A Study In The Westminster Doctrine Of The Relation Of The Civil Magistrate To The Church

By Robley J. Johnston

The Stony Brook School, Stony Brook, New York

“God, the supreme Lord and King of all the world, hath ordained civil magistrates, to be, under Him, over the people, for His own glory, and the public good: and, to this end, hath armed them with the power of the sword, for the defence and encouragement of them that are good, and for the punishment of evil doers” (The Confession of Faith, chapter XXIII, section i). 

“The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the Word and sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven: yet he hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better effecting whereof, he hath power to call synods, to be present at them, and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God” (ibid., section iii). 

“As magistrates may lawfully call a synod of ministers, and other fit persons, to consult and advise with, about matters of religion; so, if magistrates be open enemies to the Church, the ministers of Christ, of themselves, by virtue of their office, or they, with other fit persons upon delegation from their Churches, may meet together in such assemblies” (ibid., chapter XXXI, section ii). 

“It belongeth to synods and councils, ministerially to determine controversies of faith, and cases of conscience; to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God, and government of His Church; to receive complaints in cases of maladministration, and authoritatively to determine the same: which decrees and determinations, if consonant to the Word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission; not only for their agreement with the Word, but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God appointed thereunto in His Word” (ibid., section iii). 

“Synods and councils are to handle, or conclude nothing, but that which is ecclesiastical: and are not to intermeddle with civil affairs which concern the commonwealth, unless by way of humble petition in cases extraordinary; or, by way of advice, for satisfaction of conscience, if they be thereunto required by the civil magistrate” (ibid., section v). 

“The Lord Jesus, as King and Head of His Church, hath therein appointed a government, in the hand of Church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate” (ibid., chapter XXX, section i).

From the days of its inception the Christian church has been confronted with the problem posed by its very existence in the world, namely, the problem of the church’s relation to the state. The question of the attitude and relation which the church should properly bear to the governments of this world has never ceased to agitate the minds of leaders in both the ecclesiastical and the political spheres. In the course of the history of the church both extremes in that relation may be witnessed. At one time the church asserts and exercises a dominating influence over the affairs of state. At another time the church becomes the mere tool of the state. The political and religious upheavals attendant upon the Reformation brought this question into the sharpest focus and forced it upon the consideration of the church. The problem was not solved at once and the history of the struggle to solve it differs with the varying circumstances of each country in which the question arose. The controversy between church and state in England is of particular interest, for ultimately many of the ideas germinated there and some of the leaders in that struggle found their way into this country and became a determinative factor in our present-day doctrine of the separation of the church and the state.

The Westminster Confession of Faith was framed at the very height of the effort to bring into full and conscious expression the doctrines of the Reformation. Likewise it was drawn up in the midst of the controversy between church and state which was engendered by the Reformation. Consequently, in its attempt to apply the principles of the Reformation to this specific problem the Westminster Confession provides us with a most interesting problem respecting the difficult relation of the government of the state to the government of the church. The formulations of the Westminster Confession which we have quoted at the beginning of this article provide us with the main outlines of the position of the Westminster divines on the subject, but in so doing they seem to raise a question as to the harmony and consistency of the main elements which they set forth. It can hardly be denied, either from a consideration of the Confessional statements themselves, or with respect to the opinions of the preponderant majority of the divines, that the framers of the Confession meant to be perfectly clear in their assertion of the Kingship and Headship of Christ over His church and that there is a consequent government in Christ’s church which is distinct from the civil powers.[1] Nevertheless, we can hardly be blind to the difficulty posed by the equally positive assertions of the Confession which seem to blur and confuse that distinction of powers. Not only does the Confession set forth the principle of a distinct government for the church, it also sets forth the seemingly contradictory principle that the civil magistrate has a right and a duty to keep order and suppress heresies in the church and that to the effecting of the same he has power to summon synods and be present at them.[2]

The apparent incompatibility of the elements thus set forth has been the occasion of numerous charges that the Westminster Confession of Faith embodies a position of Erastianism. Judged from several angles, such a charge might seem to be difficult, if not impossible, to refute. Not only do some of the actual declarations of the Confession seem certainly to support such a charge, but many of the circumstances of the meeting of the Westminster Assembly would seem to lend plausibility to the accusation. Consequently, it cannot be without profit that we give some attention to the meaning and intent of the Westminster divines when they set forth their position as embodied in the quotations at the head of this article.

From the very beginning of the Reformation church in England the power and influence of the state was a major factor in its development. It is probable that more than in any other country the civil power in England was the preparatory and initiatory factor in the Reformation. The history of the intrusion of the civil power upon the ecclesiastical sphere in England is a long and very important one. As early as the Norman and Plantagenet kings, it became a matter of policy with the more powerful English sovereigns to concern themselves with affairs ecclesiastical and to seek to curb papal and episcopal powers. William the Conqueror, though indebted to the papacy for moral support which had been of assistance to him in his conquest of England and though he desired to repay that debt, refused to bow before the papal claims and asserted his own prerogatives instead. He refused to give to the pope the oath of fealty and in contravention of a papal decree he controlled throughout his reign the appointment of English bishops and important abbots.[3] He likewise forbade the acknowledgement of a pope without his consent and he retained the right of veto over the acts of English synods. In the thirteenth century King John in his capitulation to Innocent III forfeited for a time the claims of the English sovereigns and acknowledged the supremacy of the papal power. This action, however, only provided an added stimulus to subsequent monarchs to re-assert their powers over the English clergy. The contest waged against the oppression and abuses of the Roman Church was resumed in earnest by Edward I. In 1296 Edward demanded a payment of the English clergy in the face of Pope Boniface VIII’s bull Clericis Laicos and, when the clergy refused, Edward promptly outlawed them, putting them outside the protection of the royal courts.[4] Under Edward III the assertion of the precedence of the royal claims over the church went even further with the enactment of the Statute of Provisors and the Statute of Praemunire. The former enactment was directed against the papal practice of reserving to itself appointments and benefices and collecting fees in reward for appointment. The Statute of Provisors denies papal priority in making such appointments and in receiving their benefits and it asserts the prior claims of the king.[5] The Statute of Praemunire forbids the appeal to the papal court of cases belonging in the king’s courts.[6] Therefore, while the energies of these early English monarchs were directed mainly toward the expulsion of the powers of the church from affairs rightly belonging to the crown, before the time of Henry VIII there is a strong precedent for the assertion of the prior claims of the civil power over certain affairs of the church.

