Calvin’s Doctrine Of Creation

By John Murray

Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia

IN historical theology there are two dangers of which we need to be aware. One is that we impose upon a theologian of a particular period the thought-forms and distinctions which really belong to later developments of theological discussion. When we do this we place the theologian in question in a perspective which is not true to his position. The other danger is in the opposite direction, namely, the failure properly to take account of the continuity and even identity of thought between a particular theologian and his successors. Calvin has suffered from both of these tendencies on the part of his interpreters.

The subject of creation is one of basic interest to Christian theology. As is our concept of creation so will be the character of our theism. It may contribute a little to the better understanding of what is involved in the doctrine of creation and particularly to a better understanding of the concepts entertained by the protestant theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries if we study Calvin’s utterances on this question in relation to the formulations which became current among the protestant theologians who succeeded Calvin.

Immediate And Mediate Creation

In formulating the doctrine of creation both Lutheran and Reformed theologians, particularly those of the seventeenth century, distinguished between immediate or primary creation, on the one hand, and mediate or secondary creation, on the other. The former they conceived of as that action of God by which he brought things into being ex nihilo by the mere fiat of his will, the latter they conceived of as the creative action of God superinduced upon the material brought into existence by the antecedent ex nihilo fiat. Immediate creation is primary because prior to this action of God there was no preexisting or prejacent material through which the effect was wrought or upon which the action supervened: the whole effect embraced within the action designated as immediate creation is due to a completely originative action of God. Mediate creation, on the other hand, is secondary because there is presupposed the material antecedently brought into existence by the primary and originative fiat: the effect of the action designated as mediate creation draws within its scope previously existing material and comprises the use of that material. This is the distinction between ex nihilo and ex materia. In immediate creation the terminus a quo is nihil, in mediate creation it is materia.

A few quotations will illustrate this construction. John Wollebius, for example, says: “Creation is that by which God produced the world and the things that are in it, partly ex nihilo and partly ex materia naturaliter inhabili, for the manifestation of the glory of his power, wisdom, and goodness. To create is not only to make something out of nothing but also to produce something out of unapt material beyond the powers of nature.”[1] The Leyden Synopsis expresses the distinction more fully when it says: “By the creation of the world we understand its production out of nothing solely by the omnipotent power of God…. This omnipotence of his God demonstrated in the things created by him in a twofold manner: either immediately, insofar as he produced the nature of certain things immediately out of nothing, such as the earth, the water, the angels, and the souls of our first parents; or mediately, insofar as he formed some things out of unformed preexisting material, such as the plants of the earth, the body of Adam, and the brute beasts. Hence we define the creation of the world as the external action of God omnipotent, incommunicable to creatures, by which of himself and his most free will, moved by no other, he created heaven and earth out of nothing at the beginning of time, and fashioned certain things which he willed to form out of that primary material, by his arrangement, in the space of six days, in order that he might make known to his creatures, especially to rational beings, the glory of his great wisdom, power, and goodness, and invite them to the celebration of his name.”[2]

While this type of definition and formulation was characteristic and widely current among Protestant theologians, there are two qualifications that must be made. (1) There was not complete unanimity as to the propriety of the distinction between immediate and mediate creation. Cocceius, for example, says that it is not necessary to distinguish between mediate and immediate creation since creation signifies nothing else than the bringing into being from non-being by the call of God.[3] (2) It is not quite certain that all who used the distinction between immediate and mediate creation meant by the latter precisely the same thing. At least it may be said that the terms in which mediate creation is defined do not follow a pattern so rigidly uniform as to assure us that the conception entertained was always in all its elements identical.

This does not mean, however, that we may not derive from the definitions given a rather well-defined notion of what mediate creation was conceived to be. It would appear that the following distinctions and observations are borne out by a study of the more classic expressions of the concept in question.

1. In distinguishing mediate and immediate creation it is not to be supposed that the immediate action of God was conceived of as excluded from that which is called mediate creation.[4] The contrast is not between mediate action and immediate: the contrasting epithets respect creation, not action.

2. The contrast respects the distinction between the action of God involved in bringing something into being when there was no antecedent or preexisting material out of which that being could be fashioned or formed and the action of God in bringing into being something in connection with which preexisting matter was wrought upon and used by God. The former is bringing into being ex nihilo; the latter is bringing into being ex materia.

3. Immediate creation is not restricted to the first creative fiat. The theologians in question included the soul of man in the list of things immediately created. But prior to this action there existed the ordered heavens and earth in connection with which both immediate and mediate creation had been operative.

4. While mediate creation was conceived of as the creative action of God in which God used preexisting material, yet this action is not to be regarded as the excitation or development of potencies resident in the preexisting material. These theologians are explicit to the effect that the material used was intrinsically unfit and unapt for the effect that is wrought by the action called mediate creation. The materia is regarded as inhabilis, indisposita, indisponibilis. And these theologians are careful to distinguish between this creative action of God and the providential agency of God in the process of generation.[5] In the latter case the germ or seed is not naturally unfit or unapt for the effect that is to follow; it is, rather, naturally adapted to and fitted for that effect. In the words of the theologians themselves the germ or seed is materia naturaliter habilis whereas in mediate creation the preexisting material is naturaliter inhabilis. A good example is provided by the creation of the body of Adam. The dust of the ground used by God in the formation of man’s body was not naturally and inherently “disposed” to be the body of man. It did not have any inherent aptitude to be the animated organism which man’s body became and in that respect differed radically from the acorn in reference to the oak tree and the germ plasm in reference to the man. Thus in the formation of man’s body from dust the omnipotent and creative action of God was manifest.

