The Relationship Between The Imago Dei And Unbelievers

By Kymberli M. Cook

[Kymberli M. Cook is Assistant Director of the Hendricks Center and a PhD student at Dallas Theological Seminary, Dallas, Texas.]

Abstract

Unbelievers can be unintentionally left out of discussions surrounding the imago Dei due to differing interpretations of the tension between the New Testament and Old Testament accounts. Such an oversight may reduce appreciation of each person’s dignity and result in a lack of respect and care in public discourse. This study argues for the post-fall inclusion of unbelievers in the concept of the imago Dei by examining four prominent interpretations of the image and asserting that each can accommodate such an understanding.

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All humanity was created in the image of God. Human dignity is grounded in that image. All humans—including unbelievers—therefore are afforded the dignity of being made in God’s image. In the history of interpretation of the imago Dei these are contested assumptions. Humans were created in the image of God at creation (Gen 1:26–27), but was it lost in the fall? Is it only restored in Christ? Humans have dignity, to be sure, but is it grounded in the image or somewhere else? Are unbelievers—those who reject Christ, who is the complete and perfect image of God—really in God’s image if they refuse to be conformed to the image of Christ? If they are not in Christ, how can they be in the image of God? The conclusions to these questions have heavy implications for the nature of creation, humanity, revelation, salvation, and eschatology. As a result, there are at least half as many interpretations of the image as there are questions, which deepen the complexity and make conclusions more elusive.

Yet these questions are highly relevant. When the dignity of all humanity is forgotten, relegated, or unintentionally overlooked by those in the body of Christ, the name of our God is disparaged.

The belief that Christians are superior in skill or knowledge can lead to an arrogant tone in discussions in the public square. This posture poorly reflects our Savior, who “though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped” (Phil 2:6).[1] This may also raise questions for unbelievers (and perhaps even believers) concerning core characteristics that God has disclosed about himself, including his love and provision. My goal is to argue that God has given his image to all humanity, particularly those who reject him. This study is offered in the hope that people will recognize that God’s image grants unbelievers the dignity to warrant respectful engagement, loving service, and gratitude for their contributions to society and creation itself.

Dignity And The Imago Dei

This section introduces the conversations surrounding each of the opening statements. It will briefly argue for each claim, explore how they are contested, and offer an orientation to the rest of the argument within the article.[2]

All Humanity Was Created In The Imago Dei

That humanity is made in the image of God is fairly uncontested. However, the details are open for interpretation: where the image lies (intrinsic or extrinsic), its content (substance, function, relationship, person of Christ), its fate after the fall (lost, marred, untouched), and the implications of Christ for it (he has always been the only image, he has renewed the image, he has fulfilled the image). It is important to establish one fundamental assumption—“humanity” includes each human being.[3] Kilner argued אָדָם/adam in Genesis 1:26–27 “refers not only to a single man named Adam but also to humanity as a whole.”[4] This is indicated by the use of a singular pronoun in verse 27 “by which the Hebrew text indicates that in some sense it is the single entity, humanity as a whole, that is associated with God’s image.”[5] He supported this understanding with New Testament passages that “tend to have a corporate entity (group) in view,” such as Romans 8:29 and 1 Corinthians 3:18. In a footnote he provided additional justification with a wide swath of imago Dei scholars who also emphasize the corporate dimension of the image.[6] There is certainly a tension between the corporate and individual dynamic; so it should not be misunderstood that the individual is not also in view here. However, the corporate dimension is often so overlooked in Western societies that it bears highlighting. Following Kilner, it seems responsible to recognize both dimensions of how God created humankind in his image. Every human and all humanity are made in his image.

Human Dignity Is Grounded In The Imago Dei

Being made in the image of the omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal God distinguishes humanity from God’s other creations. “Our worth is connected to our creator” through his declaration of that worth (Gen 1:31).[7] Ascribing dignity to people honors that declaration. Mitchell described this ascription as granting “each member of the species” an “inherent value” and treating them “with special respect.”[8] Kilner succinctly described dignity as offering people “respect and protection.”[9]

Dignity is grounded in the image of God biblically, historically, and practically. Biblically, the connection is evident in passages such as Genesis 9:6, which demands death as the just consequence of murder on the basis that “God made man in his own image.”[10]

James 3:9 commands guarding one’s words about others (specifically not cursing them) because they are “made in the likeness of God.”[11] Historically there were Christian theologians, missionaries, and ministry leaders who grounded their work for others in the imago Dei. This is best exemplified by Pseudo-Clement’s argument for care and protection offered to other human beings based on the presence of the image of God:

For if you really wished to worship the image of God, you would do good to man, and so worship the true image of God in him. For the image of God is in every man, though His likeness is not in all, but where the soul is benign and the mind pure. If, therefore, you wish truly to honour the image of God, we declare to you what is true, that you should do good to and pay honour and reverence to man, who is made in the image of God; that you minister food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, clothing to the naked, hospitality to the stranger, and necessary things to the prisoner; and that is what will be regarded as truly bestowed upon God. And so far do these things go to the honour of God’s image, that he who does not these things is regarded as casting reproach upon the divine image.[12]

Not only is this connection between the image and dignity present in theological reflection, but it is also present in the fields of economics, medicine, and law.[13] Practically, where recognition of the dignity of each person has been grounded in the image of God, liberation and freedom have typically followed. “Intellectual honesty demands recognition of the fact that what passes as ‘secular,’ ‘Western’ principles of basic human rights developed nowhere else but out of key strands of biblically rooted religions.”[14] When this is disregarded or the image is misunderstood, Kilner argued, oppression results.[15] Based on biblical commands, the voices of Christians throughout history, and the flourishing that follows such an assumption, it seems reasonable to recognize that dignity and the image of God are intricately connected.[16]

All Humans Should Be Afforded The Dignity Of The Imago Dei

If we accept that all humanity, adam, was created in the image of God and that inherent in the image is a gift of dignity demanding protection and respect, then all humans should be afforded that dignity. Yet a difficulty remains. This logic can be demonstrated from the Old Testament, but the New Testament’s characterization of the image of God complicates the issue. Almost from the beginning of reflection on the imago Dei, Christian theologians have recognized a tension between two scriptural realities. There are passages describing a universality of the imago Dei, regardless of one’s sinful or fallen state (Gen 9:6; Jas 3:9; 1 Cor 11:7). The image of God may be marred, but there exists something within humankind that remains the imago Dei despite the fall. Other passages, however, shift an understanding of the image of God toward a new humanity and re-creation of humanity in Christ (Rom 8:29; 2 Cor 3:18; 4:4; Col 1:15; 3:10; Eph 4:22–23; Heb 1:3). Humanity is made in the image of God, but Christ is the very image of God. To be truly in the image of God, we must be in Christ. How believers address this tension impacts their view and ultimately their treatment of unbelievers.

