ΣΥΝΕΙΔΗΣΙΣ (Conscience) in the Pauline Writings

By Bruce F. Harris

The University of Auckland

1. Introduction

The notion of conscience, although it is certainly implicit in both the Old Testament and the Gospels, does not become prominent until the epistles of Paul. It is deserving of close attention, because it is a subject of considerable importance in New Testament ethics, and also has relevance for the student of ancient thought. This is a point at which the moralists of the later Greek schools, and their Roman interpreters such as Cicero and Seneca, impinge closely on the New Testament.

During the last century, many writers have propounded a doctrine of conscience, both from a theological and a popular point of view, and great claims have been made for its place in the Christian life. For example, Hastings Rashdall, after stating the essentially rational nature of the moral faculties, wrote “conscience may be held to include not merely the capacity of pronouncing moral judgments, but the whole body of instincts, feelings, emotions and desires which are presupposed by and which influence those judgments, as well as those which prompt to the doing of the actions which they prescribe” (Conscience and Christ, p. 30). Not only was conscience very comprehensive in scope, according to his view; he also exalted it so far as to say “no one really makes his submission even to the teaching of our Lord absolute and unlimited, except in so far as the ethical injunctions of that authority commend themselves to his conscience” (ibid., p. 33). But more recently, following intensive study of the word συνείδησις in the New Testament, strong doubts have been cast upon the validity of any doctrine of conscience. H. Osborne concluded[1] that Paul used the term with all the vagueness it possessed in popular Greek thought, and C. A. Pierce[2] condemns the expositions of Rashdall, K. E. Kirk and others out of hand, as foreign to the New Testament. Conscience, he claims, can be exalted until it becomes idolatry in the Biblical sense, i.e., setting up something in the place of God, and it allows men to be a law unto themselves, dispensing often with the aid of the church, and cloaking under the guise of conscience their own inclinations and desires, both good and bad. While sympathising with Pierce’s protests against Rashdall, we shall attempt to show that his own views are partly defective when measured against the New Testament.

2. The Meaning of συνείδησις

An examination of συνείδησις is clearly essential to a true view, particularly its use by Paul, which is normative for the New Testament. It was long assumed that he took the word out of the official vocabulary of the Stoics, although Lightfoot’s comment had been more judicious. “It is difficult to estimate, and perhaps not very easy to overrate, the extent to which Stoic philosophy had leavened the moral vocabulary of the civilised world at the time of the Christian era. To take a single instance; the most important of moral terms, the crowning triumph of ethical nomenclature, συνείδησις, conscientia, the internal, absolute, supreme judge of individual action, if not struck in the mint of the Stoics, at all events became current coin through their influence.”[3] It has since been sufficiently demonstrated by Osborne, Pierce, W. D. Stacey[4] and others that the word was never part of official Stoic terminology. Chrysippus, second leader of the School in the fourth century B.C., used συνείδησις only of that awareness of itself which is possessed by every living creature, a non-ethical use which persisted into late Greek; a papyrus of the second century A.D. has the expression ὅταν εἰσέλθης, καλῇ ὤρᾳ, εὑρήσεις συνίδησιν, “when you come at an opportune moment, will you find that people are aware of it?” It is not in a Stoic but in Democritus, precursor of the Epicureans, that we find the first genuine moral use of the word, in the sense of awareness of one’s wickedness.[5] Not until Marcus Aurelius, a gap of centuries, is there a parallel Stoic example.[6] There were, however, some Stoic ideas which approached that of conscience. They spoke of the ἔμφυτος ἔννοια of man, his reason which derived from God or cosmic Reason, and more particularly the δαίμων or ideal self which gave intuitive knowledge of right and wrong. Roman writers used conscientia in similar senses, particularly Seneca. To attribute Stoic origin to the word συνείδησις is thus strictly a fallacy,[7] but there is no doubt of its connexion with Stoic ideas.

