement philosophique dans les universites neerlandaises a l’epoque pre-cartesienne (1575-1650) (Amsterdam: Institut Francais d’Amsterdam, 1954); C. Louise Thijssen-Schoute, Nederlands cartesianisme (Amsterdam: HES, 1954); Hans-Martin Barth, Atheismus und Orthodoxie: Analysen und Modelle christlicher Apologetik im 17. Jahrhundert (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971); Thomas A. McGahagan, “Cartesianism in the Netherlands, 1639-1667: The New Science and the Calvinist Counter-Reformation” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1976); Tom Sorell, Descartes (Past Masters; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Rene Descartes and Martin Schoock, La Querelle d’Utrecht: Rene Descartes et Martin Schoock (ed. Theo Verbeek; Paris: Impressions nouvelles, 1988); J. van Oort, De Onbekende Voetius: Voordrachten wetenschappelijk symposium, Utrecht, 3 maart 1989 (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1989); Marjorie Glicksman Grene, Descartes among the Scholastics (Aquinas Lecture; Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991); Theo Verbeek, “Descartes and the Problem of Atheism: The Utrecht Crisis,” Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis 71 (1991): 211-23; Theo Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy, 1637-1650 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992); J. A. van Ruler, The Crisis of Causality: Voetius and Descartes on God, Nature, and Change (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); Roger Ariew and Marjorie Glicksman Grene, eds., Descartes and His Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Aza Goudriaan, “Die Rezeption des cartesianischen Gottesgedanken bei Abraham Heidanus,” Neue Zeitschrift fur systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 38 (1996): 166-97; Tad M. Schmaltz, Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism in Early Modern Europe (London: Routledge, 2005); Roger Ariew, Descartes among the Scholastics (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2011).
2. Ernst Bizer, “Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,” JTC 2 (1965): 24.
3. Ibid., 38.
4. Richard Henry Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (rev. ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 198; Richard Henry Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle (rev. ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 162.
5. Paul Hoffman, Essays on Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 18.
6. Serrurier, Descartes: L’homme et le penseur, 137; Henri Gaston Gouhier, La pensee metaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1962), 346-50.
7. Verbeek, “Descartes and the Problem of Atheism,” 211-23, at 223.
8. Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 7.
9. van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, 34.
10. For the life and thought of Voetius, see Arnoldus Cornelius Duker, Gisbertus Voetius (3 vols.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1897); van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, ch. 1; Andreas J. Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676): Sein Theologieverstandnis und seine Gotteslehre” (Ph.D. diss., Utrecht University, 2007), 35-59.
11. For “Christian Aristotelianism” and the eclecticism of early modern philosophy, see Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725 (4 vols.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006), 1:360-82.
12. For the life and thought of Descartes, see Adrien Baillet, La Vie de M. Descartes (2 vols.; Paris, 1691); Serrurier, Descartes: L’homme et le penseur; Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1968); Sorell, Descartes; Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
13. Gisbertus Voetius, Selectarum disputationum theologicarum (5 vols.; Utrecht: J. a Waesberge, 1648-1669), vol. 1. Hereafter this work will be abbreviated SDTh with volume and page number. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. For a Dutch translation of the first chapter of SDTh, see W. J. van Asselt et al., eds., Inleiding in de gereformeerde scholastiek (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1998), 184-200; for an English translation, see W. J. van Asselt et al., eds., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism (trans. Albert Gootjes; Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2011), 225-47. I refer with some modifications to this translation by Gootjes.
14. Voetius was the first man to promote vigorous debate against Copernicanism in the Netherlands (Rienk H. Vermij, Secularisering en natuurwetenschap in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw: Bernard Nieuwentijt [Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1991], 65). For a detailed narrative of the debate between Copernicanism and Voetianism, see Rienk H. Vermij, The Calvinist Copernicans: The Reception of the New Astronomy in the Dutch Republic, 1575-1750 (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2002), Parts 3 and 4.
15. On the disputes of Voetius and his opponents who argued for the New Philosophy, see van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, 9-35; and Descartes and Schoock, La Querelle d’Utrecht, 69-123.
16. Voetius, SDTh 1:1-47. The first chapter (“De ratione humana in rebus fidei”) was delivered in February 1636, in his first days as professor at Utrecht University. The second chapter (“De theologia scholastica”) was presented in February 1640, and the third chapter (“Quousque se extendat autoritas Scriptura”) dealt with the authority of the Bible in July 1636. For this information, see Gijsbert Voet, D. Gysberti Voetii: Selectarum disputationum fasciculus (ed. Abraham Kuyper; Amsterdam: J. A. Wormser, 1887), 1, 10; and van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, 22 n. 38.
