Time, The “Open Acquittal,” And Divine Omniscience: Two Internal Problems With Open Theism

By Mark Russell Cuthbertson

[Mark Russell Cuthbertson is a graduate student in Theology at the University of Dallas, Dallas, Tex.]

Open theism’s debut on the scene of evangelical-theological scholarship has been, in some ways, less than spectacular ... in some ways more.[1] The wealth of attention it has commanded (which, for better or worse, has yet to escape its academic confines) barely exceeds the amount of criticism it has garnered. Much of this criticism has regarded philosophical paradoxes to which, it is argued, open theism must inevitably lead. Still more has been biblically exegetical in nature.

Perhaps the most notable example of widespread scholarly censure has occurred in response to one of open theism’s earliest and boldest claims, namely its value as a theodicy. In a book calculated to reach the Christian layperson, Greg Boyd asks how a God with exhaustive foreknowledge could keep his proverbial hands clean: “If I unleash a mad dog I am certain will bite you, am I not responsible for my dog’s behavior? If so, how is God not responsible for the behavior of evil people he ‘unleashes’ on the world—if, in fact, he is absolutely certain of what they will do once ‘unleashed’?”[2] This and similar statements have evoked a strong response from opponents who note that, by affirming God’s knowledge of the present, the open theist must return to face Boyd’s own paradox.[3] Given that even on the open view God is, say, faster than any speeding bullet or “mad dog,” he remains an idle, however able, observer of evil. The difficulty is compounded by open theists’ frequent rejection of appeals to the “greater good,” typical of traditional theodicies, as an explanation of why God allows evil.[4] Accordingly, Edward Wierenga has remarked that “the open view faces the same difficulties as traditional Christianity but with fewer resources to meet them.”[5]

Whether difficulties such as this have arisen due to inherent defects on the part of open theism, or are simply the byproduct of anew system struggling to formulate itself, will be discovered with time. In the meantime, the theological and philosophical communities must continue to raise questions regarding the logical (as well as practical) implications of open theism, at least as it exists today. The paradoxes and challenges that are brought to light will be of benefit to everyone involved in the debate, and are vital to the development, if not the eventual disposal, of open theism. If open theism survives, it will do so as a system that is less susceptible to criticism than it has thus far shown itself to be.

It is in this spirit that I offer the following two challenges. The first concerns what I shall call the “open acquittal,” in reference to open theists’ denial that God is ignorant of the relevant future-facts.[6] I will contend that the ground given for holding to divine omniscience on the open view are at best unclear, and at worst inadequate and paradoxical, and that some other ground should be given. The second concerns the relevant future-facts themselves. I will demonstrate that, contrary to the explanation of open theism given by most of its proponents,[7] the list of future-facts to which God has no access must extend well beyond the future free acts of humans, that is, if open theism is to fulfill its objectives.

I. The Unfounded “Open Acquittal”

Open theists are united in their affirmation of divine omniscience, consistently rejecting accusations that they portray God as “ignorant” of the future free acts of humans. By adopting what was almost certainly the position of Aristotle, they maintain that not all future-tense propositions are characterized by bivalence, that is, are either true or false.[8] Propositions pertaining to future free acts, in particular, are logically unknowable (thus, unknowable even to God) because they are not factual at all.

When it comes to the basis for such a claim, however, open theists typically only sketch the details. What is it about future free acts that deprives their derivative propositions of truth-value? Apparently, it is the non-existence of these acts. As John Sanders comments, “[T]he future actions of free creatures are not yet reality, and so there is nothing to be known.”[9] This at once suggests that the answer lies in the ontological status of the future. And, in fact, there are statements in the literature that state precisely this. According to Boyd:

The most commonly accepted definition of truth is “correspondence with reality.” A statement is true if it corresponds with reality, false if it does not. But unless you assume that the future already exists, there is nothing for definitive statements about future free acts to correspond to. If the future is to some extent open, as we have seen, then the truth value of a definitive statement about that aspect of the future must itself be open. That is, it must be open to being either true or false until there is in fact a definite reality that either corresponds to it or not, thus resolving it as definitely true or false.[10]

John Sanders, here responding to the Calvinist theologian Bruce Ware, makes even more explicit the notion that philosophy of time is at the center of the open theist’s vindication of the divine omniscience:

Ware claims that the open view makes God “ignorant” of many beliefs. Again, this is false. If the future conditionals do not exist, then there is nothing about which to be ignorant. To be ignorant of a nothing is not to be ignorant. Perfect knowledge does not include knowing what is inherently unknowable. Ware simply begs the question by assuming his own view in making his accusation. Ware seems to assume the B-theory of time whereby the future already exists—that is, Superbowl LX already exists, it is real now. Hence, [it] is not surprising that the B-theory of time is popular among theological determinists.[11]

