Apologetics: Van Til And Transcendental Argument

By Don Collett

[Don Collett is a Ph.D. student in Old Testament at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.]

Central to the apologetic of Cornelius Van Til is the claim that a Reformed apologetic and the transcendental method of argumentation go hand-in-hand. Back of this claim lies the conviction, oft-stated by Van Til, that the theology of Scripture entails a distinctive apologetic method. For example, in the opening pages of A Survey of Christian Epistemology Van Til writes that “every system of thought necessarily has a certain method of its own.”[1] Thus Christian theism, considered as a system of thought, requires an apologetic defense that is methodologically distinctive. For Van Til, this in turn requires the Christian apologist to employ a transcendental method of argument, since “the only argument for an absolute God that holds water is a transcendental argument.”[2]

As one might expect, Van Til’s advocacy of the transcendental method soon met with criticism from Christian apologists who preferred to continue using the more traditional forms of inductive and deductive argument,[3] or who simply preferred to adopt a more integrative and methodologically diverse approach to the practice of apologetics.[4] In recent years, however, the latter approach to apologetic method has also found support among Van Tillian apologists, the most notable example being John Frame. Contra Van Til, Frame argues that transcendental arguments are not methodologically or formally distinct from traditional arguments.[5] Indeed, Frame’s counter arguments on this matter have led him to conclude that presuppositionalism “should be understood as an appeal to the heart rather than as a straightforward apologetic method.”[6]

As a result of the discussion and debate elicited by Frame’s argument, it is now possible to distinguish between Van Tillians who remain committed to the methodological distinctiveness of presuppositionalism and those who do not. In this article I intend to defend the claim that transcendental arguments are methodologically distinct from traditional argument forms.[7] To that end I will begin with a survey of some important reasons why Van Til believed in the distinctiveness of transcendental argument, then move on to a discussion of Frame’s rejection of the claim that such arguments are methodologically distinct from traditional arguments. Finally, I will provide a defense of methodological presuppositionalism by drawing upon the twentieth-century discussion of presupposition generated by the seminal work of Peter Strawson.[8]

I. Van Til and Transcendental Argument

To appreciate the reasons why Van Til believed in the distinctive character of transcendental arguments, it is helpful to begin by surveying a few of the more prominent apologetic concerns Van Til believed to be safeguarded by the transcendental method.[9] This should also help to clarify some of the reasons why Van Til believed that traditional methods of argument failed to do justice to his theological and apologetic concerns.

To begin with, Van Til believed that the transcendental method of argument safeguards the doctrine of God’s transcendence.[10] Closely related to this belief was his insistence that a Christian apologist “take seriously” the absolute character of God’s being when formulating an argument for Christian theism. The problem with both “deductive” and “inductive” methods of argument, argues Van Til, is that they typically begin with the assumption that certain axioms are more ultimate and certain than God’s existence (e.g., the principle of causality), and then proceed to reason in “a straight line” fashion to the conclusion that God exists.[11] In so doing they unwittingly assign to the concept of God’s existence a logically derivative rather than logically primitive status.[12]

By way of contrast, the transcendental argument preserves the logically primitive and absolute character of God’s existence by starting with the premise that God’s existence is a necessary precondition for argument itself.[13] In this way argument is made to depend upon God, rather than vice versa, since argument is possible if and only if God’s existence is true from the outset of argument itself. Thus in contrast to both deductive and inductive forms of argument, a transcendental argument allows the concept of God to function as a logically primitive rather than logically derivative proposition, thereby bearing witness to the non-derivative character of God’s existence on an argumentative level.

To state the matter more precisely, in Van Til’s Christian-theistic construction of the transcendental argument the truth of God’s existence is not a deductive consequence of the premises of the argument, but rather the metaphysical and logical ground for the very possibility of the premises themselves.[14] This is undoubtedly one of the reasons, if not the chief reason, why he believed that transcendental arguments were uniquely suited for the task of placing into sharp relief the non-deductive character of the truth of God’s existence.

Second, for Van Til the transcendental argument alone does justice to the clarity of the objective evidence for God’s existence, in that it highlights the necessary character of God’s existence—that is to say, it does not grant the possibility that God’s existence is falsifiable, and thus “tone down the objective claims of God upon men.”[15] Inasmuch as creation clearly testifies to the necessary character of God’s existence, it follows that the Christian apologist cannot do justice to the objective evidence for Christian theism unless he or she insists on the necessary character of the concept of God’s existence in theistic argument.

Van Til often buttressed this claim by means of an argument from predication. A transcendental argument, theistically constructed, begins all argument upon the premise that predication requires for its possibility the necessary truth of God’s existence. In this manner the concept of God’s existence is brought into a necessary relation with predication from the outset of argument itself, thereby precluding any future possibility of using argument to falsify God’s existence. Argument cannot proceed without predication,[16] and predication necessarily presupposes the existence of God.[17]

On the other hand, Van Til was convinced that traditional constructions of the “theistic proofs” fail to do justice to the necessary character of God’s existence. Responding to criticisms made by S. J. Ridderbos in this connection, Van Til reminds him that for an argument to serve as a “witness” to God, it cannot bear witness to any other God but the “living and true God.” Thus it must bear witness to God as he truly is, and that requires in turn that it bear witness to God as “the One who cannot but exist.”[18] In short, theistic argument must bear witness to the necessary character of God’s existence. Or, to state the matter in more philosophical terms, in theistic argument the concept of God’s existence must not be allowed to function on the level of logical contingency. To do so is to grant the possibility that God’s existence is falsifiable.

