Revisiting Calvin’s Cognitio Dei Et Nostri In The Light Of The French Editions Of The Institutes And His Commentary On Psalm 139

By Eric Kayayan

[Eric Kayayan is a research fellow in Historical and Constructive Theology at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa.]

Abstract

In the first sentence of the last French edition of his Institutes (1560), Calvin articulates the cognitio Dei et nostri in the following way: “c’est qu’en cognoissant Dieu, chacun de nous aussi se cognoisse” (“that in knowing God, each of us would also know himself”). The purpose of this article is to examine how Calvin may have been led to this unique formulation: firstly, by looking at the growth and modifications brought into the French text between 1541 and 1560; secondly, by examining Calvin’s exegesis and exposition of Ps 139, a biblical text well suited for dealing with the topic of God and man’s reciprocal knowledge; thirdly, by comparing this reading to the relevant sections of the Institutes. In the last formulation of the axiomatic cognitio Dei et nostri, Calvin has refined his definition of this dual knowledge, avoiding any possible confusion with the traditional philosophical meaning ascribed to it, by incorporating in a concise way the elements of his applied exegesis of the biblical text and his ultimate theological reflection. Knowing God with the necessary corollary that “chacun de nous aussi se cognoisse” leads to “bien sentir et bien faire,” which is fully part of the wisdom considered by Calvin. This dual knowledge resulting in true, sound, and thorough wisdom is to be applied at the same time to a community and to each person forming part of a community. In this final formulation, the twofold cognitio displays concisely the characteristics of a reciprocal, hierarchic, and dynamic relationship between God and mankind.

----------------

One often overlooks the fact that in the last French edition of Calvin’s Institutes (the French text dates from 1560 and was already reprinted in 1561), Calvin articulates the cognitio Dei et nostri in the following way: “c’est qu’en cognoissant Dieu, chacun de nous aussi se cognoisse” (“that in knowing God, each of us would/should also know himself”). Before 1560, all French editions—from 1541 to 1557—translated the Latin cognitio Dei ac nostri literally: “à sçavoir la congnoissance de Dieu, et de nousmesmes.”[1] This formulation also served the purpose of articulating the division of the first two chapters in all these editions, prior to 1559–1560 (ch. 1: De la congnoissance de Dieu; ch. 2: De la congnoissance de l’homme). The McNeill-Battles edition of the Institutes, though, gives adequate acknowledgement of the significance of this variant in an expanded footnote which comments on the text of this English translation of the 1559 text: “The French version of 1560 expresses even more strongly the association of the two aspects of sound knowledge: ‘In knowing God, each of us also knows himself.’ These decisive words set the limits of Calvin’s theology and condition every subsequent theological statement.”[2]

The title of the first chapter of the Institutes in both the 1559 (Latin) and the 1560 (French) versions makes clear that the above-mentioned articulation is central to the purpose of the argument: Comment la cognoissance de Dieu et de nous sont choses conioinctes, et du moyen et liaison.[3] However, only the final French text expresses this articulation directly in the very first sentence of the Institutes. Moreover, the introduction of “chacun de nous” (“each of us”) in the second part of that sentence, adds a personalized accent, both singular and plural (communal) to what the title of this chapter as well as the first part of the sentence (“nostre sagesse”) have only expressed in terms of “nous” and “nostre.” These new aspects in the text call for further examination, which I shall do in the first place by looking at the growth and modifications brought to the French text between 1541 and 1560[4] (inasmuch of course as it leans on the previous Latin editions,[5] but not exclusively, that is, taking into account any possible French variant relevant to this topic); secondly, by examining Calvin’s exegesis and exposition of Ps 139 as an important biblical text dealing with the topic of God and man’s reciprocal knowledge; thirdly, by reverting to the text of the Institutes (including sections of Books 2 and 3) and endeavoring to apply to the passages quoted the insights gained in the previous section; finally, by combining the findings of all three sections in order to elucidate what could have triggered Calvin’s last formulation of the theme in the initial sentence of the Institutes.

I. The Reorganization Of The Material Between 1539–1541 And 1559–1560

To begin with, a comparison between chapter 1 and chapter 15 of Book 1 in the 1560 edition allows us to approach our topic from the perspective of the internal growth and organization of the material of the Institutes, a perspective which yields some significant light on it. The title of chapter 15 needs to be kept in mind: Quel a est esté l’homme en sa création: où il est traité de l’image de Dieu, des facultez de l’ame, du franc-arbitre, et de la première intégrité de sa nature.[6] Here Calvin comes back to the relation between knowledge of God and knowledge of ourselves. It should be noted that the entire following quote is a 1559–1560 addition:[7]

Il faut maintenant parler de la création de l’homme, non seulement pource que c’est le plus noble et le plus excellent chef d’œuvre où la iustice de Dieu, sagesse et bonté apparoit, mais d’autant, comme nous avons dit, que nous ne pouvons cognoistre Dieu clairement et d’un sens arresté, sinon que la cognoissance de nous-mesmes soit coniointe et comme réciproque. Or combien que la cognoissance de nous mesmes soit double, assavoir quels nous avons esté formez en nostre première origine, et puis en quelle condition nous sommes tombez après la cheute d’Adam; et aussi qu’il ne profiteroit guères de savoir ce que nous avons esté, sinon qu’aussi par ceste misérable ruine qui est advenue nous comprenions quelle est notre corruption et déformité de nature. Toutesfois pour le présent contentons nous de voir quelle intégrité nous a esté donnée du commencement.[8]

One thing needs to be noted in this passage, when looking again at the beginning of the initial chapter, as Calvin himself hints he is doing (“comme nous avons dit”[9]). After stressing again that both kinds of knowledge are necessary and joined together (“coniointe et comme réciproque”[10]), he takes up the reversed vantage point which was expressed immediately after the introductory sentence of the first chapter[11]—namely, that through knowing ourselves each of us would also know God. Here Calvin states a twofold knowledge concerning man: man as originally created, and man as fallen creature (“Or combien que la cognoissance de nous mesmes soit double”[12]). Therefore, God can only be known as Creator and Redeemer, inasmuch as man knows himself first as an originally good and perfect creature, then as a fallen creature. Put summarily: anthropology properly understood leads to theology proper. Anthropology proper is not limited to the knowledge of man’s original constitution and perfection, but comprises in equal degree the knowledge of one’s misery.[13]

Again, this is clearly what he has already written in the beginning of the first chapter, but, as previously noted, both parallel thoughts running in chapter 1 and chapter 15 are 1559–1560 additions. This is a notable feature, given that between 1541 and 1557 the text has a different approach to this topic. There is no direct appeal to a duplex cognitio nostri in the first chapter of these editions. In these, after the initial sentence Calvin emphasizes first knowing the one and only God and his eternal virtues as the unique fountain of all blessings, followed immediately after by the fallen nature of man when the cognitio nostri is dealt with:

La seconde en nous monstrant nostre imbecilité, misere, vanité et vilanie, nous ameine à dejection, defiance, et haine de nousmesmes; en aprez enflambe en nous un desir de chercher Dieu d’autant qu’en luy repose tout nostre bien, duquel nous nous trouvons vuides et desnuez.[14]

In the 1541 text Calvin had thus started elaborating on man’s misery after the fall, even prior to asking the question of the precedence of the knowledge of God versus the knowledge of ourselves, or vice versa. In the 1559–1560 editions, this question of precedence is put immediately after the initial sentence. God’s eternal virtues are not even named, something quite noteworthy if one considers the general title given by Calvin to Book 1 in the final French text of the Institutes: Le Premier Livre de l’Institution Chrestienne, qui est de cognoistre Dieu en tiltre et qualité de Créateur et souverain Gouverneur du monde.[15] What comes to the fore is the dual knowledge of ourselves, starting with man necessarily led to seeking God as soon as he starts observing the gifts and dignity he has been endowed with. In this respect the metaphor of the fountain already present in the 1541 text (though not at the beginning of its own initial chapter) is now developed into a succession of metaphors which have liquid elements as vehicles: drops forming rivulets, leading in turn to the original and ultimate fountain. They give consistence to the notion of God being known as the source of all good things.[16] Thereafter comes a much more elaborate section on mankind’s miserable condition after the fall, most of it taken up from the 1541 text; this section is more fully developed than the one presenting man’s gifts and dignity. A knowledge of our misery necessarily leads us to lift up our eyes toward God: not yet the Savior God manifested in Jesus Christ, though, but the God whose perfections cannot but be put in evidence by the painful realization of our own imperfections. In 1559–1560, Calvin will expand this order of presentation, first in chapter 15 of Book 1—as far as man’s original and perfect constitution is concerned—then in chapters 1–4 of Book 2—as far as man’s sinful condition after the fall is concerned. There will be a break and a division in the exposition of the duplex cognitio nostri, both aspects being separated by the two chapters on God’s providence which end Book 1 of the Institutes.

It is not, however, as if Calvin leaves his reader in the dark as to why he considers it necessary to deal first with the dignity of man when he takes on the question of the duplex cognitio nostri. Already in 1541 he has given an explanation to that effect in his second chapter (which deals with the knowledge of man)[17] while the parallel paragraph appears in chapter 15 of Book 1 in his 1560 Institutes. Calvin stresses this necessity because avoiding to speak of the original perfection of mankind while insisting on the second aspect of our self-knowledge, concerning our fallen nature and misery, would inevitably lead most people to blame the Creator for this state of depravation.[18] He does not hint here at the notion of the gnostic demiurge, the lower and debased divinity responsible for the creation of an evil material reality fancied by third- and fourth-century heretics. He simply has in mind a too natural tendency in men to seek excuses for their own sins in the desire that the Creator should eventually be held responsible for them, since he is the author of human life. What is at stake here is the blame-shifting reflex of a conscience feeling guilty but at the same time depraved, and with it any covert attack against God’s holiness. For if this escape door was not thoroughly shut by presenting the upright nature of mankind at the time of creation, God’s perfect justice in Christ (which is the subject of Book 2 in its final form) could never be upheld, being undermined from the start.