Whatever one makes of this final statement (if by “popular” he means a majority, it is almost certainly false), Sanders has hit on something apparently vital to the open theist’s program. In committing oneself to open theism, one is committed to a certain philosophical position with regard to time.[12] If the ontological status of the future is the basis for their divine acquittal—that is, if the non-existence of the future gets God “off the hook”—then open theists must reject the view of time that is held by the majority of physicists and that held by many philosophers of time, namely, the B-theory (also “static” or “tenseless” time). As Sanders notes, the B-theory holds to the objective reality of all temporal points, past, present, and future. (Of course, these terms must be equivocated to an extent, once one rejects the notion of a now; relational terms such as “earlier than,” “simultaneous with,” and “later than” are slightly better.) There really is no ontological difference between the past, present, and future, as the present enjoys no privileged status by which to distinguish them. Further, the temporal change that we all experience is relegated to a psychological anomaly. Hans Reichenbach aptly described the B-theory’s map of the world:

It makes no difference where we put [the present].. .. This timeless universe is a four-dimensional Parmenidean Being, in which nothing happens, “complete, immovable, without end. ..; it is all at once, a continuous one.” Time flow is an illusion, Becoming is an illusion; it is the way we human beings experience time, but there is nothing in nature which corresponds to this experience.[13]

The A-theory of time (also “dynamic” or “tensed” time) is the rival theory, and is the view of the proverbial “man-in-the-street.” According to the A-theory, temporal change is real, and the present enjoys the status of distinguishing the past from the future, what has happened from what will happen. A-theorists affirm that certain events are happening now, and that to experience events in temporal sequence is to experience them as they actually are, rather than to be misled by an illusion which not even B-theorists can escape. Without question, the A-theory is the technical codification of the way most people instinctively think about time. Additionally, it must be the default theory for open theists, as only it denies the existence of future temporal points. If the future exists, as the B-theory say sit does, then it is inconceivable that facts about the future would not exist, and, by definition, an omniscient being would know them.[14] Yet here is where the difficulties begin. When one commits oneself to tensed time, presentism is usually adopted. Presentism, as the term is used in the philosophy of time, is the view that only the present exists (the past having ceased to exist, and the future not yet existing).[15] Given our understanding of open theism, however, the adoption of presentism leads to a rather bizarre result.

Consider, for example, two rival models of God. The first God, G1, is the God of open theism proper. Let us assume that G1 is related to a universe in which presentism holds true. He observes the present in its totality, remembers the past exhaustively, and, of course, lacks omniprescience. He is, according to open theists, lacking no perfection, the greatest conceivable being. The second God, G2, is also related to a universe in which presentism holds true. G2, however, is in the peculiar situation of having a severe case of Alzheimer’s disease (we will use the term analogically, as in the case of God it would be devoid of any reference to physical degeneration). He observes the present in its totality lacks omniprescience, and forgets everything he observes. Basically, G2 stares. Yet, paradoxically, G2 is omniscient, and lacking no perfection. There is nothing that he does not know, because the same principle that vindicates him (and G1) with regard to future occurrences (their non-existence) is the same one that vindicates him with regard to past ones.

As I see it, the open theist has three possible rejoinders. The first is to accept presentism and the paradox of the divine-amnesiac. It is, after all, a paradox, not a refutation. The second is to reject presentism and to espouse a rather peculiar philosophy of time, such as that held by Michael Tooley wherein the past and present exist and the future does not.[16] This is, I think, not the best option, for reasons pertaining strictly to philosophy of time. And yet these are very deep waters. To borrow a phrase from Bas Van Fraassen, it would be “bad tactics” to link our inquiry to a commitment to some solution to these problems. Suffice it to say that the case can be made, and has been made strongly, that to embrace a dynamic view of time is to embrace presentism.[17] The third rejoinder available to the open theist is to locate the principle of the inherent unknowability of propositions concerning future free acts, not in the ontological status of those acts, but in some other criterion. Yet candidates for this criterion are not forthcoming. Under certain definitions, temporal becoming would seem to be adequate. B-theorists Robin Le Poidevin and the late Murray MacBeath state, for example, that “as new people are born, events occur, changes go on, reality, as it were, expands—more facts are added to the totality of facts. This is what is meant by ‘becoming”’[18] This definition, however, is not shared by everyone. John Earman and Richard Gale write that temporal becoming is the shifting of an event with respect to being future, present, and then past.[19] Notice that this latter definition says nothing about an “expanding totality of facts.” And upon investigation, it becomes clear that Le Poidevin and MacBeath deny the truth-value of future-tense propositions precisely because of the ontological status (according to the A-theory) of their corresponding events.[20] The adoption of their definition by the open theist would therefore solve nothing, as it would simply reduce to the same problem she faced before.