The root idea of the word is “community in knowledge”, as in the original verb συνειδέναι; εἰδέναι (root ειδ) includes both immediate awareness, and knowledge by acquaintance, and the compound form was used earliest in the sense of “consciousness of something”, with the idea of complicity occasionally added. It is with the reflexive uses of the verb, however, that we are more concerned, and these are found frequently in Euripides, Xenophon, Aristophanes and Plato. Osborne describes the sense as “immediate introspective awareness of a personal quality”, as in Plat. Phaedr. 235 D ξυνειδὼς ἐμαυτῷ ἀμαθίαν, “being aware of my ignorance”; or, it can also cover the recollection of past behaviour: σύνοιδ᾿ ἐμαυτῷ δεῖν᾿ εἰργασμένος, “I am aware that I have committed a crime”. It was thus a common expression with the classical Greek writers, not a philosophical term as such; and it had no intrinsic ethical sense, although it was often so used. When the noun was required, τὸ συνειδός was preferred by the best writers, and the cognate word σύνεσις was also employed. There is a good example of the idea in Eur. Orestes 395–6. Menelaus: (to Orestes) τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ᾿ ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος; “What is the matter with you, what disease is destroying you?” Orestes: ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν᾿ εἰργασμένος “[the pangs of] conscience, for I am aware that I have sinned”.

The fixing of the meaning of the reflexive use of σύνοιδα in Greek writers, which is attempted so painstakingly by Pierce, as it was by Osborne, is thus the correct procedure, once we have seen that the noun συνείδησις was not a Stoic philosophical term which Paul took over. Osborne seems more restrained than Pierce, however, in his analysis. We may agree that the word referred regularly to a man’s awareness of the moral quality of his own acts, and of his character as exhibited by those acts: also that the usual reference is to past acts, and to bad acts, and that this awareness produces the pains of conscience. But we think it is going too far, both in pagan literature, and in the New Testament, to say that this reference to past acts, and bad acts, is part of the intrinsic meaning of συνείδησις, which is Pierce’s view (what he calls the moral (M), bad (B) negative use). The “neutral sense”, which we think is basic, is reflected in the two monostychia attributed to Menander: (597, 654) σ̔́πασιν ἡμῖν ἡ συνείδησις θεός—”Conscience is a [kind of] divinity in us all”. The noun appears in Philo occasionally, with the meaning of moral self-consciousness, but he preferred the form τὸ συνειδός: similar uses occur in the historians Diodorus Siculus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus; i.e., συνείδησις was being admitted to literature (as distinct from the popular tongue) only at the time the New Testament was being written.

We need not go into the question here of Paul’s contact with hellenistic philosophy. Some scholars, in particular W. L. Knox, have maintained that he only learned what he knew second-hand through his Jewish teachers at Jerusalem, who are known to have given summaries of Greek contemporary thought to their pupils, as part of their equipment for the maintenance and defence of the Jewish faith amongst the Diaspora in the Mediterranean world. But it is more natural to assume that Paul, even if he was never a student in the philosophical schools of Tarsus, was well aware of their tenets and their vocabulary, as well as of the popular parlance of the educated classes in his home city and elsewhere.

Συνείδησις was one of the few terms introduced by Paul from the Greek world which had not been already coloured by Jewish ideas (there is only one example of the word in LXX—Eccl 10:20). It was now well established in popular idiom in the full sense of man’s personal awareness of the moral quality of his acts and his character: usually referring to the past, and with the associated idea of guilt, but not necessarily so. The classical definition in Latin is “ille internus quasi index qui, quid faciendum fugiendumque sit, edocet (conscientia antecedens) atque bene facta approbat, male facta improbat (conscientia consequens)”. In the Old Testament, the idea of conscience was implicit in the Hebrew word לַב, “heart”, e.g., Job 27:6 “My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go: my heart shall not reproach me so long as I live”; or 2 Samuel 24:10 “And David’s heart smote him after that he had numbered the people. And David said unto the Lord, I have sinned greatly in that I have done: and now, I beseech thee, O Lord, take away the iniquity of Thy servant; for I have done very foolishly.” In these cases the “heart” is as it were externalised, as an authority passing judgment on a man. When we come to the teaching of our Lord, the idea of conscience, but not the word συνείδησις, occurs frequently, e.g., Matthew 6:22f. “The light of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!”, Luke 12:56f. “Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky and of the earth: but how is it that ye do not discern this time? Yea, and why even of yourselves judge ye not that which is right?”

3. Paul’s Use of the Term

(a) In Romans. “The light that is in thee…of yourselves judge ye not that which is right?”-these expressions take us directly to the first Pauline passage about conscience, which might be taken as the “locus classicus” for the general sense of συνείδησις, Romans 2:14–15. Here the moral responsibility of the Jew before God is compared with that of the Gentile. God judges without respect of persons, and according to the knowledge of his truth as it is possessed in measure by all men. Note that the conscience is spoken of as distinct from the writing of the law in the heart: it witnesses to this, giving rise to thoughts of approval or disapproval in men’s minds.