We must concede that there is an apparent paradox in the fact that this dual knowledge of ourselves is stressed right at the beginning of Book 1 of the Institutes, which is after all dedicated to the knowledge of God the Creator and Ruler of the world. However, this paradox finds its resolution soon enough, in the second chapter (Que c’est de cognoistre Dieu, et à quelle fin tend cette cognoissance[19]), where Calvin clearly sets the question of our knowledge of God at the beginning of the second paragraph in terms of qualis sit Deus, as opposed to quid sit Deus:[20]

Parquoy ceux qui s’appliquent à décider ceste question, assavoir que c’est que Dieu, ne font que se jouer en spéculations frivoles, veu que plus tost il nous est expédient de savoir quel il est, et ce qui convient à sa nature.… Et de fait, comment Dieu nous peut-il venir en pensée que nous ne pensions quant et quant, veu que nous sommes sa facture, que de droit naturel et de création nous sommes subiets à son empire, que nostre vie luy est deue, que tout ce que nous entreprenons et faisons se doit rapporter à luy?[21]

Clearly, for Calvin it is impossible to envisage for one moment God as Creator without referring our whole life to him, therefore knowing ourselves in terms of his design and purpose for our lives. There is thus no contradiction in dwelling on man’s dual knowledge of himself when seeking to address the question qualis sit Deus.

The crucial factor to stress in Calvin’s articulation of the relationship between the duplex cognitio Dei (God as Creator and Redeemer) and the duplex cognitio nostri, is the immediate reference to God’s special revelation from the very start of the Institutes, via the clear mention of the fall of mankind (Gen 3). Here again a comparison between the 1539–1541 text on the one hand and the 1559–1560 on the other hand yields significant light on the topic. In the first doublet (and until 1557) the mention of our misery at the beginning of chapter 1 is presented in rather general terms:

Car, veu qu’il se trouve un monde de toute misere en l’homme, nous ne nous pouvons pas droictement regarder, que nous ne soions touchez et poinctz de la congnoissance de nostre malheurté, pour incontinent eslever les yeulx à Dieu, et venir pour le moins en quelque cognoissance de luy.[22]

In the last doublet of the Institutes the paragraph has been expanded and clear references to Gen 3 are made. The following quote gives a partial idea of the additions, starting with the sentence preceding the previous quote:

Singulièrement ceste mal-heureuse ruine en laquelle nous sommes trébuschez par la révolte du premier homme nous contraint de lever les yeux en haut.… Car comme on trouve en l’homme un monde de toutes misères, depuis que nous avons esté despouillez des ornemens du ciel, nostre nudité descouvre avec grand honte un si grand tas de toutes opprobres, que nous en sommes tous confus; d’autre costé, il est nécessaire que la conscience nous poigne en particulier de nostre mal-heureté, pour approcher au moins à quelque cognoissance de Dieu.[23]

The second part of the dual knowledge of ourselves is therefore referred to in terms of what Scripture teaches about it: rebellion of the first man and shameful nakedness. As far as the dual knowledge of God (Creator and Redeemer) is concerned, it is for the very first time mentioned in chapter 2 of Book 1 in the 1559–1560 editions and also referred to in terms of what Scripture teaches about it:

Parquoy entant que Dieu est en premier lieu cogneu simplement créateur, tant par ce beau chef d’œuvre du monde qu’en la doctrine générale de l’Escriture, puis après apparoist rédempteur en la face et personne de Iesus Christ, de là s’engendre et sort double cognoissance.[24]

The necessity of compassing our knowledge of God according to what he reveals of himself (an appeal to a knowledge mediated by Scripture) is stated unequivocally in the second paragraph of the same chapter. This passage is already present in the 1541 text, and reads as follows in the 1560 edition:

Car pour le premier, l’âme bien reiglée ne se forge point un Dieu tel quel, mais regarde celuy qui est vray Dieu et unique. Puis après elle n’imagine point de luy ce que bon luy semble, mais elle se contente de l’avoir tel que luy-mesme se manifeste, et se garde soigneusement de ne point sortir par une folle audace et témérité hors de ce qu’il a déclairé pour vaguer çà ne là.[25]

The shift in the French text from “coeur fidele” (1541) to “âme bien reiglée” (“well compassed soul,” 1560)[26] does not change the thrust of the thought, but emphasizes the requirement of a properly disciplined soul, which is to subject itself to an orderly way of considering things and to remain within the very boundaries that ought to define it. These boundaries are set by God’s self revelation, as appears from a second shift in the French text between 1541 and 1560: “de ne sortir point hors de sa volunté” (Latin, in all editions: ultra voluntatem) has given way to “de ne point sortir … hors de ce qu’il a déclairé (“not to go outside of what he has declared”). God’s will cannot be confused with what we might want to think his will for us is, but by what he has expressly declared.

Here are now a few provisional conclusions in order to summarize the first part of our enquiry, which looked at the growth and modifications appearing in the text between 1541 and 1560:

• Calvin has somewhat reorganized his reflection on the governing theme of the Institutes, as presented in the initial sentence of the first chapter. We may say that if in 1539–1541 he already put at the outset the question of man’s self understanding at the core of his understanding of who God is, only in 1559–1560 did he bring explicitly in line the dual knowledge of ourselves, distributing his material in a carefully balanced way both at the very beginning of chapter 1 and in the sections dedicated to man’s self-knowledge (starting with chapter 15 of Book 1 and continuing in chapters 1 to 4 of Book 2). If it is therefore possible for Calvin to separate the two sides of our self-knowledge for the practical sake of an adequate presentation, it is clearly illusory to try to divorce or separate the knowledge of God from the knowledge of ourselves. If our conclusion is warranted, it invalidates any study on Calvin’s knowledge of God which does not take adequately into consideration the knowledge of ourselves, for such is not Calvin’s clearly expressed purpose at the outset of his Institutes. What we find expressed and developed is an overarching theme consisting of a dual knowledge (God and ourselves), in a complex relationship of mutual dependence. This overarching theme is immediately subdivided into two sets of dual knowledge: first the knowledge of ourselves as initially perfect creatures, then, after the fall of Adam, a self-knowledge as miserable creatures (1.1.1).
• This dual knowledge of ourselves leads automatically and immediately to a dual knowledge of God, first as Creator, then as Redeemer (1.1.2). For Calvin, God reveals himself as Creator only as Creator of the universe and of man, and as Redeemer only as Redeemer of sinful mankind. It is therefore in the immediate and inescapable awareness of our dual condition that we are led as by rivulets to the spring itself.[27]
• The sixteenth-century humanist is also speaking here: a reflection on the nature of mankind (originating in the famous oracle of Delphi: gnôthi seauton, “know thyself”) in line with Platonism and the dominating neo-Platonism of Calvin’s own time—especially in the France of the last Valois kings—is subjacent to his thinking. However, this reflection takes quite a different avenue than the main stream of the Renaissance, which glorifies man’s qualities and dignity, almost attributing to him the status of a semi god. Who is man really? Calvin wants his reader to hear very soon that man starts knowing himself inasmuch as he is aware of what he has lost: “nous contraint de lever les yeux en haut non seulement pour désirer de là les biens qui nous défaillent, comme povres gens, vuides et affamez” (1560).[28] Regardless of whether we address our thoughts to the right source or fountain of all good, we cannot but lament the loss of our perfect primeval state and seek God. At the outset Calvin is preparing the ground for chapter 3 of his first Book (Que la cognoissance de Dieu est naturellement enracinée en l’esprit des hommes).[29]
• It is clear from the last passages quoted above that no natural theology can be ascribed to Calvin in his method of exposition of both duplices cognitiones (God as Creator and Redeemer; ourselves as creatures and sinners), although it is equally clear that this statement is more applicable to the 1559–1560 doublet than to the 1539–1541 one, followed by all subsequent editions of the Institutes until 1557. There has been a definite clarification in the 1559–1560 editions in this respect: knowledge provided by Scripture, even if presented very cursorily in the initial pages of the Institutes, stands at the root of the argument. Ultimately, Book 1, which concerns knowing God in his title and quality as Creator and sovereign ruler of the world, can bear this very title precisely because the knowledge referred to is mediated by the God-given revelation about himself and about mankind.

II. Calvin’s Exposition Of Psalm 139

The question of the dual knowledge (God and man) is the focus of Calvin’s exposition of Ps 139 in his commentary on the Psalms30 published in 1558, thus one year before the 1559 Latin Institutes.

The summary of the psalm given before the detailed commentary pertains to the register of edification: in it Calvin states that the main purpose of the psalmist is to avoid any kind of hypocrisy, since God, who knows all our hidden thoughts, is also the one who formed us when we were hidden from the sight of fellow humans:

David afin de purger son cœur de toute hypocrisie, en desmelant toutes les vaines excuses esquelles la plus grand’part du monde s’entortillant s’abuse, déduit par plusieurs propos, qu’il n’y a rien si caché où les yeux de Dieu ne pénètrent. Ce qu’il conferme par la création de l’homme.[31]

At the very beginning of his exposition, Calvin paraphrases abundantly the psalmist, bringing thus a personal tone (ascribed to David) in order to prepare his readers to appropriate David’s experience to themselves:[32]

… d’autant qu’il sçait certainement que rien n’est caché à Dieu, il descouvre franchement toutes ses affections, et se soumet à l’examen de Dieu. C’est à toy, dit-il, ô Seigneur de veoir à clair tout ce qui est caché en moy, et rien ne te demeurera incognu. Il adjouste aussi les circonstances, par les quelles il monstre qu’il n’ya partie de sa vie où Dieu ne voye clair. Soit que je me repose, dit-il, ou que je chemine, ou que je me lève, tu cognois tous mes mouvemens.[33]

The register of edification grows rapidly in intensity when the exegesis of the Hebrew word merachoc at the end of v. 2 leads Calvin to an apologetic remark against Epicureanism in order to apply it to us:

Mais l’autre sens que j’ay suyvy me semble plus propre, asçavoir qu’il ne faut pas imaginer que Dieu soit enclos au ciel, et qu’il demeure là oisif (comme songent les Épicuriens) sans se mesler de la conduite des choses de ce monde: mais quoy que nous soyons bien loing en ce pèlerinage terrien, qu’il n’est pas toutesfois fort loing de nous.[34]

It becomes evident in the course of Calvin’s exposition of this psalm, that the cognitio nostri proper is nothing else than the knowledge that God has of each of his creatures, whereby they all stand before his judicial throne and cannot escape his scrutiny or judgment. This exposition presents a self-knowledge of man grounded in David’s awareness of God first as Judge of his innermost thoughts, then as Creator.