It is true, of course, that Van Til would sometimes argue the premise that God’s existence is falsifiable in order to perform a reductio ad absurdum of the non-Christian position. It is important to note, however, that his use of the reductio was the second part of a two-phase apologetic strategy wherein he adopted the unbeliever’s argument solely “for the sake of argument.” In view of this, Van Til’s “practical strategy”[19] of adopting the unbeliever’s stance for the sake of refuting it should be distinguished from his transcendental argument per se.[20] At this point advocates of the traditional method might argue that Van Til’s endorsement of the transcendental method overlooks the fact that Anselm’s version of the ontological argument argues from the necessary character of God’s being, and as such would be capable of addressing Van Til’s concern. In a debate over apologetic method with Greg Bahnsen at Reformed Seminary in Jackson, Mississippi, R. C. Sproul went even further and expressed the opinion that Van Til’s so-called transcendental argument was merely a sophisticated version of the ontological argument.[21]

Despite formal resemblances between the two, the transcendental argument and the ontological argument are not merely two sides of the same coin. In this connection two points should be noted. First, Van Til believed the ontological argument to be incapable of doing justice to the revelational sense in which God’s existence is necessary, since it “proves” a God who exists “by the same necessity as does the universe,” and thus a God who is no more than “an aspect of, or simply the whole of, the universe.”[22] Van Til was aware of the fact that advocates of the ontological argument, and Anselm in particular, make a distinction between two different senses of “necessity” in order to distinguish God’s existence from that of the universe. For Van Til, however, this distinction is fatally undermined by the initial starting point of the argument itself. The ontological argument begins by defining God’s being as that being “than which nothing greater can be thought,” thereby identifying God’s being with humanity’s highest thought. In other words, the ontological argument begins by identifying God’s being with an order of thought and existence that is, on a Christian world-view, metaphysically contingent. Moreover, even if a logical transfer into the realm of necessary being were possible by means of the ontological argument, such a transfer would not leave us with “the biblical notion of God.”[23]

This brings us to the second point of contrast between Van Til and the proponents of the ontological argument. In arguing for God’s existence Van Til believed one could distinguish a transcendental argument from deductive arguments, in this case the ontological argument. Those who equate the ontological argument with the transcendental argument implicitly assume that transcendental arguments are reducible to deductive arguments, yet typically fail to provide grounds for this assumption, thus begging the very point in dispute. Although the preceding discussion calls attention to some important reasons why Van Til regarded transcendental arguments to be distinctive, there is yet another reason why he believed that transcendental arguments were uniquely suited for the task of Christian apologetics. Moreover, this aspect of Van Til’s transcendental argument has not been given the due weight it deserves, even though it is precisely this feature that allows us to distinguish it on a formal level from traditional methods of argument.

At this point we must zero in, so to speak, on a particular theological and apologetic concern of Van Til, namely, the question of the metaphysical foundations of the possibility of predication. In his writings he frequently stressed the need for apologetic argument to engage this question from a Christian-theistic point of view. Consider the following statement from A Christian Theory of Knowledge, which occurs in the context of Van Til’s stated purpose “to indicate in a broad way the method of reasoning that is to be pursued” in the vindication of Christian theism:

How then we ask is the Christian to challenge this non-Christian approach to the interpretation of human experience? He can do so only if he shows that man must presuppose God as the final reference point in predication. Otherwise, he would destroy experience itself. He can do so only if he shows the non-Christian that even in his virtual negation of God, he is still really presupposing God. He can do so only if he shows the non-Christian that he cannot deny God unless he first affirm him, and that his own approach throughout its history has been shown to be destructive of human experience itself.[24]

Here we are reminded that the question of “the final reference point in predication” lies at the very center of Van Til’s approach to apologetic argument. Moreover, he clearly believed that presuppositional (or transcendental) arguments were uniquely suited for the task of justifying the possibility of predication on Christian-theistic grounds. To state the matter more concisely, Van Til’s peculiar application of the transcendental argument seeks to make definite the claim that all human predication, whether that of affirmation or negation, presupposes the truth of God’s existence:

It is the firm conviction of every epistemologically self-conscious Christian that no human being can utter a single syllable, whether in negation or affirmation, unless it were for God’s existence. Thus the transcendental argument seeks to discover what sort of foundations the house of human knowledge must have, in order to be what it is.[25]

The last two quotes highlight the central position occupied by the argument from predication in Van Til’s apologetic, and the prominence of this argument in his apologetic has been noted by John Frame as well.[26] Often overlooked, however, is Van Til’s concern to emphasize that the argument from predication is not limited to cases of affirmation, but also extends to cases of negation. Might not this emphasis merit closer scrutiny, especially in light of the distinction he drew between his own method and the methods of traditional argument?

Implicit in Van Til’s argument from predication is the criticism, albeit undeveloped on a formal level, that traditional methods of argument are inadequate because they proceed upon the assumption that at least some types of predication are possible apart from the truth of God’s existence. By way of contrast, Van Til believed that the method of argument used by a Christian apologist must make it clear that even the negation of God’s existence is impossible, philosophically speaking, unless God’s existence is true. To put it another way, the method of argument used by the Christian apologist must make it clear that God’s existence is the basis for all predication, such that one cannot predicate truly or falsely about anything unless God exists.[27] Hence the argument a Christian apologist utilizes must not grant the non-Christian assumption that predication, either in part or in toto, can be justified independently of the truth of God’s existence, and for Van Til this was a concern that only a transcendental method of argument could satisfy.

The question naturally arises as to whether Van Til was justified in thinking thus. Is it actually the case, as Van Til would have us believe, that the traditional methods of argument fail to do justice to the necessary relation that obtains between God’s existence and the possibility of predication? On the other hand, what are we to make of his confidence in the ability of the transcendental method to succeed where traditional methods of argument have failed? Is his conviction in this regard something that can be justified or is it merely a case of misdirected zeal on his part?[28] In light of the preceding discussion, it would seem that the answers to these questions are to be found in a more precise clarification of the presuppositional nature of Van Til’s argument from predication. Before entering into this project, however, it is necessary to consider what I will call “the reductionist objection” to Van Til’s belief in the distinctive character of transcendental argument.

