Dual Authorship and the Single Intended Meaning of Scripture

By Elliott E. Johnson

[Elliott E. Johnson, Professor of Bible Exposition, Dallas Theological Seminary]

Christian hermeneutics has long wrestled with the perplexing problem of the dual authorship—divine and human—of Scripture. This dual authorship seems to imply that a given passage may have more than one meaning. Yet in order to maintain the determinate nature of interpretation, Protestant hermeneutics has often affirmed the maxim of one meaning and many applications.

In response to the hermeneutical problem of how many meanings a passage may have, two solutions have been proposed in current evangelical discussions. These two will be evaluated briefly and then a third alternative will be proposed.

Single Meaning

Kaiser presents a view held by many evangelicals.[1] He writes:

Evangelicals are urged to begin a new “hermeneutical reformation”…it is urged that the following axioms be adopted and implemented….

1) God’s meaning and revelatory-intention in any passage of Scripture may be accurately and confidently ascertained only by studying the verbal meanings of the divinely delegated and inspired writers….

2) That single, original verbal meaning of the human author may be ascertained by heeding the usual literary conventions of history, culture, grammar, syntax, and accumulated theological context.[2]

This is certainly accurate as far as it goes. The divine meanings are expressed in the human author’s words. But in other writings Kaiser states the issue in this question: “Could God see or intend a sense in a particular text separate and different from that conceived and intended by his human instrument?”[3] The issue turns on the words “separate” and “different.” How is the divine meaning separate and different from the human author’s meaning? Kaiser affirms that there is no difference. In fact he says the human authors of Scripture fully knew and expressed the divine meaning. So he concludes, “God did not exceed the intention of the human author.”[4]

In discussing 1 Peter 1:10–12, Kaiser rightly argues that the passage does not support “double meaning.” But he also argues that the ignorance of the human authors was an ignorance, not of the subject matter of the Old Testament prophecies, but of the times when those prophecies would be fulfilled. “This passage does not teach that these men were curious and often ignorant of the exact meaning of what they wrote and predicted. Theirs was not a search for the meaning of what they wrote; it was inquiry into the temporal aspects of the subject, which went beyond what they wrote.”[5]

His argument seems to be dealt a fatal blow, however, if temporal aspects are stated in some of the prophets’ writings. And such is certainly the case in Daniel 9:24–27. A period of time was decreed against Israel that is related to the 70 years predicted by Jeremiah (Jer 25:11). So Peter’s general summary could legitimately include Daniel’s ignorance of all the implications of what he wrote. This ignorance seems to be referred to in other passages as well. Daniel repeatedly prayed for understanding of the visions he saw (Dan 7:15–16; 8:15–16; 10:12–14).

After Daniel was given understanding, he was told to “seal up the book until the end of time” (Dan 12:4). God spoke through Daniel to later generations who would understand more fully what Daniel wrote on the scroll. Their understanding would not arise, however, because of new, special revelation but because they could recognize the correspondence between what Daniel had written and what was happening in their day in its historical fulfillment. So Simeon had a prophetic understanding and expectation: He was “looking for the consolation of Israel” (Luke 2:25). Similarly John the Baptist understood his ministry in terms of the prophetic Word and described it as such (3:4–5). Jesus likewise presented Himself as fulfilling the prophetic expectation (4:17–19), and the people of His day recognized Him in terms defined by Old Testament prophets (9:19–20). In each case it is possible that those who lived when prophecies of Jesus were fulfilled understood the prophecies better than the prophets themselves understood their writings, and the later understanding was based not on further revelation but on correspondence between the prophecies and their fulfillments. (Of course in some situations additional revelation did provide the basis for understanding earlier prophecies.)

Though Kaiser’s work[6] is appreciated for his insistence on the single meaning of Scripture, his limiting the biblical meaning to what the human author consciously perceived must be rejected.