To express it semantically (if not strictly grammatically), nostri must be understood first as an objective genitive (God knows us, we are the objects of his knowledge), then as a subjective genitive (we know him and ourselves), thus giving consistence to the conjunction of the two knowledges in this specific sequence.[35]

To start with, God’s knowledge of man is infinitely superior to man’s self-knowledge. This is stressed in the following excerpt and constitutes a decisive vantage point on the question of true knowledge, in sharp contrast with the commonly assumed viewpoint:

Car pource que quand on parle de Dieu, incontinent plusieurs en jugent par eux-mesmes, il a esté bien besoin de réprimer une telle témérité. C’est la coutume du plus commun des hommes, qu’ils n’attribuent point plus grande connaissance à Dieu, qu’eux-mesmes en ont. Au contraire David confesse que la science de Dieu luy est incompréhensible: qui est comme s’il disoit, qu’il ne peut trouver termes propres et suffisans pour bien exprimer ce de quoy il traitte, asçavoir que rien n’est caché à Dieu, pource que sa science est sans mesure et sans fin: et que pourtant tout ce qui luy reste, c’est d’adorer en toute révérence ceste si grande hautesse, en recognoissant et confessant son imbécillité.[36]

One of the proofs of this superiority lies in the fact that God does not need to hear our words to know our thoughts. On v. 4 (“Car il n’y a point de parole en ma bouche: voicy, Seigneur, tu cognois tout”), Calvin comments:

Le sommaire du propos est, Combien qu’entre nous la langue soit nommée un pourtrait ou représentation des pensées du cœur, pource que par le moyen de la parole chacun communique avec ses prochains, Dieu toutesfois pour savoir ce qui est en l’homme, n’a point besoin de la parole, veu qu’il cognoist les cœurs.[37]

Another proof is to be found in the fact that God’s speed of action and domination far surpasses man’s speed, should it even exceed the speed of light, embodied in the rays of the sun. Calvin comments as follows on the metaphors of vv. 9 and 10 (“Je prendrai les ailes de l’aube du jour, pour habiter és dernières parties de la mer, Là aussi ta main me conduira, et ta dextre m’empoignera”):

En ce mot Les ailes de l’aube du jour il y a une belle métaphore ou similitude. Car quand le soleil se lève le matin sur la terre, il semble qu’il face comme un vol de grande vitesse, d’autant qu’il espand incontinent sa clairté de tous costez du monde. Et la mesme métaphore se trouve aussi en Malachie III, v. 2. En somme il veut dire, Qu’encores qu’un homme surmontast en vitesse la soudaineté de l’estendue des rayons du soleil, il ne sçauroit toutesfois trouver lieu pour se cacher, que tousjours il ne se trouve sous la domination de Dieu. Car la main signifie yci Puissance: comme s’il eust dit que toutes fois et quantes que les hommes tascheront de se soustraire de la présence de Dieu, il sera en sa puissance de les faire retourner, et les arrester comme fuyars.[38]

Once the infinite superiority of God’s active knowledge of ourselves has been posited, Calvin, following the thread of the psalm, moves to our knowledge of God as Judge of all man’s thoughts, which has already been hinted at, inasmuch as those who attempt to escape God’s presence have been qualified as “fuyars” (“runaways”), guilty of some other offense. Calvin speaks of cognitio nostri not in the sense which most contemporary humanists would (a sense inherited from the ancient Greek philosophy claim of the gnôthi seauton) but in the juridical sense whereby the accused is forced to acknowledge his guilt despite all his attempts at escaping, for he has been uncovered and shown his guilt by his Creator and Judge.

Vray est que nous sommes tous contraints de confesser que Dieu cognoist toutes choses: mais comme ainsi soit que c’est une maxime laquelle tous accordent sans contredit, puis après toutesfois chacun en son privé n’en tient pas conte: veu que nous nous jouons à Dieu si hardiment, et qu’il n’y a aucune révérence de sa majesté qui nous retiene, à ce que nous facions pour le moins autant envers luy qu’envers un homme mortel. Car nous aurons bien quelque honte qui nous retiendra de faire quelque acte meschant ou vilein en la présence des hommes ou à leur sceu: mais du jugement de Dieu nous ne nous en soucions non plus que s’il y avoit quelque voile entre luy et nous, qui couvrist nos forfaits, afin que sa majesté ne les apperceust.[39]

Quite unsurprisingly, Calvin quotes Ps 139:7 (“Where shall I go from your Spirit? Or where shall I flee from your presence?”) in his exposition of Gen 3:8 in order to demonstrate the uselessness of pretending to escape from God’s knowledge of one’s sins. There he defines an archetype of human behavior rooted in the original sin and applicable to each and every human being throughout the history of mankind.40 Conversely, as we have already noted, the mention of mankind’s nakedness before God—thus referring back to Gen 3—is an addition to the 1559–1560 text of chapter 1 of the Institutes. This addition emphasizes a self-knowledge which is aware of mankind’s fallen condition with regard to its original status.

The urgency of becoming aware that it is utterly vain and useless to escape the deep searching look of the all-knowing God leads Calvin to the following conclusion of the section he has dealt with (vv. 7–12):

Il ne reste plus sinon que quand nous sentirons qu’une telle nonchalance et asseurance charnelle nous vient surprendre, chacun de nous en son endroict prene ses aiguillons qui nous sont proposez pour se poindre et resveiller.[41]

It is worth noting the phrase “chacun de nous en son endroict,” which will be paralleled by “chacun de nous aussi” in the initial sentence of the final French text of the Institutes. The pastoral approach is evident: all, without exception, are confronted by the temptation of forgetting, or willingly ignoring, who God is with respect to his knowledge of our heart, Calvin including himself in the lot.

In the section following immediately, God the Judge of the inner thoughts is followed by God the Creator. For Calvin these two divine prerogatives are linked together by the fact that the Creator has established his judicial seat in man’s (here David’s) loins, or innermost parts (“leurs reins et leurs cœurs”). This interpretation seems to flow from the choice of the verb “posséder” to translate the Hebrew qanita (from the Qal root qanah) in v. 13: “Car tu as possédé mes reins, tu m’as couvert au ventre de ma mère.” Here, “posséder” is much more than merely “to form, to shape.” It denotes a creative action that takes possession of the created—living—reality in its very act of creating it:[42]

Combien qu’il semble qu’il continue la mesme doctrine, il passe toutesfois un peu plus avant, asçavoir qu’il ne se faut pas esbahir si Dieu espluche et examine ainsi toutes les plus secrettes pensées des hommes, veu que c’est luy qui a fait leurs reins et leurs cœurs. Il dit doncques qu’és reins des hommes Dieu a comme son siège judicial dressé, auquel estant assis il exerce sa jurisdiction: et que ce n’est pas merveille si les cachettes de nos cœurs secrettes et entortillées ne le peuvent tromper, veu que lors mesmes que nous estions enclos dans le ventre de nostre mère, il nous contemploit aussi à clair, comme si nous eussions esté à descouvert en pleine lumière.[43]

The anatomy of our thoughts (not “man’s thoughts,” but “our thoughts”) is perfectly known by the same Creator who shaped the anatomy of our body from the very beginning of our life of which he remains the sole owner.44 Understanding this relation, and being shown by the Psalms “all the windings and recesses of our hearts” is precisely what Calvin has expressed in the preface to his commentary on the book of Psalms, when he calls it an anatomy of all parts of the soul: “J’ay accoustumé de nommer ce livre une anatomie de toutes les parties de l’âme, pource qu’il n’y a affection en l’homme laquelle ne soit icy représentée comme en un miroir.”[45]

The necessary awakening to God’s knowledge of ourselves, and its all encompassing implications, is summarized under v. 15 which makes the junction with our own—correct—knowledge of God the Creator (“Je te célébreray, pource que terriblement j’ay esté mirifié [variant: ou fait de merveilleuse manière]: tes œuvres sont merveilleuses, et mon âme les cognoistra trèsbien”):

Ainsi doncques il ne parle point yci d’une cognoissance qui soumette à nos sens ce que mesmes par ce mot de Miracle il a confessé estre incompréhensible: (comme nous sçavons que les Philosophes sont tellement enflez d’arrogance, qu’ils ne veulent point que Dieu ait rien qui leur soit caché) mais Cognoissance signifie une estude attentive et saincte diligence, par laquelle nous soyons resveillez à rendre gloire à Dieu.[46]

We find again the necessity of an awakening mentioned earlier (“pour se poindre et resveiller”) though this time with a well defined goal: “rendre gloire à Dieu” (“to glorify God”). The proposed knowledge of man confesses first its limits, then acknowledges that there is a superior knowledge—that of God—which is worth meditating upon in its unfathomable depth and unattainable height. Such a meditation is not a purely intellectual exercise, though; it leads one to live a life of adoration and glorification of the Creator-Judge. In this respect one must note the rejection by Calvin of the wisdom of “Philosophers,” pretending to scrutinize God’s omniscience and bring it to their own level of knowledge, as he has already stressed earlier in his commentary.[47] The false wisdom of the Philosophers is thus equated by him to the custom of the common people: there is actually no substantial difference between the two, only a difference of degree in the expression.

III. Articulating Calvin’s Exposition Of Psalm 139 With The Notion Of Knowledge In The “Institutes”

With this contrast we are brought back to the initial sentence of the Institutes, where the knowledge which Calvin intends to expose to his reader will have eventually little to do with the wisdom of the Philosophers: “toute la somme presque de nostre sagesse, laquelle, à tout conter, mérite d’estre réputée vraye et entière sagesse.”[48] After pondering upon it (“à tout conter [compter]”) the dual knowledge deserves to be qualified “vraye et entière sagesse” in sharp contrast with any false knowledge and any pretense of wisdom. There is a definite apologetic tone in this interpolated clause, programmatic of a constant antithetic dialogue with any wisdom deemed by Calvin to be false or partial.[49] On the other hand, the wisdom he has been pondering over can be qualified as “true and entire wisdom” not just because of its contents, but—inescapably and intimately linked to these contents—on account of the dynamic impetus which such reliable knowledge will bring in the direction of our lives.

This is, of course, the argument put up by Calvin at the opening of the second chapter of his 1541 Institutes, which becomes chapter 1 of Book 2 in the final doublet of 1559–1560. Book 2 begins by expanding on the second part of the knowledge of ourselves, in so far as it deals with the fall and revolt of Adam.[50] In the 1541 text, the contrast between the false knowledge and the true knowledge is clearly set in evidence with a close antithesis between “et ne lui font rien contempler sinon dont il se puisse eslever en vaine confiance, et s’enfler d’orgueil”[51] on the one hand, and “Laquelle reigle il nous convient suyvre, si nous voulons parvenir au but de bien sentir et bien faire” on the other hand.[52] It is not as if Calvin despises human nature so as to contend that a knowledge of ourselves is unnecessary and would obscure the only worthy ideal of knowledge, that is, that of God (in a kind of mystical asceticism whereby man should strive to forget about himself in order to merge his whole being into the divine.)[53] It is quite the contrary actually. Calvin has started by quoting the famous Delphic adage by giving it credence, going so far as to qualify the lack of knowledge of ourselves as “beaucoup plus deshoneste”[54] than merely ignoring things pertaining to this life. His anthropology rests on a solid affirmation of man’s status as a creature of God constantly living vis-à-vis his Maker. The actual contrast lies between two diametrically opposed goals and ideals to be achieved, those of the Philosophers resting, according to Calvin, on a totally wrong appreciation of man’s condition because they do not reckon with the fall.[55] However, that there is for Calvin a goal to achieve within the dynamic impetus of a proper knowledge of ourselves is evident, from the very words noted above: “si nous voulons parvenir au but de bien sentir et bien faire.”

