“Cur Deus Homo?”: A Closer Look At The Atonement Theories Of Peter Abelard And Bernard Of Clairvaux

By Jonathon D. Beeke

The conflict between Peter Abelard (1079-1142) and Bernard of Clairvaux (1090/91-1153) is a captivating story that is often told in medieval church histories. [1] The rationalistic scholasticism of Abelard serves as a great foil to the mystic monasticism of St. Bernard. Although this caricature is generally correct, is it possible to draw a line of division throughout every tenet of Abelard’s and Bernard’s theology? More precisely, this article will examine if there is indeed a vast difference between the atonement theories of these two monumental twelfth-century figures.

Secondary scholarship is widely divergent when answering this question. Two considerations in this scholarship merit our attention; I will refer to these as the wider and narrower discussion. Within the arena of this wider discussion, scholars have attempted to examine the relation (if any) between the atonement theories of Abelard and Bernard. The majority of scholars argue that Abelard proposed a moralistic/exemplary nature of redemption, while Bernard adopted the substitutionary model of Anselm mixed together with a resuscitation of the older ransom theory. The narrower discussion centers solely upon the atonement theory of Abelard; some scholars argue that he strictly advocated an exemplary atonement, while others deny this. [2] However, the popular consensus of this wider discussion as well as the disagreement within this narrower discussion fails to recognize the proper relation between the scholastic Abelard and the mystic Bernard and their conception of Christ’s atoning work. In contrast to the portrayal given in the majority of secondary scholarship, which depicts Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter Abelard as polar opposites, this article argues that Bernard and Abelard advocated a similar view of the atonement; both had a bi-perspectival view of the nature of redemption which incorporated propitiatory and exemplary elements.

Proposed Method

As the validity of this article hinges upon the premise that both Abelard and Bernard had a bi-perspectival view of the atonement, a proper assessment of each is warranted. Thus, this article will begin by examining Abelard’s doctrine of soteriology, first by focusing on his definition of sin found in his Ethics and then turning to his commentary on Romans. Next, I will examine Bernard’s view of the nature of redemption, concentrating primarily on his Sermons on the Song of Songs (Sermones super Cantica canticorum). Following this examination of primary sources, this article will seek to establish a synthesis between Abelard and Bernard and then defend the thesis against the predominant views of secondary scholarship in both the wider and narrower discussions outlined above. Based upon the examination and proper interpretation of both monks’ writings, I will conclude by arguing that a fair assessment must take into account the dual aspect of both Abelard’s and Bernard’s teaching concerning the atonement.

Abelard: Quod Est Peccatum?

Before looking at Abelard’s answer to the atonement question, a clear grasp of his definition of sin must first be attained. Stemming from his nominalism, Abelard defined sin in a plurality of ways, two of which are significant for this discussion. Properly defined, sin for Abelard meant “the actual contempt for God or consent to evil.” [3] He argued that it is incorrect to say that a deed or event is sinful in itself as it could be done with either just or evil intentions. [4] Thus, Abelard could argue that those who crucified Christ or stoned Stephen did not sin in their actions if they believed they were pleasing God. [5] Defining Abelard’s position, David Luscombe writes,

The physical act from the moral point of view is indifferent, neither right nor wrong in itself. But the decision taken by its perpetrator, his intention and what he consents to, is either in accordance with God’s law or it is not, and deserves respectively either praise or blame from God, because the decision he takes has to be judged (and only God can make this judgment certainly) in the light of other factors such as the degree of knowledge of the moral law possessed by him. [6]

If sin for Abelard was predominantly evil intentions or consent, the reverse was also true for him; “an action is good, not because it acquires any kind of goodness in itself, but because it comes from a good intention.” [7] Abelard’s definitions of good and evil, however, did not rest solely upon this moralistic strain, as is evident from a continued reading of his Ethics.