J. P. Thornton-Duesbery thus expresses the idea well when he describes conscience as “a second reflective consciousness which a man has alongside his original consciousness of an act…readily personified”.[8] Mind and conscience are distinct (cf. Titus 1:15 “even their mind and conscience is defiled”)—νοῦς is that which creates a purpose or act: συνείδησις is that which judges a purpose or act. Pierce analyses this use as MBA (moral, bad, absolute) pointing to the context which is that of the failure of the Gentiles to live up to the light they have (1:18–32) and the comparable failure of the self-righteous Jews. Hence his summary of conscience as “the internal counterpart and complement of the wrath” (referring particularly to the use here and in Rom 13:5) “the painful consciousness that a man has of his own sins, past or, if present, begun in the past. It is of God in that it is the reaction of man’s nature, as created, and so delimited, by God, against moral transgression of its bounds”.[9] Its nature is thus, for him, essentially negative: it can never say more than “not wrong”. But we submit this is going beyond the evidences both here and in other passages. The conscience surely can commend as well as condemn (v. 15—it is allowed as a possibility that a Gentile may live fully up to the light he has and be justified before God). The reason why its function is so often to condemn is the imperfection of man, even of the regenerate man; but we must not make this alone the normative sense. This is shown by the next instance, Romans 9:1 where Paul refers to the additional witness of his conscience that he is indeed speaking the truth when he declares his great yearning for his fellow Jews. Pierce again classifies this as MBA, but surely there is no negative idea in this use. Paul’s conscience is approving his truthfulness, and the genuineness of his sorrow. With this personal reference by Paul we may compare 2 Timothy 1:3, “I thank God, whom I serve from my forefathers with pure conscience, that without ceasing I have remembrance of thee in my prayers night and day”; also the two passages in the Acts where Luke records the addresses of Paul before the Sanhedrin (23:1) and before Felix (24:16) and where we may reasonably infer that we have an accurate reflection of the actual phrase used by Paul. Note the use of the adjectives with συνείδησις in the last three parallels—καθαρά, ἀγαθή and ἀπρόσκοπος [without offence”] words which combine both positive and negative ideas with conscience.

The third passage in Romans is at 13:5 where Paul is instructing the Christians in their duties towards the state. Great emphasis is laid on this passage by Pierce as definitive for the sense of συνείδησις. Here conscience is linked immediately with “the Wrath”, manifested externally through human authority. “Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath (διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν) but also for conscience sake” (διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν) a verse which is not very lucidly rendered in A.V. Phillips has it “You should therefore obey the authorities, not simply because it is the safest, but because it is the right thing to do” which gets the sense, though it is a little far from the Greek (cf. Osborne’s version: “…not only because of human retribution (i.e., fear of punishment) but through fear of incurring the consciousness of having done wrong”). Is this usage MBA, as Pierce will have it, i.e., an essentially negative use? This does not seem to exhaust its sense here, in spite of the immediate connexion with ἡ ὁργή. The context surely allows for a positive sense also: verse 3 fin. says, à propos of the Christian’s attitude to political authorities, “do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same”, and hence the praise of one’s conscience also.

In the Epistle to the Romans, therefore, we are taught that the conscience is a divine gift to all men, which makes explicit in the moral consciousness the works of the law of God written in the heart. Conscience therefore does not possess its own intrinsic authority: its authority rests in God himself who has given it, and on his law, the knowledge of which it brings to man’s attention. This point is brought out in the first relevant passage in the Corinthian epistles, 1 Corinthians 4:4, where Paul is speaking of Christian stewardship. “I know nothing by myself” is the vague A.V. translation of the Greek οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα: the meaning is “my own conscience is clear in the matter of stewardship—I am not finally accountable to you Corinthians or to any others. But even the approbation of my own conscience does not ultimately justify me; He that judgeth me is the Lord”. He is the final authority of the human conscience. We may note in passing a verse in 1 Peter which confirms this truth: 1 Peter 2:19 “by reason of conscience toward God”, διὰ συνείδησιν θεοῦ. Of this, Dr. Selwyn writes: “If conscience be defined as it kind of Reason which possesses objective validity, then its objective ground may be found either in a law, whether “natural” or human (as in Cicero and the Stoics) or in the will of God;…That St. Peter should mention this objective ground is wholly in keeping with the God-ward reference which pervades his teaching”.[10]