We can speak here of a metanoia as the fruit of a kind of spiritual awakening, which turns around the downward-upward movement of knowledge (from man to God) into an upward-downward one (from God to man). For Calvin the very first thing fallen man does when exercising his cognitive faculties, is to look at himself, in a kind of introspection that inevitably brings him to reflect on God. The first movement of fallen man is thus not to look upwards, towards his Creator (implicitly: which Adam would have done before the Fall),[56] but downwards. The consequence of this gaze is that he either foolishly magnifies his status—via the remnant of the gifts he was endowed with in the beginning—or becomes utterly and hopelessly downcast while considering his misery. This downward-upward movement is a given which Calvin acknowledges within the reality of man’s sinful condition. He describes it in a realistic way in the first chapter of Book 1.[57] His purpose, however, is to bring man to a proper self-knowledge by turning his eyes towards the self-revealed God who illuminates this dual knowledge of man. Therefore the proper order is to learn from God’s own revelation who he is: first Creator, second Redeemer.[58] The end of the first chapter of Book 1, stating this proper order (Latin: ordo recto docendi), is not a mere matter of convenience, but of substance:

Toutesfois combien qu’il y ait une liaison mutuelle entre la cognoissance de Dieu et de nous-mesmes, et que l’une se rapporte à l’autre, si est-ce que l’ordre de bien enseigner requiert qu’en premier lieu nous traitions que c’est de cognoistre Dieu, pour venir au second poinct.[59]

After learning to know God as his Creator, man can only know God the Redeemer in the Incarnation and the mediating work of Christ, thereby being led to consider properly his dual condition (lost and redeemed) and knowing himself according to the full picture of his status. There is therefore a clear order in approaching the qualis sit Deus question.[60]

Psalm 139 appears to express for Calvin this kind of redeemed self-knowledge taking its source in God: a self-knowledge mediated by the knowledge of God as Creator-Judge whom David is enabled to trust fully, speaking to him in a most intimate manner precisely because he knows that God knew him intimately even before his limbs were formed. In Calvinian terms, as a lesson of anatomy of all parts of the soul given by the divine anatomist and teacher, Ps 139 mediates an adequate knowledge of both God and man by presenting first and foremost the knowledge that God has of man. Commenting on v. 23 of this psalm (“O Dieu sonde-moy et cognoy mon coeur”) Calvin stresses the ensuing self-assurance which the faithful (“les fidèles”) may gain from this mediated knowledge when subjecting themselves willingly to the judicial seat of their Creator and Judge, as David is doing:

Vray est qu’il faloit bien qu’il fust doué et armé d’une singulière asseurance, quand si hardiment il se présente à l’examen du jugement de Dieu: mais d’autant que sa conscience luy rendoit bon tesmoignage qu’il avoit une vraye piété, ce n’a point esté par témérité qu’il s’est présenté si asseurément devant le siège judicial de Dieu. Toutesfois ce n’est pas qu’il ait voulu dire qu’il fust du tout sans péché, veu qu’il gémissoit sous le pesant fardeau de ses vices.[61]

In the following sentence, the forgiveness of sins is stated by Calvin as the key to this assurance, pointing towards God the Redeemer, whom he does not consider to be less present in the Old than in the New Testament:

Et de faict, il est certain que les fidèles, toutes fois et quantes qu’ils font mention de leur intégrité, s’appuyent et fondent sur le pardon gratuit de leurs péchez: mais d’autant qu’ils sont bien asseurez qu’encores que par infirmité ils choppent et tombent, Dieu toutesfois approuve et accepte leur piété, ce n’est pas merveille si ainsi hardiment ils se séparent du rang des meschans.[62]

The assurance in question pertains to the realm of faith, which Calvin describes as “Cognoissance” (“Knowledge”) in the chapter on faith in the Institutes (3.2.14, a passage already present in 1541):

Quand nous l’appelons Cognoissance, nous n’entendons pas une appréhension telle qu’ont les hommes des choses qui sont submises à leur sens; car elle surmonte tellement tout sens humain, qu’il faut que l’esprit monte par-dessus soy pour atteindre à icelle. Et mesme y estant parvenu, il ne comprend pas ce qu’il entend; mais ayant pour certain et tout persuadé ce qu’il ne peut comprendre, il entend plus par la certitude de ceste persuasion que s’il comprenoit quelque chose humaine selon sa capacité.[63]

Calvin’s definition of faith as knowledge here seems to present the kind of redeemed knowledge taking its source in God which is expressed in his commentary on Ps 139: as such, it cannot originate in the heart of man.[64]

IV. A Wise Knowledge Expressing A Living Relationship

Despite all these remarks, one may object that the historical question posed at the beginning of this article has not received an adequate answer: why is it that the 1560 formulation of the second part of the initial sentence of the Institutes does not already appear in the 1559, Latin text? After all, one could argue, even agreeing that Calvin’s exposition of Ps 139 is relevant to the topic, if it appeared in a commentary published a year earlier, in 1558, he could have integrated his findings or insights a year later, when they were perhaps even fresher. We can only conjecture that a further maturation process in his thought took place between 1559 and 1560: should there have been a subsequent edition of the Latin Institutes (as a work in progress that did not stop growing during twenty-five years and offered some variations even in what was supposed to be mere reprints) we may suppose that it would have integrated this formulation. In both prefaces of the 1559 and the 1560 editions, Calvin tells his readers that he was never satisfied until he organized his material as they now can see.[65] However, we have seen in the course of this article that if the distribution of the material is indeed the same, there are at times shifts in accent and formulation between the two which testify to slightly different angles of approach, or even, as is the case with our main theme, to a definite clarification. We tend to see the French versions of the Institutes as mere copies of the Latin ones. If indeed they followed the growth of the Latin editions throughout, one should not forget that the 1551 translation in French of the 1550 Latin one comprised some new material (on the resurrection of the body) which only appeared in the final Latin (1559) edition of the Institutes.[66]

In conclusion, we see how in the last formulation of the axiomatic cognitio Dei et nostri in the Institutes, Calvin has refined his definition of this dual knowledge, avoiding any possible confusion with the traditional philosophical meaning ascribed to it, by incorporating in a concise way the elements of his applied exegesis of the biblical text and his ultimate theological reflection. Knowing God with the necessary corollary that “chacun de nous aussi se cognoisse” leads to “bien sentir et bien faire,” which is fully part of the wisdom considered by Calvin. This dual knowledge resulting in true, sound, and thorough wisdom is to be applied at the same time to a community (“nous,” “nostre”) and to each person forming part of this community (“chacun de nous”).[67] In this final formulation, the duplex cognitio displays in a nutshell the characteristics of a reciprocal, hierarchic, and dynamic relationship between God and mankind, which can be summarized in two words: covenantal relationship.

