Dei Viā Regiā: The Westminster Divine Anthony Tuckney On The Necessity Of Works For Salvation

By Ryan M. Hurd

[Ryan M. Hurd is an author and editor with a particular interest in systematics. He also translates Latin theological works mainly from the early modern period. He lives in Grand Rapids, MI.]

ABSTRACT

The question of the necessity of good works has deep bearing on soteriology, whether the explanation is held to distinguish from Roman Catholic teaching or the teaching of, for example, Antinomians. In his Praelectiones theologicae, Anthony Tuckney—an important Westminster divine—presents a careful articulation of one way of explaining the necessity of good works that sits well within the Reformed tradition. By this account, Tuckney argues that good works are necessary as the royal way walked to God.

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Anthony Tuckney wrote, “[Good works] have the relation of order, such as a means have to an end, an antecedent to a consequent, a cause sine qua non to its effect, but they are not the cause properly efficient of salvation, either keeping it, as some want, much less effecting it either physically or morally—i.e., acquiring it meritoriously.”[1] Thus Tuckney summarizes his answer as to whether works are necessary for salvation.

It seems appropriate to give away the end at the beginning, for Tuckney’s discussion of the question is tight, complex, and perhaps pedantic. Indeed, Letham has called it a “sophisticated discussion”—accurate, if not understated.[2] Nevertheless, Tuckney’s discussion is a fine, careful treatment of the issue, one which, unfortunately, to this point has received no attention. Further, his larger work in which the question occurs, his Praelectiones theologicae, has likewise received very little treatment, perhaps because it is yet untranslated. The purpose of the present work is to trace and elucidate Tuckney’s argument therein regarding the necessity of good works. As a Westminster Divine heavily involved in drafting the Standards, Tuckney contributes an expanded perspective on the debates of the Assembly and its work. While the Standards themselves will not be considered here, this article should lay the groundwork to expand current Reformed discussion on the necessity of good works, specifically for those wishing to remain confessionally bound by the authors’ intentions in the Standards.

We will begin with a brief overview of Tuckney and his work at Westminster. Then, we will proceed through the status controversiae, distinctiones, and solutiones, and finally conclude.

I. Overview Of Tuckney And His Work At Westminster

Anthony Tuckney (1599–1670) was born in Kirton, Lincolnshire.[3] He trained and then later taught at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, beginning in 1619. He received a Bachelor of Arts in 1617, a Master of Arts in 1620, and a Bachelor of Divinity in 1627. He became vicar of St. Botolph’s Church in Boston, Lincolnshire, in 1633, succeeding John Cotton when he emigrated to the Massachusetts Bay Colony. In 1643 Tuckney was called to labor at the Westminster Assembly, which he served until 1648.

Tuckney’s work at the Assembly has been acknowledged in brief[4] but largely overlooked, especially with regards to the extent he impacted the Standards. On August 30, 1643, he delivered a sermon before Commons. Though he did not often speak at the Assembly itself (only ten times at plenary sessions),[5] the extent of his work is not thus to be disparaged. When the Assembly revised the Thirty-Nine Articles, Tuckney belonged to the first and what some have argued was the most influential committee.[6]

During the subsequent work on the Standards, Tuckney was involved in numerous other committees as well, discussing a variety of topics.[7] He was appointed on December 2, 1644, to the committee for drafting a catechism, and had significant impact.[8] He later chaired the committee for the Larger Catechism, and also replaced Palmer as chairman of the Shorter Catechism in September 1646.[9] Beyond this, his primary activity, which was also the most significant for the Standards themselves, was in “wording and methodizing” the Standards, as part of the committee that did so.[10] Thus, as Van Dixhoorn notes, Tuckney became a “key figure behind the doctrinal texts of the Assembly.”[11]

In fact, according to Cho’s analysis, Tuckney “played a leading role in drafting and reporting the articles that correspond to a total of twelve chapters of the Confession.”[12] He reported on numerous articles: “Free Will,” “Perseverance and Certainty of Salvation,” “Sanctification and Saving Faith,” “Repentance unto Life,” “Good Works,” and “Religious Worship and Sabbath Day.”[13] As Cho points out, these make up the majority of the soteriological sections of the Confession.[14] While, as others have noted, no individual should tower too far above the others in what are undoubtedly “compromise documents,”[15] it nevertheless is clear that Tuckney had significant impact.

He resumed his teaching at Emmanuel in April 1645, though, by request of the Assembly, he continued to labor and be present with the Divines and their work.[16] He was later appointed Regius Professor of Divinity in 1655 and remained in that capacity until 1661, when he withdrew, largely because of the Restoration, which made many Puritans’ lives difficult. He died in London in February 1670.

Tuckney’s works consist mostly of letters, sermons, and a catechism.[17] Additionally, his most doctrinal treatise by far is his Praelectiones theologicae. The work contains a number of questions related mostly to christological and soteriological issues, and also, for our purposes, contains the question on the necessity of good works.

II. Status Controversiae

The question that concerns us here is Question 32 of the Praelectiones, which asks whether good works are necessary for salvation.[18] The context of the question, and the controversy surrounding it, is specifically contra Antinomos & Libertinos—against the Antinomians and Libertines—who argued that good works were not at all necessary for salvation.[19]

While these groups were specifically his object of dispute, Tuckney locates the question also against the Catholics, whose position he denies without equivocation from the outset. In fact, throughout his treatment Tuckney reveals his concern that, while dealing with the Antinomians, the Catholics must also be refuted. It is likely for this reason that his primary sparring partner throughout the work is no named Antinomian, but rather the Cardinal Bellarmine himself, standing in as the embodiment of the sophistica Pontificiorum.

