Roman Law and the Trial of Christ

By R. Larry Overstreet

[R. Larry Overstreet, Assistant Professor of Systematic and Practical Theology, Detroit Baptist Divinity School, Allen Park, Michigan.]

The trials of Jesus Christ which preceded His death by crucifixion have been the subject of many books and articles. Many of these deal specifically and in great depth with the Jewish trials of Christ, but few attempt to deal in any detail with the Roman law aspect of Christ’s trial before Pontius Pilate. It is the purpose of this article to consider this latter subject.

The approach followed will be to analyze Christ’s trial in view of what is known both of Roman law of that time and of the Roman governor Pilate. The four Gospels will be allowed to speak for themselves, and then it will be demonstrated that Roman law coincides with the Gospel accounts of the trial of Christ before Pontius Pilate.

Although it is readily admitted that some of the exact chronological order of the details of Christ’s arrest and trials is difficult to determine, fortunately the general outline is well agreed on by many writers.[1]

The Man Pontius Pilate

Before examining how Pilate conducted the trial of Christ, it will be helpful to gain an insight into the man himself.

Some writers have attempted to develop from Pilate’s name some information related to his descent. The following quotation is representative of this:

The nomen Pontius indicates the stock from which Pilate was descended. It was one of the most famous of Samnite names…. The name is often met with in Rom [sic] history after the Samnites were conquered and absorbed…. The cognomen Pilatus indicates the familia, or branch of the gens Pontius, to which Pilate belonged. It has been derived from pileus, the cap worn by freedmen; this is improbable, as Pilate was of equestrian rank. It has also been derived from pilum, a spear. Probably the name was one that had descended to Pilate from his ancestors and had long lost its meaning.[2]

In relation to this quotation, it should be noted that there are examples of freedmen’s descendants achieving equestrian rank in Rome.[3] Some even achieved the status of senator. It is possible, therefore, that the derivation from pileus is accurate.

It is clear from historical records that Pilate was the fifth procurator of Judea, appointed by the emperor Tiberius, that he was procurator cum potestate (having civil, military, and criminal jurisdiction), that he held office for ten years (A.D. 26-36), and that in some way, not clearly known, he was subject to the legate of Syria, which was not uncommon at that time.[4]

It is also known that Pilate created much antagonism between himself and the Jews on at least four different occasions. The first of these was immediately after his being appointed governor when he and his soldiers brought their standards into Jerusalem, bearing the emperor’s image, and placed them within sight of the Temple. This so enraged the Jews, who regarded it as idolatry, that Pilate yielded to them and had the standards returned to Caesarea.[5] A second occasion is recorded in Luke 13:1 which states that Pilate apparently killed some Galileans while they were offering sacrifices.

On a third occasion he used revenues from the Temple to construct an aqueduct. The Jews also objected to this sacrilege, but Pilate had his soldiers beat the complainers into subjection with staves.[6] On the fourth occasion he hung golden shields, apparently bearing the name of the emperor as a deity, in Herod’s palace. The Jews objected so strenuously to this that the emperor himself rebuked Pilate and ordered them removed. This event has been dated at A.D. 32.[7]

It can thus be seen that Pilate had yielded to Jewish pressures on at least one occasion, and that the emperor himself had intervened to reprimand Pilate on another occasion; this latter event carries special significance since it occured only about a year before the death of Christ. These historical events form an important background for Pilate’s dealings with Christ.

The Governor and Roman Law

Four factors have a bearing in Pilate’s dealing with Christ: Pilate’s authority, the rights of Roman citizens in a province contrasted to those of noncitizens, the relationship of Roman law to the local law of provincials, and the punishment for the crime of treason.[8]

Local Provincial Law

Generally speaking, Roman law allowed the local law of each province to be exercised without much interference. Kunkel has pointed out that “local administration, the administration of justice as between the natives of the provinces, and many other tasks were in general simply left to the political organs of the subject people.”[9] One significant exception to this was jurisdiction on matters involving capital punishment which was reserved to the procurator.

This exception has been set forth by Lyall: “The Romans did, for example, reserve the right to impose capital punishment, as in the case of Christ, but the day to day administration was none of their concern.”[10]

This particular exception is critically important in the trial of Christ before Pilate, since the Jews expressly declared, “We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God” (John 19:7); but they also said, “It is not lawful for us to put any man to death” (John 18:31). While it is true that some time later the Jews did exercise the power of capital punishment, illegally, in the stoning death of Stephen (Acts 7:58), there was a great deterrent in the case of Christ, and that was the involvement of Annas (John 18:13, 24). In A.D. 15, while Annas was the Jewish high priest, he led the Sanhedrin to violate this law when there was temporarily no procurator in Judea. That action resulted in his being deposed by Valerius Gratus that same year.[11] It seems reasonable that Annas would have had a great influence on the decision of Caiaphas, the high priest during Christ’s trial, since he was Caiaphas’s father-in-law, and the case of Christ was one that involved great popular opinion.