It was upon the strength of such statutes as those mentioned above that Henry VIII initiated those moves which were to separate the English Church from the Church of Rome and to bring it within the sphere of the Reformation. When Henry wished to have his marriage to Katharine of Aragon annulled he was opposed by Cardinal Wolsey, but with the shrewd aid of Cranmer he secured a sufficient weight of theological opinion to uphold him in his action. He then held that Wolsey was guilty of a praemunire, together with those who had sided with him, and thus Henry rendered the English clergy submissive to him through fear of his reprisals.[7] Consequently, in order to clear themselves of the guilt which Henry had hinted and in order to please him, the Convocation of the Clergy granted him in 1531 the title “The Protector and Supreme Head of the Church and the clergy of England”.[8] Not content with this, Henry in 1535 secured the passage of a bill which abolished papal supremacy in England, and declared the king to be the Supreme Head of the Church of England. Thus the English Church was severed from the power of Rome and was opened to the forces of the Reformation. Still it is quite evident that the actions of Henry VIII were impelled by no desire for reform. Henry’s motive was purely political, for he saw in the situation an opportunity to put down the only power in England which then could effectively oppose him. Hence, though Henry’s action placed England into the stream of the Reformation, from the first the Church’s own initiative in reform was stifled. Certainly it is without question that the act of separation and the constitution of the English monarch as the virtual head of the national church was plain Erastianism.

Under Henry VIII and under his successors, Edward VI and Queen Elizabeth, the prelates of the English Church were stripped of their independent jurisdiction and were reduced to subjection to the will of the monarch. In this manner ecclesiastical as well as temporal supremacy was vested in the crown. During the reigns of the Tudor monarchs this twofold supremacy was claimed as the personal prerogative of the monarch, with which Parliament had no right to meddle, as if this were a divine right. Not only did this right of the crown in matters ecclesiastical include the right to judge in particular cases, but it was also held that the king had the right to a certain extent to legislate and without the consent of Parliament to give validity to any ecclesiastical legislation proposed by the Convocation.[9] The extravagance of the claims of the English crown to jurisdiction in the church is quite plainly seen in the title of “the only supreme head on earth of the Church of England” ascribed to Henry VIII by both the Convocation of the Clergy and by the houses of Parliament.[10] The Article of 1553 read thus: “The King of England is supreme head in earth next under Christ of the Church of England and Ireland”, and that of 1563 held that “The Queen’s Majesty hath the chief power in this realm of England and other her dominions, unto whom the chief government of all estates of this realm, whether they be ecclesiastical or civil, in all causes doth appertain, and is not nor ought to be subject to any foreign jurisdiction”.[11]

As Dr. Mitchell points out in his history of the Westminster Assembly, these claims of almost unrestricted right for the civil power within the church were not allowed to go by unnoticed nor, indeed, unopposed. Whereas the powers of the king were once opposed by clerics whose first loyalty was to the pope, after the separation of the Church of England from Rome the powers of the king were opposed by Reformed churchmen who now were allied with the parliamentary proponents of constitutional government. Though the era of the Tudor sovereigns is often conceived as one of absolutism in England, still it was during their reigns that the groundwork was laid for both constitutional government and for reform in the church. Under Elizabeth numerous advances were made by the Parliament in reserving to itself certain constitutional rights as opposed to the absolute power and arbitrary acts of the crown in respect of the affairs of state. In her reign the Parliament became more and more conscious of its power and sought to assert its independence in demanding freedom of speech, freedom from arrest and freedom of access.[12] These attempts to achieve independence for Parliament, in which many of the Puritans were involved, led to the questioning of the absolute right of the sovereign in the church. Consequently, when the Article of 1563 asserted that to the Queen belonged the chief government in all causes, whether ecclesiastical or civil, the necessity of combating such claims became quite evident, if not insistent.

Not only, then, did the civil power in England assert its power in the realm of the government of the church, but on the other hand the church had made no declaration denying the right of the civil magistrate to intrude on its affairs. The only restraint placed upon the magistrate in England occurs in Article XXXVII of The Thirty-Nine Articles (English Ed. 1571) where we read: “We geue not to our princes the ministring either of God’s word, or of Sacraments”.[13] Before the writing of the Westminster Confession there had been but one confessional attempt in English territory to reduce the sweep of royal claims from this broad realm of supremacy, namely, supremacy in everything but in “the ministring either of God’s word, or of Sacraments”. This step was taken by Archbishop Ussher in The Irish Articles in which were added to the formulation just cited the words “or the power of the Keys”.[14] It was against a background, then, which was almost totally Erastian that the Westminster divines came to their task of making a pronouncement upon this difficult and, at that time, most troubled relation of church to state.

Beyond the fact of the prevailing Erastian character of the influences which had been at work in the English Church prior to the calling of the Westminster Assembly we must take note of the particular circumstances in which this assembly was summoned. The peculiar character of the Puritan revolt of these decades must be given due recognition. The struggle in the course of which the Westminster Assembly was called was not fundamentally a religious controversy. True enough, this revolt was an effort to reduce the royal power, but the primary concern of those who were seeking to reduce the royal power was not in the ecclesiastical situation as such. The king’s authority had not only intruded excessively upon the affairs of the church, but it had also been asserted to an unwonted extreme in the civil government. It was this latter situation which was the root of the discontent that began the revolt. The primary aim of the leaders in this struggle was not to free the church from the domination of the state, but to remove the seat of civil authority from the king to the Parliament. This revolt, like the Reformation under Henry VIII, was basically political in its character and affected the church only incidentally. But, like Henry’s reform, the ecclesiastical changes involved in this struggle assumed proportions comparable to those changes wrought in the political sphere. Warfield correctly summarizes the situation when he says: “The controversy was thus shifted from a contest between Pope and King to a contest between King and Parliament”.[15] Henry had seized power in the church from the pope in order to establish his absolute rule in the state, and now the leading contestants have changed in that the Parliament is seeking to wrest control of the state from the king.

At this point it is most important to remember just this that the change envisaged by the parliamentary leaders was simply a substitution of the authority of Parliament for the authority of the king. In this light we must note the very significant fact that the Westminster Assembly of Divines was a creature of the Parliament with no independent powers of its own. In the mind of Parliament the church must be subject to it just as it had acknowledged the authority of the king. The instrument by which the Parliament summoned the Assembly makes this quite plain and indicates in no uncertain terms the purely advisory function which the Assembly was to fulfil. By it the divines were required “‘to meet and assemble themselves at Westminster, in the Chapel called King Henry the VII’s Chapel, on the first day of July, in the year of our Lord One thousand six hundred and forty three’, and thereafter ‘from time to time [to] sit, and be removed from place to place’ and to ‘confer and treat among themselves of such matters and things, touching and concerning the Liturgy, Discipline, and Government of the Church of England, or the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the same from all false aspersions and misconstructions, as shall be proposed unto them by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament, and no other; and to deliver their opinions and advices of, or touching the matters aforesaid, as shall be most agreeable to the word of God, to both or either of the said Houses, from time to time, in such manner and sort as by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament shall be required; and the same not to divulge, by printing, writing, or otherwise, without the consent of both or either House of Parliament’”.[16] Parliament was not at all minded to set up an independent ecclesiastical legislature and to concern itself alone with civil affairs. Rather it was determined to hold in its own hands both the civil and ecclesiastical power and to refuse to the Assembly of Divines any power of initiation or jurisdiction. This it sought to insure by making the Assembly only a consultative body, discussing the things assigned to it by Parliament, and by controlling the publication of any of its deliberations. Herein is clearly reflected the Erastian temper of the Parliament which “never caught sight of the vision of a free Church in a free State, but not unnaturally identified the cause of freedom with itself and would have felt it a betrayal of liberty not to have retained all authority”.[17]