II. The Reductionist Objection

Objections to the distinctive character of transcendental arguments are of some vintage in the history of philosophy, going back at least as far as Kant. The decade following the publication of Kant’s Critique in 1781 witnessed a number of critical responses to the distinctive claims of Kant’s transcendental program. Indeed, a number of Kant’s German contemporaries insisted that insofar as Kant’s transcendental program constituted an answer to Hume, it was merely restating arguments that had already been voiced by the rationalist philosopher Leibniz.[29] Such criticism paved the way for later, more sophisticated attempts to deny the distinctive character of transcendental argument. To take but one example, in a series of articles published during the latter third of the twentieth century, Moltke S. Gram mounted a sustained attack on the notion that transcendental arguments are formally distinct from deductive arguments.[30] On Gram’s view, statements of the form “p presupposes q” are reducible to statements of the form “p implies q.”[31] Hence there is at least some justification for classifying arguments of this type under the title “the reductionist objection.”[32]

Not surprisingly, the debate has also spilled over into Van Tillian circles. The late Greg Bahnsen and John Frame, arguably the two leading successors to Van Til in the twentieth century, have weighed in on different sides of the debate, with Frame arguing in favor of the reductionist objection in a number of articles and books.[33] Central to Frame’s argument is the claim that “any indirect argument can be made into a direct argument with some creative rephrasing.”[34] In support of this claim Frame begins with an abbreviated statement of Van Til’s transcendental argument, then goes on to argue that it translates into an argument that is basically deductive in form. Thus in the final analysis, argues Frame, “it doesn’t make much difference whether you say ‘Causality, therefore God’ or ‘Without God, no causality, therefore God.’”[35]

A closer look at Frame’s program of reduction indicates that it turns upon the deductive relationship that exists between two rules of inference in formal logic known as modus ponens and modus tollens. In order to see this more clearly, it is necessary to state Frame’s argument more fully. Let us begin with Frame’s abbreviated statement of the direct argument, namely “Causality, therefore God.” Spelled out more fully, this argument takes the form of modus ponens, or “the mode of affirmation”:

If causality, then God	(premise 1)
Causality	(premise 2)
Therefore God	(conclusion)

How does one get from this argument to Frame’s abbreviated statement of the indirect or transcendental argument, namely, that “Without God, no causality”? By means of modus tollens, or “the mode of denial”:

If causality, then God	(premise 1)
Not God	(premise 2)
Therefore not causality	(conclusion)

Here modus tollens functions as a reductio ad absurdum for God’s existence.36 It assumes the proposition “not God” in order to refute it by deducing a conclusion from it that is obviously false (i.e., “not causality”). This refutation then serves to clear the way, as it were, for a positive affirmation of God’s existence. As Frame himself puts it, “Since we are unwilling to accept the conclusion, we must negate the premise and say that God does exist.”[37]

The important thing to note here, especially with respect to Frame’s program of reduction, is that the argument form modus tollens can be derived from the common major premise it shares with the argument form modus ponens.[38] This follows from the fact that in a complete propositional logic where the form modus ponens is valid, the form modus tollens will be valid as well. Therefore Frame is essentially right in his claim that “most positive arguments can be put into negative form and vice versa, with some skill in phrasing.”[39]

However, Frame goes even further. Having argued a case for the methodological equivalence of transcendental and traditional arguments, he goes on to suggest that Van Tillians should rest content with “a presuppositionalism of the heart” rather than continuing to insist upon the distinctiveness of presuppositionalism on a methodological level.[40] While some Van Tillians may be uncomfortable with the conclusion that presuppositionalism’s distinctiveness consists in a subjective attitude rather than an objective method, such a conclusion is difficult to escape once the validity of Frame’s argument is granted.[41]

Nevertheless, Christian apologists from both sides of the apologetic fence have questioned the validity of Frame’s deductive interpretation of the transcendental argument. In a recently published collection of apologetic essays, William Lane Craig asserts that Frame “confuses transcendental reasoning with what the medievals called demonstratio quia, proof that proceeds from consequence to ground.”[42] This is but another way of saying that Frame confuses transcendental argument with a search for the premises in a deductive argument. While I agree with Craig’s observation, it should be noted that Craig does not interact with, much less refute, the case that Frame makes elsewhere in support of his particular interpretation of the transcendental argument.[43] Thus Craig’s objection, although on the right track, fails to truly answer Frame.[44]

Criticism of Frame’s program has also arisen from within the household of Van Til. In a series of lectures given at Westminster Seminary in California,[45] the late Greg Bahnsen argues that Frame’s denial of the distinctive character of transcendental argument rests upon equivocation with respect to the meaning of causality. Bahnsen points out that when a Thomist makes use of a causal premise in traditional argument, that premise speaks of nothing more than the mere function of causality (i.e., for every effect there is a cause). On the other hand, when a Van Tillian makes use of a causal premise in transcendental argument, that premise concerns not merely the function of causality, but the ground of its intelligibility. Hence Frame is guilty of turning a premise about the mere function of causality into a premise about its intelligibility.