How have Christians navigated these two realities? One set of solutions aligns itself solely with the above New Testament passages, emphasizing Christ as the only means by which we may be reunited with the image of God that was lost at the fall. One option within this set of interpretations understands the image as only ever having been the person of Christ, to whom one must be conformed and/or united to be in the image of God.[17] Others have understood the image to be directly linked to righteousness. Therefore it is utterly lost in the fall and only restored in the new Adam.[18] The common theme is humanity’s loss of the image and Christ’s solitary role in its restoration. This position (at best passively) presents a view that unbelievers are not in the image of God.

These positions desire to do justice to both the seriousness of sin and Christ’s distinct work of redemption. Yet to say that the image of God was lost violates the tradition of ascribing dignity to humanity by means of the image—for where else would it be grounded?[19] Denying dignity to humanity violates Old Testament passages that command protection and respect because of the image’s presence. This conclusion risks replacing the image with sin. Berkouwer, while recognizing and valuing the desire to do justice to the doctrine of total depravity, argued this goes too far: “Human nature is indeed corrupt in all its powers, but there is no transformation into another substance.”[20] He went on to suggest, “We must distinguish between man’s nature as created by God—in which original sin now dwells—and original sin itself.”[21] To fail to make this distinction, for Berkouwer, results in claiming God as the Creator of sin.[22] This first set of solutions to the tension between the New and Old Testament concepts of the image, those establishing a complete loss of the original image, will not allow a navigable route through the difficult scriptural realities due to their implications concerning human dignity.[23]

A second set of solutions has more varied approaches. The first option ascribes two different senses to the image, reflecting the two different scriptural realities. One sense has in mind something within humanity that remains either corrupted or even untouched by the fall (imago existentialis). The other sense has a moral dimension that is action-oriented and requires conformity to Christ (imago conformitas).[24] This has been perhaps the most prominent interpretation throughout history. It was introduced by Irenaeus’s distinction between the “image” (imago existentialis), which remained after the fall, and “likeness” (imago conformitas), which was lost only to be restored in conformity to Christ.[25] Berkouwer traced this same manner of distinction in the Greek Orthodox tradition (a distinction between the image of God and nature), the Reformed tradition (termed “wide/broad” and “narrow” senses), and even some Lutheran theologians (described as “public” and “private”).[26] It might even be argued this tradition is present in the Catholic distinction between natural man and the donum superadditum. Despite its established past, this interpretation is challenged because it creates an antinomy or leaves concepts unhelpfully unreconciled.[27] Berkouwer questioned if it is really just establishing two different images, which might not be consistent with the scriptural account either.[28]

Another possibility for navigating the two scriptural realities is to recognize that though the image was damaged by the fall, a trace of the image remains. The fall marred but did not erase the image. This trace would need to be ontic as it was affected by the fall, making it compatible with a substantialist interpretation of the imago Dei. As will be discussed below in the treatment of the substantialist interpretation, this approach raises doubts largely because it seems to favor parts of humanity over the whole. What is this substance or capacity? Concerns also arise because it seems subjective. What is the “trace”? How do we know what makes it enough to warrant the label “image”? While strong objections are raised, some highly respected theologians take this approach, and it should be considered a reasonable option for navigating our two scriptural realities.[29]

The final option to address the apparent paradox of the imago Dei in the Bible is an attempt to ground the image extrinsically to humankind. From this perspective, the image is a reality granted and maintained by God for all humanity yet removed from direct corruption in the fall. Supporters of this view describe the content or character of the image with various approaches: relationship, function, or the person of Christ. Yet each approach has the capability of locating the image in a call or capacity granted by God rather than within the ontological fabric of the human being, which is totally depraved and utterly corrupted by the fall. From this perspective, Kilner argued, humanity is damaged but not the image.[30] Humanity is then able to be restored and re-created in the image of Christ, but those who choose to reject him maintain their status as being “in the image of God.”

It seems that any of the options in this second set of interpretations are valid, but due to the discussed weaknesses of the two-images approach, the latter two options hold the most promise for establishing the place of the image in all humanity. To complete this argument for the third opening statement (all humans—including unbelievers—are afforded the dignity of the status of being made in the image of God), the rest of this study will seek to demonstrate that major interpretations can accommodate the concept of unbelievers imaging God throughout the redemptive arc.

Unbelievers In A Substantialist Interpretation

The substantialist interpretation claims the presence of something substantive inherent within each person and is one of the oldest approaches to the imago Dei. It has been held by respected Christian theologians throughout the history of the church, including Irenaeus, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas. Some objections to this interpretation include a perceived elevation of the immaterial over the physical, a separation of the human person into parts, a lack of explicit biblical support, implications for the dignity of those without typical functions in whatever part the image is understood, as well as the aforementioned push against consideration of the image as intrinsic in humanity. Anchored in Christian history and particularly championed by Thomas Aquinas, this interpretation is held predominantly by Roman Catholic theologians.