Because of this attitude on the part of Parliament it dare not be supposed that their influence and the pressure which they sought at times to bring to bear on the divines was in any way slight. By the terms of the convoking ordinance the Assembly was itself to include thirty members of the Parliament.[18] Robert Baillie, one of the Scottish commissioners to the Assembly, testifies to the strong Erastian influences which were exerted by the Parliament when he says: “The Pope and the King were never more earnest for the headship of the Church than the pluralitie of this Parliament”.[19] Speaking of the parliamentary members of the Assembly he writes: “Most of their lawyers are strong Erastians, and would have all the Church Government depend absolutelie on the Parliament”.[20] In the same vein he writes at another time: “The most part of the House of Commons, especiallie the lawyers, whereof they are many, and divers of them very able men, are either half or whole Erastians, believing no Church-government to be of divine right, bot all to be a humane constitution, depending on the will of the magistrates”.[21] On various occasions throughout the history of the Westminster Assembly the Parliament sought to intimidate the divines by reminding them of their advisory capacity. Heedless of the debates which were being conducted in the Assembly, Parliament even passed certain distinctly Erastian ordinances affecting the government of the Church in England. Consequently, Baillie concluded that “the power of the Parliament in ecclesiastick affairs” was the greatest of the questions to be determined.[22]

This Erastian influence was strongly supported in the Assembly itself by three distinguished members of the Assembly—Lightfoot, Coleman and Selden. Lightfoot and Selden were both celebrated Hebraists and of Selden Baillie writes: “This man is the head of the Erastians: his glory is most in the Jewish learning; he avows every where, that the Jewish State and Church was all one, and that so in England it must be, that the Parliament is the Church”.[23] This was indeed the heart of the question as the issue was drawn in the debates of the Assembly. The ecclesiastical supremacy of the English monarchs was held by the Erastians to be similar to that which had been held by Jewish kings and Christian emperors. It was argued that these formed precedents for a Christian sovereign’s possession and exercise of jurisdiction within the church, in all matters of censure, although it gave no authority to interfere in the administration of the ordinances or in the ordination and deposition of ministers. The Erastians did not, therefore, oppose the dictum, “Christ, who is prophet, priest, king and head of the Church, hath fullness of power, and containeth all other offices by way of eminency in Himself”, for they held that in a Christian state, Christ had delegated the power of jurisdiction to the Christian civil magistrate. It was the genius of the Erastian argument to make all jurisdiction one, so that Selden, in his famous debate with George Gillespie in February 1644 during the general debate on the question of Independency, maintained with all the force of his vast learning that the court referred to in Matthew 18:17 was not ecclesiastical, but civil. His object was to explain away the force of the term ecclesia, or church, and to make the passage refer exclusively to the Jewish organization, the Sanhedrin. This he sought to do by an over-powering display of minute rabbinical learning, and had it not been for the keenness of Gillespie’s perception in rebutting his arguments, his speech would have produced a powerful effect upon the Assembly. In this position he was vigorously supported by Thomas Coleman in the following year when he opposed the petition of the Assembly to the Parliament requesting action to keep “the ignorant and scandalous” from the sacraments. Coleman on this occasion, both in the Assembly and in a spirited exchange of pamphlets with Gillespie, adamantly maintained: “I know no such distinction of government Ecclesiasticall and Civill, in the sense I take Government for the corrective part thereof. All ecclesiasticall (improperly called) government being meerly doctrinall: the corrective or punitive part being civill or temporall”.[24] The Erastian contention was that there was neither scriptural warrant nor politic propriety to support any independent ecclesiastical judicatory. An imperium in imperio was anathema to them. Parliament feared the consequences which might ensue from “‘granting an arbitrary and unlimited power and jurisdiction to near ten thousand judicatories to be erected within this kingdom;’” and asserted that they “‘had the more reason by no means to part with this power out of the hands of the civil magistrate, since the experience of all ages will manifest that the reformation and purity of religion, and the preservation and protection of the people of God in this kingdom, hath under God been by the Parliaments and their exercise of this power’”.[25] In these sentiments Coleman, Selden and Lightfoot heartily concurred.

The evidence which we have considered thus far bears a strong testimony to the very considerable Erastian influences which were at work in the Westminster Assembly, not only in the opinions of some of its members but also in the history of the English Reformation and in the very nature of the Assembly itself as a creature of the Parliament. In the light of such extensive evidence of a strong Erastian sentiment in and surrounding the debates of the Westminster divines it might seem altogether reasonable to attach an Erastian interpretation to the formulations of the Confession. However, the real significance of such evidence as we have considered above is not seen until it is set in the context of the exceedingly strenuous opposition with which such opinions were greeted by the greater number of the most eminent members of the Assembly. To that side of the evidence we now must turn our attention.

Before looking specifically at the actions and declarations of the Assembly on the subject under our consideration, a further inquiry into the purposes of that body may prove illuminating. In the ordinance of the Lords and Commons for the calling of the Westminster Assembly, the avowed purpose of this Assembly is said to be “that such a government shall be settled in the Church as may be most agreeable to God’s holy word, and most apt to procure and preserve the peace of the Church at home, and nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland, and other Reformed Churches abroad”.[26] The pattern of the government of the Church of Scotland, then, from the very first assumes great importance with respect to the understanding of the intents of the divines. This avowed purpose of the Assembly received new impetus and added solemnity from the course of events which accompanied the convoking of the Assembly. During the summer in which the Westminster Assembly was convened the fortunes of the Parliamentary forces were at an exceedingly low ebb. So dim, in fact, were their hopes of ultimate success that they sent a call for aid to their Scottish neighbors to the north. The Scottish Church had, with great difficulty and sore persecution, by this time achieved its independence of the dictates of the crown. Consequently, the Scottish leaders harbored a justifiable fear of endangering their dearly won freedom by casting their lot in a military alliance with the uncertain fortunes of the Parliamentary party in England. It was this fact which caused the Scots to insist upon a religious covenant rather than a mere civil agreement. What they wanted in return for aid to the English party of Parliament was an explicit avowal and promise of that which the English on their part had already professed to be their purpose, namely, the reformation and reconstruction of the government of the English Church. The result of this was the taking in September-October 1643 of the Solemn League and Covenant.