These verses thus help to elucidate the more general account of conscience in Romans 2 with which we began. But there is another problem which is a pressing one. If conscience is God-given, and its authority rests in him and his law, how is it that different individuals and communities call appeal to their consciences in support of widely differing, and often diametrically opposed, courses of action? It would be unreal to suggest that in all “cases of conscience”, as the moralists call them, one party is either being dishonest about the dictates of conscience, or unconsciously deceived in some way, as though conscience always speaks in the same terms to all people. We must admit, in a sense, the fallibility of conscience, and I think the distinction made by Professor O. Hallesby in his book on Conscience[11] is a useful one at this point. In chapter IV “The Conscience of Fallen Man”, he distinguishes between the form and the content of conscience. In its form, conscience is truly “the voice of God” and infallible. “In all men it speaks with unimpeachable authority and says that we ought to submit to the absolute will of God”: even in its form, he maintains, it has been to some extent damaged through the Fall: “its voice has lost much of its strength as well as its clarity”, but nevertheless it remains the voice of God. In its content, however, conscience is dependent upon how far the person concerned knows the will of God: this knowledge varies so much, and is so deficient often that conscience gives divergent and contradictory judgments. The Romans 2 passage speaks of the revelation of God’s will through conscience in the case of the Gentiles, and the latter half of Romans 1 is a solemn reminder that pagan Gentiles in fact have known much more of the will of God than has been commonly supposed (amongst others, by many anthropologists, and moral philosophers!) and that in fact they are guilty of disobeying their consciences and thus under the wrath of God; they are “holding down (κατεχόντων) the truth in unrighteousness” (1:18 fin.).

(b) In 1 Corinthians. This matter of divergences of conscience brings us to the important passage in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10, where situations are dealt with which involve Christians and their fellows, as well as Christians and non-Christians. The problem was the well-known one of the eating of meats which had been offered to idols in Corinth. The apostle had been asked for his guidance on this issue, and συνείδησις occurs prominently in the discussions. Pierce believes that the appeal to conscience was something the Corinthian Christians had introduced, and that Paul somewhat reluctantly answers them on their own ground, as it were. Συνείδησις was a claim of his opponents, says Pierce, and he shows its inadequacy—he was “forced, in the battle to save a Church from its own errors, to rush violently into a new field of doctrine, but later, the battle being won, consolidating his gains, and systematising, in a fashion as nearly consistent as possible, the truths that controversy has forced him to maintain”.[12] Hence Paul’s exposition in Romans at a later date. We believe there is something in this, but not as much as Pierce maintains. Certainly Paul is determined not to allow a spirit of arrogance and superiority: thus when he introduces the subject (8:1f) he is quick to say “Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth. And if any man thinketh that he knoweth any thing, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know.” But he seems to introduce the idea of συνείδησις naturally enough in verse 7. It is well known that the correct reading earlier in the verse is not συνειδήσει but συνηθείᾳ, giving the sense “some, because they have been accustomed to idols, up till now eat it as something offered to an idol”, i.e., the food has inevitable associations for them still, and they cannot eat with a good conscience. Their consciences are still “weak” in the sense that they have not completely cast off the old associations, and taken their stand on the principle that “the earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness thereof” (10:26) and that idol-worship has been in fact the worship of non-existent gods (8:4–6). Paul’s clear direction in this case is that the more mature Christian should not insist on liberty of conscience and thus offend his weaker brother, because the latter’s conscience would be defiled thereby.

Conscience therefore gives divergent judgments for Christians on some practical issues in life, according to their differing, i.e., more mature and less mature, apprehension of the will of God. The law of love (vv. 1, 11f) between Christians is therefore appealed to as the overriding dictate of conscience recognised by both weak and strong. In chapter 10 a somewhat different situation is envisaged—an invitation to dinner from a non-Christian to a Christian. Most Christians could normally eat whatever meat they brought without the raising of conscientious issues (v. 25)—”don’t ask fussy questions for conscience’s sake”, as Dr. Morris quotes in his Commentary from Wm. Barclay.[13] However, if the host specifically mentions that the meat before them has been offered to idols, to eat it would mean acquiescence in idolatry. So the Christian must refrain for conscience sake—διὰ ἐκεῖνον τὸν μηνύσαντα καὶ τὴν συνείδησιν i.e., the conscience of the pagan, as Paul makes quite clear in verse 29. What advantage would there be if the liberty exercised by a strong Christian comes under the condemnation of another, either weaker Christian or pagan? So the same overriding principle is appealed to, the edification and growth in love of all Christians, and the desire for the conversion of the pagans (vv. 32f): on these all consciences would agree. For cases of conflict of conscience, Paul would seem here to be saying: let there be an appeal by both parties to some higher, more comprehensive dictate of conscience, and let the lesser issue be decided in the light of that.