In Aquinas’s treatment of the image of God, foundational for the substantialist interpretation, he introduced his own position with Augustine’s declaration, “Herein lies man’s eminence, that God made man after his own image in so far as he gave him an intelligent mind, which is where he surpasses the animals. So whatever lacks intelligence is not after God’s image.”[31] Aquinas posited that this intellect is what distinguishes humans from other creatures and is located in the mind.[32] In our current context, Levering argued for “the ‘image of God’ (Gen 1:27) as the human imaging of the divine wisdom (above all by knowing God) and the human imaging of the divine goodness and freedom (above all by loving God).”[33] He located the image of God in the human soul.[34] Visala, largely introducing neuroscientific data to support a substantialist approach, contributed an important nuance in terminology by adding “potential” into the interpretation: “The image of God is identified with the potential to develop uniquely human cognitive mechanisms, mainly reason and will.”[35] By making this nuance explicit, he addressed one of the main objections of those who find the substantialist interpretation demeaning for the dignity of the unborn, disabled, and comatose. Levering also argued against this objection on the grounds of the image’s location in the soul rather than the body.[36] Substantialists say the image resides inherently in the immaterial dimension of a person from which the individual reflects God by means of cognitive capabilities—making relationship, function, and freedom possible. The purpose of the image is God’s intention to commune with humanity in “covenantal fulfillment that accomplishes the unity of divine and human knowing and loving.”[37]

This purpose was complicated, however, by the free decision of Adam and Eve to reject God’s commandments, pursuing knowledge “in an inordinate way.” For those understanding the image of God to reside in the “intellectual soul,” the result of the fall is a “loss of wisdom.”[38] This loss does not eliminate the image of God nor a desire for good, but it erects a barrier between that desire and its satisfaction. The Catechism elaborates, “[Man] is now inclined to evil and subject to error: Man is divided in himself. As a result, the whole life of men, both individual and social, shows itself to be a struggle, and a dramatic one, between good and evil, between light and darkness.”[39] Visala pointed out,

The extent to which sin blemishes or distorts the image of God is a controversial issue among defenders of [the substantial view]. All agree that sin has corrupted some of the capacities of the soul, usually will and desire, but this does not mean that the imago Dei has been completely lost. The operations of human cognition might very well be impaired—because of the disordering of desires, for instance—but at least some core functions still remain operational.[40]

The image of God survives the fall but not without a loss of wisdom and a resulting inclination toward evil.

Christ, who is the center of the imago Dei, is the perfect image of God.[41] Aquinas described this nuance, “The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the ‘Image,’ and never ‘to the image.’ But man is said to be both ‘image’ by reason of the likeness; and ‘to the image’ by reason of the imperfect likeness.”[42] The perfect image of God came to remedy the ravages of sin, offering restoration to humanity by making them “capable of acting rightly and doing good.”[43]

The rejection of this remedy, which demonstrates a lack of wisdom and an embrace of evil, does not result in the loss of God’s image, for humanity still has the capacity toward wisdom, goodness, and love (though they do not embrace that capability).[44] In the substantialist interpretation, the image of God is located in the soul, which is present even in eternal punishment. Concerning hell, the Catechism states, “The teaching of the Church affirms the existence of hell and its eternity. Immediately after death the souls of those who die in a state of mortal sin descend into hell, where they suffer the punishments of hell, ‘eternal fire.’ ”[45] The souls (and eventually resurrected bodies) of those who reject Christ’s salvation are still souls that house the image of God. Therefore, the image remains despite the fall, despite rejection of the perfect image, and despite eternal condemnation.

Unbelievers In A Relational Interpretation

Among those who understand the imago Dei in a relational dimension, the one uniting theme is relationship as God’s intention for humanity, typically anchored in his own Trinitarian nature.[46] A strength of this interpretation is its ability to account for a significant number of biblical themes throughout the canon, particularly adoption, reconciliation, and covenant. There are at least two general divisions in this interpretation. The first is seen in a Reformed approach, championed by Barth, in which the image is external to humankind, lying in God’s will and intention for humanity.[47] In the second, supported by scholars such as Terence E. Fretheim, Brian Rosner, and Catherine McDowell, the image lies in familial connections between God and humanity.[48]

To be in God’s image in the familial sense is to consider men and women as God’s children. God is the father whose relationality is basic to his being, and relationality is therefore “basic to the being” of those created in his image as his children. The image is evidenced by the creativity in humanity, particularly in procreation of their own images (cf. Gen 5:1–3).[49] The image of God is sonship (cf. Luke 3:38; Acts 17), “with all the responsibilities and privileges sonship entails.”[50]

Barth’s understanding of the image of God was “in the ‘analogy of relation’: the relationship between male and female [being] in some way analogous to the relationship among the persons of the Trinity.”[51] Humanity is distinguished from animals because they are “unique in their capacity to relate and respond to God” in an I-Thou relationship.[52] Within this approach, the image resides not in man himself but is granted by the intention and will of God. Barth stated, “Divine likeness is never [man’s] possession, but consists wholly in the intention and deed of his Creator.”[53] This is key because Barth argued the impossibility of losing the image in the fall:

We certainly cannot deduce from this that man has lost it through the fall, either partially or completely, formally or materially. . . . What man does not possess he can neither bequeath nor forfeit. And on the other hand the divine intention at the creation of man, and the consequent promise and pledge given with it, cannot be lost or subjected to partial or complete destruction. This is proved by the fact that the history of God's fellowship and intercourse with man is not abrogated with the fall as the actualization of man's rejection of this relationship. On the contrary, it really begins with the fall. For although it involves for man a complete reversal of the divine intention and therefore shame and judgment, it is at this point that God acknowledges His intention, addressing man as a Thou and making him responsible as an I, and that men themselves must stand and fall together as I and Thou, as man and woman.[54]

God’s intention becomes clear with the coming of Jesus Christ, who is revealed to have all along been “the real man created by God” and the real image of God to whom humanity has access through his community.[55] Peterson also elaborated, “In Jesus Christ, the Creator is reconciled to the creature. And because the man Jesus is one in nature with humanity, we are invited to infer from his human nature our own.”[56] It is Christ who offers hope of a restored relationship through the new covenant and the reconciliation of the relationship God intended all along.[57] Those who object to this position question Barth’s exegesis, a supposed anachronistic reading of a modern concept of relationship into Scripture, and the mental gymnastics required to allow the human Jesus to have existed prior to all other human beings.[58]

According to Cortez, “those affirming a more relational approach have tended to argue that the image was completely lost at the fall.”[59] However, it seems that this interpretation would be able to maintain an image after the fall—the relationship remains because God upholds his end. It is a relationship granted by God. Though the world is fallen, we are able to relate to God and others. Barriers certainly exist because of sin, but they do not mandate a removal of the image.[60] Christ, the perfect image, razes the barriers and makes reconciliation possible. Those who reject this reconciliation and are not conformed to the perfect image of God by being in Christ do not cease to be in relationship with others and God. Even in hell, they are at minimum in a continued relationship of enmity with God.[61]