Rights of Individuals

The rights of individuals within a province varied depending on whether the person was a Roman citizen or a noncitizen, an alien. The state of the noncitizen has been explained by Lyall:

The peregrini were subjects of Rome, but not Romans, because they were not citizens. They were not liable to military service, but were subject to supervision, and to the heavy burden of Imperial taxation. In terms of strict Roman law they were rightless and dutiless, existing as objects and not subjects of law.[12]

Concerning this same subject Garnsey has given a specific time when citizens were distinguished from aliens in a crucial area, that of corporal punishment. “Corporal punishment was traditionally used against slaves and aliens. This was written into the laws from the early second century, B.C., when a lex porcia granted to Roman citizens the right of appeal against beating as well as execution.”[13]

The only time a Roman citizen was supposed to be subject to execution without a properly constituted trial was if he had been declared an enemy of the state.[14] In other instances there was a clear difference between aliens and citizens in the empire. “Discrimination in favour of citizens as opposed to aliens was thus a permanent feature of the Roman judicial system. It was practised in all spheres of law where aliens were technically excluded, as from the ius civile, and where they were not, as in criminal law….”[15]

However, it should also be noted that from the time of the Republic onward aliens were supposed to be allowed “natural principles of equity which are common to all nations.”[16] It may be concluded then that aliens—and Christ was one of these in relation to Roman law—had no direct legal standing at all; however, ethically and morally the natural principles of equity should have been applied to His case, but there was no legal compulsion to do so.

Authority of the Governor

Since Judea was a province subject to Rome, “the governor exercised the unlimited jurisdiction of the military imperium….”[17] The governor of a province like Judea would exercise military, financial, and judicial functions.[18] In relation to his judicial functions, the provincial governor “exercised both civil and criminal jurisdiction among Roman citizens, and also among foreigners, so far as such cases came before him by virtue of the province’s statute (leges provinciae) or by the operation of his discretion.”[19] While it is clear that the governor’s judicial activity would mainly concern Roman citizens, it is also clear that “if the interests of Roman sovereignty were involved, no doubt he would also at all times have summoned provincials to his court.”[20]

The extent of the governor’s authority is manifested in the types of punishment he could legally mete. There is no question but that he had the power of capital punishment over noncitizens,[21] and he could also “execute humbler citizens or send them to the mines.”[22] Indeed, the evidence indicates that the governor could inflict capital punishment on any Roman citizen, but “custom seems to have directed that the governor should remit capital cases of Roman citizens to the home government….”[23]

It may be concluded, then, that the Roman governor had absolute legal authority to deal with noncitizens, such as Christ, and to prescribe the death penalty, without fear of having his authority challenged.

As far as the procedure which a governor would follow is concerned, it is documented that he could “deal with crime inquisitorially, i.e., by investigating on his own initiative and by any means at his disposal….”[24] It is clear that “judicial administration in the provinces was much less precise and technical than that which was required in Rome itself….”[25] It is this fact which enables the flexibility and informality in Pilate’s dealings with Christ to be understood. There was nothing improper or unusual about it.

Crucifixion as a Punishment

Since Christ was crucified as a result of Pilate’s final decision, it is needful to examine this mode of punishment and the people on whom it was used. In general, the mode of crucifixion was adopted by the Romans “to inflict the death penalty upon rebellious slaves and seditious provincials.”[26] Concerning crucifixion, Garnsey wrote, “Crucifixion was the standing form of execution for slaves…. Furthermore, in the reign of Nero, Gessius Florus scourged and crucified some Jews in Jerusalem, including some equestrians. On other occasions, Jewish rebels suffered crucifixion…. A political charge was at least aired in the trial of Christ….”[27]

It is obvious from the Gospels that Christ was charged with sedition or treason (Luke 23:2; John 19:2). The law on treason was not specifically delineated but was capable of wide interpretation. Indeed, in the time of the empire, “the law was extended not only to all attempts on the life of the reigning prince, but to all acts and words which might appear to be disrespectful to him,”[28] and it was regarded as a capital crime. In the case of Christ, the evidence indicates that He “was on trial for his life before the Roman governor and the basis of the prosecution was his danger to the Roman state. The very means of execution shows that Jesus died as an offender against Rome, not the Jewish nation.”[29]

An Analysis of the Trial

The object here is to present an analysis from the viewpoint of Roman law to determine whether Pilate acted legally or illegally. It is readily admitted that the four Gospels do not deal directly with this subject. Evidently, they “are far more interested in Pilate’s character than in the judicial principles by which the trial was conducted.”[30]