In addition to these groups Tuckney also bears in mind the Lutherans. He notes initially the reality of a debate among them in a prior generation, among the two groups of the Majoristas and Flacianos. Despite the reality of this debate, Tuckney concludes that it was only a λογομαχιαν (or war over words), as in his opinion both groups’ feelings on the issue were unanimous (with the Reformed).

Therefore, Tuckney in his explanation wants to (1) uncover the Catholic “sophistry,” lest in affirming necessity against the Antinomians any would be deceived; (2) remove ambiguity in the question, especially regarding those in the Lutheran camp (and some Reformed) who have lack of clarity on the point; and (3) provide a resolution to the controversy. To this end he moves to a number of distinctions.

III. Distinctiones

His distinctions are among four different categories: good works, salvation, necessity, and the persons with regards to whom the necessity is considered. These distinctions Tuckney will use later in his discussion, but we will survey them briefly here.

First, regarding good works, there are broadly two types: external and internal. The former are things that are “said or done,” deeds and words; the latter are the internal habits of the saints. He describes the latter as consisting in the “operations of the mind, will, and affections” which flow from the internal habits.[20]

Second, regarding salvation, Tuckney distinguishes between salvation more commonly taken as specifically the “height of the heavenly glory,” or the “whole of grace until glory.”[21] The latter one, Tuckney asserts from Matt 1:21, can also include “first justification”—declarative or initial justification—in se.

Third, regarding necessity, Tuckney delineates five major types. He notes that though there are many sorts of necessity, he will only treat those which specifically relate to the current issue:

1. The necessity either of coaction, which “forces someone reluctant to act,” or of obligation, “such as an action possessed without freedom.”[22] The former refers to strict compulsion either against or contrary to the will of another; the latter does not include such violation.
2. The necessity of precept, or of a means.[23] The necessity of precept is “that which God commands for the purpose of achieving some end by any way.”[24] He cites 1 Cor 9:16 as an example, where Paul speaks of a necessity laid upon him to preach the gospel. It is important to note that in the context of that passage, Paul argues that this is a stewardship he does not do of his own will (which therefore would include a reward). The necessity of a means is, as the name denotes, that “without which it is altogether not granted to accomplish that end.”[25] Here Tuckney cites Acts 14:22: “through many tribulations we must enter the kingdom.”
3. An antecedent, consequent, or concomitant necessity.[26] More of these later.
4. The necessity of presence alone, or an efficient necessity.[27] The former is “that by which something is necessary to be present to a thing which we achieve”; the latter actually “communicates necessary efficiency to the acquisition of a thing.”[28]
5. Finally, regarding efficient necessity, there are broadly two ways this could be understood. First, of a “cause sine qua non of a disposition, aptitude of a subject, of a condition, of a means, of something attending, and of a way for the purpose of accomplishing something.”[29] This, Tuckney notes, is broadly (but improperly) called causality, a cause sine qua non. Second, efficient necessity taken “strictly and properly” is truly understood as an efficient cause in se, which “either physically produces or effects something … ex merito puts a thing into existence.”[30]

The fourth and final main category of distinctions is regarding the persons “for whose salvation good works must be judged necessary to exist or not.”[31] Here Tuckney distinguishes between infantes and those who have become adultos. Regarding the former category, it is not clear whether he means specifically newborns properly so called, or figuratively—that is, newborn babes in Christ. This will be handled directly below, although here it should be noted that Tuckney includes with the description of infantes those who “are immediately after regeneration encountering death,”[32] and therefore it would seem initially that he is using the term figuratively. Furthermore, note Tuckney’s contrasting definition of adultos, or, those who are mature. They are those who have “obtained their use of reason and have become mature, who also after the commencement of new life for a while completely enjoy the use of light and have sufficient opportunities for acting well.”[33]

IV. Solutiones

Before Tuckney turns to employing these distinctions, he spends quite some time locating the issue in the context of theological debate, primarily against the Catholics (via Bellarmine). While we do not want to get too occupied with this question, it is nevertheless important to note it in brief.

1. Some Brief Background

Tuckney is aware of those attempting to unite “us, truly of the Reformed, either of Luther or Calvin” to the Antinomians and Libertines in order to overturn the whole.[34] Chief of such culprits he cites as Bellarmine, who argued that the Reformed “suppose that it is possible for man to be saved, even if he does no good works.”[35] Bellarmine and other Catholics argued that the Reformed wanted “to hold that good works have no judgment about salvation,”[36] and that the Reformed and the Antinomians so well known in England at the time were one and the same.

Against this accusation, Tuckney intends to be very clear and extricate the Reformed from such a charge. However, the issue is further complicated when some Reformed are “marveling at the phrase ‘they are necessary for salvation.’ Some of the Lutherans hesitated, and even now are hesitating”[37]—and that despite the fact that “our writers and teachers seriously, zealously, and continuously teach, urge, command, and impress the necessity of things that have been commanded, owed, ordered, and overturn these hypotheses.”[38] Therefore, against the accusations of the Catholics, the errors of the Antinomians, and the confusion of some Lutherans, Tuckney begins to establish in what sense good works are necessary for salvation.