Unbelievers In A Functional-Representational Interpretation

The functional-representational interpretations of the imago Dei understand the image as a type of royal role, function, or office given to humanity to embody and fulfill.[62] It is popular among Old Testament scholars (such as Middleton) and Kuyperians, who are able to utilize its implications in stewarding society and culture.[63] The position gained a robust argument with discoveries of Egyptian and Mesopotamian royal images, whether statues or human individuals, that were placed in portions of the kingdom to serve as representatives of the king.[64] The striking correlation with Genesis 1:26–27 suggests that a key part of God’s purpose for humanity is representation of him by means of “presencing the deity” and fulfilling the office of ruler as God himself would.[65]

Middleton pointed out that a part of God’s resting on day seven of creation, which he argued is still going on today, was the delegation of “postcreation rule of the earth to humanity.”[66] Humankind abandoned their role in the attempt to “be like God” (Gen 3:5).[67] On their watch and by their hand, sin entered the world and corrupted everything, including their ability to image God. According to the functional-representational interpretation, the image is not lost as a result of the fall because (by Barthian logic) it is granted by God and is therefore extrinsic to humanity.[68] It is, however, impacted by sin. “The result was somewhat paradoxical: humans are entrusted with presencing God in the world yet are subject to a fatal misreading of what this means as subjective reality.”[69] Humans still image and presence God; they just do it terribly.[70]

It is difficult to address the impact the coming of Christ has on the image of God in the framework of the functional-represent-ational interpretation. Middleton left New Testament implications intentionally unaddressed because his method is to provide Old Testament exegesis as fodder for theological reflection.[71] He footnoted a list of New Testament passages using image terminology as assertions about Christ and the “salvific renewal of the image of God in the church.”[72] Based on these passages and Middleton’s presentation, an integration of the functional-representational interpretation with the New Testament would certainly recognize the link between Christ and the image of God. Distinctively, Christ might be understood to perfectly presence God and function in the role of imager (2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15; Heb 1:3). The renewal of the image (2 Cor 3:18; Eph 4:22–23; Col 3:10) would be a removal of the barriers erected by sin, which limit humanity’s ability to image and presence God. By following Christ’s perfect example within the community of his followers, humankind is able to image and presence God appropriately.[73]

For those who reject Christ and his community, the image remains as it did after the fall with a faulty sense of godlikeness and misguided attempts to find significance and meaning. Similar to the relational interpretation, the role of being God’s image remains during the unbeliever’s time on earth and even after they face the final judgment. They are, however, unable to execute the purpose for which they are made and consequently are unable to truly live. Objections to this approach usually question whether the Genesis text was meant as a polemic against such an ancient Near Eastern context and warn against giving too much weight to these contextual realities for the text’s meaning.[74] The other main sources of critique surround the interpretation’s ability to coalesce with the entirety of the canon as it mainly focuses on the image in the Genesis narrative and its place conceptually as more of a consequence or implication of being in God’s image than the content of the image itself.

Unbelievers In A Christological Interpretation

The christological interpretation of the imago Dei is fundamentally driven by the understanding that God created humankind to be united with Christ, ultimately reflecting his glory. It is grounded in New Testament texts directly correlating Jesus and the image of God.[75] Two of the key passages for this approach are Colossians 1:15, “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation,” and Romans 8:29, “For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers.”[76] Though this interpretation is the center of much contemporary conversation, particularly McFarland’s The Divine Image, it has deep roots in discussions of the image reaching back to Irenaeus and Origen.[77]

In an earlier era of the church, Irenaeus presented a type of christological interpretation of the imago Dei when he stated, “For He made man the image of God; and the image of God is the Son, after whose image man was made: and for this cause He appeared in the end of the times that He might show the image (to be) like unto Himself.”[78] The image of God does not reside within humankind. It has always resided in Jesus Christ, and his coming was a progression in our understanding of that reality. Young explained, “Now that the Word has become flesh, the fact that humanity was modelled on this image of God has become evident, and the restoration of humankind to its lost ‘likeness’ has been made possible. So the incarnate Word is the image of God, the model after which humankind is fashioned.”[79] That image, according to this approach is Jesus Christ, in whom humankind was created and is renewed.[80]

For McFarland, this includes the person of Jesus as well as his body, which is “still being quite literally fleshed out” throughout history with the multitude of different individuals incorporated into the body of Christ.[81] McFarland argued the image of God was always intended to reveal more about God than about man. “The church’s understanding of God remains very much under construction.”[82] Jesus Christ is the image of God, which was only revealed with his coming and continues to be enfleshed by the church.

The image remains undamaged by the fall as it does not lie in people but in Christ. Kilner argued strongly, “It is vital that people not think that God’s image has been damaged by sin. Many things about people are badly damaged, but God’s image and people’s status as created in that image are not.”83 “Sin has damaged people, but not God’s image.”[84] With people damaged by the fall, God’s desire for connection and representation is deterred.[85] It is only with the incarnation that “restoration of humankind to its lost ‘likeness’ ” is possible.[86] Kilner stated,

It is people, not God’s image, that need changing. In fact, they so thoroughly need changing that their renewal amounts to a new creation. God’s provision for that is Jesus Christ, who is the image of God. Christ reveals what it looks like to be intimately connected with God and to reflect all of the godly attributes God intends for humanity to reflect.[87]

Those damaged by the fall may conform themselves to Christ and in so doing will renew their whole being in God’s image. McFarland and Kilner did not develop the implications for the image regarding those who refuse such a renewal.[88] However, considering their stated positions, it might be possible to deduce that those who reject a commitment to Christ and his people do not cease to be in God’s image (which is never damaged) but remain in sin and cannot ultimately dwell with God in the eternal kingdom.[89] They will be cast into the lake of fire, but as far as they are human, they remain in God’s image even in eternal punishment. Objections arise regarding the logic of humanity’s creation prior to Christ’s human existence, which is the image in which humanity is created. There is also skepticism regarding the practical reality of their position, “If Christ is the image, how are all other humans in the image?”[90]

Conclusion

This study has attempted to establish the legitimacy of three claims about the imago Dei, which put together have distinct implications for how believers view and treat those outside our faith. Based on the corporate sense of the image in both the Old and New Testaments, it is recognized that all humanity was created in the image of God. Human dignity has been historically grounded in that image based on biblical commands and the practical consequences of following those commands. The bulk of the article considered how all humans—including unbelievers—might be afforded the dignity of the status of being made in the image of God amid two scriptural realities of the imago Dei (imago existentialis and imago conformitas). Given the immense amount of theological effort in navigating this apparent paradox, it was concluded that four of the current major interpretations of the imago Dei can accommodate both senses and retain human dignity. This makes it possible to affirm the legitimacy of ascribing the status of being in the image of God to the unbeliever.