5. The distinction between mediate and immediate creation can most readily be demonstrated in the distinction between the formation of Adam’s body and the creation of his soul. The former is an example of mediate creation, the latter of immediate. The soul of man is adduced as an example of immediate creation precisely because, in the esteem of these theologians, the soul was not formed from any antecedent, prejacent, or preexisting material but brought into existence by the mere fiat of God, that is, by fiat ex nihilo. And the body of man is an instance of mediate creation precisely because the dust of the ground was used. Since it is the absence of prejacent material that gives to the creation of the soul the right to be called immediate as contrasted with mediate, so it is the very presence and use of prejacent material that requires us to call the formation of the body an act of mediate creation as contrasted with immediate. It would also appear that mediate creation was not conceived of as involving the interjection of any new entity immediately created by God but simply as the fashioning into something new of an entity which already existed. Thus the formation of man’s body is called creation not because origination of essence in any way entered into the action of God in this case but only because the immediate and omnipotent power of God was alone adequate to form a human body out of so unfit and so unapt an entity as dust of the ground.

We also see from the distinct actions which entered into the creation of man how these theologians conceived of mediate and immediate creation as co-working to the realisation of a certain end. In the creation of man both kinds of creative activity were present, mediate in the case of his body, immediate in the case of the soul. These two perfectly coalesced in the creation of man in his unity and totality. Yet the distinctness is carefully maintained and the distinguishing feature of the one action is strictly excluded from the other.

6. Mediate creation must not be construed in terms of a succession of ex nihilo fiats supervening or superinduced upon preexisting material.[6] We are liable to interpret the concept in this way, but this would be incorrect. As was indicated above, the very differentia of mediate creation is the exclusion or absence of this ex nihilo factor. Again, the case of Adam shows the fallacy of such an interpretation. If mediate creation consisted in the supervention of ex nihilo fiat upon an already existing material context, then the creation of man would be an example of mediate creation. That is to say, mediate creation would describe the whole situation of man’s origin. But this is not the case. The theology concerned discriminated between Adam’s body and his soul and did not conceive of mediate creation as the coalescence or combination of ex nihilo fiat and mediate creative action. This does not mean, of course, that God’s action in the creation of the world was so conceived as to exclude repeated and successive ex nihilo fiats. So far from excluding such they were posited. But the point is that the concept of mediate creation does not derive its definition from these successive ex nihilo fiats nor was it conceived of as comprising any such ex nihilo fiat. Rather is it the case that its very definition strictly excludes that type of action.

7. Mediate creation must not be equated with or construed in terms of God’s ordinary providential control and direction.[7] In the latter God uses second causes which are suited to and endowed for the achievement of certain ends. In ordinary providence there is the operation and development of the powers which God has deposited in the world and these powers naturally exert their agency in the production of certain effects. By definition mediate creation is radically diverse; it is the creative action of God upon entities which have no intrinsic aptitude or power in the direction of the result which the creative action achieves.

Calvin’s Teaching

This construction of the doctrine of creation raises many questions in the mind of the student of historical theology. The question of particular interest in the present study is whether or not Calvin’s thought on the subject of creation falls into the framework of the distinction between immediate and mediate creation. The question here is not the relatively simple one of determining whether or not Calvin uses such terminology. The present writer is not aware that Calvin anywhere uses these terms to distinguish one type of creative action from another type. The question is whether his references to God’s creative action and his interpretation of what such action involved warrant the inference that he conceived of God’s creative activity as taking two forms, the one corresponding to what other Protestant theologians called “immediate creation” and the other to what was called “mediate creation”. Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield has devoted considerable attention to this matter and discusses the question with his characteristic erudition. He is quite emphatic to the effect that the “sequence of truly creative acts”, posited by those who distinguish between immediate and mediate creation, is the very thing Calvin disallows and even directly contradicts.[8] He proceeds to argue that Calvin severely restricted the word “create” and the action denoted by it to ex nihilo fiat and thus set aside and repudiated the notion of “mediate creation”.[9] “Calvin’s sole motive”, he says, “seems to be to preserve to the great word ‘create’ the precise significance of to ‘make out of nothing,’ and he will not admit that it can be applied to any production in which preexistent material is employed.”[10] He regards Calvin as maintaining that God “has acted in the specific mode properly called creation only at the initial step of the process, and the result owes its right to be called a creation to that initial act by which the material of which all things consist was called into being from non-being”.[11] Furthermore, according to Warfield, Calvin held that the indigested mass, which “was called into being by the simple fiat of God”, contained the “‘promise and potency’ of all that was yet to be” and “all that has come into being since—except the souls of men alone—has arisen as a modification of this original world-stuff by means of the interaction of its intrinsic forces”.[12] Hence “all the modifications of the world-stuff”, all the changes that took place after the original fiat, while they take place “under the directly upholding and governing hand of God, and find their account ultimately in His will”, yet “find their account proximately in ‘second causes’”. And this Warfield asserts is a “pure evolutionary scheme”,[13] that is to say, “the modification of the original world-stuff into the varied forms which constitute the ordered world, by the instrumentality of second causes—or as a modern would put it, of its intrinsic forces”.[14]