2. The Persons And Works

He begins with the last category of distinctions first: regarding the persons. Here Tuckney clearly asserts that it is only those adultos of which we understand, or “at least those who have obtained use of reason.”[39]

To this though he adds also a secondary qualification for the persons being considered, namely, that they “after the first point of regeneration are living long enough that they may have the time and occasion for working well.”[40] This becomes an important distinction, yielding two separate groups within the category of adultos, or, those who have the use of reason: (1) those who have opportunity for good works, and (2) those who do not. (It is to be noted that Tuckney is a bit hazy about applying this distinction distinctly throughout the section.)

It is with the above distinctions in mind that we turn again to the question introduced earlier, namely, what is meant by infantes and adultos? Does either of these terms carry only a physical or spiritual idea, or perhaps both? It appears that Tuckney has only the physical in view, though there is some ambiguity. For example, the way Tuckney handles this point can be seen in brief in his None But Christ, where he treats the salvation of infants and means specifically those who are physically young. He also includes with this category those who are “deaf and blind from the womb; and so without this possibility of having Christ so revealed to them, as for them by faith to lay hold on him.”[41] The reason why such can be saved is based upon their relationship to the covenant of grace. They are “so wrapt up in it, as also to be wrapt up in the bundle of life.”[42]

However, Tuckney extends this category to also include a different group of people who are physically mature, whereby he indicates that he does not intend strictly to limit the question to physical infants. He writes that God “acteth in the souls of Believers in articulo mortis [at the point of death, e.g., a death-bed conversion], when some of them are as little able to put forth an act of reason, as they were in articulo nativitatis [at the point of birth].”[43] There is a relationship then between the infant category (which has already been noted as including those physically handicapped) and those who are physically adults.

Regarding how such are saved, Tuckney writes, with regards to infants, that they do not have “actual faith, so as to exert it,” yet they may have the infused habit of it.[44] Here the habitus idea is present, which in his Praelectiones Tuckney will turn to in order that he may clarify the question. But here, he includes with the habitus the idea of sanctification—faith working in love, or faith with external works—wherein he turns immediately to deal in this context with what he terms the “pleonasme of love” in 1 Tim 1:14, in which could be a possible objection that it is both faith “and love” as “the way … they might be saved.”[45]

However, as Tuckney describes it, this is not just a “pleonasme of love,” but rather “a hyper-pleonasme of love.”[46] It is a “Pleonasme of a sparkling wit and pen,” but “no solid Divinity.”[47] Thus it is not faith working externally in love that is necessary for salvation in this case, but rather only the internal habit.

From this place it appears that Tuckney works with the category of physical infants, yet has some degree of relationship with those who have death-bed conversions and are thus spiritually immature. Regarding both, the works considered is the infused habit of works.

And this is consistent with, secondly, how Tuckney continues in his Praelectiones. After introducing the distinction of persons, he brings in Bellarmine, Aquinas, and Alphonsus on the question, who (as Catholics!) taught that “infants and also adults recently baptized” are saved even if “immediately they depart from this life.”[48] Granting that they “did not have the time and opportunity for working”—again, an important factor—“his faith without works is sufficient for him, and it is counted unto righteousness.”[49] As Tuckney explains, the reason this is true is because they are “counted to fulfill the whole law, who after justification have not violated it, and who bear charity, which is the fullness of the law, at least habitually in their heart.”[50]

Nevertheless, Tuckney notes that some Reformed theologians are not happy with this explanation, citing Chamier, referencing his De operum necessitate.[51] Therefore, to continue to unravel the issue and propose a satisfactory solution, Tuckney proceeds with his distinctions to solve the issue.

He moves to the distinction regarding good works, either external or internal. He notes that Bellarmine, standing in for Catholics en masse, wants the question to deal primarily with “the infused habit of grace of the saints,” with reference specifically to initial justification.[52]

Having granted this point, Tuckney further elucidates external works, quoting from Rom 10:10 that not only by the heart it is believed for righteousness, but also with the mouth confession is made. He affirms that such are also necessary for salvation, with this qualification: “provided that one is granted time and opportunity for working.”[53]

Here then he weaves back in the “infants and adults without time to work” relationship. With regards to internal good works, he concedes they are likewise necessary. They cannot be “completely absent.” Furthermore, they ought “necessarily to be present in all having the use of reason,” even if they are “immediately after regeneration taken away by death.”[54] Those who are physically mature who come to faith must have internal good works, though “faith without external works is sufficient for him, and it is counted unto righteousness”[55]—because he has the infused habit of grace.

Further with reference to internal good works, with respect to infants, Tuckney notes they are also necessary for them likewise, though this is considered to be only the “root of the thing,” the “seed of God,” or, as Bellarmine terms it, “the infused habit of grace.”[56] How this is to be distinguished from the “full-flower” infused habit of works is not made clear.