Abelard also defined sin as the punishment or penalty which man incurs because of his contempt of God. All men, even children who cannot intend to do evil or good, are subject to this penalty through the disobedience of Adam. [8] He wrote,

The penalty of sin is also called “sin” or a “curse,” as when we say that sin is forgiven, meaning that the penalty is remitted, and the Lord Jesus “bore our sins,” meaning that he endured the penalty for our sins, or the penalties springing from them. But when we say that young children have “original sin,” or that we all, as the apostle says, sinned in Adam, this amounts to saying that our punishment or the sentence of our condemnation takes its rise from his sin. [9]

With this definition, Abelard attempted to marry his conclusion that those who crucified Christ or stoned Steven did not sin with the seeming contradiction presented by Christ’s and Stephen’s prayers, which besought the Father to forgive the sins of their enemies. Why would they need forgiveness if they had not sinned? Abelard believed that this paradox arises when sin is defined in its broader meaning as opposed to its more proper definition. Loosely defined, the murderers of Christ and Stephen did sin in act; “nevertheless, they would have sinned more grievously if they had spared them against their own conscience.” [10] Abelard concluded, “When he [Christ] said, ‘Forgive,’ this did not refer to any previous fault or contempt of God…but had to do with the reasonableness of imposing a penalty, which, as we have said, could follow with good cause, even without any previous fault.” [11] As we shall see in fuller detail below, Abelard’s two-fold conception of sin is integral to his discussion of the atonement; the dual nature of sin necessitated his bi-perspectival view of the atonement.

Abelard: Cur Deus Homo?

Abelard first discussed the atonement in his commentary on Romans 3, stating, “We must first investigate why it was necessary for God to take human nature upon him so that he might redeem us by dying in the flesh.” [12] Following a method similar to that found in his Sic et Non, Abelard first questioned the validity of what is today classified as the Ransom Theory. With Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard denied that the devil had any intrinsic rights and so payment is not due to “the torturers but the masters of those who are held captive.” [13] Secondly, he doubted the validity of a strict substitutionary theory of the atonement. He asked, “In what way does the apostle declare that we are justified...to God through the death of his Son, when God ought to have been the more angered against man, inasmuch as men acted more criminally by crucifying his Son than they ever did by transgressing his first command in paradise through the tasting of a single apple?” [14] After raising this question, Abelard proposed his solution:

Our redemption through Christ’s suffering is that deeper affection in us which not only frees us from slavery to sin, but also wins for us the true liberty of sons of God, so that we do all things out of love rather than fear—love to him who has shown us such grace that no greater can be found. [15]

A dual element of redemption is immediately evident in this quotation. According to Abelard, Christ’s suffering freed us from the bondage of sin and at the same time granted the grace sinners needed in order that they might become the sons of God. Both elements are constitutive to Abelard’s characterization of redemption; the former evidences the necessity of a propitiatory element, while the later demonstrates the necessity of an exemplary element.

With this two-fold atonement, the dual aspect of sin defined by Abelard is expiated. On the one hand, our contempt for God is overcome as Christ excites love in us, while, on the other hand, we are freed from the punishment derived from Adam. Commenting on this duality, J. Patout Burns states, “The divine love which is exhibited in the death of Christ provokes a response of love in the sinner which overcomes his contempt of God. Christ bears the punishment of death which was imposed for sin. In liberating men from this condemnation, he gains for them access to salvation.” [16] Abelard, however, is somewhat unclear as to how these two elements work together; in his commentary on Romans, he does not explain how Christ’s death makes amends for the curse of sin that rests upon all mankind. [17] Perhaps as an effort to fill this gap, Abelard immediately turned to the subject of baptism. He argued that it is impossible for anyone who is predestinated to life to die apart from baptism. He wrote, “But we claim that everyone who honestly and purely loves the Lord for his own sake is predestined to life, and will never be overtaken by death until the Lord shows him what is of obligation concerning the sacraments, and also gives him the ability to understand it.” [18] Two things were necessary for everlasting life, according to Abelard: baptism and a state of charity. The connection between these two aspects and the bi-perspectival character of Christ’s atonement is unmistakable. Through baptism, a person appropriates the propitiatory quality of Christ’s death, freeing him from the curse of sin, while the necessary quality of love is evoked in the elect by the example Christ gave in dying. [19]