17. Aza Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625-1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus Van Mastricht and Anthonius Driessen (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006), 37. On the relationship between Socinianism and other philosophers in the early modern period, see Zbigniew Ogonowski, “Der Sozinianismus aus der Sicht der grosen philosophischen Doktrinen des 17. Jahrhunderts,” in Socinianism and Its Role in the Culture of the 16th to the 18th Centuries (ed. Lech Szczucki, Zbigniew Ogonowski, and Janusz Tazbir; Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publisher, 1983), 115-23. M. Schneckenburger writes, “Er [Socinianism] ist die erste Form, unter welcher sich in der protestantischen Kirche der Rationalismus geregt hat, er ist gewissermassen eine Nachgeburt des alten Pelagianismus [Socinianism is the first form under which rationalism has emerged in the Protestant church, and it is, in a certain sense, an afterbirth of the old Pelagianism]” (Matthias Schneckenburger, Vorlesungen uber die Lehrbegriffe der kleineren protestantischen Kirchenparteien [ed. Karl Bernhard Hundeshagen; Frankfurt: H. L. Bronner, 1863], 30).
18. Voetius, SDTh 1:1.
19. Valentinus Smalcius, Refutatio thesium Wolfgi Franzii de praecipuis religionis christianae capitibus (Rakow: Sternacius, 1614), preface.
20. Voetius, SDTh 1:1.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 1:2.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 1:3: Haec tanquam principium quod conclusiones fidei ex unico infallibili scripturarum principio educit, atque adeo actibus simplicis apprehensionis, compositionis, divisionis, & discursus tou gnōstou supernaturalis seu spiritualis intelligentia peragit (author’s emphasis; I transliterate the Greek word).
26. Ibid. Voetius refers to Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, qu. 1, art. 8. He also writes, “A similar defense of the faith can be seen in Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Arnobius, Lactantius, Augustine, Theodoret, Cyril of Alexandria, and so forth; in the medieval writers Thomas Against the Pagans, and the other scholastics, if one with discretion and discernment takes the more solid excerpts; as well as Savonarola in The Triumph of the Cross; Raymond of Sabunde in On Natural Theology; Cardinal Cusanus, Dionysius the Carthusian and others who wrote against the Muslims; and finally, more recent writers such as Louis Vives, Agostino Steuco, Charron, the scholastics who treat quaestiones and the commentators on Lombard and Thomas; but especially Du Plessis in his excellent treatise On the Truth of the Christian Religion” (SDTh 1:3).
27. Ibid., author’s emphasis: His pramissis dicimus nullam rationem humanam esse principium quo seu per quod, aut ex quo seu cur credamus, aut fundamentum aut legem, aut normam credendorum ex cuius prascripto judicemus.
28. Ibid., 1:4: sed contra resolvi fidem nostram, ut notat credenda, in S. Scripturam; ut notat actum credendi, in illuminationem Spiritus Sancti.
29. Ibid. (author’s emphasis).
30. Ibid.: Quia essentia & attributa Deitatis ab humana mente immediate, adaequate, ut sunt in se, atque adeo perfecte non comprehenduntur: sed tantum per viam negationis, causalitatis, eminentiae.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.: Non est itaque principium fidei divinae, cui non potest subesse falsum.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.: Ratio humana non est prior notior, certior fide; ergo non est ejus principium. . . . [Ratio] ergo non est prior. Quia per fidem ratio illustratur.
35. Ibid., 1:5.
36. On Gontery and Veron, see van Asselt et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 234-35, nn. 27, 29. Voetius consistently writes these names in this disputation as “Gunterus” and “Verron.”
37. Voetius, SDTh 1:5-6.
38. Ibid., 1:6.
39. Ibid., 1:7 (emphasis mine): Sententia nostra est, in Theologica Elenctica, seu in refutatione falsitatis e.g. purgatorii, indulgentiarum, & c. discursu, & consequentiis utendum esse, & siquidem praefractus adversarius eas neget, etiam probationibus consequentiarum, non tantum ex sacris litteris, sed etiam ex axiomatis & principiis luminis naturalis sive naturaliter sive technice ex Philosophia & Logica notis, ut appareat apta connexio medii termini cum majori extremo.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 1:8, 44.
42. Ibid., 1:7-8. Voetius refers to the following scriptural texts: Matt 22:44; John 5:39, 26; Acts 2; 3; 15:8-9, 16-17; 17:16-18; 18:28; 26:22; and 1 Cor 15.
43. Ibid., 1:8.
44. Ibid., 1:9.
45. Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 36-37.