In this interpretation of Calvin’s doctrine of creation there are two questions: (1) whether or not it is true that Calvin set aside and repudiated the concept of mediate creation or rather the concept which the term “mediate creation” denotes; and (2) whether or not Calvin regarded all the changes that took place in the formation of the world subsequent to the original fiat—with the exception of the soul of man—as wrought by the instrumentality of forces intrinsic to and resident in the world-stuff which came to exist by the initial ex nihilo fiat. It may be that these two questions are really reducible to one question. But, if so, it is well to bear in mind both ways of stating the question as we proceed to examine Calvin’s own teaching on this subject.

Perhaps the two most relevant statements in Calvin’s opus magnum, Institutes of the Christian Religion, are found in I, xiv, 20 and I, xv, 5. They read respectively as follows: “Therefore to apprehend by a true faith what it behooves us to know concerning God, it is good, first of all, to learn the history of the creation of the world, as it is briefly set forth by Moses…. From this we shall learn that God, by the power of his word and Spirit, created out of nothing the heaven and the earth; and thereafter produced all things, animate and inanimate, distinguished the innumerable variety of things in an admirable gradation, gave to each kind of thing its proper nature, assigned its offices, and appointed its places and stations.” “It must therefore be concluded with certainty that the souls of men, even though the divine image is impressed upon them, were no less created than the angels. And creation is not a transfusion but an origination of essence out of nothing.” From these quotations it is obvious that Calvin defines creation in terms of origination out of nothing, that is to say, in terms of ex nihilo fiat, and by such fiat, he believed, originated the heavens and the earth and the souls of men. It is also apparent that he regarded all other things, animate and inanimate, as having been produced from that which came into existence by ex nihilo fiat, or, at least, as having been produced subsequent to the creation ex nihilo of the heavens and the earth.

It is not, however, clear that Calvin by such statements would be precluded thereby from affirming, in addition, what other Reformed theologians called mediate creation. Those maintaining the distinction between mediate and immediate creation could have said what Calvin says in these quotations with respect to the creation of the heavens and earth and the origin of the souls of men, the two subjects with which, in these places, Calvin is mainly concerned. And these theologians might not have demurred when Calvin says that all other things beside heaven and earth, the angels, and the souls of men were produced from the material called heaven and earth. They would define the divine method whereby these other things were produced, but they would not deny what Calvin says that they were produced from, or after, the heaven and the earth (hinc[15] omne genus … produxisse). We may conclude, therefore, that nothing very conclusive can be elicited from these statements in the Institutes. We shall have to turn, therefore, to Calvin’s comments on the Mosaic account of creation.

On Genesis 1:1 he says:

He moreover teaches by the word ‘created’ (creandi verbo), that what before did not exist was now made…. Therefore his meaning is that the world was made out of nothing (ex nihilo conditum esse)…. Let this then be maintained in the first place, that the world is not eternal, but was created by God (creatum a Deo fuisse). There is no doubt that Moses gives the name of heaven and earth to that confused mass (molem illam confusam) which he shortly afterwards denominates waters. The reason of which is that this material was to be the seed of the whole world (ratio est, quod materia illa totius mundi semen fuerit).

The most significant statement in this comment, apart from what has been noted already, is that the heaven and earth of Genesis 1:1 Calvin regards as the confused mass described in verse 2 and that this confused mass was the “seed” of the whole world. One is distinctly liable to derive from such a statement as this the impression that the confused mass had inherent in it the potencies or germs which were capable of producing the innumerable variety of things, animate and inanimate, under the providential direction and government of God, and that the whole subsequent ordering, fashioning, moulding into distinct forms was by the development of forces intrinsic to the confused mass as created by God. In other words, the expression semen totius mundi would suggest that all subsequent change—except the soul of man—was, as Dr. Warfield proposes, a “pure evolutionism”.[16]

This view would appear to be confirmed when we turn to Calvin’s comments on Genesis 1:21. He discusses the use of the word “create” in this verse.

A question here arises out of the word created. For we have before contended that the world was made out of nothing because it was created, but now Moses says that things which were formed out of other matter (ex alia materia) were created. They who assert that the fishes were truly and properly created[17] because the waters were in no way suitable or adapted to their production (ad procreandos ipsos idoneae aptaeque fuerint) only avoid the question: for, in the meantime, the fact would remain that the material existed previously, which the strict signification of the word (create) does not admit. I therefore do not restrict (non restringo) the creation here spoken of to the work of the fifth day but rather take it as referring to that shapeless and confused mass which was as the fountain of the whole world (scaturigo totius mundi). God therefore created the whales and other fishes, not because the beginning of their creation is to be reckoned from the moment in which they receive their form but because they are comprehended in the total matter which was made out of nothing (ex nihilo factum est). So, as regards species, form alone was then added: but creation is, nonetheless, properly used of the whole and the parts.