By the terms of this pact, the two nations bound themselves to each other in a solemn league and covenant which was sworn in England by the houses of Parliament and by the Assembly and in Scotland by both the civil and religious authorities.[27] The two nations pledged themselves to “the preservation of the reformed religion in the Church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government, against our common enemies”, and to “the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government, according to the word of God and the example of the best reformed Churches”. The end which they sought was that the Churches of God in the three kingdoms might be brought “to the nearest conjunction and uniformity in religion, confession of faith, form of Church government, directory for worship and catechizing”.[28] The purpose of the Solemn League and Covenant, then, was to bind the English to make the Church of England as near in government and doctrine to the Scottish churches as the Word permits. This quite clearly provides us with a background for knowing what was the intent of the divines; the Scottish arrangement will throw light on the Westminster Assembly’s purpose. It is significant to note that until the taking of the Solemn League and Covenant the Assembly was engaged upon the revision of The Thirty-Nine Articles. However, when the covenant was sworn, Parliament immediately sent to the Assembly orders to proceed to the consideration of a form of government. Since the Church of England was doctrinally quite close to the Church of Scotland, the taking of the Solemn League and Covenant placed the question of church government in the greatest prominence. Hence, we see the great significance of this covenant for showing us the intention of the Assembly as they approached this question. While it is true that the Solemn League and Covenant did not bind the English to Presbyterianism, it should be borne in mind that the Scottish model was intended to be followed. This fact lends great significance both to the character of the Scottish settlement of church government and to the influence of the Scottish commissioners in the Assembly. In an exchange of correspondence between the English Parliament and the Scottish Assembly an accompanying letter from a number of English ministers at London expressed itself as desirous that “we may agree in one Confession of Faith, one Directorie of Worship, one publicke Catechisme, and form of Government” and asked the appointment of some Scottish delegates “to assist at” it.[29] The influence of the Scottish commissioners we shall notice later, but we note here at the very outset the basic significance of the Scottish Church as a model for the reformation of the English Church. While it is true that the Scottish arguments on the subject of church government allowed of some place in synods, etc., to the civil magistrate (see especially the writings of George Gillespie), it cannot be denied that the Scottish had successfully expelled the magistrate from control in the church government. The Scottish arrangement itself was a denial of the supremacy of the civil magistrate in ecclesiastical courts and an assertion of the independence of the church in matters beyond “the administration of the Word and sacraments”.

The question which we have under consideration in this article first arose, as we have noted already, after the Assembly turned from the revision of The Thirty-Nine Articles to the task of framing a government for the Church of England consonant with the Scottish arrangement. It was during the framing of the Propositions concerning church government that the debate between Selden and George Gillespie occurred, and during this time Gillespie’s influence may be seen both in his arguments on the floor of the Assembly and in his able treatises on the subject. Therefore, the Propositions as they were adopted by the divines will serve to show us something of the degree to which they were affected by the Erastian arguments. Here it is significant to note that the Propositions are against any human headship, or any right of the civil magistrate to rule in Christ’s church. Furthermore, they hold that Christ is Head of the church and has given all officers necessary to its edification and for the perfecting of the saints. The Propositions allow of a subordination of courts and grant a right of appeal, but no mention is made of any right of appeal from them to the magistrate or to Parliament.[30] That the Assembly adopted this as its position is alone a very significant fact, but when it is remembered that the Parliament in February-March 1645–6 passed an ordinance setting up a body of commissioners in every province to be appointed by the Parliament for the purposes of appeal from the ecclesiastical courts and when we place the adopted position of the Assembly over against such extreme Erastianism, then the resistance of the divines to any real interference on the part of the magistrate in the affairs of the church begins to assume truly great proportions. The Erastian influences surrounding the Westminster Assembly are indeed important in seeking an explanation for the Westminster formulations on the civil magistrate and the church, but even more significant is the strenuous opposition which the overwhelming majority of the divines offered those influences. In spite of the most insistent and extreme Parliamentary pressure to secure a recognition of its supremacy in the matter of church judicatories, the Assembly refused to yield. Thus it begins to appear, as Mitchell points out, that any power meant to be acknowledged by the Confession as belonging to the civil magistrate in the church must have been regarded as something extrinsic and not intrinsic to the church’s affairs.[31]

If the temper of the Parliament may be said to have been Erastian, it would seem equally clear from the opposition which the Assembly offered the Parliament on this score that the majority of the Assembly were by no means amenable to the establishment of such an arrangement in England. This is to be inferred not only from the adopted statements of the divines, but also from their conduct with respect to the Erastian ordinances of the Parliament. When Parliament passed the Ordinance for Provincial Commissioners in March 1646, the Assembly drew up a solemn and serious petition which was carried up to the Parliament by the Assembly in a body and presented by Mr. Marshall. The courage and conviction of the divines on this score may be understood when we notice how the Parliament on this occasion bared its teeth and judged the Assembly guilty of a breach of privilege and threatened the divines with the penalty of the Statute of Praemunire. In this context there is no evidence that the Westminster divines bowed to the position of Parliament or in any way altered their own position to admit of a place for the civil magistrate in the government of the church. This attitude on the part of the divines is of the greatest importance in seeking to establish and evaluate the governing principle upon which the Assembly operated in formulating the section with respect to the civil magistrate.

From the foregoing evidence we may judge that the Westminster divines, whatever may be the prima facie purport of their formulations on the subject of the civil magistrate and the government of the church, were not in any way desirous of denying or vitiating the Headship of Christ in His church or the independence of the church courts from civil interference. What, then, can have been their meaning when they wrote down as their well considered opinions the statements we have quoted concerning the rights of the civil magistrate with respect to order and purity in the church? To discover something of their more precise meaning we must give some attention to the writings of George Gillespie on this subject, for Gillespie, together with Samuel Rutherford in his Lex, Rex and Divine Right of Church Government and Excommunication, set forth at length an apologetic for the position which seems to have been the position taken by the Assembly in the Confession of Faith.