A better view of how God treats those who reject him has been provided. He loves them and calls them into existence, bestowing his image on them. He has a vested interest in who they are as creatures. He grants them dignity. He respects his creation with the gift of free will. His protection for them flows out of his immense love for them, evidenced by his providential care and provision for their redemption.

If believers are to truly follow his example, being conformed to his image, we would love unbelievers as he loves them. We would value their existence and seek to recognize in them the dimensions of the God in whose image they are made. We would respect their experiences, their choices, their expertise, and their right to go a different way than we do. We would listen, value what they offer society, and display a perseverant love in the midst of difference and disagreement. We would serve them. We would seek to provide for their needs—particularly the poor, suffering, and marginalized. We would joyfully work alongside them in addressing evil, caring for creation, and cultivating societal flourishing. Finally, we would involve them in God’s providential and salvific work as much as they are willing. This is how God loves all people, even those who reject his salvation. May we endeavor to do the same.

Notes

1. Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture quotations are from the English Standard Version.
2. Two works are particularly important for my understanding. John F. Kilner’s argument in Dignity and Destiny: Humanity in the Image of God is central in establishing and defending the link between dignity and the image (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015). Also key is G. C. Berkouwer’s orientation in Man: The Image of God to the problem of the two imago Dei scriptural realities and the landmines around which it is necessary to navigate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962).
3. It is not the intention of this study to engage the worthwhile conversation surrounding what it means to be human nor to argue for one particular interpretation of the image. However, this study tries to limit the acceptability of some interpretations of the imago Dei by establishing that each human is a part of corporate humanity. Any interpretation that excludes individual humans from corporate humanity should be considered with caution. Further, such an interpretation must directly address the question of where human dignity is grounded.
4. Kilner, Dignity, 85.
5. Kilner, 85.
6. For a list of sources about the corporate aspect of image, see Kilner, 131n1.
7. Art Lindsley, “What the Image of God Means for Our Dignity and Work,” Institute for Faith, Work, and Economics, April 24, 2019, https://tifwe.org/what-the-image-of-god-means-for-our-dignity-and-work/.
8. C. Ben Mitchell, “The Audacity of the Imago Dei: The Legacy and Uncertain Future of Human Dignity,” in Imago Dei: Human Dignity in Ecumenical Perspective, ed. Thomas Albert Howard (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 111.
9. Kilner, Dignity, 7.
10. Kenneth A. Mathews commented, “Justification for penal execution is the value of the victim, the ‘image of God.’ God alone may make or dispose of a person as he sees fit.” Genesis 1–11:26, New American Commentary 1A (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1996), 405. Abraham Kuyper also linked the value of human life to the image based on this passage: “Man was also created in the image of God. This entails that whoever extinguishes the life of another person assaults not only God’s ordinance but God himself in his image-bearer.” Common Grace: God’s Gifts for a Fallen World, ed. Jordan J. Ballor and Stephen J. Grabill, trans. Nelson D. Kloosterman and Ed M. van der Maas, Collected Works in Public Theology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham, 2015), 1:64.
11. “Clearly, James taught that the original stamp of the likeness of God in the human creature is still present. It is to be respected and blessed, not made the object of malediction. The human being was made for God, fashioned to know God and to reflect the attributes of God in a creaturely way. To dishonor any human being in some way dishonors God.” Kurt A. Richardson, James, New American Commentary 36 (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1997), 157–58.
12. Pseudo-Clement of Rome, Recognitions of Clement, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Cox, vol. 8, Fathers of the Third and Fourth Centuries, trans. Thomas Smith (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1886), 148. Kilner’s discussion provides a robust list of these individuals (Dignity, 15).
13. For economics, see Beverly Eileen Mitchell, “The Struggle for Human Dignity in a Consumer-Oriented Culture,” Anglican Theological Review 98.1 (2016): 113. For medicine, Andrew Lustic, “The Image of God and Human Dignity: A Complex Conversation,” Christian Bioethics 23.3 (2017): 317–34; and Bryan C. Pilkington, “Putting Image into Practice: Imago Dei, Dignity, and Their Bioethical Import,” Christian Bioethics 23.3 (2017): 299–316. For law, Claudia Welz, “Imago Dei and Human Dignity: Reciprocal Regard and an Unfulfilled Demand,” in Humanity in God’s Image: An Interdisciplinary Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
14. Max L. Stackhouse, “Why Human Rights Needs God: A Christian Perspective,” in Does Human Rights Need God? ed. Elizabeth M. Bucar and Barbra Barnett (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 33.
15. Kilner, Dignity, 15.
16. This dignity might also be considered a result of common grace. Berkouwer, Man, 148–93.
17. Ian A. McFarland seemed to espouse this view, which will be discussed more toward the conclusion of the article. The Divine Image: Envisioning the Invisible God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005).
18. John Wesley stated, “It is certain that ‘God made man upright;’ perfectly holy and perfectly happy: But by rebelling against God, he destroyed himself, lost the favour and the image of God, and entailed sin, with its attendant, pain, on himself and all his posterity.” “The Mystery of Iniquity,” The Works of John Wesley, 3rd ed. (London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room, 1872), 253. Martin Luther summarized his discussion on the image: “Therefore my understanding of the image of God is this: that Adam had it in his being and that he not only knew God and believed that He was good, but that he also lived in a life that was wholly godly; that is, he was without the fear of death or of any other danger, and was content with God’s favor . . . as though [God] said: ‘Adam and Eve, now you are living without fear; death you have not experienced, nor have you seen it. This is My image by which you are living, just as God lives. But if you win, you will lose this image, and you will die.’ ” “Lectures on Genesis Chapters 1–5,” in Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1955), 63. Ambrose of Milan also seemed to espouse this view, and Phillip Melanchthon used his work as support for his interpretation. Ambrose, On the Duties of the Clergy, in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, vol. 10, St. Ambrose: Select Works and Letters, trans. H. de Romestin, E. de Romestin, and H. T. F. Duckworth, Second Series (New York: Christian Literature Company, 1896), 23–89; and Philip Melanchthon, “Apology of the Augsburg Confession,” in Concordia: The Lutheran Confessions, ed. Paul Timothy McCain, 2nd ed. (St. Louis: Concordia, 2006), 78.