Bahnsen’s reply, however, ultimately misses Frame’s point. For Frame the problem is not whether Van Tillians and Thomists mean different things when they speak of causality, but whether these differences find expression on the level of apologetic method and formal argument as such. If they do not, then the sharp distinction that Van Til posits between his method and the traditional method collapses, along with all attempts to distinguish, on methodological grounds alone, Van Tillian and Thomistic uses of the word “causality.”[46] The question Bahnsen must answer, at least as far as Frame is concerned, is how we are to go about detecting the presence of such equivocation solely on the basis of argument form.[47] Thus Bahnsen’s reply to Frame, while plausible in some respects, nevertheless fails to penetrate to the heart of Frame’s argument.[48]

Frame’s argument, then, may be summarized in terms of two claims. First, Van Til’s method of apologetic argument reduces to the traditional method in view of the relationship of deductive equivalence that obtains between the two. Consequently Van Til’s attempt to draw a methodological distinction between his position and the traditional method fails, since no such distinction exists. The second claim is closely related to the first, namely, that Van Til’s presuppositionalism is best understood “as an appeal to the heart rather than as a straightforward apologetic method.”[49]

One might be inclined to concede the case for “a presuppositionalism of the heart”[50] were it not for the fact that another interpretation of the concept of presupposition is available in the work of Peter Strawson, one that arguably makes more systematic sense of Van Til’s transcendental argument, especially his argument from predication. Moreover, when this concept is used to clarify what is meant by the term “presupposition,” a plausible case can be made for the claim that transcendental arguments are not deductively equivalent with (or reducible to) traditional argument forms. Ironically, what Frame’s program demonstrates is not that transcendental and traditional arguments are deductively equivalent, but that traditional argument forms are inadequate when it comes to capturing the distinctive concerns of Van Til’s apologetic.

III. In Defense of Methodological Presuppositionalism

By way of preface it should be noted that while Van Til himself never provided a formal defense of the proposition that transcendental arguments are irreducible to either deductive or inductive arguments, it does not follow from this that he was unaware of the reductionist objection to his position. In A Survey of Christian Epistemology, a book that traces back to the earliest years of his teaching career, Van Til speaks of the distinction that exists between the transcendental method on the one hand, and the inductive and deductive method on the other:

To us the only thing of great significance in this connection is that it is often found to be more difficult to distinguish our method from the deductive method than from the inductive method. But the favorite charge against us is that we are still bound to the past and are therefore employing the deductive method. Our opponents are thoughtlessly identifying our method with the Greek method of deduction. For this reason it is necessary for us to make the difference between these two methods as clear as we can.[51]

This passage serves as a reminder that the reductionist objection to the transcendental argument is not new, nor was Van Til unaware of it. Nevertheless, there is truth in Frame’s claim that Van Til himself never provided us with an actual argument for its distinctiveness.[52] What follows is a tentative attempt to do so by making use of twentieth-century philosophical discussion of the concept of presupposition and the subsequent application of this discussion to transcendental argument. Admittedly this will involve making use of ideas that, strictly speaking, do not appear in Van Til’s writings. Nevertheless, I believe that the clarity they lend to the exposition of Van Til’s presuppositional argument, and especially his argument from predication, will eventually justify their introduction. The argument that follows, therefore, may be construed as an attempt to provide a motivation for the distinction Van Til drew between transcendental and traditional forms of argument.[53] Perhaps not all Van Tillians will find my argument convincing. At the very least, however, it should serve to suggest a new avenue of approach to the question upon which others may perhaps build.

The failure of traditional argument forms to capture what is meant by the concept of presupposition points up the need for a more precise way of construing the semantic relation between statements related by it. The most promising option that has emerged is arguably that of Peter Strawson. According to Strawson, a statement A may be said to presuppose a statement B if B is a necessary precondition of the truth-or-falsity of A.[54] Strawson’s interpretation of the concept of presupposition has been restated in succinct fashion by Bas van Fraassen as follows:[55]

A presupposes B if and only if A is neither true nor false unless B is true. This may also be stated as follows:[56]

(1)	A presupposes B if and only if:
	a) if A is true, then B is true.
	b) if ~A is true, then B is true.

Van Fraassen’s formulation is helpful for two reasons. First, it enables us to articulate more precisely Van Til’s claim that “no human being can utter a single syllable, whether in negation or affirmation, unless it were for God’s existence.”[57] Second, it provides us with more formal language by which to articulate the differences between transcendental and traditional argument forms. To illustrate this, let us begin by applying the semantic relation embodied in (1a) to the causal argument for God’s existence. Letting C = causality, and G = God’s existence, we translate as follows:

(2)	C presupposes G	(premise 1)
	C	(premise 2)
	Therefore G	(conclusion)

 A comparison of this argument form with modus ponens makes it clear, as van Fraassen has noted, “that an analogue of modus ponens holds also for presupposition.”[58] Formal differences become apparent, however, when we negate the minor premise in (2) as follows:

(3)	C presupposes G	(premise 1)
	~C	(premise 2)
	Therefore G	(conclusion)

Note that in terms of the characterization provided by (1), the corollary principle (1b) shows that (3) is valid, whereas this argument would be invalid for implication.

We are now in a position to identify a distinguishing feature of arguments based upon the concept of presupposition as we have formulated it here. That feature concerns what logicians refer to as “truth-functionality.” In arguments of the form (3), the truth value of the conclusion is not a function of the truth value of the antecedent minor premise (i.e., premise 2), since the conclusion remains true whether C or ~C obtains. By way of contrast, in the case of standard implicational or direct argument forms such as modus ponens or modus tollens, the truth value of the conclusion is a direct function of the truth value of the antecedent minor premise. In Van Til’s Apologetic, Bahnsen calls attention to this peculiar feature of transcendental arguments. He summarizes the matter as follows:

To put it simply, in the case of “direct” arguments (whether rational or empirical), the negation of one of their premises changes the truth or reliability of their conclusion. But this is not true of transcendental arguments, and that sets them off from the other kinds of proof or analysis. A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.[59]