To summarize Tuckney’s point, there are two categories of persons of which he is speaking. First, with respect to infants (and presumably those mentally handicapped, i.e., not possessing the ability to reason properly), he affirms that, as the “seed of God” or the “root of the thing,” internal works are necessary for salvation. Second, with regards to adults, or those having the use of reason, there are two main categories: those who have opportunity, and those who do not. If the latter is in view, only the internal good works are necessary; if the former, then to such must be added external works as well. As Tuckney says, “Thus, up till now—namely, in these various ways of understanding—good works are necessary to all for salvation.”[57]

So far, so good, Tuckney affirms. However, as he has previously pointed out, necessity can be spoken of in many ways, and therefore the previously made distinctions regarding necessity should be brought forward for further clarity. And note well, though Tuckney does not say so explicitly, it appears that moving forward he will be dealing with this category throughout the remainder of his distinctions: the necessity of external good works with respect to adult persons having reason.

3. Necessity And Salvation

(I) Necessity Of Compulsion, Or Obligation?

Tuckney first deals with the necessity of coaction or compulsion, which he flatly denies against Bellarmine. Here he refers to that necessity for salvation “we have made complete by the fact of our performing or neglecting.”[58] He opts rather for the necessity of obligation—affirming that we indeed should be willing, but not “therefore free” (here, voluntary not being “opposed to obligation, but to forced and slavelike”[59]). Indeed, the necessity is obligatory with respect to us.

To this he adds the necessity of precept, which is the basis of the necessity of obligation. Regarding the former, this is very clearly taught in Scripture, Tuckney citing Matt 5:16 and Titus 3:8, 14. Regarding the latter, he cites Mal 1:6 and Luke 17:10: “As long as we remain creatures of God, and redeemed by the blood of the Lord Christ,” it is a debt which can never be “settled.”[60]

But can we say anything further? It appears so. Having established that there is both a necessity of precept (which Tuckney uses as a catch-all for necessity of obligation as well—it is together “both obligated and ordered”), Tuckney turns to discuss whether this necessity is (and, if so, how it is) a means to salvation specifically.[61] But before answering the question directly, he pulls in the prior distinctions regarding salvation, which he expands and clarifies.

(II) Initial Salvation, Or Future?

With regards to a necessity of means for salvation, such a salvation should be considered in different ways, of which three are possible: “having been begun, or in progress, or in the end and final completion.”[62] Only the first and last of these concern him here.

The first refers to the initial calling, justification, and adoption.[63] Here, for the sake of argument only against the Catholics, Tuckney takes up the question of necessity with respect to this understanding of salvation. If the necessity should be considered with respect to salvation viewed in this way—specifically, good works considered to be necessary in an antecedent necessity—“we would deny this entirely.” Tuckney cross-references Augustine, and moves forward: “Good works do not precede being justified, but nevertheless they follow justification.”[64]

Nevertheless, they are indeed to be considered with respect to this understanding of salvation as necessary consequently and “also by that in a sense concomitantly.” Tuckney affirms they are in that way necessary, based off the connection between justification and sanctification.[65] He writes: “If sanctification should come (as it ought to be used) into the judgment of this salvation which has been attained, then good works, if by the signification of them they include the internal habit of grace, would concern the formal nature of this salvation, and thus from it could never be separated. If they should denote its operations, they would be likewise inseparably necessary to this divine nature, and have been effected by this particular cause.”[66] Note the idea here is for proving or validating the reality of initial justification.

(III) Necessity With Respect To Future Salvation.

Tuckney, having dispatched with salvation considered in the first sense, now turns to what appears to be his primary object: “We believe [good works] are necessary for acquiring salvation at the future time.”[67] There is both a necessity for the presence of good works, as well as an antecedent necessity for salvation at the last day. Tuckney cites with regards to the former Heb 12:14 and Rev 21:27; and the latter, Matt 5:8.

But here Tuckney introduces an objection: “But there is not also causal and efficient necessity, is there?”[68] By introducing this question with the num particle, he tips his hand—no, there is not. Nevertheless, he handles the objection, noting first that the question is understood in various ways. It could be understood as delineating a necessity as “whatever power, by a tendency or affection, which in some of the thing is present for the purpose of achieving another thing, or even approaching it.”[69] Tuckney notes that some of the Reformed have affirmed this, such as Zanchi: “We do not deny absolutely that good works are the cause of salvation—namely, the instrumental, rather than the efficient, and as a cause which they call sine qua non.”[70]

Even beyond Zanchi (who is admittedly a bit ambiguous here), Tuckney notes that Piscator himself has said there is an efficient causality on the basis of Eph 1:4. Johann Piscator, a contemporary of Tuckney who addressed the question of the necessity of good works, was well known to the Assembly for his work on the active obedience of Christ (which affects this question, and which Piscator handles in the context of Christian obedience), which was part of the debate of the Divines. And, while not specifically citing a place in Piscator, Tuckney most likely means his Analysis logica sex epistolarum Pauli. To provide context for Tuckney’s answer, Piscator needs to be briefly considered.