Bernard: Cur Deus Homo? As Seen In The Sermons

Bernard’s eighty-six Sermons on the Song of Songs are a valuable source for understanding his view of salvation and the atonement. Interpreting the Canticles as an extended allegory of Christ and the church, Bernard’s main purpose of preaching these sermons was to kindle and inflame the love between the bride (church) and bridegroom (Christ). [20] This love, he taught, was best expressed in a life of obedience and humility. Those who desire union with Christ (the holy kiss of the bridegroom) must travel the road of obedience back to God. [21] Bernard warned his monks,

Do not imagine that love of your own repose is to become an obstacle to the way of obedience and the traditions of the seniors. If so, the Bridegroom will not sleep in the same bed with you, especially if, instead of the flowers of obedience, you have bestrewn it with the hemlock and nettles of disobedience. Because of this he will not listen to your prayers. When you call he will not come. Nor will this great lover of obedience who preferred to die rather than disobey, put himself into the power of one who will not obey. [22]

For Bernard, the greatest affection in any relationship, especially the sacred marriage union between Christ and the church, must be love. Fear of hell sets the traveler upon the road of salvation, but he is then spurred onwards by an ever-increasing love abetted by grace. Only those who are guided by the Spirit (“the loyal groomsman”) to burn with love for God Himself will experience the “ecstatic ascent of the purified mind to God, and the loving descent of God into the soul.” [23]

Within this redemptive plan, which culminates in the visio Dei, what role did Bernard attribute to the incarnation, life, and death of Jesus Christ? In true monastic style, Bernard stressed the importance of meditating upon the life and sufferings of Christ. [24] Who, asked Bernard, can comprehend the glorious message that God became man, emptying Himself of all His glory? Who is able to plumb these great depths? The obvious answer is a resounding “No one!” In this manner, Bernard called his hearers to live lives of greater contemplation and devotion. He believed if the “manner” of redemption (Christ’s self-emptying) was kept continually in the foreground, the “fruit” (being filled with God) was inescapable. [25] Mirroring the exemplary element we have already found in Abelard, Bernard taught that the love and gratitude excited in man by Christ’s self-sacrificing death is the mode whereby one is made more obedient and loving, which meant more righteous. The importance of the moral influence view of the atonement is best expressed by Bernard himself, who wrote,

I think this is the principal reason why the invisible God willed to be seen in the flesh and to converse with men as a man. He wanted to recapture the affections of carnal men who were unable to love in any other way, by first drawing them to the salutary love of his own humanity, and then gradually to raise them to a spiritual love. [26]

Although the Sermons on the Song of Songs are replete with the theme of ecstatic love animated by the sufferings of Christ, Bernard did not supply this as the sole answer to the atonement question. [27]

Propitiation was also an integral part to Bernard’s doctrine of the atonement. With Abelard, Bernard taught that the sins of mankind must be appeased before a just and holy God. Speaking about the wonderful act of the incarnation, Bernard wrote, “[Christ] stooped to me, in avoiding sin he took counsel with himself, in accepting death he satisfied the Father.” [28] Man, he said, was bound by the serpent with the shackles of sin. Christ, however, overcame the unjust power of Satan and reconciled us to the offended Father by “pouring out his blood as the price of our redemption.” [29] By the loving wounds of the Bridegroom, God is appeased. The lofty God can be reconciled only through the power of Christ’s love, manifested most clearly on the cross. Stressing the importance of the act of propitiation by love, Bernard wrote, “Can the highest of all be made one with all? Who has done this? It is love, taking no thought of divinity, rich in honor, powerful in affection, potent in persuasion. What is more violent? love triumphs over God.” [30]