Notes

1. 1557: “assavoir la cognoissance de Dieu et de nous-mesmes.” Latin, 1536: “cognitione Dei ac nostri” (in Joannis Calvini opera selecta, ed. P. Barth and G. Niesel, 5 vols. [Munich: Kaiser, 1926–1936], 1:37, hereafter OS); 1559: “Dei cognitione et nostri” (in Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss, 59 vols., Corpus Reformatorum 29–87 [Brunswick: Schwetschke, 1863–1900], 2:31, hereafter CO); OS 3:31.8 (Inst. 1.1.1).
2. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols., LCC 20–21 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), 36n3. My own attempt at translating it “should/would also know himself” endeavors to give a better rendition of the French subjunctive “se cognoisse” with the dynamic purpose, or intent, of this self-knowledge derived from the knowledge of God. McNeill-Battles’s appropriate acknowledgement is echoed in the translation of the Institutes into Afrikaans by H. W. Simpson, Institusie van die Christelike Godsdiens (Potchefstroom: Calvyn Jubileum Boekefonds, 1984), 113n4. Describing the cognitio Dei ac nostri as the “leitmotiv of the Institutes,” Neuser, while resuming the old debate about the central theme or motive of the Institutes, writes the following: “Es wird zu zeigen sein, dass das Leitmotiv, cognitio Dei et nostri, diese Lücke füllt. Das Leitmotiv gibt nämlich Auskunft über die Struktur seines theologischen Denkens und über seine Darstellungsmethode. Es sei darauf hingewiesen, dass diese Prolegomena allen Ausgaben des Institutio vorangstellt werden. Dies spricht für ihr theologisches Gewicht” (W. H. Neuser, Johann Calvin Leben und Werk in seiner Frühzeit, 1509–1541, vol. 6 of Reformed Historical Theology, ed. H. J. Selderhuis et al. [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009], 203). Millet, in his critical edition of the 1541 text of the Institutes, establishes the filiation of this topic, starting from Luther’s De Servo Arbitrio: “Par ailleurs la formule ‘science des choses divines et humaines’ appartient à une large tradition philosophique, morale et religieuse héritée de l’antiquité classique (voir par exemple Cicéron, De Officiis, II, ii, 5; Sénèque, Ep. 89, 5; Quintilien, Institution oratoire, XII, 2, 1, et pour la tradition juridique, Ulpien cité par le Digeste, I, 1, 10, etc.) renouvelée sur ce point par Budé” (Olivier Millet, ed., Institution de la religion chrétienne (1541), 2 vols., Textes Littéraires Français 598 [Geneva: Droz, 2008], 1:187–88).
3. Dei notitiam et nostri res esse coniunctas, et quomodo inter se cohaerant (CO 2:31; OS 3:31.4–5). “How the knowledge of God and of ourselves are joined together, and by which means and relation” (my translation). Barth, probably influenced by H. Bauke’s statement about Calvin’s thought as a complexio oppositorum (Die Probleme der Theologie Calvins [Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1922], 14–16) noted that same year: “We must begin with the famous opening sentence, which remained the same in every edition: Nearly all wisdom (doctrina) consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and ourselves.… We can and even must say that Calvin discusses this twofold theme throughout, that he is always speaking about God and us. Here is the synthesis in which more or less clearly all the theses and antitheses of his theology unfold in their dialectic of opposition and relationship, and to which, when rightly understood, they all seek to point” (Karl Barth, The Theology of John Calvin, trans. G. W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995], 162). Barth’s presentation of Calvin’s theme as an initial synthesis unfolding in a series of theses and antitheses and his ascribing to Calvin “a profound need for synthesis and an ardent desire for it” only betray his own philosophical presuppositions, expressed earlier (p. 159): “Synthesis is something original and creative. It precedes all detailed discussion. It is not itself discussion but the subject in every discussion. It is an ability and desire to see antitheses together, no matter whether we are thinking of spirit and nature, the inward and outward, eternity and time, faith and ethos, revelation and history, intuitive and discursive thinking, or whatever.” For a comparative view on God’s knowledge by Calvin and Barth, see Cornelis van der Kooi, As in a Mirror: John Calvin and Karl Barth on Knowing God, a Diptych, trans. D. Mader (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
4. As far as the sections dealt with in this article are concerned, the French text of 1545 differs very slightly from the 1541 one, being actually a translation of the expanded Latin edition of 1543: differences concern mainly the phrasing of some sentences. The numbering of paragraphs does not appear prior to the Latin 1550 edition of the Institutes, and the subsequent French translation of 1551, followed by its 1553, 1554, and 1557 reprints. For an overview of the growth of both the Latin and the French versions of the Institutes, see François Wendel, Calvin: Sources et évolution de sa pensée religieuse (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), 79–109; J. D. Benoît, “The History and Development of the Institutio: How Calvin Worked,” in John Calvin, ed. G. E. Duffield (Appleford: Sutton Courtenay, 1966), 102–17; Wilhelm Neuser, “The Development of the Institutes, 1536 to 1559,” in John Calvin’s Institutes: His Opus Magnum, Proceedings of the Second South African Congress for Calvin Research, Institute for Reformational Studies 28 (Potchefstroom: Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 1986), 33–54; Wulfert de Greef, The Writings of John Calvin: An Introductory Guide, trans. Lyle D. Bierma (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993), 195–202, esp. 200–201. Benoît, editor of the masterly prepared edition by the C.N.R.S. of Calvin’s text of 1560—which details all the different layers of the text since 1536, with the variants between the Latin and the French and a fifth volume entirely dedicated to various indexes, glossaries, and a comparative table of the layout of all the French versions of the Institutes—presents an apt summary of the extent and significance of the French variants; see Jean-Daniel Benoît, Jean Calvin: Institution de la religion chrétienne, 5 vols., published in conjunction with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957–1963). Neuser, “Development of the Institutes,” 49, also writes, “In his translation Calvin stays close to the model but does not give a slavish rendering—which is a modern phenomenon—and also makes use of French phrases and idioms, which are lacking in the Latin text. This peculiarity of his translation still requires thorough evaluation.” This is what the present article has in view with respect to the initial sentence of the Institutes in its final French version. Leaning on J. W. Marmelstein, Étude comparative des textes latins et français de l’Institution de la religion chrestienne par Jean Calvin (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1923), Wendel dispels the objections of the Strasbourg editors of the Calvini opera, followed by G. Lanson and J. Demeure, concerning the authenticity of the 1560 French text: “C’est le mérite notamment de J. W. Marmelstein d’avoir administré la preuve que ce texte est parfaitement authentique et qu’il peut donc servir de base légitime à une étude de la pensée calvinienne” (Calvin: Sources et évolution, 85–86). T. H. L. Parker, Calvin’s Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952), 3, concurs with Wendel on this issue: “Comparison with the earlier editions is sometimes fruitful, as also between the Latin originals and the French translations which Calvin left us of every edition from 1539 onwards. The 1560 translation of the definitive edition has often been stated to have been badly revised by other translators, but J. W. Marmelstein shows (quite conclusively, to my mind) that it was Calvin’s own translation.”
5. About the transition from doctrina to sapientia in the initial sentence of the 1536 and 1539 editions of the Institutes, and from there to the text of 1541, see Millet, ed., Institution de la religion chrétienne (1541), 1:187n1.
6. Discussion of Human Nature as Created, of the Faculties of the Soul, of the Image of God, of Free Will, and of the Original Integrity of Man’s Nature (McNeill-Battles, 183). Unless otherwise specified, all English quotes of the 1559 Institutes are taken from the McNeill-Battles edition and will be referred to by page number. For the 1541 French text, Millet’s two-volume edition of 2008 is used (see the end of n. 2 above); references will be made under his name with volume and page number. The final French text of 1560 is quoted from the afore-mentioned C.N.R.S. edition of Benoît (see n. 4) with his name, volume, and page number followed by the standard Institutes numbering of book, chapter, and paragraph (e.g., Inst. 1.15.1).
7. One must keep in mind that modifications to the text of the Institutes are not necessarily added layers gradually superimposed upon previous ones, but often consist of reworded sentences or paragraphs. Cf. Benoît, “History and Development of the Institutio,” 110–12, who provides a clear picture of how Calvin reworked previous editions of his Institutes until the final doublet (i.e., “twin” Latin and French versions) of 1559–1560.
8. Benoît, 1:206; Inst. 1.15.1. “We must now speak of the creation of man: not only because among all God’s works here is the noblest and most remarkable example of his justice, wisdom and goodness; but because, as we said at the beginning, we cannot have a clear and complete knowledge of God unless it is accompanied by a corresponding knowledge of ourselves. This knowledge of ourselves is twofold: namely, to know what we were like when we were first created and what our condition became after the fall of Adam. While it would be of little benefit to understand our creation unless we recognized in this sad ruin what our nature in its corruption and deformity is like, we shall nevertheless be content for the moment with the description of our originally upright nature” (McNeill-Battles, 183).
9. “ut initio diximus” (OS 3:173.29–30).
10. “nisi accedat mutua nostri cognitio” (OS 3:173.31).
11. “In the first place, no one can look upon himself without immediately turning his thoughts to the contemplation of God in whom he lives and moves” (McNeill-Battles, 35; Inst. 1.1.1).
12. “Etsi autem ea [cognitio] duplex est” (OS 3:173.31–32; Inst. 1.15.1). “This knowledge of ourselves is twofold: namely, to know what we were like when we were first created and what our condition became after the fall of Adam” (McNeill-Battles, 83).
13. T. F. Torrance, also quoting from Inst. 1.15.1, expresses this very aptly in ch. 1 of his Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 13: “‘We cannot clearly and properly know God,’ he says, ‘unless the knowledge of ourselves be added.’ By this he does not mean that anthropology of itself can contribute to or condition our knowledge of God, but that unless there arises within our knowledge of God a real knowledge of man our knowledge of God is not real. The purpose of a Christian anthropology is twofold: by pointing the believer to his original creation in the image of God to produce gratitude, and by pointing him to his present miserable condition to produce humility.… Therefore, while the knowledge of man has no independent status, in Calvin’s theology it is regarded as an essential function of our knowledge and worship of God.”
14. Millet, 1:188–89. “By showing us our weakness, misery, inconsistence, and state of contempt, the second one [knowledge] brings us to humiliation, lack of self-confidence and hatred of ourselves; and hereafter provokes in ourselves a desire to seek God inasmuch as all our good, of which we are otherwise empty and deprived, rests in him” (my translation).
15. The first Book of the Christian Institutes, which concerns knowing God in his title and quality as Creator and sovereign ruler of the world (my translation). We have here another significant variant of the French text compared to the pithy Latin (OS 3:31.3): De Cognitione Dei Creatoris, “knowledge of God the Creator” as in all translations made from the Latin. Not only do the words “tiltre [titre] et qualité” connote the position of highest nobility conferred to God the Creator, but the extension “souverain gouverneur du monde” includes chs. 16 and 17 of Book 1, which handle the topic of God’s providence. In the 1541 text and subsequent versions, this topic was dealt with in ch. 4, within the Apostles’ Creed (Où le symbole des apostres est explicqué).