In his Analysis, Piscator lays out the first fourteen verses of Ephesians as relaying the causes of salvation. Underneath the heading of the efficient cause of salvation, specifically the actions of God the Father, Piscator notes that “he has sanctified us unto a blameless life.”[71] Furthermore, regarding v. 4, he writes: “But [Paul] adds the final cause of election, which concerns partly us, and partly God—namely, that we may live holily. For this pertains both for the purpose of renewing our nature and for glorifying the name of God. But this is our sanctification itself: it is an action of God, by which we among others are led to salvation. And thus it has the idea of some efficient cause.”[72]

It is probably specifically this last phrase that Tuckney is referencing. Piscator will argue extensively from this later. He lays out those whom he has in view further in his work: “Because we have been elected unto this end, that we may be sanctified and blameless before the face of God, therefore they argue wrongly who teach, ‘If I have been elected, I will be saved. Whatever I will have done, or however I will have lived. Therefore, it is permitted to securely indulge in the desires of the flesh.’ On the contrary, if you are elect, God will give to you grace that you may live holily, and that you may reach by the way of holiness (the way, I say, not meritoriously) to eternal life, to which you have been elected.”[73] He is thus careful to note that “because God has elected us unto eternal life in Christ before the foundation of the world, the consequence is that no one by his actions is promised by God that he is elected.”[74]

To answer Piscator’s “idea of some efficient cause,” Tuckney asserts three things to confirm that the answer truly is, no. First, he considers the matter with regards to qualifications required in the persons being saved “and so habits of the subject for achieving salvation.” In that respect, they are necessary. However, these are “qualities of the ones being saved, not properly of salvation”[75]—and therefore cannot be efficient causes for salvation.

Second, considering works as conditions for achieving salvation,[76] Tuckney points out that it is only in the sense as “without which salvation is not gained,” not as “effective conditions, from whose proper efficiency salvation is acquired.”[77] That is to say, conditions here (as in contracts) can be of two types—“antecedent, which grant a cause for the contract, and constitute its foundation and essence; or consequent, which are added to the preceding, which do not constitute the essence of the contract nor change it, although they are nevertheless obligatory to one of the two parties.”[78]

The introduction of covenant terminology here includes the pactum salutis. (While he does not here outline anything further on the pactum salutis, it is here to be remembered that he is dealing with future justification—so this is not surprising.) Tuckney notes that good works do not constitute that covenant with respect to its basis, but rather the conditions here are of the second kind. The first respect would be an efficient cause in se of the contract. The second respect yields an interesting problem. Good works, though their presence does not “constitute the pactum salutis,” nevertheless are those “whose nature and power it is that, although the presence of them does not effect salvation, nevertheless the absence can hinder it.”[79]

Tuckney appears to be equivocating slightly. He never names this cause, but rather provides an illustration—that of temperance and wisdom. Temperance does not create wisdom; however, “its absence impedes” it.[80] He concludes thus: “Because saving faith always and necessarily has been surrounded by holiness and good works, from the absence of those conditions altogether faith is understood to be necessarily absent. Hence, there can be no salvation, but certain perdition.”[81] Clearly, however, whatever this type of cause is, it cannot be considered properly an efficient cause.

Third, the implication is that good works are simply “means attending salvation ... which have no affect at all for salvation.”[82] The means here are thus instrumental. Here, Tuckney returns to remove any calumny regarding Zanchi: “Zanchi wants that instrumental cause not of salvation itself through its efficiency”—(though admittedly, to this author, this idea is a bit abstract).[83] Again though Tuckney turns illustrative, quoting approvingly from Bernard, “They are the way to the kingdom, but not the cause of reigning”;[84] or, again interpreting Zanchi, the “wedding garment for approaching” the marriage of the Lamb, rather than the “accomplishing of the wedding itself.”[85]

“In summary,” Tuckney concludes, “[good works] have the relation of order, such as a means have to an end, an antecedent to a consequent, a cause sine qua non to its effect, but they are not the cause properly efficient of salvation, either keeping it, as some want, much less effecting it either physically or morally—i.e., acquiring it meritoriously.”[86]

V. Conclusion

Tuckney will continue and return to dealing with the Catholics, and then the Lutherans, and then the Antinomians, and others. Having distanced himself from the Antinomians, his main desire in the last section appears to warn about going too far back into the Catholics: “Let us beware, in order that, while we are all thus rising up against the Antinomians, we would not seem to move gradually over to the camp of the Catholics, or at least seem to be favorable to them.”[87] We will not proceed further down this route, but simply summarize what has gone before, where Tuckney has established his nuanced position.

It probably is best first to provide a rough sketch of what has preceded (see Figure 1). We established that Tuckney with respect to infants holds to the necessity only of internal good works. The same also applies for adults who are regenerate and then immediately die—though the difference between the two is the former is a “seed” and the latter the “full-bloom” of internal good works. With regards to adults—namely, those who have reasoning capacities—both internal and external good works are necessary for salvation.

With regards to the type of necessity, we noted that, against the Catholics, there was no necessity of coaction, but was one of obligation or of precept. This, however, can be said of all creatures—devils and angels included—and therefore is not especially helpful in the discussion. Whether there is a necessity as a means to salvation is answered affirmatively, with qualifications. If salvation is considered as initial salvation, then the necessity is not antecedent but consequent or concomitant in the sense that good works prove or validate the reality of salvation. If salvation is considered as future or final, then good works are necessary both by a necessity of their presence, or, existence, as well as being antecedent to the attainment of eternal life. This is not—contra-Piscator—an efficient necessity properly so called, but is truly a cause sine qua non, the absence of which (hypothetical) would prove to undermine the possibility of salvation. In this way it is perhaps most correct to describe such as an instrumental cause. Thus, according to Tuckney, with respect to those who have use of their reason, who have time and opportunity for good works, both internal and external good works are necessary for final salvation with regards to their presence as an antecedent, instrumental cause sine qua non. Or, as we could summarize for him: Are good works necessary for salvation? Yes, but we distinguish.