Some writers maintain that Pilate acted illegally. Clark is a representative of this position:

The trial before Pilate was illegal because it was an appeal and yet a new charge of treason was presented by the chief priests. At the beginning the trial was marked with regularity and solemnity. But when Jesus returned from Herod, Pilate became afraid of the people. He listened to the mob—there was no order and no regularity.[31]

In response to Clark’s position it should be observed first that this was not an appeal. The Jews brought Christ to Pilate because they were forbidden by law to put Him to death themselves. Second, it should be remembered that a provincial governor had the legal freedom to conduct a trial as informally and with as little set procedure as he wished. Clark’s objections may hold good in relation to twentieth-century American jurisprudence, but they completely miss the mark of Roman jurisprudence.

Several observations may be made concerning Pilate and the legality of the trial of Christ. First, since Pilate was governor of Judea, and this was to be a capital offense, he was the proper person to conduct the trial of Christ. Second, he was quite correct in initially declining to hear the case, since the first charge was so vague (see John 18:30). Third, he acted in accordance with Roman law when there was an indictment for treason leveled against Christ (Luke 23:2), and he questioned Christ privately concerning this matter, deciding He was innocent. At this point Pilate had the legal authority to release Christ, but he did not. Instead, he once again went to the Jews, for which he has been criticized as acting illegally. However, when it is remembered that under Roman law a noncitizen, such as Christ, had no legal rights to begin with, then Pilate could not have acted illegally. He may be accused of being unethical or immoral (and rightly so), but he may not be accused of acting illegally under the Roman legal system. He had every legal authority to continue or not, as formally or informally as he pleased. Fourth, Pilate did not act in an unusual manner when he sent Christ to Herod (Luke 23:6–12). Greenidge has pointed out that a provincial governor had the power to ask anyone he wanted to be his adviser, and that “it was even possible in an important prosecution to summon expert advice from another province—nay, even a neighboring provincial governor himself….”[32] Herod’s refusal to try Jesus indicates that in his opinion Jesus was innocent; Pilate used this in his argument for Christ’s release (Luke 23:15).

The remainder of Pilate’s legal dealings with Christ may be considered from the legal basis of a noncitizen having no legal rights in Roman law.

An Evaluation of Pilate’s Actions

It can be observed that Pilate did attempt to save Jesus from the cross, by declaring Him innocent, by offering to chastise or scourge Him, and by offering to release Him as was the custom (but Barabbas was released instead). Indeed, it has been accurately said that Pilate “sent Jesus to the cross, but not before he had exhausted every expedient for saving Him, except the simple and straightforward one of dismissing the case.”[33] Pilate persisted in trying to convince the Jews to let him release Jesus “till they threatened to implicate in the charge of rebellion against Caesar the governor himself, if he persisted in unwonted mercy.”[34] This must have had a special effect on Pilate since only a year before Christ’s crucifixion, which took place in A.D. 33,[35] Pilate had been rebuked by the Emperor Tiberius concerning the shields he had set up in Herod’s palace which had offended the Jews. Pilate obviously was in no frame of mind at this early time to risk another confrontation with the emperor, if he thought it could be avoided.

It can also be accurately said that when Pilate delivered Christ to be crucified he demonstrated “all the cowardice of the judge who thus declines to act as the protector of innocence,”[36] and the natural principles of equity which should have been allowed to an alien (although not required by Roman law) were denied. This certainly constitutes in Pilate an act which is unethical and immoral, even if not technically illegal.

What could Pilate have done instead of sending Christ to the cross? He could have displayed the fortitude to do what was morally and ethically right, and then relied on the emperor’s sense of justice if the matter had been brought before him. The proconsul of Achaia, Gallio by name, did this very thing when the Apostle Paul was brought before him (Acts 18:12–17); he refused to hear the case and literally drove the complainers from his presence. Pilate could have done this, but instead he chose to follow what he thought was the politically expedient route and sent Christ to the cross.

Pilate’s Later Life

It is known from history that Pilate was removed from his position as governor in A.D. 36. The event that led directly to this was Pilate’s leading his troops against some restless Samaritans on Mount Gerizim, and conducting a needless massacre. The Samaritans complained to Vitellius, the legate of Syria, concerning this, and he immediately deposed Pilate and sent him to Rome to answer the accusations before the Emperor Tiberius. However, by the time Pilate had reached Rome, Tiberius was dead, and Caligula was on the throne.[37]

What happened to Pilate following this is a matter of some conjecture. Though there are many traditions, Eusebius stated that Pilate committed suicide.[38]

Conclusion

The purpose of this article has been to consider the trial of Christ before Pilate from the standpoint of Roman law. The conclusion was reached that there was technically no breach of Roman law in the trial due to the special fact that Christ was a noncitizen. However, it was also emphasized that there was more than the purely legal aspect which must be considered. Pilate certainly showed cowardice in the face of the clamoring Jews, and he acted in an unethical and immoral manner in that he did not release Christ even though he knew His innocence.