One Literal Meaning and Several Spiritual Meanings

A second evangelical alternative is presented by LaSor.[7] He forthrightly affirms that “the literal meaning of the text, then, is the basic meaning and the basis for interpretation…. Without the literal sense we have no control of any other sense.”[8] This literal sense is the product of the grammatical-historical method. Then LaSor writes:

Starting from the premise that the Bible is the word of God to the people of His covenant, it follows that this word is applicable according to His will to all generations. Since He is a spiritual being and since His purpose is redemptive, it follows that His word is spiritual and redemptive. There is therefore a spiritual meaning—or possibly more than one spiritual meaning—implicit in His word. Discovering the spiritual message in, rather than imposing it on, the Scripture is a serious task; and the believing community has attempted various methods.[9]

On the surface the approaches of Kaiser and LaSor seem directly opposite. While Kaiser argues for single meaning and single intent, LaSor readily acknowledges a literal meaning and one or more spiritual meanings. In part the difference is one of emphasis. Kaiser acknowledges the importance of recognizing several factors in interpreting a passage’s single meaning, including history, culture, grammar, syntax, and accumulated theological teaching. LaSor limits the literal meaning to two contexts: grammatical and historical. At this point it is clear that Kaiser’s view of “single meaning” differs from LaSor’s view of “literal meaning.” But in this author’s opinion, LaSor has lost control on the determination of limits to meaning in his discussion of sensus plenior.

In discussing the Davidic Covenant LaSor criticizes the literal meaning as being inaccurate. “Israel did not continue to live ‘in their own place, and be disturbed no more’ ([2 Sam] 7:10)…. The throne of David was not ‘made sure forever’” (7:16).[10] Then he turns to the New Testament writers’ view of the Davidic Covenant and concludes, “It becomes obvious that, for the New Testament writers (and for Jesus), at least, the Old Testament passage must have some deeper meaning.”[11] Concluding the discussion with these remarks, LaSor leaves a number of questions unanswered. If the literal meaning is inaccurate, in what sense is it a controlling base for the sensus plenior? If a passage has some deeper meaning, what limits exist for that deeper meaning? How are those limits recognized? These two approaches introduce the need for parameters in interpreting the Bible. The first parameter is determinate limits that enable meaning to be known and recognized as known. The second parameter is flexibility in the fullness of meaning so that some distinction may be acknowledged between the textual sense understood in the historic context and this same sense understood in its future fulfillment.

At stake here is the very tradition of literal interpretation that both Kaiser[12] and LaSor acknowledge as basic to accurate and controlled interpretation. At issue is the question of whether there is a sensus plenior that is legitimate and one that is illegitimate. Could God intend a sense separate and different from that intended by the human author? LaSor argues for a sensus plenior that is built on the literal sense.

One Single Meaning That Includes Related Submeanings

In Kaiser’s view the “control” for interpretation is that each text has a single meaning that is textually determined. He properly recognizes historical and cultural contexts with emphasis on lexical, grammatical, and syntactical considerations. In addition the theological context is limited to the accumulated theological revelation at the time of the human writer. The textual context determines the meanings expressed, and the theological context may inform his written textual usage. It is clear that the stated text was understood sufficiently by the human author to express the message. But are there unstated meanings that are also necessarily intended meanings? Clearly in cases where there is dictation of the message, as in the case of the “70 sevens,” Daniel may not have understood the full sense of what he wrote. In his case the decree to rebuild Jerusalem had not yet been given. Who can say that Daniel knew the date of the future decree? The date that would initiate the period of the “70 sevens” was unknovrn. Thus a definition of literal sense that rests on the indeterminate aspect of the human author’s awareness results in a literal sense that is ultimately indeterminate itself.

Another view of “controls” in interpretation is that the sense of a passage is textually indeterminate. This is the traditional allegorical interpretation. In this view a text may have a literal sense and also several other senses determined by other factors such as theology, church tradition, or spiritual practice. Since the textual form may be interpreted within any conceivable context brought by the interpreter, no controls are within the text itself. This is the danger in LaSor’s treatment of the Davidic Covenant.