Figure 1. A chart showing Anthony Tuckney's nuanced position on salvation and works.

Notes

1. Anthony Tuckney, Praelectiones theologicae (Amsterdam: Printed by Stephani Swart for Jonathan Robinson and George Wells, 1679), 233–34.
2. Robert Letham, The Westminster Assembly: Reading Its Theology in Historical Context (Philipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2009), 282.
3. For further biographical information, see Thomas Baker, History of the College of St. John the Evangelist, Cambridge, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1869), 1:229–32; William Barker, Puritan Profiles (Fearn, Ross-Shire: Mentor, 1999), 175–79; Edmund Calamy, The Nonconformist’s Memorial: Being an Account of the Ministers, who were ejected or silenced after the Restoration, particularly by the Act of Uniformity, which took place on Bartholomew-day, Aug. 24, 1662 (London: Printed for W. Harris, 1775), 1:205–8; Patrick Collinson, “Tuckney, Anthony,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 55:504–6; Alexander Gordon, “Tuckney, Anthony,” Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Sidney Lee (London: Macmillan, 1899), 57:286–88; James Reid, Memoirs of the Lives and Writings of Those Eminent Divines, Who Convened in the Famous Assembly at Westminster, in the Seventeenth Century (Paisley: Stephen and Andrew Young, 1811), 1:186–89. For the most comprehensive introduction to his life, see Youngchun Cho, “Union with Christ in the Theology of Anthony Tuckney (1599–1670)” (PhD diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, 2015), 9–52. Cho’s dissertation is the only one to date on Tuckney, and I am indebted to him also for pointing out the sources in this note.
4. See, for instance, Barker, Puritan Profiles, 175–79; John Bower, The Larger Catechism: A Critical Text and Introduction (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2010), 17–18; John H. Leith, Assembly at Westminster: Reformed Theology in the Making (Richmond: John Knox, 1973), 46–47; Letham, Westminster Assembly.
5. Chad Van Dixhoorn, The Minutes and Papers of the Westminster Assembly, 1643–1653, 5 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 2:52, 166, 180, 230, 360, 3:131, 278, 298, 372, 377.
6. Baker, History of the College of St. John the Evangelist, 2:644.
7. See Cho, “Union with Christ,” 36–37, for a summary of these topics.
8. Bower, Larger Catechism, 6.
9. Van Dixhoorn, Minutes and Papers, 4:697.
10. Bower, Larger Catechism, 18.
11. Van Dixhoorn, Minutes and Papers, 3:596–97.
12. Cho, “Union with Christ,” 39. The chapters of the Confession are 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, and 24.
13. See Van Dixhoorn, Minutes and Papers, 4:181, 276, 284, 315, 589, 599.
14. Cho, “Union with Christ,” 2.
15. Letham, Westminster Assembly, 111.
16. Van Dixhoorn, Minutes and Papers, 4:697.
17. They are as follows: “A Briefe & Pithy Catechism as It Was Delivered in Emmanuell Colledge Chapel 1628 per Anthony Tuckney” (MS. 3.1.13 in the Emmanuel College Library Special Collections, Cambridge University); The Balme of Gilead, for the Wounds of England Applyed in a Sermon Preached at Westminster Before the Honourable House of Commons, at the Late Solemne Fast, August 30, 1643 (London: Printed by Richard Bishop for Samuel Gellibrand…, 1643); None but Christ, or a Sermon Upon Acts 4.12. Preached at St. Maries in Cambridge … July 4, 1652. To Which Is Annexed, an Enquiry After What Hope May Be Had of the Salvation of 1. Heathens. 2. Those of the Old World, the Jews and Others Before Christ. 3. Such as Die Infants, and Idiots, &c. Now Under the Gospel. By Anthony Tuckney (London: Printed for John Rothwell and S. Gellibrand, 1654); Thanatoktasia, or, Death Disarmed: And the Grave Swallowed up in Victory. A Sermon … at S. Maries in Cambridge, Decemb. 22. 1653. at the Publick Funerals of Dr. Hill … With a Short Account of His Life and Death. To Which Are Added Two Sermons More Upon the Same Text … By Anthony Tuckney (London: Printed for J. Rothwel and S. Gellibrand, 1654); introduction to A Brief Exposition with Practical Observations upon the Whole Book of Canticles, by John Cotton (London: Printed by T. R. & E. M. for Ralph Smith, 1655); A Good Day Well Improved, or Five Sermons Upon Acts 9.31 Two of Which Were Preached at Pauls, and Ordered to Be Printed. To Which Is Annexed a Sermon on 2 Tim. 1.13. Preached at St. Maries in Cambridge, on the Commencement Sabbath, June 30. 1650. By Anthony Tuckney D. D. and Master of St. Johns College in Cambridge (n.p.: Printed by J. F. for S. Gellibrand, 1656); Forty sermons upon several occasions by the late reverend and learned Anthony Tuckney … sometimes master of Emmanuel and St. John’s Colledge (successively) and Regius professor of divinity in the University of Cambridge, published according to his own copies his son Jonathan Tuckney (London: Printed by J. M. for Jonathan Robinson and Brabazon Aylmer…, 1679); Praelectiones theologicae (1679); and Benjamin Whichcote, Eight Letters of Dr. Anthony Tuckney and Dr. Benjamin Whichcote Concerning the Use of Reason in Religion, the Differences of Opinion Among Christians, the Reconciliation of Sinners with God, the Studies and Learning of a Minister of the Gospel (London: Printed for J. Payne, 1753).