Generally speaking, then, presuppositional or transcendental arguments may be distinguished from implicational or “direct” arguments in terms of “the truth-functional relation of their conclusions to their premises.”[60] In view of this distinction, the claim that traditional or “direct” forms of the causal argument yield “a transcendental conclusion”[61] becomes questionable. To qualify as a transcendental conclusion, the truth of the conclusion in a direct argument would have to be in some sense independent of the truth value of its antecedent premise. However, both modus ponens and modus tollens, two classic forms of direct argument, fail to meet this criterion.[62]

The same must be said with respect to the claim that we can reach a “transcendental conclusion by many kinds of specific arguments, including many of the traditional ones.”[63] In the nature of the case, the truth of a “transcendental conclusion” does not depend upon the truth value of its antecedent premise, regardless of whether this premise affirms causality or any other principle, since a transcendental conclusion constitutes the very ground for the proof of that premise. Thus Frame’s claim in this regard is either false, or based upon some non-classical understanding of what qualifies as a transcendental proposition.[64]

Formal differences between the concepts of presupposition and implication also emerge when we consider the analogue to modus tollens for presupposition:

(4)	C presupposes G
	~G
	Therefore ~C

 Again, whereas this argument would be valid for implication as an instance of modus tollens, it is not valid when C and G are joined by the semantic relation of presupposition, since in the latter case C has no truth value unless G is true.[65] Thus the possibility of assigning a truth value to C depends upon the logically anterior truth of G. To put the matter another way, if ~G obtains, we have what Strawson refers to as “a failure of presupposition,” in which case the possibility of assigning a truth value to C does not even arise.[66]

At the very least these observations raise questions about Frame’s belief that Van Til’s transcendental method provides us with “a set of conditions that any number of arguments might fulfill.”[67] Frame rightly notes that Van Til’s apologetic method “seeks to show that all intelligibility depends on, or presupposes, Christian theism.”[68] In light of the preceding arguments, however, there is reason to question whether direct argument forms such as modus tollens meet this criterion. In argumentative instances where causality (C) and God’s existence (G) are related by implication, ~C follows from ~G. In other words, an argument formulated in terms of modus tollens contains the implication, albeit subtle, that at least some types of predication are possible in cases where God’s existence fails to obtain. By way of contrast, Van Til desired to argue that even cases of predicational negation presuppose the truth of God’s existence. In light of this, modus tollens would seem to be incapable of sustaining the apologetically radical goal he was aiming at with his argument from predication.

Strawson’s concept of presupposition, as formulated by van Fraassen, also allows us to sharpen the distinction between the method of reductio ad absurdum and Van Til’s transcendental argument from predication. In a reductio, a position is refuted by deducing a contradiction from its premises. In Van Til’s transcendental argument from predication, the possibility of assigning a truth value—and thus by extension the very possibility of generating a contradiction—fails to obtain unless God’s existence is true. In other words, Van Til’s transcendental argument from predication makes a stronger claim than the claim generated by the reductio. The latter generates a contradiction from the non-Christian position, while Van Til’s transcendental argument from predication makes the more radical claim that contradiction itself is impossible apart from the truth of God’s existence. To state the contrast in slightly different terms, if God’s existence is a necessary condition for the mere truth of causality, then denying God’s existence while affirming causality results in contradiction. However, if God’s existence is a necessary condition for both the truth or falsity of causality, then denying God’s existence results in a failure to predicate anything at all.[69]

This points up yet another reason why the transcendental argument should not be confused or equated with the method of reductio ad absurdum. For Van Til it was not enough to deduce a contradiction from the non-Christian’s position and leave matters at that. Indeed, had Van Til stopped there it is doubtful whether he would have ruffled as many apologetic feathers as he did. Rather, Van Til insisted on going further and making the transcendental claim that the very intelligibility of the non-Christian’s claims, whether true or false, necessarily presuppose the truth of Christian theism.[70] To be sure, the reductio helps make definite the nature of the presuppositional relation between God’s existence and causality, and it does this by pointing out contradictions that arise in the non- Christian position when God’s existence is denied. Strictly speaking, however, the reductio does not establish God’s existence, since the truth of God’s existence is a necessary precondition for the possibility of argument itself, and it is precisely the latter claim that Van Til’s transcendental argument from predication seeks to prove.

The reductionist objection to the unique character of transcendental argument rests upon the assertion that “p implies q” and “p presupposes q” are deductively equivalent propositions. However, if the arguments developed above are valid, as I am inclined to believe, then it follows that the semantic differences between the concepts of presupposition and implication do in fact translate into differences on the level of formal argument and method. As such it is not possible, by means of “creative rephrasing,” to reduce transcendental arguments to “direct” or implicational arguments. All of which is to say that the reductionist objection to the transcendental argument fails.

Van Til’s transcendental argument from predication helps us to see that the most fundamental question in logic and argument turns out to be a metaphysical one, namely that of God’s existence.[71] For Van Til, God’s existence is a metaphysical presupposition that grounds the very possibility of logic, and by extension argument itself. This is doubtless the reason why Van Til’s apologetic method takes very seriously the essential character of the relation between God’s existence and argument—so much so that on Van Til’s view of things, the negation of God’s existence renders argument impossible. How so? By rendering impossible the task of assigning truth values in argument (i.e., predication). In this way Van Til’s transcendental argument from predication takes us beyond the analysis of particular arguments and raises the question of argument itself.

IV. Conclusion

A few closing caveats in anticipation of possible objections. Note first of all that the argument as I have formulated it here is neither invalid nor unsound, given the definition of presupposition stated in (1) in section III of this paper. One may nevertheless object that the argument begs the question, inasmuch as it assumes that a certain semantic relation between God and causality obtains from the outset. However, other commonly accepted forms of argument, for instance arguments based upon material implication, also begin with a semantic relation that is assumed. The relation of presupposition, like the relation of implication, is a semantic relation. Thus there is no reason why, prima facie, an argument that begins with the premise “C presupposes G” should be assigned a lesser status than an argument that begins with the premise “C implies G.”