16. “Davantage, par les biens qui distillent du ciel sur nous goutte à goutte, nous sommes conduits comme par petits ruisseaux à la fontaine.” Cf. also Benoît, 1:59; Inst. 1.3.1, where a 1560 addition echoes this: “[Car afin que nul ne cherchast son refuge sous tiltre d’ignorance, Dieu a imprimé en tous une cognoissance de soymesme], de la quelle il renouvelle tellement la mémoire, comme s’il en distilloit goutte à goutte.” We actually find the matrix of this imagery well into the first chapter of the 1541 edition, as an echo of Acts 14:16–17, when Calvin writes, “Par cy devant, dict-il, Dieu a permis que les gens cheminassent en leurs voyes, toutesfois qu’il ne soit pas laissé sans tesmoignages, envoyant ses benefices du ciel, donnant pluyes et fertilitez de biens, remplissant les hommes de viande et de joye. Combien donc que Dieu ne soit point despourveu de tesmoignages, en tant que par sa largesse il invite doucement les hommes à la cognoissance de soy, neantmoins ilz ne laissent point de suyvre leurs voyes, c’est-à-dire de cheminer en erreur damnable” (Millet, 1:214). In 1560, this allusion to Acts 14:16–17 is found in ch. 5 (Benoît, 1:84; Inst. 1.5.13). For a detailed discussion of the cognitive import of the liquid metaphors in the 1560 text of the Institutes, see Eric Kayayan, “La portée cognitive du langage figuré dans le texte français de l’Institution de la Religion Chrestienne de Jean Calvin” (Master’s thesis, Potchefstroom University for Higher Christian Education, 1997), 61–66.
17. Millet, 1:251–52.
18. Benoît, 1:206; Inst. 1.15.1: “Et aussi devant que venir à ceste condition tant misérable en laquelle l’homme est détenu, il est besoin d’entendre quel il estoit auparavant; car il nous faut bien garder qu’en démonstrant trop cruement les vices naturels de l’homme, il ne semble que nous les imputions à l’autheur de sa nature.”
19. McNeill-Battles, 39: What It Is to Know God, and to What Purpose the Knowledge of Him Tends.
20. The three first sentences of this paragraph (1.2.2) are a 1559–1560 addition. In his De vera et falsa religione commentaries (published in 1525 and also dedicated to King Francis I), Zwingli already expressed a similar thought: “Porro, quid deus sit, tam ex nobis ipsis ignoramus, quam ignorant scarabeus quid sit homo” (see Benoît, 1:56). Charles Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 29, writes the following on this topic: “Calvin is not interested in speculating about God-in-himself, but in God-as-revealed in his word. Calvin is concerned with God-for-us. Thus to know God is to know his relationship to us as it is revealed and to refuse to search for a hidden God.” See also Wendel, Calvin: Sources et évolution, 111.
21. Benoît, 1:56–57; Inst. 1.2.2. McNeill-Battles, 41–42, reads: “What is God? Men who pose this question are merely toying with idle speculations. It is more important for us to know of what sort he is and what is consistent with his nature.… For how can the thought of God penetrate your mind without your realizing immediately that, since you are his handiwork, you have been made over and bound to his command by right of creation, that you owe your life to him?—that whatever you undertake, whatever you do, ought to be ascribed to him?” Here Calvin is exactly in the same register of expression as with his commentary on Ps 139 (see below). The expression “de droit naturel et de création” denotes a juridical relation.
22. Millet, 1:189. “For since there is a whole world of misery in man, we cannot look straightforwardly without being deeply touched by the knowledge of our unfortunate condition, in order to immediately lift up our eyes towards God and at least come to some knowledge of him” (my translation).
23. Benoît, 1:51; Inst. 1.1.1. “The miserable ruin, into which the rebellion of the first man cast us, especially compels us to look upward.… For, as a veritable world of miseries is to be found in mankind, and we are thereby despoiled of divine raiment, our shameful nakedness exposes a teeming horde of infamies. Each of us must, then, be so stung by the consciousness of his own unhappiness as to attain at least some knowledge of God” (McNeill-Battles, 36).
24. Benoît, 1:55; Inst. 1.2.1. “First, as much in the fashioning of the universe as in the general teaching of Scripture the Lord shows himself to be simply the Creator. Then in the face of Christ he shows himself the Redeemer. Of the resulting twofold knowledge of God we shall now discuss the first aspect” (McNeill-Battles, 40). “Quia ergo Dominus primum simpliciter creator tam in mundi opificio, quam in generali Scripturae doctrina, deinde in Christi facie redemptor apparet: hinc duplex emergit eius cognitio” (OS 3:34.21–24).
25. Benoît, 1:57; Inst. 1.2.2. “For, to begin with, the pious mind does not dream up for itself any god it pleases, but contemplates the one and only true God. And it does not attach to him whatever it pleases, but is content to hold him to be as he manifests himself; furthermore, the mind always exercises the utmost diligence and care not to wander astray, or rashly and boldly to go beyond his will” (McNeill-Battles, 42). The 1541 text reads: “Premierement le coeur fidele ne se forge point un Dieu tel quel à la volée, mais il regarde celuy qui est seul et vray Dieu, et ne luy attribue point tout ce que bon luy semble, mais est content de l’avoir tel qu’il se manifeste, se gardant tousjours diligemment de ne sortir point hors de sa volunté par audacieuse oultrecuydance” (Millet, 1:201). For a rhetorical reading of this chapter, see Serene Jones, Calvin and the Rhetoric of Piety (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1995), 123–53.
26. The Latin wording remains the same throughout the various editions from 1539: “pia mens Deum non quemlibit somniat” (1539, CO 1:285; 1559, OS 3:36.5; Inst. 1.2.2).
27. It is therefore not correct to contend, as Edward A. Dowey Jr. does in the preface to the 1994 edition of his book The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), x, that speaking of the duplex cognitio in order to refer to the knowledge of God and of man has only brought confusion in the understanding of Calvin’s purpose, because the proper object of this duplex cognitio would technically concern God as Creator and Redeemer: “It would promote clarity and accuracy in Calvin scholarship generally if Calvin’s own terminology of the ‘two-fold’ knowledge were used exclusively as Calvin used it for the knowledge of God the Creator and Redeemer. This technical term should not be carelessly applied to the ‘knowledge of God and ourselves,’ as often happens. For the latter, the term ‘correlative knowledge’ (or the like) would avoid confusion.” Dowey seems to have missed the expressed mention of a double knowledge of man (ourselves) in Inst. 1.15.1 with the use of the phrase “Or combien que la cognoissance de nous mesmes soit double.” Reading Calvin carefully shows that the path towards the correlation between the two dual knowledges is not a straightforward one whereby the knowledge of ourselves would be a mere subsidiary of the knowledge of God. To call the duplex cognitio a technical term only to be applied to the latter is a theological construct which cannot be ascribed to Calvin as such.
28. See n. 23 above.
29. The Knowledge of God Has Been Naturally Implanted in the Minds of Men (McNeill-Battles, 43; Inst. 1.1.3). As noted in n. 16 above, the first paragraph of this ch. 1 finds again the metaphor of the drops instilled one by one by God himself.
30. The text from this psalm will be quoted from Commentaires de Jehan Calvin sur le Livre des Pseaumes avec une table fort ample des principaux points traittez és Commentaires, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie de Ch. Meyrueis et Compagnie, 1859). The text of the psalm in Calvin’s own translation appears in this Meyrueis edition and is also given in OS 56:497–98 with very minor spelling differences in the transcription (e.g., “Ie” for “Je,” “assiete” for “assiette”). The editors of CO also consulted the 1563 edition of the commentary on the Psalms. English excerpts quoted in footnotes below are given either from the translation by James Anderson, Commentary on the Book of Psalms by John Calvin translated from the original Latin, and collated with the author’s French version (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989), or from my translation when the English translation from the Latin sensibly differs from the original French.
31. Meyrueis, 1:531. “In this Psalm David, that he may dismiss the deceptive coverings under which most men take refuge, and divest himself of hypocrisy, insists at large upon the truth that nothing can elude the divine observation—a truth which he illustrates from the original formation of man, since he who fashioned us in our mother’s womb, and imparted to every member its particular office and function, cannot possibly be ignorant of our actions” (Anderson, 206).
32. For an assessment of the rhetorical category of imitatio used by Calvin here, see Jones, Calvin and the Rhetoric of Piety, 35.
33. “…knowing with certainty that nothing is hidden from God, he unveils with candour all his feelings and submits himself to God’s scrutiny: It belongs to you, O Lord, to see clearly everything which is hidden in me, and nothing will remain unknown to you. He also adds the circumstances, whereby he shows that there is not a single part of his life which God does not see clearly. Whether I rest, he says, or I walk, or stand up, you know all my movements” (my translation).
34. “The other meaning I followed looks more appropriate to me, that is, we must not imagine that God is enclosed in heaven and stays there idle (as the Epicureans dream) without interfering in the business of things of this world. Rather, although we are quite far in this earthly pilgrimage, he is nevertheless not very far from us” (my translation). Cf. Benoît, 1:56; Inst. 1.1.2: “Car quel profit y aura-il de confesser avec les Epicuriens qu’il y a quelque Dieu, lequel, s’estant deschargé du soin de gouverner le monde, prenne plaisir en oisiveté?”
35. Barth’s analysis of the cognitio Dei ac nostri in the 1536 Institutes is fully in line with this assessment (Theology of John Calvin, 162): “If we now look at what Calvin has to say about God on the one side and man on the other on the first pages of his 1536 Institutes, one thing that strikes us is that so far as possible he sets God at once in the light of a full and sufficient knowledge of man, and that he at once speaks of man in such a way that we note that this is the man who is seen and known by God. In neither case is there any trace of a restraint that might indicate that we have here only a first and provisional stage of knowledge, for example, a natural theology and anthropology.… He [God] is the judge who is over us all and who puts the fateful question whether we really serve his glory. But he is also the merciful God who takes up the cause of the needy when they flee to him and appeal to his faithfulness, ready to forgive, to help, and to save those who put their whole trust in him (I, 27).”
36. Meyrueis, 2:532. “Many when they hear God spoken of conceive of him as like unto themselves, and such presumption is most condemnable. Very commonly they will not allow his knowledge to be greater than what comes to their own apprehension of things. David, on the contrary, confesses it to be beyond his comprehension, virtually declaring that words could not express this truth of the absoluteness with which all things stand patent to the eye of God, this being a knowledge having neither bound nor measure, so that he could only contemplate the extent of it with conscious imbecility” (Anderson, 210).
37. Meyrueis, 2:533. “The idea meant to be conveyed is, that while the tongue is called a portrait, or a representation of the heart’s thoughts since by way of words one communicates to one’s neighbours, God, however, does not need to hear words to know what is in man, since he knows his heart” (my translation).
38. Meyrueis, 2:534. “In these words, The wings of dawn, we have a beautiful metaphor, or simile. For when the sun rises on the earth in the morning, it seems to be flying extremely swiftly, inasmuch as it spreads its radiance to all regions of the world. The same metaphor is found in Mal 4:2. The idea is: though one should fly with a speed superior to the sun’s rays, he could find no recess where he would be beyond the reach of divine power. For hand here means Power: as if he were saying that every time men try to escape from God’s presence, he has the power to arrest them and draw them back as fugitives” (my translation, adapted from Anderson, 211).