It might seem that Calvin here restricts creation to the original ex nihilo fiat by which the shapeless and confused mass came into being and that the only reason why the word “create” is used in Genesis 1:21, with reference to the specific action of that day, is that the whales or fishes derived the substance of which they were formed from the original ex nihilo fiat of Genesis 1:1. This would mean that the word “create” is not used at all to describe the action of the fifth day but has reference exclusively to the fiat at the beginning, and the only relevance of its use in 1:21 is that the material then being formed proceeded from an earlier act of ex nihilo fiat mentioned in 1:1. This would have to be the inference if it is maintained that Calvin would refuse to apply the concept of creation to any other action than that of making out of nothing.

It is clear that here Calvin recognises that the strict signification of the word “create” does not admit (verbi proprietas non admittit) of its being applied to an act of formation out of preexisting material. And it is also clear that for this reason he finds in the use of the word “create” in Genesis 1:21 an allusion to the ex nihilo fiat of 1:1. But what is not apparent is that here Calvin disallows altogether the propriety of the use of the word “create” with respect to the specific action of the fifth day. The case seems to be, rather, that though, in his esteem, creation, strictly understood, cannot apply to a formative action, that is, to the fashioning of something ex materia praeëxistente yet in some sense he does regard creation as applicable to the specific action of the fifth day. When he says: “I do not restrict creation to the work of the fifth day” this is not by any means to be understood as meaning that he restricted creation to the original fiat of Genesis 1:1. The import is rather that while creation applies to the work of the fifth day yet it is not restricted to the work of that day but includes also the originative fiat. But this obviously implies that the use of the word “create” in Genesis 1:21 has some relevance to the work of God on that particular day. Furthermore, this may well be the force of what he says a little later. “So, as regards species, form alone was added: but creation is, nonetheless, properly used of the whole and the parts.” It is possible, of course, that what he means at this point by “the whole and the parts” is not the original ex nihilo fiat and the subsequent formative acts but the whole mass of formless material of Genesis 1:2 and the various parts of that total mass out of which specific things were later formed. But the expression the “whole and the parts” may also refer to the total mass of unformed matter (which is the fountain of the whole world) and the specific things which by subsequent action were formed by the hand of God. “The parts” would thus denote the things formed, including the divine action by which they were formed. Finally, in this precise connection, there is his statement: “Therefore God created whales and other fishes, not because the beginning of their creation (initium creationis) is to be reckoned from the moment in which they receive their form…”. Here Calvin says that the whales and fishes did not begin to be created when they received their form. This is apparent and is in line with his whole argument at this point. But while the fishes did not then begin to be created it does not at all follow that the formation on the fifth day is not included in the creation spoken of in the verse concerned. That the actual formation is included would seem to be the import.

There is one other remark of Calvin’s in his comment on this verse which is worthy of some consideration. He says: “Those who say that the fishes were truly and properly created because the waters were by no means suitable or adapted to their production only avoid the question”. Here it would seem that Calvin is repudiating the notion that creation, in its strict signification, must be posited on the fifth day because the waters were not suitable to the production of fishes. And this could be interpreted as implying that Calvin was aligning himself against those who posited “mediate creation” and posited such in order to explain the formation of things out of material which was naturally unfit and unadapted for the effect produced (ex materia naturaliter inhabili). But again this inference does not necessarily follow. What Calvin is saying is that those who say fishes were truly and properly created, because the waters were in no way suited or adapted to their production, resort to a subterfuge. The adverbs “truly” and “properly” should be noted. And what Calvin may be repudiating here is simply the notion that creation in its strict signification must be posited on the fifth day because the waters were not adapted to the effect. If so, then his argument at this point does not exclude the exercise on the fifth day of creative activity in some other sense. The mediate creationists themselves excluded creation in its primary sense of creatio ex nihilo from the action of the fifth day. Calvin’s “truly” and “properly” may have reference to this same kind of creative action.

The purpose of this extended study of Calvin’s comments on Genesis 1:21 has not been to prove that Calvin held to the view called “mediate creation” and posited the presence of such creative action on the fifth day. All that has been in view is simply to show that his comments on Genesis 1:21, when carefully weighed, do not establish his repudiation of the doctrine of mediate creation and that his comments on Genesis 1:21, as also on Genesis 1:1, leave the door open. We have not yet found conclusive evidence to support B. B. Warfield’s contention that Calvin repudiated the doctrine of mediate creation.

We must now turn to certain other comments which more directly bear upon the kind or quality of the divine action conceived of by Calvin as exerted in the progressive ordering and fashioning of the heavens and the earth. There are two questions in particular which should be borne in mind: (1) does Calvin conceive of the progressive action of God by which form, ornament, and perfection were given to the world as involving creative activity on the part of God?; (2) does he regard the rude and unpolished, empty and confused mass of Genesis 1:2 as containing within itself the forces which were developed into the ordered universe?