Others may be inclined to point out that a non-Christian will not accept the initial premise that “causality presupposes God.” This objection confuses the distinction between objective argument and subjective persuasion.[72] Of course the non-Christian may not accept such a premise, given the noetic effects of sin. However, that does not prove that the premise is invalid, still less that the Christian apologist is bound to give it up in the interests of persuading a non-Christian that God exists.

Finally, some might object that the arguments advanced in this paper entail the conclusion that Christian apologists, and Van Tillians in particular, are somehow obliged to stop using implicational arguments altogether. It should be kept in mind that in terms of the concept of presupposition set forth in this article, both modus ponens and its presuppositional analogue represent valid forms of argument. Thus in the case of modus ponens there is in fact formal overlap between an argument based upon the concept of implication and its presuppositional analogue. Commenting on this nature of this overlap, van Fraassen writes: “Thus presupposition and implication are not the same, but they have something in common. What they have in common is that, if A either presupposes or implies B, the argument from A to B is valid.”[73] In those argumentative contexts where modus ponens is operative, or where the operative semantic relation is that of implication proper, methodological differences between presuppositional and traditional approaches do not register themselves on a formal level. In such contexts implicational arguments continue to have their proper function and place. However, in cases where A presupposes B the argument from ~A to B is also valid, and this makes it possible to distinguish Van Til’s transcendental argument from traditional arguments on formal grounds.

The philosophical journal Nous featured a symposium on transcendental arguments in 1971. Among the contributors to that symposium was Moltke S. Gram, who began his paper as follows: “The problem about transcendental arguments is whether there are any.”[74] Obviously the passage of some 30 years has not rendered this question moot by any means. Secular philosophers certainly have not reached anything like a consensus on this question. From this it does not follow, however, that Christian apologists are somehow bound to share in Gram’s scepticism with respect to transcendental arguments. On the other hand, one must also grant that neither van Fraassen nor Strawson has said the last word on presupposition, and there may in fact be better ways to construe the relation of presupposition. There may also be different, and even better, ways of stating the case for the distinctive character of “presuppositional” argument. At the very least, however, the arguments advanced in this article call into question the assumption that the concept of presupposition lacks formal and methodological significance. A plausible case can be made for the distinctive character of Van Til’s transcendental argument, provided one keeps an eye on the concept of presupposition and the distinctive way that it functions in argument. My hope is that this essay may at least contribute to the ongoing discussion in that regard.