19. A helpful exploration beyond the scope of this study would be the consideration of different Christian conceptual groundings for humanity’s dignity, particularly among those who understand the image lost at the fall. John D. Zizioulas rightly warned of the importance of basing dignity theologically, not allowing “the concept of the person” to be detached “from theology and [united] with the idea of an autonomous morality or with an existential philosophy which is purely humanistic.” Being as Communion (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), 27. Potential alternate foundations for dignity, such as the incarnation or reason, each present significant difficulties, warranting caution. Grounding dignity in reason could risk denying the dignity of those with limited or hindered cognitive capabilities. Establishing it in the incarnation attempts to split two themes the Bible has inextricably linked—Christ and the imago Dei. For these reasons, I take the traditional position of grounding dignity in the image at this time, but further consideration seems needed in this area.
20. Berkouwer, Man, 132.
21. Berkouwer, 133.
22. “Scripture even says that man’s nature after the fall is still the ‘work and creature of God’ (See Deut 32:6; Isa 45:11, 54:5, 64:8; Acts 17:25; Rev 4:11; Job 10:8–12; Ps 139:14–16). God remains the Creator, and fallen man is not simply sin itself. Otherwise God would be the Creator of sin.” Berkouwer, 133.
23. Kilner summarized the concern, “In Christian thinking, it has fueled the idea absent from the Bible that unbelievers are not truly/fully in God’s image and the associated implication that some groups or particular people are more in God’s image than others are. . . . This idea has invited stereotyping certain (e.g., racial) groups as lacking the morality/righteousness of others, leading to the conclusion that they lack God’s image and do not warrant the respect and protection that come with that status.” Dignity, 195.
24. Berkouwer’s chapter “A Preliminary Orientation” has an extensive survey and discussion of these two senses. Man, 37–66.
25. “And then, again, this Word was manifested when the Word of God was made man, assimilating Himself to man, and man to Himself, so that by means of his resemblance to the Son, man might become precious to the Father. For in times long past, it was said that man was created after the image of God, but it was not [actually] shown; for the Word was as yet invisible, after whose image man was created, Wherefore also he did easily lose the similitude. When, however, the Word of God became flesh, He confirmed both these: for He both showed forth the image truly, since He became Himself what was His image; and He re-established the similitude after a sure manner, by assimilating man to the invisible Father through means of the visible Word.” Irenaeus of Lyons, Against Heresies, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Cox, vol. 1, The Apostolic Fathers—Justin Martyr—Irenaeus, trans. Alexander Roberts and W. H. Rambaut (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885), 544.
26. Berkouwer, Man, 39–51.
27. Berkouwer, 53.
28. Berkouwer, 57.
29. Some who defend this approach are Matthew Levering, Aku Visala, and Joshua R. Farris. Marc Cortez’s chapter “Imago Dei” gives a thorough treatment of the strengths and particularly the weaknesses of this interpretation. Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 14–40.
30. Kilner, Dignity, x.
31. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Thomas Gilby, vol. 13 (Cambridge: Blackfriars, 1964), 53.
32. Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1a, q. 93, a. 2.
33. Matthew Levering, Engaging the Doctrine of Creation: Cosmos, Creatures, and the Wise and Good Creator (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 145.
34. Levering, Creation, 154.
35. Aku Visala, “Human Cognition and the Image of God,” in The Christian Doctrine of Humanity, ed. Oliver D. Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 129.
36. Matthew Levering, “The Imago Dei in David Novak and Thomas Aquinas,” The Thomist 72.2 (2008): 298–301.
37. Levering, 311. The Catechism of the Catholic Church 1703 offers more on the relationship between God’s purposes and the imago Dei. Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church (New York: Doubleday, 1995).
38. Levering, “Imago Dei,” 309.
39. Catechism of the Catholic Church 1707.
40. Visala, “Human Cognition,” 129.
41. Levering asked “how Christ is at the center, not whether Christ is at the center.” He grounded the relationship between Christ and the image of God with an Athanasian argument, “Athanasius goes beyond recent interpreters of the image of God because he sees a link between the creative Word and rationality. If the Son is the Word, and humans are the image of the Word, then why should not this human image be associated uniquely with reason/word? I agree with Athanasius that if the human image of God is connected uniquely with the Word, then it is connected with reason and freedom, intellect and will.” Creation, 153.
42. Aquinas, SummaTheologica I, q. 93, a. 1. Levering added depth to Aquinas’s argument, stating, “This master is Christ, in whom the image of God has been taken up and perfected by the divine Image. In his human image, Christ displays the divine Image; he is ‘the image of the invisible God’ (Col 1:15). As Christ says in response to the question of his disciple Philip, ‘He who has seen me has seen the Father’ (John 14:9).” “Imago Dei,” 307.
43. Catechism of the Catholic Church 1708–9.
44. “The divine image is present in every man. It shines forth in the communion of persons, in the likeness of the unity of the divine persons among themselves.” Catechism of the Catholic Church 1702.
45. Catechism of the Catholic Church 1035.
46. “For the meaning and purpose of God at his creation were as follows. He willed the existence of a being which in all its non-deity and therefore its differentiation can be a real partner; which is capable of action and responsibility in relation to Him; to which His own divine form of life is not alien; which in a creaturely repetition, as a copy and imitation, can be a bearer of this form of life. Man was created as this being.” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/1, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. J. W. Edwards, O. Bussey, and H. Knight (New York: T&T Clark, 2007), 185.
47. Jürgen Moltmann also presented a relational view, “The only way out of the impasse is to abandon the anthropology of substance, and to understand the human being in the relations given by the history of God, and in that light. In this case the imago Dei is neither the indestructible substance of the human being, nor can it be destroyed by human sin.” God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 232. Particularly relevant for Moltmann is the embodiment of this relationship.
48. Craig L. Blomberg pointed out that the familial interpretation seems to be a combination of the substantialist and relational interpretations. “ ‘True Righteousness and Holiness’: The Image of God in the New Testament,” in The Image of God in an Image-Driven Age: Explorations in Theological Anthropology, ed. Beth Felker Jones and Jeffrey W. Barbeau (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2016), 73. I have placed both Barth’s traditional interpretation and the familial interpretation under the heading of “relational” as both argue for the same purpose of humanity (God desiring relationship with humanity) and for this God/humanity relationship as the core of the image of God.