Calvin is insistent that although the “Word” is not expressly mentioned in Genesis 1:1, 2 yet it was by the efficacy of the “Word” that the mass of heaven and earth was brought into being. Nevertheless he also maintains that God did not put forth his Word until he originated light (in lucis origine). It is in connection with Calvin’s comments on the origin of light that we are introduced to expressions which are particularly relevant to our question. In this connection there are at least three occasions on which he uses the word “create”. The first instance (ad Gen. 1:3) is rendered more significant by the fact that he is arguing for the eternity of the hypostatical Word by whose efficacy the mass of heaven and earth had been created and carried to its completion. The Word dwelt in God and without him God could never be. But it was with the origin of light that this became apparent—”the effect of which, however, became apparent when the light was created (quum lux creata est)”. A little later he says that “the light was so created (sic creatam fuisse lucem) as to be interchanged with darkness”. Then in connection with the fourth day (ad Gen. 1:14) he says: “He (God) had before created the light (prius lucem creaverat): but now he institutes a new order in nature, so that the sun may be the dispenser of light by day, and the moon and the stars may shine by night”.

It is apparent that here Calvin applies the term “creation” to an act of God which was subsequent to the creation of the shapeless mass of Genesis 1:1, 2. Light originated when God for the first time put forth his Word and Calvin employs the term “create” to designate this action.

Even more instructive along this line are his comments on Genesis 1:11. “Hitherto”, he says, “the earth was naked and barren: now the Lord fructifies it by his word. For though it was already destined to bring forth fruits, yet, till new virtue (nova virtus) proceeded from the mouth of God, it must remain dry and empty. For neither was it naturally fit to produce anything, nor had it a germinating principle from any other source, till the mouth of the Lord was opened (neque enim ipsa naturaliter ad gignendum quicquam apta erat: nec aliunde erat germen, donec apertum est os Domini)…. Moreover, it did not happen fortuitously that herbs and trees were created (creatae sunt) before the sun and moon. We now see that the earth is quickened by the sun to cause it to bring forth its fruits … but because we are wont to include in their nature what they derive from another source, it was necessary that the vigour which they now seem to impart to the earth should exist before they were created (prius extare quam creata essent)…. When he says, ‘Let the earth bring forth the herb …’, he signifies not only that herbs and trees were then created (creatas fuisse), but that, at the same time, both were endowed with the power of propagation, in order that offspring might continue.”

No more illuminating passage than the foregoing occurs in Calvin’s exposition of Genesis 1. It is necessary to note its significant features. (1) He uses the term “create” on two occasions with reference to the production of herbs and trees on the third day and with reference to the sun on the fourth day. This exemplifies what we have found already, that Calvin freely uses this word “create” to designate the action of God subsequent to the ex nihilo fiat of Genesis 1:1. He has no hesitation in speaking of light, herbs, trees and the sun as having been created. (2) Prior to the action of the third day, he says, the earth was naked and barren (nuda et sterilis). This bare statement of itself might not establish very much in reference to our question. But the other supplementary remarks indicate what he meant by naked and barren. He adds that new virtue or power needed to be added by God, that the earth had no germinating principle, and that the herbs and trees were not only created but endowed with the power or virtue of propagation (propagationis virtutem). This description of the earth’s condition and of what was requisite in order that it might bring forth fruit is in no way consonant with the notion that the earth was endowed with certain intrinsic forces which were developed by a process of “pure evolution”. In other words, this description which Calvin gives of the earth’s condition prior to the third day and of the divine procedure on that day is far other than one which could be defined as “the modification of the original world-stuff into the varied forms which constitute the ordered world, by the instrumentality of second causes”.[18] (3) Calvin here says also that the earth was “not naturally fit to produce anything” (neque … naturaliter ad gignendum quicquam apta erat). This reminds us quite distinctly of the language used by other theologians in connection with mediate creation. What they said was that the material upon which God’s creative action supervened, in the instances of mediate creation, was materia naturaliter inhabilis, materia non apta. This is exactly the thought of Calvin at this point and he uses practically identical language: the earth was not naturally fit (non naturaliter apta). Yet he speaks of creation in this connection. And his thought is surely to the effect that creative action supervened upon this naked and barren material in endowing it with new virtue, germinating capacity, and the power of propagation. This, in essence, is the kind of creative action which was conceived of by other Protestant theologians as mediate creation in contradistinction from immediate. (4) In this same context Calvin says that “what David declares concerning the heavens ought also to be extended to the earth, that by the word of the Lord it was made and adorned and furnished by the breath of his mouth (Ps. 33:6)”. In his comment on Psalm 33:6 he says: “In saying that the heavens were created (conditos) by the word of God, he greatly magnifies his power, because by his nod alone (solo nutu contentus), without summoning help from other sources, and without the expenditure of much time or labour he made so splendid and noble a work”. It is therefore this creative word of God that was exemplified, according to Calvin, in the specific actions of the third day.

There are several other statements of Calvin in his exposition of Genesis 1 which are illustrative and corroboratory of what we have found in the foregoing passages. These statements need simply to be quoted. “God … distributed the creation of the world (mundi creationem) into distinct stages, in order that he might claim our attention” (ad Gen. 1:5). “On the fifth day the birds and fishes are created (creantur)” (ad Gen. 1:20). “When he says ‘the waters brought forth’, he continues to commend the efficacy of the word, which the waters hear so promptly, that, though lifeless in themselves (mortuae in seipsis), they may suddenly teem with living offspring” (ad Gen. 1:21). “He descends to the sixth day on which the animals were created (creata sunt animalia), and then man…. But whence has a dead element life? Therefore there is in this respect a miracle as great as if God had begun to create out of nothing (creare ex nihilo coepisset) those things which he commanded to proceed from the earth. But he does not take material from the earth as if he needed it but that he might the better combine the several parts of the earth with the universe itself” (ad Gen. 1:24).