The most basic principle for the government of the church which Gillespie sets forth is that there is a government by officers of the church which is distinct from the government of the state. This principle finds succinct expression in the sixth proposition of Gillespie’s treatise One Hundred and Eleven Propositions concerning the Ministry and Government of the Church. Here he says: “The same Lord and our Saviour Jesus Christ, the only Head of the Church, hath ordained in the New Testament, not only the preaching of the word and administration of baptism and the Lord’s Supper, but also ecclesiastical government, distinct and differing from the civil government; and it is his will that there be such a government distinct from the civil in all his churches everywhere, as well those which live under Christian, as those under infidel magistrates”.[32] This note is pervasive in all that Gillespie wrote and said on the subject of church government. This was the thrust of his answer to Selden on Matthew 18:17 and it is determinative for his argument in his Aaron’s Rod Blossoming. In this last named work Gillespie puts the matter very pointedly when he says: “The question is not, 1. Whether the magistrate be God’s deputy or vicegerent, and as God upon earth; for who denies that? Nor, 2. Whether the magistrate be Christ’s deputy… Nor, 3. Whether the Christian magistrate be useful and subservient to the kingdom of Jesus Christ … for in this also I hold the affirmative… But the question is, Whether the Christian magistrate be a governor in the church vice Christi, in the room and stead of Jesus Christ, as he is Mediator? … I am for the negative.”[33] Here Gillespie puts himself on record as opposing unconditionally the Erastian contention that there is but one government and that residing in the state. To this end he argues for the necessity of a government in the church which is different in kind from the rule of the civil magistrate when he says: “Church censures must needs be dispensed by ministers and elders, because they are heterogeneous to magistracy: For, first, The magistrate by the power which is in his hand, ought to punish any of his subjects that do evil, and he ought to punish like sins with like punishments. But if the power of church censures be in the magistrate’s hands, he cannot walk by that rule; for church censures are only for church members, not for all subjects.”[34] Furthermore, in this same treatise Gillespie gives a lengthy and exhaustive argument in which he adduces the arguments of Scripture to support a distinct church government.[35] His proposition is that there ought to be in the church “a ministerial or ecclesiastical government, properly so called, beside the civil government or magistracy”.

In accordance with this principle of the distinction of governments, Gillespie will suffer no intrusion of the power of the civil magistrate into the doctrine and discipline of the church. Thus he says in proposition forty-three: “Yet the civil power and the ecclesiastical ought not by any means to be confounded or mixed together. Both powers are indeed from God, and ordained for his glory, and both to be guided by his word … to both powers their proper dignity and authority is to be maintained and preserved in force: to both also is some way intrusted the keeping of both tables of the law, also both the one and the other doth exercise some jurisdiction … but these and other things of like sort, in which they agree notwithstanding, yet by marvellous vast differences are they distinguished the one from the other.”[36] Although he admits that the operations of civil and church government may and do touch one another and that in some cases their spheres must overlap, nevertheless Gillespie is unequivocal in his assertion that neither the magistrate nor church officers may engage in activities which properly belong to the other. Nor does he conceive the case is in anywise altered by the fact that a magistrate may be a Christian. The mere fact that a man may be a Christian who holds the office of magistrate does not mean that the jurisdiction of the office is at all broadened.[37] He does not deny, indeed, that the magistrate governs in the church, but he does deny that he governs the church.[38] Therefore Gillespie gives no quarter to the magistrate who would intrude into ecclesiastical affairs. “Seeing, then, there are so many and so great differences of both offices, and seeing also that the ‘function of ministers and elders of the church is not at all contained in the office of the magistrate; neither, on the other part, is this comprehended with that; magistrates shall no less sin in usurping ecclesiastical power, ministering holy things, ordaining ministers, or exercising discipline ecclesiastical, than ministers should sin in rushing into the borders of the magistrate, and in thrusting themselves into his calling.”[39]

It is with these most basic assumptions in mind that we must consider and judge the statements concerning the actions allowable to the civil magistrate. And, in order to discover Gillespie’s precise meaning, we must give some attention to how he defines the respective spheres of civil and church government. These two spheres he distinguishes first in respect of their foundation and institution—civil government being grounded upon the law of nature and thus common to unbelievers and Christians alike, while the church government is grounded only on the positive law of Christ and thus peculiar to Christians. In the second place he distinguishes them in respect of their object—the civil power being occupied with the outward man, with the external state and condition of the members of the church.[40] The church, on the other hand, is concerned with two sorts of things, some of which are intrinsic, belonging to the soul or inward man, and other things which are extrinsic, belonging to the outward man. The former intrinsic things include the preaching of the word and the administration of the sacraments, the keys of the kingdom, the ordination and deposition of ministers, and such are not to be administered by the civil magistrate. The extrinsic things belong to the outward man and are therefore common to the church and to other human societies and are consequently the proper objects of the magistrate’s care.[41]

Consequently, although Gillespie grants to the civil magistrate certain authority and duties with respect to the well-being of the church, he does so always with the above distinctions in mind. The office of the civil magistrate is, in Gillespie’s estimation, not at all a light or unimportant one. The magistrate is intended not only for the restraint of evil but also for the promotion of good. Therefore, he avers that the magistrate is the keeper and defender of both the tables of the law. The decalogue, then, as the summation of the moral law and at the same time the rule of conduct for the church, is to be enforced by the civil magistrate. However, we should note Gillespie’s language in this connection. In describing the magistrate as keeper of the law of God, he says, he “may and ought first and chiefly to take care of God’s glory, and (according to his place, or in his manner and way) to preserve religion when pure, and to restore it when decayed and corrupted: and also to provide a learned and godly ministry, schools also and synods, as likewise to restrain and punish as well atheists, blasphemers, heretics and schismatics, as the violaters of justice and civil peace”.[42] Because of the distinctions which we have noted before and the qualification he makes in the words “in his manner and way”, it would seem clear that these duties of the magistrate as they touch the affairs of the church must be understood as applying to those things which Gillespie calls τὰ ἔξω. This becomes even more clear in another place where Gillespie allows to the magistrate the use of force in the preservation of the peace and purity of the church. Here he says that since the use of compulsion is not proper to the church, in cases where excommunicates or blasphemous persons threaten to upset the peaceful operation of the church it is the duty of the magistrate to repress them.[43] It is worthy of note that it is not the magistrate who, in Gillespie’s opinion, declares persons excommunicate or heretical, but rather the magistrate must take action against those whom the church has declared excommunicate. Thus he seeks to guard against giving the magistrate any power within the church while granting him power in affairs extrinsic to the church.