A third view is proposed by this writer. In this view the sense of a passage is textually determined as a single meaning that includes any related submeanings or implications of the meaning expressed by the human author. This statement of literal sense has the advantage of being textually determined. The sense expressed by the author in the text is a single meaning that includes any unstated yet related submeaning, a meaning that is a necessary trait of that type of meaning as a whole. It follows that the determinate nature of literal meaning must be defined not at the word level but at the level of a unit of text in which the author expresses a single message or proposition. Each message expressed by the author involves a distinct unit. The most clearly distinguished unit expressed by a human author is the composition of the whole piece of literature. However, this includes many other subunits of thought, such as sentences, paragraphs, and chapters. The propositions so expressed must also be recognized as distinct “types of meaning” subsumed by the overall type of meaning.

This recognized type of meaning determines the limits of a literal meaning. In this model the textual meaning consists of (a) a type of meaning as a whole and (b) component traits of meaning. This rests on a knowledge of categories of meaning shared between an author and his reader. When an author expresses a new type of meaning in the text, the reader recognizes that meaning as he reads. The meanings of the text are necessary or associated traits of the type of meaning expressed. This model describing the communication of textual meanings explains both the implications of the textual sense and the implications of historical reference. It does not rest on determining those meanings the human author is aware of or on distinguishing which meanings the divine Author knows beyond the human author. Meaning is determined by the text and by considering the historical reference about which the Author spoke.

This model of the literal meaning can be supported because it accounts for test cases in which the biblical writers interpreted the Bible. The divine and human authors shared the textually expressed meanings. How many additional unstated submeanings the human author consciously knew is unnecessary to determine. At the same time God, since He is omniscient, intended all the submeanings necessary to this expressed type of meaning. The interpreter may not know or recognize all these submeanings until the divinely intended reference appears in history. But such recognition of submeanings is not a “consequent” sense.[13] Nor are they “separate” in the sense of unrelated. They are separate only in the sense of being unstated. Nor are they “different” in the sense of being conflicting. They are different only in the sense of being unexpressed. They are necessary submeanings of a category of meaning. They are necessary because, though they are unstated, they still define that type of meaning. In addition there are associated traits which, though not defining, are commonly associated with this type of meaning. But associated traits must be stated for them to be determined.

Without identifying this model of type and trait of meaning, Marshall exhibits the same concept. He imagines the Apostle John responding, “I hadn’t consciously thought of the story like that, but now that you suggest it to me, I would agree that you could also understand it in that way.”[14] This approach also helps clarify passages that are difficult to interpret.

The Views Illustrated in Isaiah 7:14

As illustrated in Isaiah 7:14, submeanings or implications are not an “elusive surplussage.”[15] Two questions focus on the central issues in this crux interpretum. What is the meaning of Isaiah 7:14, and what is the correspondence between Isaiah 7:14 and the sign to Ahaz? Three views have been given in answer to these questions. (1) The verse refers to a natural conception, and the birth of a son was the sign to Ahaz. (2) The verse refers to a natural conception followed by the birth of a son, which was a sign to Ahaz; and at the same time the verse typologically refers to the supernatural conception of Christ to which Matthew refers. (3) The verse refers to the supernatural conception and birth of Christ, and the sign refers either to the growth of this future “Son” or more likely, to the statement of promise given to Ahaz.

Support for the meaning of a natural conception rests in the broad semantic range of the word, עַלְמָה. In Hebrew usage this word means “young woman.” Koehler and Baumgartner say the word means a girl of marriageable age, a young woman (until the birth of her first child).[16]

However, some would seek to limit the range by specifying the trait of virginity. “Since bétulā is used many times in the Old Testament as a specific word for ‘virgin,’ it seems reasonable to consider that the feminine form of 'almâ is not a technical word for virgin but represents a young woman, one of whose characteristics is virginity.”[17] This limited sense rests on biblical usage where the sense can be determined, but not all cases are clear. And since עַלְמָה is not the technical term in Old Testament usage, Wilson draws the following conclusion: “Since the presumption of common law and usage was and is, that every 'almah is virgin and virtuous until she is proven not to be we have the right in assuming that Rebecca and the 'almah of Isa 7:14 were virgins until and unless it shall be proven that they were not.”[18]