In this act of propitiating love, Christ perfects in mankind a three-fold freedom: freedom from necessity (common to all men), freedom from sin (partially experienced by the saints in this world), and freedom from sorrows (reserved for the elect in heaven). [31] Adam, Bernard argued, was created in both God’s image (freedom from necessity) and His likeness (freedom from sin and sorrows), but in the Fall, Adam abused his freedom. Although man retained the image of God, he consequently lost the likeness of God due to Adam’s disobedience. Bernard found the only answer to man’s predicament in Jesus Christ; only in Him, who perfectly possessed these three liberties, can mankind once again attain the likeness of God. [32] Bernard concluded that two things were necessary for man to again achieve a state of perfect and complete freedom; 1) Christ had to have been subject to the law of suffering in order to liberate us from the yoke of sin, and 2) we must follow the inspiring example of Christ so that we may be found acceptable offerings in the sight of God. [33] Man is deemed righteous on account of the fulfillment of these two criteria.

Abelard And Bernard: Rivals On Atonement?

Bernard’s instrumental role in Abelard’s condemnation at the Council of Sens (1040/41) may seem problematic for the thesis of this article. [34] William of St. Thierry, who thought Abelard was potentially subversive and offensive, brought to Bernard’s attention what he believed to be heretical opinions in Abelard’s works. Depending largely upon the Disputatio of William, Bernard then arranged his own compilation of Abelard’s errors, which chiefly dealt with the subject of redemption and the Trinity. Constant Mews argues, however, that the eventual condemnation of Abelard by Innocent in July of 1141 must be considered in its wider political context. [35] Bernard was anxious to suppress the anti-authority tendencies that were expressed under the auspices of Abelard’s more rationalistic theology. [36] Although Mews agrees that the doctrinal differences between the two should not be minimized (i.e., differing views of the Trinity), his thesis is helpful in establishing the thesis of this article. Bernard’s conflict with Abelard at the Council of Sens was not a clash of conflicting views of the atonement, but rather a struggle between two methods of practicing theology that had significant political ramifications.

As noted above, much of the evidence Bernard brought forward against Abelard rested upon the work of others, namely, William of St. Thierry and Thomas of Morigny. [37] It is further evident that Bernard was little acquainted with the actual writings of Abelard; he “felt that these things were better condemned unread.” [38] It is not surprising then that the charges (capitula) of Bernard against Abelard were general in nature. Considering the nature of this article, the charge concerning Abelard’s doctrine of redemption is an important example of this. Bernard wrote, “How is it that he [Abelard] says, that the purpose and reason of the Incarnation was that Christ might illuminate the world with the light of His wisdom, and kindle it to love of Himself? Where then is the redemption?” [39] Bernard believed that Abelard had reduced the atonement solely to a display of mercy, leaving out any mention of justice. While this charge in itself demonstrates the necessary bi-perspectival view of Bernard, it also reveals the limited research upon which Bernard based his accusations. [40]

Reappraisal Of Secondary Literature

Within the wider discussion, which I have defined as scholarship comparing the atonement theories of Abelard and Bernard, most of the secondary literature utilizes the language of “subjective” and “objective.” Abelard is most often characterized as a subjectivist in that he merely proposed an exemplary atonement, while Bernard is portrayed as more balanced in his approach. Robert Franks writes, “The opposition between the objective view of redemption and the subjective could not be more clearly stated.... [Abelard] reduce[d] all theories of Christ’s work to one only, that of the moral influence of His life and death.” [41] Although he does not employ the exact language of this distinction, G. R. Evans similarly believes that a wide gulf existed between Abelard and Bernard here. Evans thinks that while “the only reason Abelard can conceive why God became man” was to show humans how they ought to live, Bernard’s teaching on redemption “is both consistent and comprehensive.” [42] Positing this distinction between Abelard and Bernard, however, fails to take into account the bi-perspectival views of both monks. Marcia Colish, although failing to recognize the biperspectivalism of Abelard or Bernard, arrives at a similar thesis to my own, suggesting that “Bernard develops a doctrine of Christ’s saving work that is extremely close to his [Abelard’s].” [43]