49. Terence E. Fretheim, “Children in the Book of Genesis,” in What Kind of God? Collected Essays of Terence E. Fretheim, ed. Michael J. Chan and Brent A. Strawn, Siphrut: Literature and Theology of the Hebrew Scriptures 14 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2015), 207–8.
50. Catherine McDowell, “In the Image of God He Created Them,” in Felker Jones and Barbeau, Image of God, 30.
51. McDowell, 33. For Barth’s somewhat idiosyncratic emphasis on the essential role of male and female as a key component of the image, see CD III/1, 184–87.
52. McDowell, “Image,” 33. Barth stated, “But what is the original in which, or the prototype according to which, man was created? We have argued already that it is the relationship and differentiation between the I and the Thou in God Himself. Man is created by God in correspondence with this relationship and differentiation in God Himself: created as a Thou that can be addressed by God but also as an I responsible to God; in the relationship of man and woman in which man is a Thou to his fellow and therefore himself an I in responsibility to this claim” (CD III/1, 198).
53. Barth, CD III/1, 197.
54. Barth, CD III/1, 200.
55. Barth, CD III/1, 203–5. Ryan S. Peterson linked election with the image of God in Barth’s presentation, stating, “Ultimately, God’s election is the theological basis for the creation of humanity in the imago Dei. God elects Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ implies humanity.” Imago Dei as Human Identity, Journal of Theological Interpretation Supplement 14 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2016), 46. This is clearly a Reformed position, which is to be expected from Barth. A relational interpretation from an Arminian perspective, that God would accomplish his purpose “with or without you,” perhaps might bring about the conclusion that the image is still perfect in Christ and perhaps his community, but those are relational interactions into which one steps by means of a libertarian free choice rather than being deterministically placed there. Roger E. Olson, Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 39.
56. Peterson, Identity, 44.
57. “It will be shown that the divine likeness cannot actually exist for him in the continuance or even the progressive development of a deposited quality, but can only be the object of his hope in God his Creator; that as man he can look only for the man who is not only created in this image and after this likeness, but in accordance with it will actually be God’s image.” Barth, CD III/1, 190.
58. Peterson, Identity, 46–49. Peterson’s section, “Analogia Relationis: Intra-Trinitarian Relations and Human Relationships” offers a helpful treatment of the strengths and weaknesses of Barth’s interpretation (42–52). See also Cortez, Theological Anthropology, 27; and Phyllis Bird, “Male and Female He Created Them,” Harvard Theological Review 74.2 (1981): 132.
59. Cortez, Theological Anthropology, 26. Cortez’s treatment of the image here is an incredibly helpful summary of the overall image debate and is well-regarded in the theological anthropological community, particularly his summary of what seems to unite all interpretations of the image. See Joshua R. Farris, “A Substantive (Soul) Model of the Imago Dei: A Rich Property View,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology, ed. Joshua R. Farris and Charles Taliaferro (Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), 166.
60. “While we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son” (Rom 5:10). If the relationship is entirely severed, this reconciliation (or enmity) does not seem possible. The relationship does not have to be on positive terms for it to be by nature a relationship. Additionally, the term “reconciliation” seems to imply a relationship in need of reunification, not a new relationship being established.
61. Though Barth is one of the most important voices for the relational interpretation of the image, considering hell in the midst of this conversation is complex. He is often labeled a universalist due to the logical end of many of his arguments, some of which pertain to his statements surrounding judgment. This understanding is nuanced and mildly challenged by Michael Bartholomaeus, who explored Barth’s specific stance on hell and the fate of the individual who rejects God. He argued Barth does hold to a concept of hell (though not literal and future), the possibility of an “impossible” rejection of God, and the mysterious fate in the future of the individual (“Barth on Hell,” Reformed Theological Review 74.3 [2015]: 176–90). Of particular interest for our purposes are Barth’s statements regarding the rejection of this relationship offered by God, “But we cannot hear of God’s election without also hearing God’s Yes. If we truly hear, then in face of this election and its meaning it is not possible for us not to be able to hear or obey that Yes, not to will to be amongst those who are affirmed by God. This is not a possibility but an impossibility. It is a turning of the sense of that election into nonsense. It is a descent into the abyss of the divine non-willing and the divine non-electing. Even in such a descent the creature cannot escape God. Even in this abyss it is still in the hands of God, the object of His decision. Yet that does not mean that it has been flung, or even allowed to fall, into the abyss by God Himself. God is and God remains the One who has decided for the creature and not against it. It is by love itself that the creature is confounded. Even there, in the midst of hell, when it thinks of God and His election it can think only of the love and grace of God.” Church Dogmatics, II/2, trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, ed. G. W. Bromiley et al. (New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 27. Though Barth’s concepts of “hell” and “rejection” differ from those of other interpreters, his assertions here still indicate a similar conclusion as asserted in summary of the relational interpretations.
62. This view need not see the image solely as an office. J. Gordon McConville emphasized, “I have been suggesting that there are aspects of both function (‘rule’) and intrinsic nature in this likeness of humans to God. In fact, it is difficult to separate these two aspects of the ‘image,’ as Middleton rightly argued. For him, the exercise of divine rule on earth cannot be entirely understood as delegation of a task but rather supposes an actual likeness of the human to the divine. Human representation of God is to be understood in this sense, that only one who is like God can represent him.” Being Human in God’s World: An Old Testament Theology of Humanity (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016), 25. Middleton engaged both the functional and relational interpretations.
63. J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 1995), 32. In a passage defending corporal punishment, Kuyper argued for humanity’s responsibility in ensuring justice as “God placed man in this creation as his representative and sent him out across this earth as his ambassador and as the bearer of his dignity.” Common Grace, 80.
64. “In Egypt the king as divine image was a cultic intermediary who guaranteed the cosmic order, natural and social, on earth; in Mesopotamia the concept was that of a more active, functional representative.” McConville, Being Human, 656.
65. McConville, 26.