Notes

1. Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 5; hereafter SCE.
2. Van Til, SCE, 11.
3. Van Til’s commitment to the transcendental method of argument did not lead him to reject the use of inductive and deductive methods of argument per se. However, in keeping with his belief that Reformed theology entails an apologetic method that is distinctive, namely the transcendental method, Van Til called for the methodological reconstruction of deductive and inductive argument along transcendental lines (see Van Til, SCE, 8–11, 201). It lies beyond the purview of this paper to enter into the question why Van Til himself chose not to provide us with explicit examples of such a reconstruction in his writings.
4. Most, if not all, non-Van Tillian apologists fall into this category.
5. John M. Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1994), 69–88, hereafter AGG; idem, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1995), 317–20, hereafter CVT. See also his more recent but brief comment in John M. Frame, “Presuppositional Apologetics,” in Five Views on Apologetics (ed. Stanley N. Gundry and Steven B. Cowan; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), 220–21 n. 18.
6. Frame, CVT, 320; AGG, 85–88.
7. Readers should note that my purpose in this article is to defend the methodological distinctiveness of transcendental arguments on a formal level. Such a defense, if successful, does not entail the conclusion that inductive and deductive arguments have no place whatsoever in a presuppositional apologetic. In general I agree, along with both Bahnsen and Frame, that “there is no transcendental argument that ‘rules out all other kinds of arguments.’. .. either in general philosophy and scholarship or particularly in apologetics” (Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic [Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1998], 502 n. 64). Frame apparently believes that Van Til himself would not have agreed with such a claim, and thus he calls for the “supplementation” of transcendental argument “by other arguments” (Frame, AGG, 73; CVT, 316–17). While presuming to differ with Frame’s interpretation of Van Til at this point, the question whether Van Til himself allowed the use of other argument forms should be distinguished from the question whether Van Til was justified in his belief that transcendental arguments are methodologically unique. Again, this paper primarily addresses the latter question.
8. Peter Strawson, An Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen & Co., 1952), 174–79.
9. For a brief overview of Van Til’s methodological concerns, consult Van Til, SCE, 4–13.
10. “It should be particularly noted, therefore, that only a system of philosophy that takes the concept of an absolute God seriously can really be said to be employing a transcendental method. A truly transcendent God and a transcendental method go hand-in-hand” (Van Til, SCE, 11).
11. Van Til, SCE, 8–11.
12. To my knowledge, Van Til never stated the matter in precisely these terms or categories (“logically derivative” vs. “logically primitive”). Their usage here hopefully serves to clarify the language that Van Til often uses when he states this point in his writings (“straight line” reasoning vs. “indirect” reasoning).
13. “It is not as though we already know some facts and laws to begin with, irrespective of the existence of God, in order then to reason from such a beginning to further conclusions. It is certainly true that if God has any significance for any object of knowledge at all, the relation of God to that object of knowledge must be taken into consideration from the outset. It is this fact that the transcendental method seeks to recognize” (Van Til, SCE, 201).
14. “The best, the only, the absolutely certain proof of the truth of Christianity is that unless its truth be presupposed there is no proof of anything. Christianity is proved as being the very foundation of the idea of proof itself” (Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith [Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1955], 396). Subsequent references to The Defense of the Faith (hereafter DOF) are to the 1955 edition unless otherwise noted.
15. Van Til, DOF, 197.
16. Van Til has in mind predication which affirms that something is the case (i.e., it is the case that John is tall) and predication which denies that something is the case (i.e., it is not the case that John is tall). In terms of assigning truth values to the propositions in an argument, this amounts to the claim that it is (logically) impossible to predicate truly or falsely about any proposition in an argument unless the proposition “God exists” is true.
17. Van Til’s argument from predication is closely related to his criticism of the cosmological argument—to wit, that the cosmological argument, as traditionally constructed, assumes that the principle of causality is intelligible apart from God. For Van Til, the only way to avoid this consequence in apologetic argument is to insist upon the necessary relation of God’s existence and predication from the outset of argument itself.
18. Van Til, DOF, 197.
19. Frame, CVT, 320.
20. According to John Frame, Van Til’s version of the transcendental argument is “essentially a reductio” (Frame, CVT, 315, 319). While the two are closely related in Van Til’s apologetic, especially on a practical level, putting the matter in this way tends to obscure the distinction between a transcendental argument and the method of reductio ad absurdum.
21. The audio tape of this debate (titled “The Bahnsen/Sproul Debate Over Apologetic Method”) is available from Covenant Media Foundation, 3420 Piccadilly Circle, Nacogdoches, TX 75961.
22. Cornelius Van Til, The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980), 64–65.
23. “If we take the highest being of which we can think, in the sense of have a concept of, and attribute to it actual existence, we do not have the biblical notion of God. God is not the reality that corresponds to the highest concept that man, considered as an independent being, can think” (Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology [Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1974], 206).
24. Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 13 (emphasis added).
25. Van Til, SCE, 11 (emphasis added).
26. Frame summarizes Van Til’s approach to theistic proof as the belief that “all legitimate theistic proof reduces to the ‘proof from the possibility of predication.’ God exists, in other words, because without him it would not be possible to reason, to think, or even to attach a predicate to a subject” (Frame, AGG, 70).
27. See also the remarks of Greg Bahnsen in this regard: “Van Til’s stunning application of this feature of transcendental argumentation to apologetics is that the truth of the Christian worldview is established not only by theistic premises and opinions, but also by antitheistic beliefs and opinions. As Van Til said, ‘Antitheism presupposes theism’ (SCE, xii). Even if the unbeliever wants to start with the assertion that ‘God does not exist,’ a transcendental analysis of it would show that the possibility of its coherence and meaningfulness assumes the existence of the very God that it denies” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 502 n. 63).
28. “Van Til is very sensitive to the spiritual side of intellectual life. He has much wisdom about the influence of sin upon intellectual disciplines, particularly philosophy and apologetics. But, in my view, he is too much inclined to equate these spiritual issues with formal matters of method and strategy” (Frame, CVT, 319–20).
29. See Henry E. Allison, The Kant-Eberhard Controversy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). Eberhard was a contemporary critic of Kant who argued, according to Allison, “that whatever is true in Kant is already found in Leibniz, and that wherever Kant differs from Leibniz he is wrong” (ibid., 9). Kant’s own response to Eberhard came in 1790 in the form of a short essay entitled “On a Discovery According to Which Any New Critique of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One.” Although Eberhard never argued that a formal equivalence obtains between transcendental and deductive arguments, he nevertheless opened the door to such criticism by questioning whether Kant’s transcendental philosophy differed in substance from the deductive rationalism of Leibniz.
30. See the helpful bibliography provided in Stephen Wentworth Arndt, “Transcendental Method and Transcendental Arguments,” International Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1987): 43 n. 1.
31. Moltke S. Gram, “Transcendental Arguments,” Nous 5 (1971): 15-26.
32. The term “reductionist,” like the term “rationalist,” admits of a broad range of uses. Its application in this paper is somewhat restricted and refers primarily to someone who claims that a deductive relationship obtains between the form of a transcendental argument and the various forms of implicational argument (e.g., modus ponens and modus tollens).