39. Meyrueis, 2:535. “It is true that we all are forced to confess that God knows all things. While everyone agrees with this maxim, in private no one takes it seriously: we make no scruple in mocking God. No feeling of reverence towards his majesty will hold us back, and we will not even treat him the way we would a mortal man. We might experience some shame preventing us from acting in an evil or dishonest way in the presence of our fellow men. But we are indifferent to God’s judgment, as if there were between him and us some kind of veil covering our misdeeds from his sight, preventing his majesty from seeing them” (my translation).
40. CO 23:65–66: “Iam hoc posterius fugae remedium, nihilo melius priore: quandoquidem fugitivos Deus sola voce mox retrahit. Scriptum est (Psal. 139, 7): Quo fugiam a facie tua? Si mare traiiciam, si assumptis alis transcendam nubes: si descendam in profundas abyssos: tu Domine ubique eris. Id fatemur omnes verum esse, neque interea cessamus captare vana subterfugia: et quaslibet umbras nobis fingimus optima esse propugnacula. Neque omittendum est, quod pauca folia minimum sibi prodesse expertus ad integras arbores confugit. Sic enim solemus frivolis cavillis exclusi excusationes novas fingere, quae nos velut sub densiore umbra occultent.” In the modernized French of the Kerygma-Farel edition of this commentary (John Calvin, Le Livre de la Genèse [Marne-la-Vallée: Éditions Farel and Aix-en-Provence: Éditions Kerygma, 1978], 77): “Ce second remède de la fuite n’est pas meilleur que le premier, parce que Dieu les retire soudain de leur fuite par sa seule voix. Il est écrit: Où fuirai-je de ta face? Si je passe par la mer, si je prends des ailes pour monter par-dessus les nuées, Si je descends dans les profonds abîmes, tu seras partout, Seigneur! (Ps. 139:7) Nous confessons bien tous que cela est vrai, et cependant nous ne cessons de chercher de vains subterfuges et nous faisons accroire que, quelques ombrages que nous puissions avoir pour nous couvrir, ce nous sont très bonnes défenses. Il ne faut pas ici omettre qu’Adam ayant expérimenté que les feuilles ne lui servaient à rien, se retire dans les arbres mêmes. Car c’est notre coutume, quand nous sommes forclos de nos cavillations frivoles, de controuver des excuses nouvelles, pour nous cacher sous ombre plus épaisse.”
41. Meyrueis, 2:535. “All there is to do when we feel that such nonchalance and fleshly assurance is about to surprise us, is for each of us to take up the goads presented here, stir himself up and awake from his sleep” (my translation).
42. Cf. the King James Version: “For thou hast possessed my reins: thou hast covered me in my mother’s womb.” Commenting on this same verse, E. J. Young writes, “To translate the verb which the Psalmist employs is not easy. It here means to acquire by creation. Possibly, despite the fact that the translation does entail some difficulties, we should best render the word ‘create.’… To use the expression ‘kidneys’ seems strange. Yet by this expression David is simply referring to what may be called the seat of his pains and pleasures, of his strongest sensibilities. If God has created the reins, then God has control of David in such a way that the control reaches to the innermost part of his being” (Psalm 139: A Study in the Omniscience of God [London: Banner of Truth, 1965], 66–67). If in his translation of v. 13 Calvin speaks of “reins” (“loins”) only, in his commentary he adds “coeurs” (“hearts”) which is a combination appearing in other psalms, such as 7:9 and 26:2. Rabbi Avrohom Chaim Feuer comments as follows on “kidneys”: “When used in context with intellect, this term refers to the part of the mind which creates and initiates plans and ideas.… The kidneys symbolize the seat of innermost thought [see 7:10], hidden deep within the human psyche” (Tehillim, Psalms: A New Translation with a Commentary Anthologized from Talmudic, Midrashic and Rabbinic Sources [New York: Mesorah Publications, 1996], 5:1639).
43. Meyrueis, 2:535. “Although it seems that he is pursuing the same subject, he carries it somewhat further, declaring that we need not be surprised at God’s knowledge of the most secret thoughts of men, since he formed their reins and their hearts. He thus represents God as sitting king in the very reins of man, at the center of his jurisdiction, and shows one should not wonder that all the windings and recesses of our hearts cannot deceive him. For when we were enclosed in our mother’s womb, he saw us as clearly as if we had stood before him in the light of mid-day” (my translation, adapted from Anderson, 214).
44. See n. 21 above about the juridical aspect attached to this possession.
45. “I am accustomed to calling this book an anatomy of all parts of the soul, for there is not one single affection in man which is not represented here as in a mirror” (my translation). See E. Kayayan, “Le Sainct Esprit a icy pourtrait au vif: Calvin’s understanding of the Holy Spirit’s modus operandi in the life of believers in the light of the preface to his Commentary of the Psalms,” in Prompte et Sincere: John Calvin and the Exposition of the Word of God, ed. R. M. Britz and V. E. d’Assonville, AcTSup 10 (Bloemfontein: University of the Free State Press, 2008), 84–94.
46. “Therefore he does not speak here of a kind of knowledge which would make subservient to our senses that which he confessed with the very word Miracle to be incomprehensible (as we know that Philosophers are so puffed up with arrogance that they do not want God to keep anything hidden from them). Rather, here Knowledge means a careful study and a sanctified diligence by which we are awakened to give glory to God” (my translation). If the arrogance of the Philosophers is sharply rebuked, their witness to the wonder of man as creature is plainly called upon by Calvin at the beginning of 1.5.3: “Pour ceste raison aucuns des Philosophes anciens ont à bon droit nommé l’homme un petit monde, pource que c’est un chef d’oeuvre auquel on contemple quelle est la puissance bonté et sagesse de Dieu, et lequel contient en soy assez de miracles pour arrester nos esprits, moyennant que nous ne desdaignons pas d’y estre attentifs” (Benoît, 1:70; Inst. 1.5.3).
47. Meyrueis, 2:532: “C’est la coutume du plus commun des hommes, qu’ils n’attribuent point plus grande connaissance à Dieu, qu’eux-mesmes en ont.”
48. “Tota fere sapientiae nostrae summa, quae vera demum ac solida sapientia censerit debeat” (OS 3:31.6–7; Inst. 1.1.1). Solida can be translated in English by “entire” or “complete,” following the French “entière”: “Nearly all the wisdom we possess, which—after pondering upon it—is worthy to be considered true and entire wisdom.”
49. We see an example of it with the remark on the Epicureans in his commentary on Ps 139:2. False or partial wisdom certainly includes in Calvin’s mind empty knowledge dispensed by false Christian teachers, as witnessed in his commentary on 1 Tim 6:20: “O Timothée, garde le dépost, évitant vanité profane de babil, et les oppositions de science [Ou, fuyant ces crieries vaines et profanes, et contradictions de science, etc.]: Car combien qu’ils entonnent je ne sçay quoi de grand, toutesfois il n’y a rien dessous. C’est doncques un son inutile: lequel aussi il appelle Profane, pource que l’efficace de l’Esprit est esteinte aussi tost que les Docteurs, c’est-à-dire ceux qui enseignent en l’Eglise enflent ainsi leurs cornemuses, pour monstrer leur éloquence, et se faire valoir” (Meyrueis, 4:263). Torrance (Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 14) sums up Calvin’s view as follows: “Man can have true self-knowledge only when he knows God truly, and when in knowing God he so images Him as to be what he was made by God to be, man in complete dependence on God.” Parker (Calvin’s Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, 25–26) offers a helpful comparison between Calvin’s views and J. B. Bossuet’s treatise De la connoissance de Dieu et de soi-même, written in 1670 for the Dauphin, thus 110 years later (quoted here from the Traité de la Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même par Bossuet, ed. E. Lefranc [Paris: Imprimerie et Librairie Classiques J. Delalain & Fils, 1817]). Bossuet is clearly indebted to the new Cartesian approach in his method of exposition. Leaning on Acts 17:27–28 to support this method, his point of departure rests on the idea that Christian wisdom consists in knowing God and oneself, the second knowledge leading to the first one. His opening sentences are: “La sagesse consiste à connaître Dieu et à se connaître soi-même. La connaissance de nous-même nous doit élever à la connaissance de Dieu. Pour bien connaître l’homme, il faut savoir qu’il est compose de deux parties, qui sont l’âme et le corps.” Clearly, for Bossuet the duplex cognitio nostri does not concern man’s misery after the fall. In his treatise one finds no trace of the notion of sin and how it may impair a proper knowledge of oneself. The entire argument consists in observing oneself carefully and finding in such a detailed observation the image of God which cannot but lead to eternal truths and to the Creator himself: “The prime duty of man, inasmuch as he is able to reason, is to live according to reason and seek the author of his life, lest he should lack gratitude towards him if he should neglect to seek him and ignore him” (p. 148, my translation).
50. Millet, 1:247: “Ce n’est pas sans cause que par le proverbe ancien a tousiours esté tant recommandé la congnoissance de soymesmes. Car si nous estimons que ce soit honte d’ignorer les choses qui appartiennent à la vie humaine, la mescongnoissance de nousmesmes est encore beaucoup plus deshoneste, par laquelle il advient qu’en prenant conseil de toutes choses necessaires, nous nous abusons paovrement, et mesmes sommes du tout aveuglez. Mais d’autant que ce commandement est plus utile, d’autant nous fault-il plus diligemment garder de l’entendre mal. Ce que nous voyons estre advenu à d’aucuns philosophes. Car quand ilz admonestent l’homme de se congnoistre, ilz l’ameinent quant et quant à ce but de de considérer sa dignité et excellence, et ne luy font rien contempler sinon dont il se puisse eslever en vaine confiance, et s’enfler en orgueil.” See also Millet’s introduction to the second chapter, 1:237–45. For the English parallel in the 1559 Institutes, see McNeill-Battles, 241–42; Inst. 2.1.1.
51. See end of quote in the previous note: “et ne luy font rien contempler sinon dont il se puisse eslever en vaine confiance, et s’enfler en orgueil.” The English of the 1559 text reads, “And they would have him contemplate in himself nothing but what swells him with empty assurance and puffs him up with pride” (McNeill-Battles, 242).
52. In the 1559–1560 text, an extended addition between the two elements of the antithesis prevents the reader from grasping the impact of the rhetorical contrast. The 1559 Latin reads, “Quam regulam tenere convenit si ad rectam et sapiendi et agendi metam pertingere libet” (OS 3.229.12–14; Inst. 2.1.1). English 1559: “We ought to keep this rule if we wish to reach the true goal of both wisdom and action” (McNeill-Battles, 242). The French “bien sentir et bien faire” shifts the qualification rectam from the word “goal” to “knowing/being aware of”; “bien sentir” (to apprehend/understand well) and “bien faire” (well-doing) set forward a moral ideal of combined understanding and action.
53. This reflects a near-Platonist view which Partee (Calvin and Classical Philosophy, 30) summarizes: “Concerning the knowledge of things human and divine, Plato says that we know ourselves only by self-contemplation of Nous in the knowledge of God (Alcibiades Major, 132 e–133 c.).” The most influential neo-Platonist philosopher of the Renaissance, Marsilio Ficino, thus opens the proem to his Platonic Theology Concerning the Immortality of Souls (ca. 1470), dedicated to Lorenzo de Medici: “Noble-souled Lorenzo! Plato, the father of philosophers, realizing that our minds bear the same relationship to God as our sight to the light of the Sun, and that therefore they can never understand anything without the light of God, considered it just and pious that, as the human mind receives everything from God, so it should restore everything to God. Hence in the sphere of moral philosophy one must purify the soul until its eye becomes unclouded and it can see the divine light and worship God. And in the examination of causes, the final object of our search into them should be the cause of causes, and once we find it we should venerate it.” In this initiation voyage of knowledge towards the full light, in a downwards-upwards movement, Plotinian overtones are easily recognizable. In the introduction to this work (Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Vol. 1, Books 1–4, English trans. Michael J. B. Allen with John Warden, Latin text ed. James Hankins with William Bowen [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001], vii-viii), we are told, “As a scholar Ficino was also fascinated by music, magic and harmonic theory, by medicine, astrology, demonology, mystical mathematics and aspects of the occult, and by the idea of an ancient pagan mythological philosophy, God’s trinitarian gift of wisdom to the poets and sages of the gentiles.”