Beyond this duty of the magistrate, Gillespie gives to him a certain right of review over the actions and declarations of the councils of the church which might at first sight appear to be an Erastian intrusion into the affairs of the church. He says: “For the national synod ought to declare … the grounds of their sentence, and the reasons of their proceedings, when he (the magistrate) demandeth or inquireth into the same, and desireth to be satisfied”.[44] However, all that Gillespie allows in this case is that the civil governor may secure a review by the church council of its decisions. The magistrate himself cannot reverse the decision and deliver a ruling in such matters. Moreover, this right of review is no more than that which belongs to each member of the church respectively, namely, the right of private interpretation of the Scriptures. In other words, the magistrate, no more than any other member of the church, is not required to accept the decisions of the council merely because it is a decree of the council, but it is his right as a Christian to judge the decree by the Word of God.[45] Samuel Rutherford expresses himself very plainly on this point when he says: “The Magistrate is not obliged to execute the decrees of the Church, without further examination; whither they be right or wrong, as Papists teach that the Magistrate is to execute the decrees of their Popish councels with blind obedience.”[46] Rutherford cites here his reason as the fact that every Christian is under command from God to try all things to see if they be in accord with the principles of the Scripture. The right to judge of the decrees of councils belongs to the magistrate if he be a Christian, and by way of eminence in virtue of his office as head of the state, for though he may not be a judge in matters spiritual, yet he does have the right, Gillespie affirms, to be “judge of his own civil act about spiritual things; namely, of defending them in his own dominions, and of approving or tolerating the same”.[47] Furthermore, when he reserves this right to the civil governor—especially in his judgment of his own civil act about spiritual things—Gillespie is careful not to leave the magistrate without responsibility, but holds him strictly accountable, in such judgments in which he might err, to the judgment of “the supreme tribunal”.[48]

Last of all we must notice what Gillespie has to say upon the subject of the calling of synods by the civil magistrate. When he concedes to the magistrate the right to call synods he does so not with respect to those things which are distinctive of synods, but only in respect of the things “which are common to synods with other meetings and civil public assemblies, that is, not as they are assemblies in the name of Christ, to treat of matters spiritual, but as they are public assemblies within his territories”.[49] Gillespie’s insistence is always this, that the lawful activities of the magistrate with respect to the government of the church are confined to those activities which have a civil aspect—that the rights and duties of the civil magistrate to suppress heresies and blasphemies belong to him by right of his duty to maintain order within his realm and to insure a peaceful place of habitation to the church in his territory.[50] In connection with the calling of synods and the magistrate’s rights respecting them Gillespie admits of some sort of intrusion by the civil power in times of extra-ordinary corruption in the church. Just how far these powers go it is difficult to determine, for he says little more than that under circumstances of defection “it belongeth to the magistrate to take the protection of those who are cast out or censured unjustly; for extraordinary evils must have extraordinary helps”.[51]

Gillespie everywhere contends for a distinction of powers with no intrusion of the one into the other. However, the magistrate, by virtue of his office as keeper of the law, has certain duties with respect to the church, but these are confined to the external affairs of the church. These nice distinctions Gillespie seeks everywhere to preserve and they come to clearest expression in his Propositions concerning the Ministry and Government of the Church and Aaron’s Rod Blossoming. In the latter treatise he succinctly sets forth his view of the situation in general when he says: “The civil power hath for the object of it τὰ βιωτικά, the things of this life, matters of peace, war, justice, the king’s matters, and the country matters—those things that belong to the external man; but the ecclesiastical power hath for its object, things pertaining to God … as they are distinct from civil matters… For example, prayers, the administration of the word and sacraments, ecclesiastical censures, are things necessary and essentially belonging to the communion of saints; but set days, set hours … and the like, belong to the decency and order of the church… But human things we call such as touch the life, the body, goods, and good name, as they are expounded in the second table of the Decalogue; for these are the things in which the whole civil administration standeth.”[52] From this and other statements to which we have given attention we may fairly judge that in Gillespie’s mind, at least, there was no serious confusion of the powers of the state and the church.

With an understanding of the background of the Westminster Assembly and some insight into the views of one of its most influential members, we may now come to a consideration of the formulations of the Confession itself and seek to discover that explanation of them which will be most consonant with the facts as we have found them to be. To begin with, while we may not discount altogether the influences of Erastian thought on the framers of the Westminster Confession, it would seem quite safe to assume that the divines were not consciously intent upon injecting any such ideas into their statements. On the contrary, it would be more likely to suppose that if there are present in the Confession any distinctly Erastian elements, they are there in spite of the determined purpose of the majority of the divines to exclude the authority of the civil magistrate from a wider sphere of affairs ecclesiastical than had ever been the case in England before.

The first fact to note, and one that is deserving of the greatest emphasis, is the insistence of the Confession on a government of the church which is distinct from the civil power. As we have seen in the case of George Gillespie, so we must acknowledge in the case of the Confession that this principle is really basic. The influence of Gillespie in particular and of the Scottish Commissioners in general was one of the most potent factors in the framing of the Confession. Not only were these men all theologians of great powers, but it was the purpose of the Assembly to bring the government of the Church of England into conformity with the Church which they represented. So that it would seem safe to suppose that in this point the Confession reflects the prodigious labors of Gillespie both in debate and in writing on the subject. At least, its statements are in complete harmony with and are reminiscent of much that we have seen in his treatises on the question. In chapter XXX, section I of the Confession this principle is made most explicit. It says: “The Lord Jesus, as King and Head of His Church, hath therein appointed a government, in the hand of Church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate”. Thus in unmistakable language the Confession takes the position that the government of the church is not (as the Erastians claimed) in the same hands as the government of the state. Likewise in chapter XXXI, section III the framers of the Confession outline the proper sphere of operation of synods and councils of the church and this includes “to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God, and government of His Church; to receive complaints in cases of maladministration, and authoritatively to determine the same”. The Confession does not hereby derogate from nor deny the authority of the civil power which is established in language equally plain in chapter XXIII, section I.

In the second place, the Confession not only distinguishes between civil and ecclesiastical government but it also outlines the duties of each. To the church belongs the administration of the Word and sacraments and the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, while it is the magistrate’s office to have the “power of the sword, for the defence and encouragement of them that are good, and for the punishment of evil doers”.[53] It is important to note particularly this language, for all that the Confession says of the rights of the magistrate respecting the church should be construed in these terms. Whatever else may be said of the duties of the civil powers, it must be comprehended within the limits of “the power of the sword” and “the defence and encouragement of them that are good, and for the punishment of evil doers”.

Not only does the Confession distinguish between two different kinds of government but, in the third place, it will not allow of the intrusion of either into the sphere of the other. The framers of the Westminster Confession had a very definite conception of the peculiar function of the church and they allowed to it nothing which was not distinctly ecclesiastical, that is, spiritual or inward. Therefore in chapter XXXI, section V they specifically exclude the officers of the church from interfering with the affairs which concern the commonwealth. By the same token, the civil magistrate is forbidden on his part from assuming any the least part of the authority in the church. On this point the Confessional teaching is no less clear than are the statements of George Gillespie, though it is necessarily less full. It says: “The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the Word and sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven”.[54] By this formulation the civil magistrate is positively forbidden to exercise authority in sacris. It is important to note here that the Confession distinguishes between the “administration of the Word and sacraments” and the “power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven”. The proof-texts are of some help here in understanding just what was in the minds of the divines when they drew up the sections on the civil magistrate. Here Matthew 16:19 is linked together with Matthew 18:17. The former describes the deliverance of the keys of the kingdom to Peter and the latter clearly sets forth a case of church discipline. From this we may safely judge that by “the power of the keys” the divines evidently had in mind the sphere of church government. So that what is denied to the civil power is not only doctrinal in nature, but also that which is governmental in the church. If any further evidence is needed to make it conclusive that the Westminster Confession is unalterably opposed to the assumption by the civil magistrate of any authority in the church we note the references to II Chronicles 26:18 and Hebrews 5:4. The Old Testament reference invokes the solemn prohibition given to Uzziah to burn incense in the temple. The affairs of the house of God are reserved hereby for the priesthood alone and in corroboration Hebrews 5:4 says: “And no man taketh this honour unto himself, but he that is called of God, as was Aaron”. The general tenor of the great debates on the subject of the autonomy of the church had been a great jealousy to maintain the “crown rights of Jesus Christ”. This was the exact point of the famed debate between Selden and Gillespie in which Gillespie’s defense of a church government which is distinct from civil seems by all accounts to have prevailed. This, therefore, removes all ground for any charges of Erastianism in the Confession, for there is no reason for supposing that the divines desired in any way to weaken or to deny this principle of separation.