Because of the difficulty in limiting the meaning of עַלְמָה to “virgin,” various commentators have concluded that Isaiah’s promise refers to a historic woman, either Isaiah’s bride-to-be or Ahaz’s wife, who conceived in a natural fashion and not as a virgin. Isaiah’s prophecy then concerned the timing of the conception and the birth of the boy. The determinate limits of the condition of the young woman are settled in the broader semantic range of the word in its usage.

This interpretation is certainly legitimate, but it conflicts with Matthew’s interpretation. In Matthew, the angel quoted Isaiah to satisfy Joseph’s concern, since Isaiah anticipated a “virgin conception.” Mary’s pregnancy, which came by the Holy Spirit, was a historic realization of what Isaiah prophesied. So Joseph need not put her away but could take her as his wife without any sense of guilt or any concern. This sense of “virgin conception” is not the same as “natural conception.” Thus in light of the broader biblical context the limited historic view (view 1) must be rejected.

Therefore some have taken the historic sense to have also a typological meaning that anticipates a future conception. Hoekema holds to this interpretation. “Obviously, this [Isa 7:14] was fulfilled in the immediate future in the birth of a child as a sign to King Ahaz [but] the greater fulfillment of these words to Ahaz occurred when Jesus was born of the virgin Mary.”[19] In typology there are shared traits as well as traits distinguishing the type from the antitype. In this case the shared traits must be the same kind of conception and birth. In this typology view the conception by a woman in Isaiah’s day anticipated and was fulfilled in Christ’s conception. But in what way is a natural conception a type of a virgin conception? In fact this example of double reference involves two meanings that are unrelated in the text. A natural conception corresponds to a virgin conception only in that both are conceptions. In this interpreter’s judgment, the single textual meaning is violated in the two unrelated types of conception, natural and virgin. The natural conception was miraculous only in timing, and that timing does not adequately typify the virgin conception by Mary.

Rather than being established by usage, the meaning of the kind of conception is determined in the contextual type of meaning expressed by Isaiah. The meaning builds on the legitimate semantic range of עַלְמָה but the determining limits are found in the type of meaning expressed in the context. While there maybe some question about the defining components of a type of meaning, it is clear that a subject and complement define important components of the textual meaning. The immediate textual unit is Isaiah 7:10–17. Isaiah proclaimed a sign that is two-edged. This is the subject. The Lord granted evidence (signs) that accompany His Word and vouch for its validity and reliability. At issue in the context is the Lord’s warning of the certain and near demise of Damascus and Ephraim (7:7–9a). Included as well is a warning concerning Ahaz’s own future (7:9b). His future rested on his faith in response to the Lord’s warning.

Isaiah offered a sign to verify his warnings. When Ahaz refused to believe (7:12), the sign did two things. It guaranteed the house of David in spite of the threat of attack from Israel and Syria, and at the same time it assured the king of his coming demise.

The Hebrew word אֹת (“sign”) “either signifies the unusual event itself (miraculous display) or in some way points to that unusual event.”[20] Beecher has argued with force that the syntax of the stated prophecy reflects the syntax of the promise formulation of a divinely enabled birth as it was first spoken to Abraham and Sarah.[21] When this promise was clarified (Gen 15:4–5), Abram asked how he might know it would happen. In response God confirmed the promise in the form of a covenant formulation. In the initial expression, the covenant gave evidence of fulfillment.