When we attempt to draw general conclusions from Calvin’s teaching on this subject, it will have to be admitted that everything is not as clear and definite as we should wish it to be. Indeed there might appear to be incompatibility at certain points. He appears to define creation as making out of nothing, that is, the origination of essence out of nothing, and, with the exception of Adam’s soul, to restrict this action to the fiat mentioned in Genesis 1:1. On the other hand, he uses the word “create” with the utmost freedom in reference to the successive acts of God by which the heavens and the earth were adorned, furnished, and perfected. Not only does he use the word “create” in these connections but also other terms which are applied to the originative ex nihilo fiat. The following observations may be made, however, on the basis of the evidence.

1. It is apparent that Calvin accords a special place in his concept of creation to the fiat mentioned in Genesis 1:1. This was ex nihilo fiat: no created entity, no material substance whatsoever, existed prior to this event. For this reason there is something absolutely specific and distinctive about it, and any other creative act subsequent to it cannot be in precisely the same category. All subsequent acts have the context of preexistent created reality. Even though subsequent acts of creation should have brought into being new entities or essences and therefore should have involved additional ex nihilo fiats, yet these subsequent acts would still differ in this respect that there was already a created universe into which these new essences would have been injected or to which they would have been added. Any conclusion, therefore, which we may be compelled to draw respecting Calvin’s view of the character of the subsequent creative acts need not and must not in the least deny or obscure the distinctive category to which the original fiat of Genesis 1:1 is assigned.

2. Calvin did regard the shapeless and confused mass referred to in Genesis 1:2, and which resulted from the fiat of Genesis 1:1, as the seed (semen) or fountain (scaturigo) of the whole world (ad Gen. 1:1 and Gen. 1:21 respectively). What, more precisely, he meant by such terms it is very difficult to ascertain. It is very likely, however, that he regarded this naked, barren, and unformed mass as containing the whole of the material substance out of which the world was shaped and formed. It is questionable if he would regard any subsequent act of God as bringing into existence any new material substance. At least it must be said that he regarded this confused mass as the basic substrate upon which all subsequent acts supervened and as providing material which entered into the composition of all that had been formed and fashioned later on.

3. Calvin did not regard this unformed mass as containing within itself the living germs and potencies or the intrinsic forces by the development or evolution of which the various forms of life were subsequently produced. His statements, as we found, are explicitly and emphatically to the contrary. The earth as waste and void was “naked and barren”, it was not “naturally fit to produce anything”, it had no “germinating principle”, it needed “new virtue”. We must not, therefore, be misled into thinking that when Calvin called the shapeless mass the seed or fountain of the whole world he meant by this that it contained the seeds, the germs, the potencies, which, by potentialities and forces resident in them, produced, under the proper providential conditions, the innumerable variety of forms which the created world, when perfected, assumed. It may well be that his thought is properly expressed by saying that the unformed mass was the seed-bed of the whole world. That it was the seed, in the sense of possessing the germinal principles or capacities, Calvin denies.

4. Calvin does not use the term “mediate creation” with reference to the creative acts which were subsequent to the original fiat. Though he does not use the term it does not appear that there is any essential or principal difference between the conception Calvin entertained with respect to these subsequent acts and the conception entertained by the theologians who described these acts in terms of mediate creation. The fact is that he uses terms which are distinctly similar to those which were used by these theologians to describe what they designated as acts of mediate creation, namely, that these were acts of formation ex materia naturaliter inhabili, and acts, therefore, which were to be carefully distinguished from those of immediate creation. The latter were not acts of formation ex materia praeëxistente but ex nihilo fiats. It may be said with good warrant that the later Reformed theologians had adopted terminology which Calvin did not use but that, nevertheless, the conceptions they entertained and developed were not essentially different from those which had been expressed by their precursor in the Reformed tradition.

It seems to the present writer, therefore, that B. B. Warfield’s inferences with respect to Calvin’s doctrine of creation are not supported by the relevant evidence. It is not apparent that Calvin repudiated the notion of mediate creation, even though he does not use such a term. More particularly, and of much greater importance, it is not by any means apparent that Calvin’s position was, that after the original fiat “all that has come into being since—except the souls of men alone—has arisen as a modification of this original world-stuff by means of the interaction of its intrinsic forces”.[19]

In fact it seems far removed from the terms in which Calvin describes the process by which the heavens and the earth were adorned, fashioned, and perfected to say that he “ascribed the entire series of modifications by which the primal ‘indigested mass,’ called ‘heaven and earth,’ has passed into the form of the ordered world which we see, including the origination of all forms of life, vegetable and animal alike, inclusive doubtless of the bodily form of man, to second causes as their proximate account”.[20] In other words, Calvin conceived of creative factors as entering into the process by which the heavens and the earth were perfected so that we are not able to characterise the process, as he conceived of it, as “a very pure evolutionary scheme”.[21]

Concluding Observations

If we were to venture a judgment with respect to the notion of mediate creation a few things would have to be said.