Marked interest has been recently shown attempting to accurately define the nature of Peter Abelard’s doctrine of the atonement (here we are concerned with the narrower discussion as defined above). Those who classify Abelard as a subjectivist often point to him as the father of the moral influence theory. [44] Here, the criticisms of Richard Haugh are helpful: “[Abelard] does not write that the only purpose of the Incarnation is to instruct. Within the thought structure of early Christianity, God did become man to instruct and to give an example but not only to instruct and give an example.” [45] yet, some scholars, while trying to clear Abelard of much ill-founded criticism, propose that Abelard was not an exemplarist at all. Convinced of this, Alister McGrath writes, “Abailard is an exemplarist if, and only if, it can be shown that he understands Christ to be our example, through whose imitation we are redeemed—whereas it is clear that he understands Christ to be our example in the sense that, because we are redeemed by him, we now wish to imitate him.” [46] While McGrath rightly sees the more objective side in Abelard’s view, he fails to recognize that in Abelard’s estimation man is justified based upon the love and obedience that is formed within him. Neither side, whether the objective or subjective, should be neglected when considering Abelard’s view of the atonement. [47]

Conclusion

According to both Abelard and Bernard, sinners are effectually made righteous on account of the propitiatory and exemplary elements found within the atoning life and death of Jesus Christ. Humbling Himself as God-man, Christ sacrificed His own body, wiping away the effects and curse of sin. In this way, Christ provided both the opportunity and the example for justification. To take away either of these two aspects is to do injustice to the nature of redemption as taught by either man. Both firmly believed that man is corrupted by sin and therefore unable to initiate himself upon the pathway of justification. By appeasing the displeasure of an injured God, Christ’s death removed this inability and enabled man to begin the journey towards justification. Furthermore, both Abelard and Bernard taught that Christ’s suffering and death provided a clear example of how one must walk upon this road; by following the footsteps of Christ, the epitome of humility and love, sinful men are transformed from sin unto righteousness. The dual aspects of Christ’s atoning work as propitiation and model must be seen as integral and consistent with both Abelard’s and Bernard’s soteriology, namely, an infused grace cooperating with meritorious works.