Pilate’s character is not to be envied: he appears as a vacillating, compromising individual more concerned with political expediency than with equity at the trial of Christ. His actions may not be condemned because they were illegal; however, his actions may justly be condemned because he acted against his own conscience (Matt 27:24), and also against what was morally and ethically correct.

Notes

1. See, for example, the following works: Johnston M. Cheney, The Life of Christ in Stereo, ed. Stanley A. Ellison (Portland, OR: Western Baptist Seminary Press, 1969); Alfred Edersheim, The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974); John H. Kerr, A Harmony of the Gospels (Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1924); A. T. Robertson, A Harmony of the Gospels (New York: Harper & Row, 1950); William M. Reese, “The Interwoven Gospels,” in The System Bible Study (Chicago: John Rudin & Co., 1967); and The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, s. v. “Pilate, Pontius,” by J. Macartney Wilson, 4:2396–98.
2. Wilson, “Pilate, Pontius,” p. 2396.
3. Jérême Carcopino, Daily Life in Ancient Rome, ed. H. T. Rowell, trans. E. O. Lorimer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 56-61.
4. Wilson, “Pilate, Pontius,” p. 2396. See also “Pilate,” Unger’s Bible Dictionary (Chicago: Moody Press, 1960), p. 865.
5. Josephus Jewish Antiquities (trans. Louis H. Feldman) 18.3.1, Loeb Classical Library (1963), pp. 42-47; Josephus The Jewish Wars (trans. H. St. J. Thackeray) 2.19.2–3, Loeb Classical Library (1927), pp. 389-91.
6. Josephus Jewish Antiquities 18.3.29, Loch Classical Library, pp. 46-47; Josephus The Jewish Wars 2.9.4, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 391-93.
7. Philonis Alexandrini, Legatio ad Gaium, xxxviii, ed. and trans. E. Mary Smallwood (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961), pp. 128-30. That this event is dated at A.D. 32 has been adequately presented by Harold W. Hoehner, “Chronological Aspects of the Life of Christ,” Bibliotheca Sacra 131 (October-December 1974): 344-45.
8. It will be observed that references to both criminal law and ius privatum are included in the discussion. It was deemed necessary to proceed thusly in order to illustrate the totality of the concept of Roman law at the time of Christ.
9. Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History, trans. J. M. Kelly, 2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 40.
10. Francis Lyall, “Roman Law in the Writings of Paul—Aliens and Citizens,” The Evangelical Quarterly 48 (January-March 1976): 12.
11. The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, s. v. “Jesus Christ, Arrest and Trial of,” by John James Maclaren, 3:1671.
12. Lyall, “Roman Law,” p. 12.
13. Peter Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 139.
14. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
15. Ibid., p. 262.
16. Lord Mackenzie, Studies in Roman Law, 6th ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1886), p. 84.
17. A. H. J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero’s Time (London: Oxford University Press, 1901), p. 410.
18. A. H. M. Jones, Studies in Roman Government and Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), p. 124.
19. Kunkel, Introduction, p. 85.
20. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
21. H. F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1954), p. 412.
22. Gamsey, Social Status, p. 121.
23. Greenidge, Legal Procedure, p. 413.
24. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction, p. 413.
25. William Riley Wilson, The Execution of Jesus (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), p. 130. This type of procedure was established by Augustus and is known as cognitio extra ordinem; it is described in some detail by Kunkel (Introduction, pp. 69-74).
26. Paul Winter, On the Trial of Jesus (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1961), p. 65.
27. Garnsey, Social Status, p. 127.
28. Mackenzie, Studies, p. 395.
29. W. R. Wilson, Execution, p. 130.
30. Ibid., p. 18.
31. Allen Clark, “The Court Trials of Jesus: Illegal,” Faith for the Family, March/April, 1976, p. 15.
32. Greenidge, Legal Procedure, p. 410.
33. J. M. Wilson, “Pilate, Pontius,” p. 2398.
34. Edersheim, Life and Times, 2:580.
35. Hoehner, “Chronological Aspects,” pp. 332-48. Not all will agree with Hoehner on this date, but his arguments are cogent and persuasive, and seem to account best for all the available evidence
36. Frederick Louis Godet, Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, n.d.,), 2:326.
37. Josephus Jewish Antiquities 18.4.1-2, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 60-65. See also S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock, and M. P. Charlesworth, eds., The Cambridge Ancient History, 12 vols. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1963), 10:649–50.
38. Eusebius The Ecclesiastical History (trans. Kirsopp Lake) 2.7, Loeb Classical Library (1926), p. 125.