33. Relevant bibliography is cited in n. 5 above.
34. Frame, AGG, 76.
35. Ibid.
36. As noted earlier, Frame suggests that Van Til’s transcendental argument is “essentially a reductio” (Frame, CVT, 315, 319). This equation helps explain Frame’s tendency to formulate Van Til’s transcendental argument in terms of modus tollens, a practice that in my opinion is misleading.
37. Frame, AGG, 76. By way of further clarification, one should also note that the conclusion “God exists” is not true unless premise 1 is true as well. In other words, Frame’s reconstruction takes premise 1 as a given.
38. Using the rules of replacement for propositional logic, such a derivation might appear as follows: 1. (p>q) A ~q (assumed premise) 2. p>q (by simplification from 1) 3. ~q (by simplification from 1) 4. ~p v q (by material implication from 2) 5. ~p (by disjunctive syllogism from 3, 4) 6. [(p>q) A ~q] > ~p (completed proof from 1–5) For a list of the rules of replacement commonly used in propositional logic, see Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (7th ed.; New York: MacMillan, 1986).
39. 39 Frame, CVT, 318.
40. Frame, CVT, 320; AGG, 85–88.
41. A somewhat weaker reading of Frame’s argument is possible when one takes into account the following concession on his part: “I do not deny in principle that spiritual concerns can have specific methodological consequences. I am only saying that Van Til has not succeeded in proving that his spiritual concerns directly entail his methodological proposals” (Frame, CVT, 320). Here Frame seems to be willing to grant in principle the possibility that Van Til’s “spiritual concerns” may in fact translate into “specific methodological consequences,” though he is obviously skeptical about the possibility of making a case for it.
42. William Lane Craig, “A Classical Apologist’s Response,” in Five Views on Apologetics (ed. Stanley N. Gundry and Steven B. Cowan; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), 233.
43. Frame briefly references the case for his interpretation of the transcendental argument in Frame, “Presuppositional Apologetics,” 220 n. 18.
44. Craig also attempts to identify Alvin Plantinga, rather than Van Til, as the true exponent of the transcendental argument for Christian theism in the 20th century. While Plantinga’s arguments provide us with a devastating critique of naturalism on its own terms, to my knowledge he nowhere makes the transcendental claim, as did Van Til, that the very intelligibility of the naturalist’s claims, whether true or false, necessarily presuppose the truth of Christian theism.
45. These lectures were taped and later transcribed into a booklet entitled An Answer to Frame’s Critique of Van Til: Profound Differences Between the Traditional and Presuppositional Methods. The booklet contains no publishing information, but is made available by the Westminster Campus Bookstore in Philadelphia.
46. While Professor Frame is willing to grant that Van Til’s understanding of causality differs at important points from that of Aquinas, he apparently believes that one must consult Aquinas’s writings on nature and grace, rather than his apologetic method per se, to make a solid case for the claim that Aquinas defined the principle of causality in an “autonomous” fashion (e-mail correspondence from John Frame to the author).
47. “How do we know when an apologist is assuming that the universe is intelligible apart from God? Usually, not from the form of his argument as such” (Frame, CVT, 319).
48. In my opinion the argument Bahnsen makes in his last book comes much closer to addressing the precise issue raised by Frame (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501–2). I reference this argument in section III of this paper. To my knowledge Frame has not yet replied to Bahnsen in print on this point.
49. Frame, CVT, 320.
50. The arguments that follow should not be construed as an attempt to deny that presuppositionalism involves a heart attitude as well as an objective method. I heartily concur with Frame’s insistence that presuppositionalism, rightly understood, requires a particular “heart attitude.” However, one need not concur with Frame’s deductive reading of the transcendental argument in order to agree with him on this point.
51. Van Til, SCE, 9. This work represents the second edition of a syllabus originally written by Van Til in 1932 under the title The Metaphysics of Apologetics.
52. “The first thing to note is that in this discussion Van Til has not presented us with an actual argument. He has presented (1) a conclusion, (2) a logical model, and (3) a practical strategy.. .. I confess that I am not convinced that a transcendental argument for Christian theism must of necessity be indirect rather than direct. To my knowledge, Van Til never argues the point, but merely asserts it. But it is by no means obvious” (Frame, CVT, 315, 317).
53. Inasmuch as Frame himself remains open in principle to the possibility of constructing such an argument (see n. 41 above), this paper should also be viewed as an attempt to explore that possibility more fully.
54. “A statement S presupposes a statement S' in the sense that the truth of S' is a precondition of the truth-or-falsity of S” (Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, 175).
55. Bas C. van Fraassen, “Presupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference,” Journal of Philosophy (1968): 136-52. See also the application of van Fraassen’s work to Kant’s transcendental argument in Gordon G. Brittan, Kant’s Theory of Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 28–42. The argument that follows builds upon the work of both these scholars. I recognize, of course, that neither of these men would be likely to agree with the particular application I make here of their work.
56. Since A has no truth value (i.e., is neither true nor false) unless B is true, the truth of B must be presupposed whenever A has a truth value (i.e., whenever A is either true or false). Thus van Fraassen’s definition may be restated in terms of the conjunction given in (1) above.
57. Van Til, SCE, 11 (emphasis added).
58. Van Fraassen, “Presupposition,” 137.
59. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501–2.
60. Ibid., 501.
61. Frame, “Presuppositional Apologetics,” 220–21.
62. Noteworthy at this point is the fact that Frame construes the traditional causal argument in terms of modus ponens (Frame, AGG, 76).
63. Frame, “Presuppositional Apologetics,” 220.
64. The classic definition of a transcendental principle in argument was given by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason: “But though it needs proof, it should be entitled a principle, not a theorem, because it has the peculiar character that it makes possible the very experience which is its own ground of proof, and that in this experience it must always itself be presupposed” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [trans. Norman Kemp Smith; London: MacMillan, 1958], B765).
65. Recall that in terms of the way we have construed the presuppositional relation, the truth value of C (i.e., its truth or falsity) depends upon the truth of G. Thus if G fails to obtain, then the possibility of predicating a truth value for C also fails to obtain.
66. See the traditional maxim non entis nulla sunt attributa, “of nothing, nothing can be attributed.” Since a property cannot be truly or falsely predicated of what does not exist, predication requires an existential. For Van Til, predication requires God’s self-existence, since God’s existence is the only “existential” that can ultimately justify the possibility of predication.
67. Frame, CVT, 315.
68. Frame, CVT, 314–15 (emphasis added).
69. Strawson argues that the logical absurdity involved in self-contradiction should be distinguished from the logical absurdity involved in a failure of presupposition: “It is self-contradictory to conjoin S with the denial of S' if S' is a necessary condition of the truth, simply, of S. It is a different kind of logical absurdity to conjoin S with the denial of S' if S' is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of S. The relation between S and S' in the first case is that S entails S'. We need a different name for the relation between S and S' in the second case; let us say. .. that S presupposes S”’ (Logical Theory, 175).
70. If there is an apologetic equivalent to the “offense of the cross” in Van Til’s method, this would be it.
71. The primacy of metaphysics in Van Til’s apologetic traces back to his earliest writings, as evidenced by the title The Metaphysics of Apologetics, a work originally written by Van Til in 1932 (see n. 51 above). Viewed from this perspective, Van Til’s apologetic method is thoroughly anti-Kantian.
72. See the discussion of this point in John M. Frame, Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1987), 151–52.
73. Van Fraassen, “Presupposition,” 138.
74. Gram, “Transcendental Arguments,” 15.