Notes

1. For a general outline of the lives, works, and teachings of these men, as well as a sense of the opposition that existed between them, see the histories provided by Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity: Beginnings to 1500 (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 1:424 –25 and 502– 504; Joseph Dahmus, A History of the Middle Ages (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1995), chap. 9; G. S. M. Walker, The Growing Storm: Sketches of Church History from A.D. 600 to A.D. 1350 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961), chap 8.
2. For a partial list of literature concerning these two discussions, see the following heading entitled “Reappraisal of Secondary literature.”
3. Peter Abelard, Ethics, taken from E. R. Fairweather, trans. and ed., A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), 291. References to this work are hereafter noted by chapter number of this work, followed by the page number of this miscellany.
4. To illustrate this point, Abelard assembled seventeen quotations in his Sic et Non under the heading “That it is lawful to kill people, and not so.” Abelard sought to demonstrate that it was not the act of killing that determined whether or not it was evil, but the intention is the determining factor. See M. T. Clanchy, Abelard: A Medieval Life (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 140.
5. Abelard, Ethics, XIII, 291.
6. David Luscombe, A History of Western Philosophy: Medieval Thought (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1997), 53.
7. Abelard, Ethics, XI, 289.
8. This is significant as Bernard charged Abelard with rejecting the doctrine of original sin. See Robert S. Franks, The Work of Christ: A Historical Study of Christian Doctrine (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), 153. Also see Edward little, “Bernard and Abelard at the Council of Sens, 1140,” in Bernard of Clairvaux (Washington, D.C.: Consortium Press, 1973), 68-69 for a list of nineteen charges (capitula) brought against Abelard at the Council of Sens. The eighth proposition states, “Quod non traximus culpam ex Adam, sed poenam tantum.” This list is appended to Bernard’s Letter 190–Contra Quadem Capitula Errorum Abaelardi (a letter written to Innocent II) and is a re-working of the thirteen accusations supplied by William of St. Thierry.
9. Abelard, Ethics, XIV, 292.
10. Ibid., XIV, 297.
11. Ibid., XIV, 293. Abelard compared this paradox to a person who has never heard the gospel preached to him. Such a person is not to be blamed for unbelief for this would be unreasonable, however, if this man dies without believing in Christ, “we should not dare to make him any promise of life” for he is subject to the penalty of sin incurred through Adam.
12. Peter Abelard, Commentaria ad Romanos, taken from E. R. Fairweather, trans. and ed., A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), 280. References to this work are hereafter noted by chapter number of this work, followed by the page number of this miscellany.
13. Ibid., II, 283. Although Abelard unequivocally rejected the absolute rights of the devil, he still referred to the devil as our “jailer” or “torturer” by permissive justice of God. Cf. Richard E. Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abailard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 136-39. Weingart notes that Abelard was falsely charged by Bernard and William of St. Thierry at the Council of Sens on this point. The fourth of the nineteen accusations reads as follows: Quod Christus non assumpsit carnem, ut nos a jugo dyaboli liberaret. See little, “Bernard,” 68.
14. Abelard, Romanos II, 282. Two qualifications should be kept in mind when considering this skeptical attitude towards a substitutionary atonement. First, Abelard does not positively reject that God can be appeased by the death of His Son, he simply posed this as illogical. Secondly, Abelard here is concerned with an answer that is strictly substitutionary; for Abelard this is only half the answer, which is in fact no answer at all.
15. Ibid., III, 284.
16. J. Patout Burns, “The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory,” Theological Studies 36 no. 2 (1975): 290.
17. Ibid., 290.
18. Abelard, Romanos, IV, 285.
19. Abelard did fear the charge of teaching justification by the works of the law (by “law,” Abelard means ceremonial laws of the Old Testament) which is why he concluded the exposition of Romans 3:27 by reaffirming the necessity of love. He wrote, “let this be our sufficient refutation on the subject of our justification, and the justification of all people, that it consists in love even before sacraments are received.” See Abelard, Romanos, IV, 287. Two things are worthy to note from this quote: 1) from the context it is understood that the love spoken of here is the love formed in the person, and 2) the necessity of baptism is reiterated, albeit somewhat muted.