(c) In other Epistles. It remains to discuss briefly the other passages in Paul’s epistles involving συνείδησις. 2 Corinthians 1:12 is similar in context and meaning to Romans 9:1 and the parallels there mentioned. Even Pierce admits this use as MPG (moral, positively good) and it is as eloquent an expression as we have in Paul’s writings anywhere of the approbation of one’s conscience which follows a godly life and a faithful ministry. The other two examples in 2 Corinthians, 4:2 and 5:11, are not admitted by Pierce as relevant, because they are non-reflexive in meaning: “commending ourselves to every man’s conscience in the sight of God”, the idea of shared knowledge in συνείδησις here not involving every man with himself, as it were, but every man and Paul, i.e., the mutual knowledge, as before God, that Paul has faithfully fulfilled his ministry. We agree with this analysis, as also at 5:11 which is again non-reflexive.

When we come to the Pastoral Epistles, there are four passages in 1 Timothy, three of which are classed by Pierce as MB Neg. The first is at 1:5, ἀγαθὴ συνείδησις; love is the τέλος of the commandment, love which proceeds from a pure heart and from a good conscience. It is surely not necessary to say here that good = not evil, which Pierce is obliged to do in terms of his definition of συνείδησις as essentially negative. The context is entirely positive: actual purity of heart, reflected in an approving conscience, is the essential condition for the highest fulfilment of the law, the spirit of love. The same adjective ἀγαθή is used at verse 19; good conscience here means the inner assurance for Timothy that he has been waging, and is now waging, the good warfare (v. 18) which again is a positive sense of the word. Paul however reminds us that this good conscience can be put away in the course of departing from the faith (vv. 19f). Extreme cases of this are referred to at the beginning of chapter 4. The conscience of these reprobates is “seared with a hot iron” as the A.V. graphically puts it: κεκαυτηριασμένων τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν.

The adjective ἰδίαν—”their own conscience” would seem to suggest that not only do these men corrupt others, but they are themselves grievously corrupted in their own souls: their consciences, which should have reflected the voice of God within, have been irreparably damaged in the process of their apostasy. There has taken place, as Osborne remarks, the depraving of “even the most intimate self-criticism of the Conscience”[14] In contrast to this is the remaining passage in the epistle, 3:9, where purity of conscience, καθαρὰ συνείδησις, is mentioned as one of the marks of a deacon. This purity of conscience is a concomitant of faithful adherence to the faith—again surely a positive sense. The only other reference in the Pastoral Epistles is at Titus 1:15 which describes the opposite state—μεμίανται αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνείδησις. There is a solemn ring about the Greek here. Those who have wilfully turned from the light of God’s truth are defiled both in their minds, at the very source of thought and action, and equally in their consciences, which no longer give them a true assessment of the rightness and wrongness of their actions in the sight of God.

(d) Comparison with other passages. When we look outside the Pauline corpus, it is noteworthy that the half-dozen or so passages involving συνείδησις conform to Paul’s use of the word, and in some instances further elucidate it. It occurs five times in the later chapters of the epistle to the Hebrews. There are two references to the καθαρισμός of the conscience, which was unattainable under the sacrificial system of the Old Order (10:2) but which had now been attained through the blood of Christ (9:14). This cleansing of the conscience follows the exercise of faith, and is in a sense progressive; as the Christian apprehends and obeys more of the truth as it is in Christ, so the conscience becomes purer. Verse twenty-two of chapter ten dwells on the same thought on the negative side—ἐρραντισμένοι τὰς καρδίας ἀπὸ συνειδήσεως πονηρᾶς, “having our hearts sprinkled (with the blood of Christ) from an evil conscience”. The result is a καλὴ συνείδησις as we have it in conscience which the final reference at 13:18, the honourable is the concomitant of honourable living (note the emphatic repetition in the Greek—καλή…καλῶς).