The sign then was in the restatement of the divine Word that promised a divinely enabled birth. In Isaiah’s prophecy the sign[22] was in the statement of the promise that pointed to an unusual miracle in the future. The complement expressed something about that two-edged sign. It denied Ahaz, who rejected the sign, a future in the royal line. And yet it affirmed the glorious climax of the Davidic line in spite of imminent judgment by Assyria. If this is stated about the עַלְמָה conception, then the conception must necessarily be a virgin conception. Only a virgin conception would exclude Ahaz or his heir from participating in the royal line of David. Thus the type of meaning expresses limits and determines the sense of עַלְמָת and harmonizes completely with the Matthean usage.

But what about the historical elements in the sign? A prediction of a future miraculous conception does not seem at first to relate to the events in Ahaz’s day. The antecedent of “He” in 7:15 seems to anticipate some historic figure. This difficulty may be surmounted either by saying that “He” refers to the future born Son in anticipation of His growth[23] or by saying that “He” refers to “Shear-Jashub” (7:3), whom Isaiah was told to bring with him during his prophecy. This second alternative would introduce a break in thought between 7:14 and 7:15, as a new subject is introduced.

This model of literal interpretation meets the criteria demanded by the biblical usage and data. First, it establishes a determinate sense expressed in the text. This determinate meaning is shared by the human author who expressed the text and by the divine Author who authored the text. Recognized as a type of meaning, it determines both the proposition (subject and complement) and any unstated but necessary submeanings. Isaiah knew that his prophecy anticipated an עַלְמָה, a virgin who conceives and who bears a son who is named Immanuel. Did Isaiah know it referred to and meant Mary? One has no way of knowing. Did God know it meant Mary? There is no way of denying that. If Isaiah could have been transported to the time of Mary’s experience and he had no further information beyond his own prophecy, he could identify her as the girl God said would conceive. This is the understanding of the angel, of Joseph, and of Matthew who recorded the prediction. The construction of biblical meaning and its interpretation recognizes determinate textual limits and possible components of meaning in the progress of revelation. Thus this model of literal interpretation is valid because it corresponds with the data of Scripture and because it meets the demands of literal interpretation.

Notes

1. Walter C. Kaiser Jr., “The Single Intent of Scripture,” in Evangetical Roots, ed. Kenneth C. Kantzer (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1978), pp. 123-42.
2. Ibid., p. 138 (italics added).
3. Walter C. Kaiser Jr., “A Response to Author’s Intention and Biblical Interpretation,” in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible, ed. Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984), p. 442 (italics his).
4. Ibid., pp. 445-46.
5. Kaiser, “The Single Intent of Scripture,” p. 126 (italics added).
6. “The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics, Article XVIII,” in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible, pp. 889-900.
7. William Sanford LaSor, “The Sensus Plenior and Biblical Interpretation,” in Scripture, Tradition and Interpretation, ed. W. Ward Gasque and William Sanford LaSor (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 260-77.
8. Ibid., p. 263.
9. Ibid., p. 266.
10. Ibid., p. 268.
11. Ibid., (italics added).
12. Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., Toward an Exegetical Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981).
13. Kaiser, “A Response to Author’s Intention and Biblical Interpretation,” pp. 441-42.
14. I. Howard Marshall, “Introduction,” in New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Principles and Methods, ed. I. Howard Marshall (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 11-14.
15. Kaiser, “A Response to Author’s Intention,” p. 442.
16. Ludwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner, eds., Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), p. 709.
17. Theological Word Book of the Old Testament, s.v. “עלְמה,” by Allan MacRae, 2:672.
18. Robert Dick Wilson, “The Meaning of ‘ALMA (AV virgin) in Isaiah 7:14, ” Princeton Theological Review 24 (1926): 308.
19. Anthony A. Hoekema, The Bible and the Future (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979), p. 209.
20. Theological Word Book of the Old Testament, s.v. “אוֹת,” by Robert L. Alden, 1:19.
21. Willis J. Beecher, The Prophets and the Promise (1905; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1963).
22. The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, s.v.”σημειον,” by O. Hofius, 2:627.
23. Edward J. Young, The Book of Isaiah, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1965, 1967, 1969), 1:291–92.