46. Voetius, “De errore et haeresi, pars sexta” [G. Baxcamp, 22 November 1656] (SDTh 3:750).
47. Voetius, SDTh 1:2.
48. See van Asselt et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 228. Based on the Latin, I describe Voetius’s intention more clearly than the English translation does. Objectum fidei divinae hic intelligimus formale, non prasuppositum: h. e. articulos fidei salvificae oikeious, proprios & stricte dictos, non vero prasuppositos, qui ipsi cum Theologia naturali, & cum sana Philosophia sunt communes.
49. On natural theology of this period, see Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard Kessler, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 598-638; and John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982).
50. Voetius, SDTh 1:5. Voetius references the following texts: 1 John 1:9; Rom 1:19; 2:14-15; Ps 147:20; Acts 14:16-17; and Eph 2:12-13.
51. Voetius, “Assertiones theologicae de praeiudiciis verae religionis” [D. van Boxtel], repr. in Gisbertus Voetius, Thersites heautontimorumenos (Utrecht: A. ab Herwiick & H. Ribbius, 1635), 347: Lumen naturae cum lumine gratiae, Philosophia cum Theologia non pugnant. Itaque atheologoi sunt, insuper in Deum et veritatem ejus injurii, qui Philosophiam condemnant. Cited in Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 30 n. 5.
52. Voetius, “De errore et haeresi, pars sexta” (SDTh 3:750-58).
53. Ibid., 3:750.
54. Cf. ibid., 1:7.
55. Ibid., 1:9.
56. Ibid., 1:10.
57. Voetius, Thersites heautontimorumenos, 127: Scripturis tanquam unico principio Christianis Theologiam nostram persuademus, Metaphysicam et Philosophiam adhibemus ut regulas consequentiarum fulciamus, ut sophismata ac strophas ex corrupta ac perversa ratione ex pseudo-philosophia depromptas delegamus. Translation mine.
58. Voetius, SDTh 4:757-58: . . . hac philosophia probe percepta ad solidam eruditionem theologicam . . .
59. Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 36, 54.
60. Theo Verbeek, “From ‘Learned Ignorance’ to Scepticism: Descartes and Calvinist Orthodoxy,” in Scepticism and Irreligion in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (ed. Richard Henry Popkin and Arie Johan Vanderjagt; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 44.
61. Along these same lines, Vermij writes, “Cartesianism was offensive [to Voetius] not only because it ran counter to received philosophy, but also because it appeared problematic from a religious and theological point of view” (Vermij, Calvinist Copernicans, 162).
62. Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 33. Even though Goudriaan rightly points out that Voetius’s concern was both theological and philosophical, he fails to demonstrate that the main concern was theological.
63. Voetius, SDTh 1:ch. 3. On Voetius’s definition of theology, see Gisbertus Voetius, Diatribae, de theologia, philologia, historia et philosophia, sacra (Utrecht: S. de Vries, 1668), 2-9.
64. Voetius, SDTh 1:25-26.
65. Beck argues that for Voetius, theology is a practical science. He writes, “Die Theologie ist fur Voetius in ihrer Eigenart praktische Wissenschaft (scientia practica)” (Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius,” 428). Thus, for Beck, Voetius sides with Duns Scotus rather than with Thomas Aquinas, who sees theology as “a mixed discipline of theoretical and practical science [eine Mischdisziplin aus theoretischer und praktischer Wissenschaft]” (429).
66. Voetius, SDTh 1:26.
67. Voetius argues that “the light of nature does not fight with the light of grace, nor philosophy with theology [Lumen Natura cum lumine gratia, Philosophia cum Theologia non pugnat]” (ibid., 3:750).
68. For the Latin edition and a French translation, see Rene Descartes, OEuvres de Descartes (ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery; 11 vols.; Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1957), 8b:1-198 (hereafter AT); also Descartes and Schoock, La Querelle d’Utrecht, 321-99.
69. See Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny; 3 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3:220 n. 3 (hereafter CSMK).
70. Descartes, AT 8b:4: . . . hi non rationibus, sed solis obtrectationibus me impugnant . . . [Voetius] quia me non rationibus, sed sola authoritate aggrediebatur. All English translations of Descartes’s Latin and French works are mine except where noted otherwise.
71. Ibid.: Quamvis enim ab iis qui suprema utuntur potestate, rationem judicati petere non liceat.
72. Ibid., 8b:8: Additque rationem, non quod causam malam judicet, vel defenfionem non aequam & bonam, sed quod ista quaestio generaliter ad omnes Ecclesias pertineat.
73. Ibid., 8b:15: ac mihi non esse amicum, & ideo nullam fidem iis quae de me dixeris esse adhibendam, nisi ea certis testimoniis aut rationibus confirmes.
74. Ibid., 8b:42: multa legi ex scriptis tuis, atqui nullam unquam in iis reperi ratiocinationem.
75. Ibid. The previous three quotations in the text are also from this page.
76. Ibid. For an English translation of this passage, see CSMK 3:221-22. The translators offer only a five-page excerpt of Descartes’s letter to Voetius.