Although the Confession thus explicitly separates the government of the state and the government of the church, yet it grants a right and assigns a duty to the magistrate to take order to preserve peace and unity in the church. How can this be reconciled with the rigid separation of powers which we have seen to be a marked characteristic of the confessional teaching? Here we must turn for light to those writings of George Gillespie which we considered above. The language of the Confession is so similar to that of Gillespie at this point that we cannot but conclude that they mean to say the same thing. If this is true, then all that the Confession says in chapter XXIII, section III about the duty of the magistrate to preserve peace and unity in the church must he conceived as having to do with the extrinsic affairs of the church. While it is not the office of the magistrate to prescribe the doctrine, ordinances, government or discipline of the church, yet he must provide those external conditions which will enable the church to work peaceably and unitedly. Consequently he has the duty to restrain any disruptive purposes on the part of those who are excommunicate from the church and must repress public blasphemy which is to the hurt of the church. He also has the duty to see that the truth of God be kept pure and entire and that the ordinances of God be duly settled, administered, and observed. All of which we take to mean that he must provide that all these things be done according to the agreements arrived at in the church and by the judicatories of the church itself. This does not involve any Erastian sentiments, for this is nothing more than the magistrate being called upon to enforce a duly agreed-upon arrangement in any human society within his realm. This does not grant to the civil power any authority in the church.

The proof-texts which the divines adduced at this point are enlightening. The first of them is Isaiah 49:23 and is quite evidently intended to demonstrate the proposition that the civil power has a duty to foster the peace and unity of the church. “And kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers: they shall bow down to thee with their face toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet.” The divines likewise cite the words of the Psalmist (Psalm 122:9) to show that the magistrate has a positive function in promoting the interests of the church. “Because of the house of the Lord our God I will seek thy good” (i. e., the good of the church). Ezra 7:23–28 is an exceedingly important reference indicating the function of the civil power in fostering the welfare of the church and its worship yet without the least intrusion into the affairs which are distinctly ecclesiastical. Ezra 7:26 and Leviticus 24:16 together with Deuteronomy 13:5, 6, 12 serve to show how the divines conceived the magistrate ought to repress heresies and blasphemies. The references here cited indicate that the civil power is thought of only as enforcing the provisions of the moral law—an office which can scarcely be thought of as Erastian. The examples of Obadiah in affording protection to the truth of God and of Josiah in encouraging and promoting reform in the church are adduced in I Kings 18:4 and II Kings 23:1–26. In neither case is the authority of the officers of the church usurped by the civil power, though the hand of the church is certainly strengthened by the actions of the king. All of these citations serve to indicate that the divines conceived of the magistrate as having power to see that those whose duty it is to wait upon ecclesiastical things “do them according to their judgment of the mind of God, while he is bound to suppress public blasphemies and heresies against the law which he administers; and all public hinderances which may be thrown in the way of church officers, according to his judgment of those things”.[55] Chapter XXIII, then, defines the respective powers of magistracy and ministry, each acting in their appropriate sphere, according to the mind of God. To the objection that this chapter gives to the church and the magistrate a joint jurisdiction we must agree that this is the case, but only with respect to the public conduct of men. The suppression of heresies and blasphemies is quite evidently construed in conformity with Gillespie’s arguments as simply the duty of the civil magistrate in enforcing the Decalogue provisions. “We challenge the world to prove that men are exempt from obedience to the law of nature in any relation, or to prove that the church and state are not both required, each in its appropriate sphere, to enforce obedience to that law.”[56]

It remains yet to consider the provision which the Confession makes for the calling of synods by the civil magistrate found in chapter XXIII, section III and chapter XXXI, section II. Here the magistrate is granted power “to call synods, to be present at them, and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God”. Again we must insist that the fundamental distinction of the Westminster divines be kept in mind and that this statement be viewed first of all as pertaining to synods in those respects which are common to synods and other meetings of human societies. This is not to assert that the church has no fundamental right of her own to call assemblies, nor that the magistrate’s presence gives any validity to the synod’s actions, nor that if he is present that he sits as a judge or director of the debate. This provision may well be construed as the function of the magistrate as a “nursing father” to the church. However, it is possible that this statement was intended to give the magistrate broader powers than this. But, even if we do understand this to be the case, we must recognize that these rights so conceived only come properly into action in a time of great abuse and defection in the church. The preceding sentence in this section certainly contemplates a time of corruption in the church and it is for the effecting of a reformation that the Confession grants to the magistrate the right to call synods. To assert what the Confession does is not to hold that the civil magistrate has a right to these prerogatives in ordinary times or that he has a right to do so at all by virtue of any supremacy of power in the church.[57] Here again we find corroboration when we consult the proof-texts given by the divines. They cite here II Chronicles 19:8–11 in which it is recorded that Jehoshaphat set up the Levites as judges over the people and charged them to execute the commands and judgments of the Lord. Here there is no sanction for the usurpation of religious authority by the civil power. Rather the function indicated here is that of encouragement to the church officers to perform that duty to which they are called as church officers. The revival under Hezekiah, recorded in II Chronicles 29 and 30 is also cited in this connection, and again the most that can be drawn from this reference is that it is proper for the magistrate to encourage and to call for reform in the church when it is needed. The magistrate’s presence at synods need cause us no great difficulty, for he is always present, in effect, in the fact of the civil law, and hispersonal presence need not be conceived of as giving him any additional authority. It is these provisions of the power to call synods and to be present at them which seem most directly to impinge upon the independence of ecclesiastical government, but the only reasonable meaning which we can attach to them is that they refer only to the externals of such assemblies and that this right applies only in times of great corruption in the church. To view them otherwise would be to introduce hopeless contradiction into the Confession and to accuse the divines of intellectual dullness.