18. “Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem” (Praelectiones, 228).
19. “Contra Antinomos & Libertinos a D. Respondente instituitur hodierna Controversia; contra Antinomos, inquam qui tam Doctrina quam praxi bona opera ad salutem ita minime necessaria esse somniant, ut ei impedimento esse blasphemando asserant” (ibid.).
20. “Bona opera sunt … interna, quae intellectus, voluntatis, affectuum operationibus consant” (ibid.).
21. “Salutis vox saepius & vulgo totius rei … & caelestis gloriae fastigium magis proprie denotat: saepe etiam totam gratiae ad gloriam usque” (ibid.).
22. “Necessitas vel coactionis, quae invitum cogit ad agendum, vel debiti, ut actio pro non arbitraria habeatur” (ibid., 229).
23. “Necessitas praecepti, vel medii” (ibid.).
24. “Necessitas praecepti … est, quod ad finem aliquem consequendum Deus quovis modo jubet” (ibid.).
25. “[Necessitas medii est] sine quo finem illum assequi omnino non datur” (ibid.).
26. “Aliquid alteri necessario annectitur, vel antecedenter, vel consequenter, vel concomitanter” (ibid.).
27. “Necessitas ista potest esse vel solius praesentiae, vel simul etiam efficientiae” (ibid.).
28. “Illa, qua aliquid rei quam assequimur adesse necesse est … haec illius est quod necessariam efficaciam impertit ad ipsam rei acquisitionem” (ibid.).
29. “Est causae sine qua non, dispositionis & habilitatis subjecti, conditionis, medii, administrantis, & viae ad rem assequendam” (ibid.).
30. “Phyisce producit & efficit … ex merito suo rem in esse ponit” (ibid.).
31. “Ad quarum salutem bona opera, necessaria esse vel non esse censenda sunt” (ibid.).
32. “Infantes … & statim post regenerationem mortem oppetentes” (ibid.).
33. “Ii qui rationis usum adepti & adultiores facti sunt, qui etiam post novae vitae exordia aliquandiu lucis usura perfruuntur, & bene operandi idoneas opportunitates habent” (ibid.).
34. “Haec Antinomos & Libertinos … configant licet convitia, Nos, vere Reformatorum vel Lutheri vel Calvini sequacium, nullos feriunt” (ibid., 230).
35. “Calumniatorem ergo, eumque mendacissimum agit Bellarminus, cum haec nobis assingit, quasi omnino existimemus, posse hominem salvari, etiam, si nulla opera bona faciat” (ibid.).
36. “Nos tenere vult bona opera nullam revelationem habere ad salutem” (ibid.).
37. “Ad Phrasin quidem istam necessaria esse ad salutem ambigebant, haesitabant Lutheranorum aliqui, atque etiamnum haesitant” (ibid.).
38. “Hoc Scriptores & Concionatores nostri scrio, sedulo, incessanter docent, urgent, imperant, necessitatem mandati, debiti, ordinis, consequentiae, hypotheseos inculcant” (ibid., 229).
39. “Saltem ratioinis usum adeptis” (ibid., 231).
40. “& qui insuper post primam regenerationem tam diu vivunt, ut bene operandi tempus & occasionem habeant” (ibid.).
41. Tuckney, None But Christ, 133.
42. Ibid., 136. It is important to note that the context of this specific question is: granted that infants of believers may be saved having passed away early in life, does that not then include heathens who have not heard of Christ?
43. Ibid., 135.
44. Ibid., 136.
45. Ibid., 138–39.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 139.
48. “Nam Bellarminus, qui adeo operum necessitatem urget, infantes excipit, atque adultos etiam recens batpizatos, quos salvari concedit, si continuo ex hac vita decedant” (Praelectiones, 231).
49. “Ei vero who non operatur (si modo operandi tempus & oppurtunitatem non habuerit) fides eius sine operibus ei sufficit, & reputatur in justitiam” (ibid.).
50. “Censentur totam legem implere, qui post justificationem eam non violaverunt, & qui charitatem, quae est Legis plenitudo saltem habitualiter in corde gerunt” (ibid.).
51. See Daniel Chamier, Panstratiae Catholicae, sive controversiarum de religione adversus pontificios corpus, 4 vols. (Geneva, 1606), 3.15.1 and 3.
52. “Interna reducendus est infusus gratiae sanctificantis habitus, in quo praecipue ipse Bellarminus justificationem consistere vult” (Praelectiones, 231).
53. “Si modo concedatur operandi tempus & opportunitas” (ibid.).
54. “Non omnino abesse concedimus, imo necessarie adesse debere affirmamus omnibus rationis usum habentibus, licet continuo post Regenerationem morte abreptis” (ibid.).
55. “Fides eius sine operibus ei sufficit, & reputatur in justitiam” (ibid.).
56. “Radicem rei … semen Dei … infusum gratiae habitum” (ibid.).