77. Descartes, AT 8b:43; CSMK 3:222.
78. Descartes, AT 8b:43; CSMK 3:222.
79. Descartes, AT 8b:43; CSMK 3:222. Neque enim, ut scias, verus ille usus rationis, in quo omnis eruditio, omnis bona mens, omnis humana sapientia continetur, in disjundis syllogifmis confiftit, sed tantum in circumspeca & accurata complexione eorum omnium, quae ad quaesitarum veritatum cognitionem requiruntur.
80. Descartes, AT 8b:169-70; CSMK 3:223. Et nova ista criteria non alia assertis, quam quod ea tantum ut vera velim amplecti, quoe tam clara sunt, ut nullam dubitandi relinquant occasionem.
81. Descartes, AT 8b:170, 175; CSMK 3:223. Descartes argues that Voetius compares him to the atheist Cesare Vanini, who was condemned for atheism and burned at Toulouse in 1619.
82. For Descartes on reason, see Harry G. Frankfurt, “Descartes’ Validation of Reason,” American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 149-56; Hiram Caton, “Will and Reason in Descartes’s Theory of Error,” The Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 4 (1975): 87-104; Frederick P. Van de Pitte, “Descartes’ Role in the Faith-Reason Controversy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (1980): 344-53; Louis E. Loeb, “The Priority of Reason in Descartes,” The Philosophical Review 99 (1990): 3-43; John W. Yolton, Philosophy, Religion, and Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1990); Thomas M. Lennon, The Plain Truth: Descartes, Huet, and Skepticism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2008); Russell Shorto, Descartes’ Bones: A Skeletal History of the Conflict Between Faith and Reason (New York: Doubleday, 2008).
83. Caton, “Will and Reason,” 96; Van de Pitte, “Descartes’ Role,” 345.
84. Caton, “Will and Reason,” 96.
85. Descartes, AT 7:148: propter quam rebus fidei assentimur, sit obscura; nam contra haec ratio formalis consistit in lumine [naturale].
86. Ibid.: Nec sane Turcae aliive infideles ex eo peccant, cum non amplectuntur religionem Christianam, quod rebus obscuris, ut obscurae sunt, nolint assentiri, sed vel ex eo quod divinae gratiae interius illos moventi repugnent, vel quod, in aliis peccando, se gratia reddant indignos.
87. Ibid., 8b:353-54.
88. Caton, “Will and Reason,” 99.
89. Descartes, AT 8b:4: Cumque, anno superiore, judicium quoddam nomine Academiae Vltrajectinae, cujus tunc Rector erat, edidisset, in quo meam Philosophiam eo praetextu condemnabat, quod fingeret varias, falfas, & absurdas opiniones ex ea consequi, pugnantes cum orthodoxa Theologia (Descartes’s emphasis). The judgment is from March 17, 1642, and is reproduced in Descartes’s letter to P. Dinet (see ibid., 7:590).
90. Ibid., 8b:5.
91. Ibid., 8b:14: vulgare Theologis; quod ego virtutem maximam & vere Christianam semper putavi.
92. Ibid., 8b:17.
93. Ibid., 8b:17, 32.
94. Ibid., 8b:111. He also confirms that the most important virtue in Christianity is love (charitas) (112). He asks his opponents for love in dealing with this issue (115).
95. Ibid., 8b:33-34.
96. Ibid., 8b:93.
97. Ibid., 8b:132.
98. Descartes’s axiom that “one truth can never be in conflict with another” (una veritas alteri adversary nunquam possit) should be interpreted from this perspective (ibid., 7:581). See also Theo Verbeek, “Tradition and Novelty: Descartes and Some Cartesians,” in The Rise of Modern Philosophy: The Tension Between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz (ed. Tom Sorell; Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 170.
99. Descartes, AT 8b:176.
100. Ibid., 8b:180.
101. Descartes, AT 3:372; CSMK 3:182. On Descartes’s notion of substance, see R. S. Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics (London: Routledge, 1993).
102. Descartes, AT 8b:165, note a.
103. Voetius, SDTh 1:126: . . . omnem scientiae certitudinem explodit, ridet, in dubium trahit . . .
104. Cf. Verbeek, “From ‘Learned Ignorance’ to Scepticism,” 33-34, 43.
105. Voetius, SDTh 3:701.
106. Descartes, AT 8b:14, 19. Descartes argues that the first seven pages of Voetius’s book Philosophia Cartesiana offer only common arguments against the innovators and a praise of Aristotle (14), and that his opponents allow only the reasoning that comes from Aristotelian principles (18-19).