(1) It must be admitted that the term itself is not a felicitous or lucid one. The terminology tends to confuse the mediate and immediate agency of God. While it is true that God is present and active in every event, which is just saying that God’s providence embraces all that occurs, yet it is all-important to distinguish the differing modes of the divine agency. And the most basic distinction is that between God’s immediate action and his action through the mediacy of other agencies. It would be more in the interests of clarity and precision to reserve the word “creation” for the strictly originative activity of God, that is to say, to the bringing into being of something, solely by the will and fiat of God. The word “creation” would then be restricted to what has been called creatio ex nihilo. The term “mediate”, as applied to creation, is liable to be interpreted as qualifying “creation” in a way that is inconsistent with its real meaning.

(2) There is no good reason why the kind of divine action denoted by the word creation in this its precise and strict signification should be restricted to the action spoken of in Genesis 1:1. There may have been a succession of truly creative acts in the process depicted for us in Genesis 1 and 2. It does no prejudice whatsoever to the idea of creation to suppose a succession of truly creative acts over the course of the six days. In the formation of man (Gen. 2:7) we have an example of a truly creative act supervening upon an existing entity in order to produce a result which is wrought by the combination of two factors, namely, the preexistent material called “dust from the ground” and the inbreathing of the breath of life by which man became living creature (Gen. 2:7; cf. Gen. 5:1, 2). If this occurred in the formation of man, there is no a priori reason why this kind of action should not have occurred in other cases.

(3) It is necessary to distinguish between the first creative fiat by which being other than God himself began to be and all subsequent truly creative fiats. The distinction arises from the fact that before the originative creative fiat there was no created context or entity. But once the originative fiat is posited all subsequent creative fiats presuppose an already existent created context. That is to say, the first creative fiat presupposes no created reality as its context; subsequent creative fiats do presuppose a created context in relation to which they occur. What terms we might use to express this distinction is a matter simply of terminology. We must remember, however, that, if we are to use the term “creation” in its strict sense, there is no proper distinction in the precise mode of the divine action. For creation is always the strictly originative action of God in which by the fiat of his will he calls into being that which did not exist prior to such action. It is for this reason that the term “mediate creation” is misleading. Creation as act is not mediate. And if Calvin refrained from the use of the designation “mediate creation” it is to his credit.