We have sought to show that the framers of the Confession tried always to avoid an Erastian position. That they had some measure of success in this endeavor is attested by the fact that the Parliament refused its sanction to the thirtieth and thirty-first chapters of the Confession simply because of their clear opposition to anything like Erastianism. And yet to deny that the divines were in any way influenced by the Erastian spirit of England and of their times would probably be inaccurate. While the divines endeavored to avoid an Erastian position yet their conception of what was included in the rights of the magistrate circa sacra was undoubtedly affected by the prevailing views of the day. Certainly many of the divines held views of the extent of the right of the magistrate to punish with which we today could not concur and which may be attributed to the prevailing Erastian spirit; these men were men of their times. Yet, admitting all of this, we need not suppose that the divines did not have good and sufficient reasons for setting forth their position as they did. We cannot reasonably accuse the Confession of contradiction. With the possible exception of the provision for the calling of synods, the elements considered in their context admit of a consistent anti-Erastian interpretation. There are three factors which it would seem were operative in the minds of these men and which induced them to make these formulations as they did. The first was a concern to avoid thinking too lowly of the civil magistrate. They wanted to avoid the error of the Papists who made the magistrate an automatic executor of the church’s decrees and that of the Anabaptists who gave too little in dignity to the magistrate. Therefore, the divines sought to give full dignity to the office of magistrate and consequently throughout the Confession his prerogatives may fairly be viewed as his by way of eminence as the head of the state. The second concern was to maintain the distinctness of the two spheres. More particularly, the divines were zealous that in their concern to uphold the autonomy of the church they did not thereby derogate in any wise from the rights of the magistrate, even with respect to the outward aspects of the activities of the church. The last concern was a very important one, namely, a concern to provide for reform in the church in times of abuse and decadence. These men were not far removed from a time of lamentable abuse and great corruption in the church and they were zealous to make provision for reform if such a time should come again. From these considerations we may deduce ample reason why the framers of the Confession, though they abhorred the thought of Erastianism, gave great prominence to the rights and duties of the civil magistrate.

This is the light in which we must understand the formulations of the Westminster Confession on the relation of the civil magistrate to the church. We must take seriously the solemn averment of the divines that they held to a government of the church which is quite distinct from the government of the state. In harmony with this fundamental principle we must view the statements which grant powers to the magistrate respecting the church as contemplating these as civil operations having to do with the external aspects of the church. The Confession will brook no interference on the part of the magistrate in sacris, and consequently, that power granted to the magistrate circa sacra is severely limited to those things in which the church was considered to be subject to civil law just as any society of men would be so subject. And, finally, even if we view certain elements as reflecting the Erastian sentiments of the day, even these are not at all inconsistent with the anti-Erastian position of the Confession as a whole. Therefore, while we may recognize the imperfect way in which the Confession breaks with Erastianism, we must still give due acknowledgment to the fact that it is indeed a break with that doctrine—a break all the more remarkable when viewed in the light of the times.

Notes

1. Westminster Confession, ch. XXIII, sec. iii, and ch. XXX, sec. i.
2. Westminster Confession, ch. XXIII, sec. iii, and Ch. XXXI, sec. ii.
3. W. E. Lunt: History of England, pp. 92 f.
4. W. E. Lunt: op. cit., pp. 205 f.
5. Gee and Hardy: Documents Illustrative of English Church History (London, 1921) pp. 112 f.
6. Gee and Hardy: op. cit., pp. 103 f.
7. W. M. Hetherington: History of the Westminster Assembly of Divines (New York, 1843), p. 16.
8. Idem.
9. A. F. Mitchell: The Westminster Assembly (Philadelphia, 1884), p. 273.
10. Ibid., p. 276.
11. Idem.
12. W. E. Lunt: op. cit., p. 384.
13. P. Schaff: Creeds of Christendom (New York, 1882), Vol. III, p. 512.
14. Ibid. p. 536. Reformed Confessions in other countries were not more, but less, explicit in excluding the power of the magistrate from ecclesiastical affairs. Neither the Second Helvetic Confession (1566) nor the Belgic Confession (1561) in their articles on the magistrate make any specific prohibition to the magistrate in this regard. To the contrary, they set forth certain duties and rights of the magistrate with respect to the well-being of the church which in themselves might admit of an Erastian interpretation. See also pp. 305 f., 432 f.
15. B. B. Warfield: The Westminster Assembly and its Work (New York, 1931), p. 4.
16. Ibid., p. 12.
17. Ibid., pp. 15 f.
18. Ibid., p. 12.
19. Robert Baillie: Letters and Journals (Edinburgh, 1841), Vol. II, p. 360.
20. Ibid., p. 267.
21. Ibid., p. 307.
22. Ibid., p. 205.
23. Ibid., pp. 265 f.
24. Thomas Coleman: A Brotherly Examination Re-examined (London, 1646), p. 11.
25. W. M. Hetherington: op. cit., p. 226.
26. A. F. Mitchell: op. cit., p. ix.
27. B. B. Warfield: op. cit., p. 24.
28. Cf. Gee and Hardy: op. cit., pp. 570 f.
29. Quoted from B. B. Warfield: op. cit., pp. 29 f.
30. A. F. Mitchell: op. cit., p. 288.
31. A. F. Mitchell: op. cit., pp. 288 ff.
32. One Hundred and Eleven Propositions concerning the Ministry and Government of the Church, p. 6 (in The Presbyterian’s Armoury, Edinburgh, 1846, Vol. I).
33. Aaron’s Rod Blossoming, or the Divine Ordinance of Church Government Vindicated, p. 97 (in The Presbyterian’s Armoury, Vol. II).
34. Ibid., p. 115.
35. Ibid., pp. 124 ff.
36. One Hundred and Eleven Propositions, p. 13.
37. Cf. ibid., p. 18; see also Aaron’s Rod Blossoming, p. 116.
38. Aaron’s Rod Blossoming, p. 97.
39. One Hundred and Eleven Propositions, p. 18.
40. Ibid., p. 13.
41. Aaron’s Rod Blossoming, p. 121.
42. One hundred and Eleven Propositions, p. 12.
43. Ibid., p. 15.
44. Ibid., p. 20.
45. Ibid., p. 21; cf. Aaron’s Rod Blossoming, pp. 117 f.
46. Samuel Rutherford: The Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication (London, 1646), p. 596.
47. One Hundred and Eleven Propositions, p. 21.
48. Idem.
49. Ibid., p. 14.
50. Ibid., p. 16.
51. Aaron’s Rod Blossoming, p. 118.
52. Ibid., p. 88.
53. Chapter XXIII, section I.
54. Chapter XXIII, section III.
55. C. Webster: Divine and Human Rights: or, The Westminster Confession and the Constitution of the United States Tested by the Holy Scriptures (Philadelphia, 1845), p. 83.
56. Ibid., p. 80.
57. Cf. Bicentenary of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster (Cincinnati, 1845), p. 112.