20. Halflants writes, “These two lines contain his entire spiritual program: to direct man’s love to God; to restore with the help of God’s grace a twisted power which clings unduly to creatures, in order that once freed it may find again the dignity of its origin.” See Bernard of Clairvaux, On the Song of Songs, trans. Kilian Walsh and intro. Corneille Halflants (Kalamazoo, MI: Cisterian Publications, 1981), 1:ix.
21. See again the introduction by Halflants to Vol. I, especially under the headings “The Road Back to God” and “The Grace of union —Spiritual Marriage.”
22. Bernard, Song, Vol. 3, 46:5.
23. Ibid., Vol. II, 31:6. Abelard, along with the majority of medieval theologians, would have heartily affirmed this. Both Abelard and Bernard held to an infusionist scheme of salvation: grace is infused into whomsoever God desires and in turn, a person’s faith is formed more deeply and fully by love ( fides caritate formata). Bernard wrote, “To seek first the Kingdom of God means really to prevent sin from ruling in our lives and to prefer the yoke of modesty and sobriety with God’s help.” See Bernard, On Loving God, ed. by James M. Houston (Portland, OR: Multnomah Press, 1983), 156.
24. Bernard advised his monks when they were praying to place before themselves the “sacred image of the God-man, in his birth or infancy or as he was teaching, or dying, or rising, or ascending. Whatever form it takes this image must bind the soul with the love of virtue and expel carnal vices, eliminate temptations and quiet desires.” See Bernard, Songs, Vol. I, 20:6.
25. Ibid., Vol. I, 11:3.
26. Quoted by Clanchy, Abelard, 287.
27. Examples abound throughout the Sermons on the Song of Songs which stress the theme of humility (the epitome of righteousness for Bernard) formed upon consideration of Christ’s great example of humility; see 25:3– 6; 28:11-13; 33:14; 34:3; 42:6-11; 47:5-8; 62:6. This same conviction is echoed in his work on humility and pride. The reason Christ became man was to leave us an example: “from those things which he suffered we mere men may learn how much we should be ready to suffer for obedience since for it he who himself is God did not hesitate to die.” See Steps of Humility and Pride, trans. by Ambrose Conway and intro. by Basil Pennington (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1989), III:7. Cf. IV:1; VII:20; XI:39n. The point must be stressed that in the soteriological schema of both Abelard and Bernard a person is made more justified as growth in love and humility is evidenced. Thus, humility and love are not merely effects of the atoning work of Christ, but part and parcel of it.
28. Bernard, Songs, Vol I, 20:3.
29. Ibid., 20:3. For a valuable discussion concerning both Abelard’s and Bernard’s conception of the ius diaboli see Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, (Cambridge: university Press, 1986), 1:60-62. As already noted in footnote 12, Abelard held that the “devil had potestas over man de facto but not de iure.” Similarly, Bernard recognized this power was unjust because it was usurped by the devil, but it is just in that it comes from God.
30. Bernard, Songs, Vol. III, 64:10. Relational language is central throughout Bernard’s sermons, yet he does not erect a dichotomy between the relational and legal. See also Mark S. Burrows, “Foundations for an Erotic Christology: Bernard of Clairvaux on Jesus as the ‘Tender lover,’” Anglican Theological Review 80, no. 4 (1998): 477-93. This essay is very helpful in pointing out the great emphasis Bernard placed on spiritual experiences.
31. Bernard of Clairvaux, Treatise on Grace and Free Choice, ed. and intro. by James M. Houston (Portland, OR: Multnomah Press, 1983), III–VI.
32. Ibid., X.
33. Ibid., III, 8 and X, 34 –35 respectively. This bi-perspectival view is also evident in Bernard’s On Loving God (De Diligendio Deo). Bernard wrote, “[God] is both the efficient cause and the final object of our love. He gives the occasion to love, He creates the desire to love, He brings our affection to its fruition. He is such that to have Him is a natural due, for He is lovable. It is natural to trust Him, since our love by ourselves for Him would be in vain unless we had hope that one day we would love Him perfectly. Our loves are prepared and rewarded by Him. He loves us first, leading the way for our response. So we are bound to repay Him with love. We are nurtured by Him to cherish high hopes in Him.” See Bernard, Loving, 153– 54.
34. Mews argues that the traditional date assigned to this council ( June 2, 1140) is incorrect, preferring May 25, 1141. See Constant J. Mews, “The Council of Sens (1141): Abelard, Bernard, and the Fear of Social upheaval,” Speculum 77, no. 2 (2002): 342-82. As is so often the case, the victor’s and the loser’s stories are very different. Bordering on hagiography, Richard Storrs writes, “Bernard entered alone, with downcast eyes, serious face, in coarse garments, dispensing benedictions to those who sought them. Abelard strode in, surrounded by his disciples, with head erect and proud mien, startling those who looked on his worn and scornful face. The difference corresponds with all that we know of the character of the men” (Bernard of Clairvaux: The Times, the Man, and His Work [New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1892], 461-62). For a more sympathetic version towards Abelard see Roger Lloyd, The Stricken Lute: An Account of the Life of Peter Abelard (London: Lovat Dickson Ltd., 1932), 197– 213.