54. “multo vero foedior” (OS 3:228.12; Inst. 2.1.1); “even more detestable” (McNeill-Battles, 241).
55. It would be outside the scope of this article to go into a thorough investigation of the tradition against which Calvin positions himself when rejecting the kind of knowledge leading to a mere pretense of wisdom. For more detailed sources, see Millet, 1:247 and passim. Cicero’s classical formulation of the knowledge of things divine and human (taken up by, among others, Seneca [letter 89 to Lucilius, “Division of Philosophy, about Luxury and Greed”] and Quintilian [Institutio Oratoria, 12.2]) appears in De Officiis 2.2.5, where Cicero defines philosophy quite plainly as the “love of wisdom.” Leaning on a definition given by “the philosophers of old,” he goes on to describe wisdom as “the knowledge of things divine and human, and of the causes by which those things are controlled”: “Hanc igitur qui expetunt, philosophi nominantur, nec quicquam aliud est philosophia, si interpretari veils, praetor stadium sapientiae. Sapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est, rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque quibus eae res continentur, scientia.” The second part of the last sentence is questioned by Seneca as a superfluous addition, since, in his opinion, the causes are part of the very things. Cicero’s claim that self-knowledge is to know the power of the body and the mind (Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy, 30) would undoubtedly be rejected by Calvin as resting upon a deceitful anthropology. For detailed (and at times contradictory) studies on the relationship, indebtedness, and criticism of Cicero by Calvin, see Egil Grislis, “Calvin’s Use of Cicero in the Institutes I:1–5: A Case Study in Theological Method,” ARG 62 (1971): 5–37; Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy, 42–43; Peter J. Leithart, “That Eminent Pagan: Calvin’s Use of Cicero in Institutes 1.1–5, ” WTJ 52 (1990): 1–12.
56. Cf. Parker, Calvin’s Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, 27: “Man in his created state of purity was capable of the knowledge of God. True, he did not know Him immediately, but by revelation by the Word in the opera Dei; but he was capable of the knowledge of God.” Brian G. Armstrong, “The Nature and Structure of Calvin’s Thought According to the Institutes: Another Look,” in John Calvin’s Institutes, His Opus Magnum, 65–66, develops his view on the hypothetical structure of Calvin’s thought, recalling Calvin’s mention of a lost natural knowledge of God in Inst. 1.2.1 (Benoît, 1:55): “Seulement ie parle de ceste pure et saincte cognoissance à laquelle l’ordre naturel nous meneroit si Adam eust persisté en son intégrité.” Armstrong comments thus: “But therein the problem resides: Adam did not remain upright and thus the availability of this objective revelation is cancelled.… Of course, because of sin we cannot duly perceive it and it cannot take root in the heart, and thus we are faced with the purely hypothetical character of the discussion” (“Nature and Structure,” 66).
57. In Inst. 1.5.4, Calvin clearly echoes Rom 1:18–21 and the willful suppression of the knowledge of God the Creator by men who cannot but sense his presence in themselves when looking inwardly: “Ils sentent comme Dieu besongne merveilleusement en eux et l’expérience leur monstre quelle variété de dons ils possèdent de sa libéralité; ils sont contraints, veuillent-ils ou non, de cognoistre que ce sont autant de signes de sa divinité, lesquels toutesfois ils tiennent cachez dedens eux” (Benoît, 1:71; Inst. 1.5.4). Paragraphs 1 to 5 of this chapter (Que la puissance de Dieu reluit en la création du monde et au gouvernement continuel) constitute a full new development in the 1559–1560 doublet, with the exception of the first two sentences. The first of these two (1539–1541) finds its counterpart in the Catechism of 1545 with the only difference that it characterizes the knowledge of God not only as the goal of our life, but also as its felicity, the two being intimately connected: “Or pource que la souveraine félicité et le but de nostre vie gist en la connaissance de Dieu…” (Benoît, 1:68; Inst. 1.5.1); Latin: “Adhaec quia ultimus beatae vitae finis in Dei cognition positus est…” (OS 3:44.30–31). Catechism of 1545, first question (OS 2:75.3–8): “Quis humanae vitas praecipuus est finis?—Ut Deum, a quo conditi sunt homines, ipsi noverint.” It is noteworthy that neither in the Institutes nor in the Catechism is the knowledge of ourselves counted by Calvin as the ultimate goal and felicity of man. Certainly this is where the ideal of the Renaissance and that of the Calvinian Reformation diverge very sharply, regardless of the real necessity of knowing oneself according to Calvin.
58. Torrance (Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 14) states: “There is no true knowledge of man, therefore, unless it is conceived as grounded upon the downward motion of grace.”
59. Benoît, 1:54; Inst. 1.1.3. “Yet, however the knowledge of God and of ourselves may be mutually connected, the order of right teaching requires that we discuss the former first, then proceed afterward to treat the latter” (McNeill-Battles, 39).
60. In the initial sentences of Inst. 2.8.1 (ch. 8 deals with the moral law—L’exposition de la loy morale— and forms the third chapter of the 1541 Institutes), Calvin offers a short summary of the cognitio dei et nostri. It should be noted that he particularly insists on man’s state of moral misery as far as the second element (cognitio nostri) is concerned, leaving aside any mention of our original dignity. This section already appears in 1541 and is preceded by a few sentences added in 1559–1560, pointing in particular towards the necessity of a mediator to whom the Jews in the OT were led by force, when considering their inability to comply with God’s requirements. In the 1541 text, the passage on the dual knowledge reads as follows: “En explicquant les choses requises à la vraye congnoissance de Dieu, nous avons monstré qu’on ne le peut concevoir selon sa grandeur que incontinent ceste pensée ne vienne en l’entendement: qu’il est seul à la majesté duquel appartient souverain honneur. En la congnoissance de nousmesmes nous avons dict que le principal poinct estoit qu’estans vuides de toute fiance de nostre justice, au contraire abattuz de la considération de nostre paouvreté, nous apprenons parfaite humilité, pour nous abbaisser et demettre de toute gloire” (Millet, 1:391). In order to make a proper connection with the initial sentences of ch. 8 of Book 2 in 1560 (stressing the necessary service of God which his law commands), Calvin has modified his sentence thus: “or cy dessus en exposant la somme de ce qui est requis pour vrayement cognoistre Dieu, nous avons monstré que nous ne le pouvons concevoir en sa grandeur, que sa maiesté ne nous saisisse pour nous rendre obligez à le servir” (CO 1:416).
61. “It is true that he must have been endowed and girded with a remarkable assurance to dare to present himself so boldly before the examination of God as judge. However, inasmuch as his conscience was testifying towards him that he displayed a genuine piety, he did not recklessly step forward with this great assurance before God’s judicial seat. It is not, however, that he meant he was without any sin, seeing that he was moaning under the heavy burden of his vices” (my translation).
62. “In fact, it is certain that the faithful ground themselves and lean onto the free forgiveness of their sins every time they mention their integrity: but although they know very well that they stumble and fall due to their infirmities, God nevertheless approves and accepts their piety. It is thus no wonder if they can boldly separate themselves from the wicked” (my translation).
63. “When we call faith ‘knowledge’ we do not mean comprehension of the sort that is commonly concerned with those things which fall under human sense perception. For faith is so far above sense that man’s mind has to go beyond and rise above itself in order to attain it. Even where the mind has attained, it does not comprehend what it feels. But while it is persuaded of what it does not grasp, by the very certainty of its persuasion it understands more than if it perceived anything human by its own capacity” (McNeill-Battles, 559; Inst. 3.2.14).
64. Cf. above Calvin’s commentary on Ps 139:15–18: “Ainsi doncques il ne parle point yci d’une cognoissance qui soumette à nos sens ce que mesmes par ce mot de Miracle il a confessé estre incompréhensible … mais Cognoissance signifie une estude attentive et saincte diligence, par laquelle nous soyons resveillez à rendre gloire à Dieu.”
65. “Parquoy i’ay tasché d’en faire mon devoir, non seulement quand ledit livre a esté imprimé pour la seconde fois, mais toutesfois & quantes qu’à la rimprime il a esté aucunement augmenté & enrichy. Or combien que ie n’eusse point occasion de me desplaire au travail que i’y avoye pris, toutesfois ie confesse que iamais ie ne me suis contenté moymesme, iusques à ce que ie l’ay eu digéré en l’ordre que vous y verrez maintenant, lequel vous approuverez comme i’espère” (Benoît 1:23). “Etsi autem laboris tunc impensi me non poenitebat: nunquam tamen mihi satisfeci, donec in hunc ordinem qui nunc proponitur digestum fuit” (OS 3:5.13–15).
66. Cf. De Greef, Writings of John Calvin, 201. It is actually to be hoped that a source-oriented translation in English of the 1560 Institutes will eventually see the light of day.
67. Herman Dooyeweerd (1894–1977), a neo-Calvinist philosopher from the Amsterdam school, expresses the junction between the moi and other moi in a way strongly reminiscent of Calvin’s initial sentence of the 1560 Institutes in the first of five conferences given in Paris in 1959 (“La prétendue autonomie de la pensée philosophique,” RRef 10, no. 3 [1959]), at the end of which he states: “Quoique le moi soit le point central de référence de toute notre expérience temporelle, il n’est rien en soi. Il n’existe qu’en une relation centrale avec d’autres moi, qui s’exprime en chaque moi individuel. Mais cette relation centrale entre le moi et les autres moi n’existe pas non plus en soi et se dissout à son tour en un néant en tant qu’elle est absolutisée; c’est-à-dire que la connaissance de soi-même, condition nécessaire d’une pensée radicalement critique, ne peut être puisée ni dans le moi en soi, ni dans la relation centrale entre le moi et les autres moi, ni dans l’horizon temporel de notre expérience et de notre existence. C’est que la connaissance de soi-même dans sa relation intrinsèque avec la connaissance des autres moi n’est possible qu’en liaison indissoluble avec la connaissance de l’Origine absolue, du Créateur qui a exprimé son image dans le centre de l’existence humaine” (p. 17). He continues further in exposing the antithesis at work in the human heart, hinting again at the Calvinian “vraye et entière sagesse” in opposition to any sort of apostate wisdom: “De principe, il n’y a que deux motifs centraux agissant dans le coeur de l’existence humaine. Le premier est issu de l’action du Saint Esprit qui par la puissante pression de la Parole de Dieu dirige vers son Créateur l’homme et toute la création pour autant qu’elle est concentrée en l’homme. Le second motif central est celui de l’esprit d’apostasie qui détourne de sa véritable origine l’impulsion concentrique innée au cœur humain, pour la diriger vers des idoles issues de l’absolutisation du relatif” (p. 18). Dooyeweerd’s work, as well as that of other twentieth-century philosophers or Christian apologists, such as Cornelius Van Til, testifies to the seminal import of the initial sentence of the Institutes insofar as it contains, as in a sequence of DNA, the whole structure of an articulated reflection on the duplex cognitio.