57. “Adeoque huc usque, hoc vario scilicet intelligendi modo, bona opera omnibus ad salutem necessaria sunt” (ibid.).
58. “Ut pro arbitrio nostro salva salute ea vel facto exequi, vel negligere nobis integrum sit” (ibid., 232).
59. “Vox illa voluntaria non opponitur debitae, sed asperae & servili” (ibid.).
60. “Quod quamdiu Dei Creaturae, Christi etiam Domini Sanguine redempti manemus, nunquam expungi queat” (ibid.).
61. “An vero aeque ac necessitas praecepti & debiti & ordinis, etiam & medii ad salutem asserenda est?” (ibid.).
62. “Initio, vel progressu, vel fine & perfectione ultima” (ibid.).
63. “Salus … incipit a prima vocatione, justificatione, adoptione” (ibid.). Tuckney cites Rom 4:6 and Eph 2:6 as examples.
64. “Bona opera non praecedunt justificandum, sed sequuntur tamen justificatum” (ibid.).
65. “At consequenter (atque eo in sensu concomitanter) saluti in justificatione adeptae necessaria sunt” (ibid.).
66. “Si Sanctificatio (uti debet) in huius adeptae salutis censum veniat, bona opera si internum gratiae habitum significatu suo comprehendant, de ipsa huius salutis formalitate sunt, adeoque ab ea separari nequeunt: si eius operationes denotent, Divinae huic naturae aeque inseparabiliter necessaria sunt, ac effecta causis suis propriis” (ibid.).
67. “Sed ad salutem olim adipiscendam necessaria esse credimus” (ibid.).
68. “Num vero & necessitate causalitatis & efficientia?” (ibid., 233).
69. “Causalitas enim & efficientia large & improprie sumi potest pro qualibet vi, tendentia vel affectione, quae rei alicui inest ad rem aliam consequendam, vel etiam adeundam” (ibid.).
70. “Non simpliciter negamus bona opera esse causam salutis nempe instrumentalem potius quam efficientem, & ut causam, quam vocant, sine qua non” (ibid.).
71. “Sanctificavit nos ad vitam inculpatam” (Johann Piscator, Analysis logica sex epistolarum Pauli [1596], 101).
72. “Addit autem electionis causam finalem, quae partim nos respicit, partim Deum; nempe ut sancte vivamus: hoc enim & ad naturam nostram instaurandum & ad nomen Dei glorificandum pertinet. Haec autem ipsa nostri sanctificatio, actio Dei est, qua nos inter alias ad salutem adducit: ac proinde rationem aliquam causae efficientis habet” (ibid., 88).
73. “Quum electi simus in hunc finem, ut simus sancti & inculpati coram Deo: Ergo male argumentatur qui dicunt: Si sum electus, salvus fiam; quicquid egero, seu quomodocunque vixero: Ergo secure indulgere cupiditatibus carnis licet. Imo, Si es electus, Deus dabit tibi gratiam ut sancte vivas, & via sanctitatis (via, inquam, non merito) ad vitam aeternam, ad quam electus es, pervenias” (ibid., 103).
74. “Quum Deus nos ad vitam aeternam in Christo elegerit ante jacta mundi fundamenta: consequens est, neminem suis operibus a Deo promereri ut eligatur” (ibid., 102).
75. “Ut sunt qualificationes in persona salvanda requisitae adeoque habilitates subjecti ad salutem consequendam…. At hae qualitates sunt salvandorum, non propriae salutis” (Praelectiones, 233).
76. “Conditiones salutis assequendae” (ibid.).
77. “Ut sine quibus salutem non assequimur, licet non sint tales conditiones effectivae, ex quarum efficientia propria salus acquiritur” (ibid.).
78. “Cum enim conditiones in contractibus duplicis sint generis, vel antecedentes, quae causam dant contractui, eiusque fundamentum & essentiam constituunt: vel consequentes, quae adduntur praecedentibus, quae contractus essentiam non constituunt, & mutuae licet sint, alterutram tamen partem obligant” (ibid.).
79. “Quarum haec natura & vis est, ut licet earum praesentia salutem non efficiat, absentia tamen eam impedire queat” (ibid.).
80. “Temperantia non efficit sapientiam, aliter omnis temperans sapiens foret, at eius absentia sapientiam impedit” (ibid.).
81. “Cum vero fides salvifica sanctitate & bonis operibus semper & necessario stipata sit, ex horum tanquam conditionum absentia ipsa fides omnino abesse necessario intelligitur, unde nulla salus esse potest, sed certa perditio” (ibid.).
82. “Ut sunt media salutis administrantia … quae nequaquam nullam omnino ad salutem affectionem habent” (ibid.).
83. “Zanchius ea causas vult instrumentales non ipsius salutis per ea efficiendae” (ibid.).
84. “Sunt via ad Regnum, sed non causa regnandi” (ibid.).
85. “Ut vestis nuptialis conviviam adeundi, non ipsas conficiendi nuptias” (ibid.).
86. “Ut summatim dicam, Relationem habent ordinis, qualem habent media ad finem, antecedens ad consequens, causa sine qua non, ad effectum, at non causae proprie effectivae salutis vel retinendae, ut aliqui volunt, multo minus vel physice efficiendae, vel moraliter, h.e. meritorie acquirendae” (ibid., 233–34).
87. “Caveamus itaque ne dum ita toti in Antinomos insurgamus, in Pontificiorum castra sensim transire, vel saltem iis faventiores esse videamur” (ibid., 234).