35. Innocent II’s condemnation was two-fold: 1) Abelard and his followers were ordered to maintain perpetual silence and 2) Abelard and Arnold of Brescia were to be “shut up separately in places of religion and their erroneous books to be burned wherever they might be found.” The second part of this condemnation was never carried out as Peter the Venerable convinced Abelard to stay at Cluny. Peter the Venerable was also responsible for the later reconciliation of Abelard and Bernard. See Clanchy, Abelard, 318-25.
36. Ibid., 379-80. Arnold of Brescia is a clear example of these tendencies. “[Arnold], a notorious critic of episcopal and papal power, attached himself to Abelard, helped make Abelard’s theological critique of traditional understanding of divine omnipotence appear to be subversive thinking.”
37. Mews, “Sens,” 366-68.
38. Murray, Abelard and Bernard, 51.
39. Quoted in Franks, Work, 153.
40. Murray notes that Abelard affirmed with Bernard that justice and mercy is displayed in redemption. Commenting on Romans 6:23, Abelard wrote, “Sed ex hoc ni fallor contuendo nobis Apostolus reliquit Deum in incarnatione Filii sui id quoque sibi machinatum fuisse, ut non solum misericordia, verum et justitia per eum subveniret peccantibus, et ipsius justitia suppleretur quod delictis nostris praepediebatur.” Quoted in Murray, Abelard and Bernard, 82.
41. Franks, Work, 152-53. As was noted earlier, Bernard himself believed this charge was credible. For further examples of this subjective vs. objective distinction see A. Victor Murray, Abelard and St. Bernard: A Study in Twelfth Century ‘Modernism’ (Manchester: Manchester university Press, 1967), 138 –39; H. D. McDonald who writes, “In Abelard’s view the effect of Christ’s atonement is primarily manward; indeed, it is exclusively so. It is altogether subjective” (The Atonement of the Death of Christ: In Faith, Revelation, and History [Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985], 180); and Merton Bernard Leigh, “A History of the Doctrine of the Atonement from the Scholastics Through the Reformers” (Bachelor of Divinity Thesis, Talbot Theological Seminary, May 1970), 23-32. Also see J. Denny Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 18-19 who focuses solely on Abelard’s “subjective” view.
42. G. R. Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux (Oxford: university Press, 2000), 87. Cf. Evans’s article “Cur Deus Homo: St. Bernard’s Theology of the Redemption. A Contribution to the Contemporary Debate,” in Studia Theologica 36 (1982): 27-36.
43. Marcia l. Colish, Peter Lombard (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), 1:455. Colish proposes a similarity based upon a common denial of political and military terms as well as a common emphasis placed upon Christ’s efficacious sacrifice which allows man to love God again.
44. Those who criticize Abelard of strict exemplarism most often point to Abelard’s commentary on Romans, quoting the following comment by Abelard as proof: “Now it seems to us that we have been justified by the blood of Christ and reconciled to God in this way: Through this unique act of grace manifested to us—in that his Son has taken upon himself our nature and preserved therein in teaching us by word and example even unto death—he has more fully bound us to himself by love; with the result that our hearts should be enkindled by such a gift of divine grace, and true charity should not now shrink from enduring anything for him” (Abelard, Romanos, III, 283). Although this quotation undoubtedly demonstrates Abelard’s exemplarism, a more holistic reading which takes into account Abelard’s other writings will clearly validate my thesis.
45. Richard S. Haugh, “Aspects of Abelard’s Theology in the Context of Christian Doctrine,” in Peter Abelard: The Personality, Self-Consciousness and Thought of a Martyr of ‘Enlightenment,’ by George Fedotov (Vaduz: Büchervertriebsanstalt, 1988), 193.
46. Alister McGrath, “The Moral Theory of the Atonement: An Historical and Theological Critique,” in Scottish Journal of Theology 38, no. 2 (1985): 209. Letham follows McGrath in this conviction. See Robert Letham, The Work of Christ (Downer’s Grove, Il: Intervarsity Press, 1993), 167. Letham writes, “Hence, the atonement [of Abelard] is in reality a Godward phenomenon and not a subjective moral change in us.”
47. While I have argued that an objective and subjective element are evident in the atonement theories of both Abelard and Bernard, it is helpful to keep in mind that both of their soteriologies were ultimately subjective; salvation ultimately rested upon the acceptance or denial of grace.