Notes

1. Compendium Christianae Theologiae, Lib. I, Cap. V (Amsterdam, 1638, p. 27). The phrase “ex materia inhabili” I have rendered “out of unapt material”. The Latin word “inhabilis” is a difficult word to translate in this connection. It might be translated by words such as “inert” or “unfit”.
2. Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, Disputatio X, Theses III, IV, V. Cf. also Melchior Leydecker: Synopsis Theologiae Christianae, Lib. II, Cap. III, §XVIII; Francis Junius: Theses Theologicae, Cap. XIV, Theses II and IV; Cap. XV, §3; Cap. XVI, Thes. 2 (Opuscula Theologica Selecta, Amsterdam, 1882, pp. 149 ff.); William Amesius: Medulla Theologica, Cap. VIII, §10; Mark Frederick Wendelinus: Christiana Theologia, Lib. I, Cap. V, Thes. VII; John Maccovius: Loci Communes Theologici, Cap. XXXVII (Amsterdam, 1658, p. 344); J. A. Quenstedt: Theologia Didactico-Polemica, Cap. X, Sect. I, Theses XIII, XIV, XV (Leipsic, 1715, p. 594); Benedict Pictet: La Theologie Chrétienne Liv. V, Chap. I (Amsterdam, 1702, p. 230); Heinrich Heppe: Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche (Neukirchen, 1935), pp. 157 f. (English Translation, London, 1950, pp. 197 f.); Francis Turretine: Institutio Theologiae Elencticae, Loc. V, Quaest. I, §VI; Heinrich Schmid: The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Philadelphia, 1899), pp. 160 f.; Charles Hodge: Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 556 ff.; A. A. Hodge: Outlines of Theology (New York, 1908), pp. 238 f. Roman Catholic theologians also use this distinction between first and second creation; cf. Joseph Pohle: God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural (ed. Arthur Preuss, St. Louis and London, 1934), pp. 3 ff., pp. 98 ff.; Sylvester J. Hunter: Outlines of Dogmatic Theology (New York, 1896), Vol. II, pp. 224 ff.
3. “Ideo non est necesse distinguere inter creationem mediatam et immediatam; quasi in omni creatione sit indigitatio nihili: quum nihil significet nisi adductionem a non esse ad esse per vocationem sive momentum voluntatis, aut imperii” (Summa Theologiae, Loc. VI, Cap. XV, §5; Opera Omnia (Amsterdam, 1701), Tom. VII, p. 189). It is possible that P. Van Mastricht exercises similar reserve (cf. Theoretico-Practica Theologia, Lib. III, Cap. V, §IX).
4. William Amesius (Medulla Theologica, Cap. VIII. §10) says: “Quaedam revera dicuntur creari, quorum materia praeexistebat: sed tum creatio non immediatam tantum illam actionem respicit, qua fit ut talia existant; sed etiam mediatam, qua factum est, ut ipsa materia existeret, ex qua illa formantur: sic fuit in creatione plantarum et animalium, Genes. 1:20”. There are difficulties connected with the interpretation of this passage. But it would appear that Amesius considers the very formation that takes place through the medium of the preexisting material to be an immediate action of God and that the term “mediate” also applies to such action simply because the material upon which the action of God supervenes already existed and came to exist of course, by the immediate action of God at the beginning. The words to be noted in this connection are: tum creatio non immediatam tantum illam actionem respicit … sed etiam mediatam”.
5. Cf. Melchior Leydecker (op. cit., Lib. II, Cap. III, §XVIII) who, in defining mediate creation, says: “Mediata facta est ex inhabili materia”, and then adds: “Haec differt a generatione, quae materiam habilem praerequirit”. In the quotation given above from Wollebius the same thought appears when he says that mediate creation is to produce something ex materia inhabili, supra naturae vires.
6. There is, however, in Francis Junius a statement which seems to be to the opposite effect. He says: “Creatio est ratio Dei externa, qua immediate per se res a non esse ad esse, sine alteratione, pro sua libera voluntate produxit: idque aut nulla prorsus praeexistente materia fundens per verbum: aut in materiam iam a se creatam formam e nihilo creatam inducendo” (op. cit., Cap. XV, Thee. 3). It will be noted that the formula immediate per se res a non esse ad esse applies to both types of creation, mediate as well as immediate. This is in line with what we have found already that mediate creation does not exclude immediate action on the part of God. But when Junius says that to the material already created by God is added form which, in turn, is also created ex nihilo, we find that the formula creatio ex nihilo is applied to both immediate and mediate creation. And this would imply that even in mediate creation there is ex nihilo fiat. If this is so, then Junius would be taking a position which runs counter to what appears to be the more characteristic viewpoint of the theologians in question. The more classic formulation of mediate creation requires a sharp contrast between ex nihilo and ex materia, and it is the latter which applies to mediate creation. There may be a way of reconciling this statement of Junius with the other viewpoint. It may be that a solution lies in the distinction which Junius makes in the preceding chapter when he distinguishes between the act of creation in which something is produced according to its whole substance without any preexisting condition and the act of creation in which something which already exists is changed for the better, not according to its substance but according to its qualities (op. cit., Cap. XIV, Thes. I). The ex nihilo fiat which enters in mediate creation would then be not the creation ex nihilo of substance but the creation ex nihilo of the qualities with which the new form is endowed. This would tend to relieve the discrepancy but it is not at all certain that it would eliminate it. For in the more common formulation there does not appear to be room for any ex nihilo fiat in the action which is specifically one of mediate creation.
7. Charles Hodge does not adhere to this distinction in his use of the term “mediate creation” and consequently his concept of mediate creation is much more elastic than that of the earlier Reformed theologians. He defines mediate creation indeed, in the usual way as “forming out of preexisting material” but then proceeds to apply this to the continuous order of providence. He says: “And the Bible constantly speaks of God as causing the grass to grow, and as being the real author or maker of all that the earth, air, or water produces. There is, therefore, according to the Scriptures, not only an immediate, instantaneous creation ex nihilo by the simple word of God, but a mediate, progressive creation; the power of God working in union with second causes” (op. cit., p. 557). It is this extension of the term “mediate creation” to include God’s activity in the course of ordinary providence that the older theologians would have disallowed. Francis Turretine, for example, says respecting mediate creation that it is “ex materia aliqua, sed plane inhabili et indisposita, nec ulla causarum secundarum vi disponibilis si ita loqui licet, ad termini productionem, et in qua sola datur potentia obedientialis, seu non repugnantiae, in ordine ad causam primam infinita virtute agentem” (op. cit., Loc. V Quaest. I, §VI).
8. B. B. Warfield: “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Creation” in Calvin and Calvinism (New York, 1931), p. 301.
9. Ibid., pp. 302 f.
10. Ibid., p. 302.
11. Ibid., p. 300.
12. Ibid., p. 304.
13. Ibid., p. 305.
14. Ibid., p. 306.
15. It is difficult to know whether “hinc” at this point means that every other thing was produced “from” the heaven and earth or “after” the heaven and earth.
16. Op. cit., p. 305.
17. The Latin at this point reads: “Qui dicunt vere et proprie creatos esse pisces”. John King, the Calvin Translation Society translator (Edinburgh, 1847), renders thus: “They who truly and properly assert that the fishes were created”; B. B. Warfield, however, thus: “Those who assert that the fishes were truly and properly created”. The question is the simple one whether the adverbs “vere” and “proprie” are to be construed with “dicunt” or with “creatos esse”. If the former alternative were followed then Calvin would be saying that it is quite correct to say that the fishes were created. It seems, however, to be more in accord with the construct on and argument of the sentence to take “vere et proprie” with creatos esse”, as we have done in our translation, and interpret Calvin’s argument accordingly.
18. B. B. Warfield: op. cit., p. 306.
19. Ibid., p. 304.
20. Ibid., p. 305.
21. Idem.