66. Middleton, Liberating Image, 291.
67. Bruce K. Waltke stated if Adam and Eve had been doing their job, “they would have driven out the serpent; instead it drives them out.” Genesis: A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 87.
68. McConville stated, “The two creation accounts (as Old Testament criticism has typically seen it) has yielded a story not of a loss of the image in Genesis 3—since the image was not a property that could be lost—but of one in which the idea of humanity bearing the image of God was developed in terms of the reality of the human condition” (Being Human, 42). Middleton avoided this with the insistence that image involves both function and similarity (Liberating Image, 88).
69. McConville, Being Human, 42.
70. This interpretation grants a new perspective to the affront of sin. God created images to reflect and represent him; instead they freely chose to reject that role and comport themselves in a manner in direct opposition to his character.
71. Middleton, Liberating Image, 10.
72. Middleton, 17.
73. This corresponds with McConville’s treatment of the image, which links the concepts of “presencing” God and “godlikeness,” by which he meant being and functioning “in ways resembling God” that “commits both God and humans to a life together, the story of which will occupy the pages of the Old Testament and the New” (Being Human, 28–29).
74. Most who hold this interpretation are quick to point out that these possibilities do not necessitate such a meaning in the Genesis text, but they recognize these certainly help illuminate the terminology and concept at least within its cultural context (McConville, 30).
75. Levering, Creation, 150. Kilner stated, “Creation in God’s image entails a special connection with God and an intended reflection of God” (Dignity, xi). McFarland and Kilner are contemporary voices who hold to this. Concerning Kilner’s presentation of this interpretation, Levering keenly pointed out that this approach lets nothing other than the New Testament define the image (Creation, 151). This is an interesting juxtaposition to the representational interpretation that, it could be argued, lets little other than the Old Testament define the image.
76. “The clearest text that would require further elaboration in this context would be Paul’s statement that God’s people have been ‘predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son’ (Rom 8:29), clearly suggesting that the Son’s status as the imago Dei played a constitutive role in the shaping of humanity from the beginning.” Marc Cortez, “Nature, Grace, and the Christological Ground of Humanity,” in Crisp and Sanders, The Christian Doctrine of Humanity, 36.
77. Frances Young, God’s Presence: A Contemporary Recapitulation of Early Christianity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 158. Young pointed out that while having similar interpretations, “Irenaeus attributes the image to the incarnate Christ while Origen applies it to the divine Son of God or Logos” (156).
78. Irenaeus of Lyons, The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, trans. Armitage Robinson (New York: Macmillan, 1920), 22. Cortez pointed out that one of the strengths of the christological interpretation that arises from Irenaeus’s presentation is the ability to claim the embodiment of the image. The image is embodied because Christ is embodied. “Irenaeus thus locates his understanding of the imago Dei within the broader framework of God’s self-revelation in creation, maintaining that it is in the embodied Son that we truly see the Father (cf. John 14:9). Consequently, Irenaeus emphasized more clearly than most other early theologians that the body itself is intrinsic to the imago Dei.” Cortez, “Nature,” 33.
79. Young, God’s Presence, 158.
80. “Ultimately, the image of God is Jesus Christ. People are first created and later renewed according to that image” (Kilner, Dignity, xi); “Ordinary human beings would be the image of God in the strongest sense too, then, not when trying to image the divine image in a created fashion all by themselves, but, instead, when drawing near to the divine image, so near as to become one with it. . . . Humans have the image of God only by clinging to what they are not—that divine image itself—becoming attached to it not merely physically but in every way possible for them—ideally with purity of attention, full commitment, and intense love.” Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13.
81. McFarland, Image, 37.
82. McFarland, 37, 209. “We seem to be on much firmer ground when we claim to learn from Jesus something new about God” (4). Further explaining Jesus as the image of God, McFarland stated, “An image conveys knowledge of the thing imaged. It would therefore seem to follow that the point of describing some entity as the image of God would be to convey knowledge of God” (11).
83. Kilner, Dignity, 159. This is a theme throughout Kilner’s work, intended to challenge those who use the imago Dei (intentionally or not) to oppress others.
84. Kilner, 233. Part of my study’s suggestion is that though this concept emerges from a christological interpretation, it functions in an extrinsic interpretation.
85. Glenn Kreider, “Dignity and Destiny,” Review, DTS Voice, September 19, 2017, https://voice.dts.edu/review/dignity-destiny-humanity-image-god/.
86. Young, God’s Presence, 158.
87. Kilner, Dignity, 233.
88. Kilner addressed the reality that “only some will embrace” their destiny but argued that “all humanity participates in human dignity” (xi).
89. The exception here could be McFarland’s position, which might not coordinate with this deduction. It seems that, for McFarland, only those who are in Christ are in the image of God: “The image of God is rightly regarded not as something that we have, but rather as something God does to us by grafting us into the life of Christ” (Image, 166). Levering did not believe this is what McFarland is claiming, however, stating, “Since [McFarland’s] position seems to exclude non-Christians from being created in God’s image, McFarland clarifies it by stating that creation in God’s image can simply refer ‘to the fact that God has chosen to relate to human beings’ through Christ, and thus in this manner all humans are created to be in God’s image” (Creation, 152). If this is the case, then those unbelievers who would not be conformed to Christ’s image are his image insofar as God chose to relate to human beings and grafted their lives into the life of Christ as enemies and those who would reject him. At best this seems to shift the interpretation to a relational one—that God desires a relationship with humankind and it is mediated through Christ. Insofar as there is the capability or call to that relationship, the image remains. But this does not seem to be what McFarland was stating, and despite Levering’s charitable reading, it seems difficult to see McFarland’s assertions as anything other than a statement that only those in Christ are in the image of God. This should not be understood as the position of all of those with a christological interpretation because Kilner clearly argued for the image being a reality for all human beings as it is the source of their dignity, regardless of their destiny. “This connection with God is the basis of human dignity. This reflection of God is the beauty of human destiny. All of humanity participates in human dignity. All of humanity is offered human destiny, though only some embrace and will experience it” (Kilner, Dignity, xi).
90. Levering, Creation, 151.