The A.V. does include a single reference in the Gospels to conscience, in the Adulteress Pericope at the beginning of John 8. This incident, while usually taken to be authentic, is not to be regarded as part of the original Gospel, and the phrase “being convicted by their own conscience” has even less claim to be included, since it is a gloss following five uncial MSS of the sixth century and later. Pierce takes the whole incident, however, as illustrative of his general view of συνείδησις. The woman, because she had transgressed the moral law, was in danger of the Wrath mediated by human institutions, the penalty of death; but her accusers were shown by the Lord to be themselves subject through their sinful hearts to the Wrath mediated internally through the pangs of conscience. And we may agree that this does well illustrate the frequent use of the term in a bad sense.

4. Conclusion

What then are we to conclude about συνείδησις in Paul? It is true to say, we think, that the term is used naturally and without definition, and with some imprecision in meaning here and there, because it was already well established in popular parlance at the time, and had the same imprecision often in ordinary use (though probably less than the vagueness of our English word “conscience”). Osborne concludes as follows: “I find no justification for the view of certain scholars that the word and concept sustained at his hands an enrichment and developement of meaning (apart of course from the new and higher ethical valuations which were attendant upon the Christian renewal, and which incidentally affect the judgment of what constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Conscience)”.[15] His long proviso would seem in effect to contradict his original statement. Surely Paul did enrich and develop the whole sense of the word, particularly on the positive side, i.e., the place of conscience in the experience of the believer. It is on this side that we believe Pierce’s analysis is defective, in spite of the thoroughness of his investigation. No one would maintain that conscience is an important doctrine, so that it is unnecessary for Osborne to point out that Paul attempted no integration of συνείδησις with the doctrines of repentance, and faith, and love. For the conscience is part of the equipment, as it were, given to us by God for the realisation of his truth in our personal experience. It is therefore holy, and is designed to be the voice of God within, but is to be distinguished from the truths it mediates to us.

On the other hand, we believe that Pierce confines its scope more than is justified by its use in the New Testament. We may grant that its most frequent sense involves the consciousness of sin, and warning against infringement of God’s laws, and that it usually refers to the past and present, i.e., that “conscientia consequens moralis” is often the sense. But this is to neglect the other side; as we have seen above, conscience in the non-Christian can still provide considerable knowledge of God’s standards for the life; much more in the Christian, if it is pure and enlightened and sensitive to his voice, it can give an inner assurance and peace when that voice is obeyed. Conscience therefore does play its part in any account of the Christian life as God intends it to be lived. Some writers have assigned it too great a role, both in the individual and in a corporate sense in the church, and none of us would agree with the man who is constantly taking a stand on “conscientious” grounds when in reality he is only rationalising his own personal desires. No doubt it is this unwarranted individualism amongst Christians which called forth the protest made by Pierce at the end of his book.[16] We suspect that conscience has also been unduly magnified by being treated as a separate faculty: to this T. C. Hammond supplies a good corrective,[17] by maintaining that conscience is really synonymous with the whole personality, related to the emotions but being primarily a rational judgment which is related directly to an act of will. Cognition, feeling, and will—all are involved in the exercise of conscience in the human personality. For the Christian, in a special sense, it represents “God’s most intimate presence in the soul”.

Notes

1. Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XXXII, pp. 167–179.
2. Conscience in the New Testament, London: S C M Press, 1955.
3. “St. Paul and Seneca” in Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians, p. 303.
4. The Pauline View of Man, London: Macmillan, 1956.
5. H. Diels: Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, II, pp. 206f, Fr. 297, συνείδησει…τῆς…κακοπραγμοσύνης.
6. The adjective εὐσυνειδήτος: possessing a good conscience.
7. Cf. Pierce, op. cit., ch. I.
8. Art. “Conscience” in ed. A. Richardson: A Theological Word Book of the Bible, London: S C M Press, 1950.
9. Op. cit., p. 111.
10. First Epistle of St. Peter, pp. 177, italics mine. He adds “The point is one of importance in an age when conscience is often invoked as though it meant no more than a personal prejudice obstinately held, e.g. by anti-vaccinationists”.
11. London: Inter-Varsity Fellowship, 1950.
12. Op. cit., p. 65.
13. The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians (Tyndale N. T. Commentaries), p. 149.
14. Op. cit., p. 176.
15. Op. cit., p. 175.
16. Chs. XIII f.
17. Perfect Freedom, ch. VIII.