Thus, if temporal-existence confers bivalence upon propositions, then the open theist is required to hold to the existence of the past (or face an embarrassing paradox). Yet if presentism is true, then something other than temporal-existence must be found to bestow bivalence—and the “open acquittal” is unaccounted for.[21] Now, this may not be the only temporal-philosophical problem facing open theism. Particularly, claims to the partial definiteness of the future accompany many claims that the future is open; yet how God can have any anticipatory knowledge of the future, other than his current intentions to intervene, is not clear.[22] Additionally, the admission that “God’s knowledge of our makeup, motivations, etc., enables God to rule out some of the outcomes [of future free acts]”[23] would seem, once again, to be a flirt with fatalism. This treatment, however, while not exhaustive, does help to vindicate the popular consensus that what we as humans are, with regard to future occurrences, is “ignorant.” This vindicated use of the term would be equally applicable to the God of open theism.

II. God’s Book of Facts

Explanations of open theism on behalf of its proponents routinely involve certain catch phrases. In particular, the claims that God is a “risk taker,” that their view gives humans “true significance,” and that it allows for a “genuine relationship” between God and humans, purportedly define open theism. These statements have drawn criticism only to the extent that they rely on the claim that most consider to express the true sine qua non of open theism, namely, that “God does not foreknow the future free actions of humans.”[24] Statements to this end can be found in very nearly the entire catalogue of relevant literature.

Yet reflection will demonstrate that the future-facts to which God has no access cannot be merely coterminous with free human actions. God must, if open theism is to dismiss the hobgoblins of simple divine foreknowledge, be barred from facts that entail future free actions. These facts involve far more entities than just the free performers of the actions in question. To leave the abstract for a moment, let us visit a now standard reference, namely, Thomas Flint’s “Counterfactual” Cuthbert, who is deciding whether or not to buy an iguana.[25] Let us suppose that Cuthbert doesn’t know whether he even likes the taste of iguana, and has decided to try it before he purchases it (I assure you, this is necessary).

Open theists explicitly deny that God has knowledge of such propositions as

(1) Cuthbert will bite the iguana. But (1) is entailed by

(2) June 25 is 30 days before Cuthbert will bite the iguana.

Thus, if God knows (2), then he knows (1). Now, this may not be much of a paradox. The point is simply that temporal relations involving future acts of creaturely freedom are off limits. Perhaps this is no big deal, so let’s move on. Now (1) is also entailed by

(3) Detroit is 30 miles from where Cuthbert will bite the iguana. Thus, if God knows (3), then he knows (1). A paradox? Hardly, but scratch spatial relations off the list. Naturally, we could go on to consider other relations, but we won’t. Rather, we will consider (one-place) properties:

(4) The iguana’s shape reflects Cuthbert’s teeth marks.

(5) Pet store security footage shows Cuthbert biting the iguana.

Both (4) and (5) entail (1), and demonstrate that God cannot know the future properties of things when the properties entail a future free act. Thus, God could not know the destinies of, for example, most pieces of paper, or the way the next Cher album will sound (perhaps this is a perfection).

Between relations and one-place properties, there is an astounding amount of (future) data that is absent from the divine mind.[26] The open theist could, of course, bite this bullet, or she could adopt a nominalist metaphysic, holding that properties and relations do not exist, and thereby continue to espouse the “only future free acts” catch-phrase. Thus, if it is true that open theism comes replete with a philosophy of time, it would now require the adoption of something far more grandiose. The bullet’s better.

Can it get worse? Perhaps. The existence of an entity that is unmistakably the causal result of a given future free act could not be known without knowledge of the event in question (this does, of course, fall under the category of relations). The most telling example is that God could not foreknow the existence of any particular human being. This is a point that was recently raised by Bruce Ware:

Open theism’s denial of exhaustive foreknowledge precludes the possibility of God’s knowing from eternity past just what persons would actually be conceived and born, at any and every point, throughout the history of humankind. That is, exactly who, how many, and obviously, anything about them, would be completely and fully unknown to God.. .. God can no more know who will be born a year from now than you or I can.[27]

This point has special implications for Christians, as, on the open view, God could not (for this and other reasons) foreknow the identity of the redeemed.[28]

That the entities treated here (free human actions, as well as the relevant relations, properties, and human existents) do not yet exist and that their related propositions have no definite truth-values, are points that have been conceded for the sake of argument.[29] Therefore, to respond that these things do not exist and are, properly speaking, nothing to know, comes short of refutation, as my contention is precisely that the open theist’s claim has been too narrow. If future free actions are unknowable, this renders the relations, properties, and effects (particularly human existents) discussed equally unknowable. If this is the conclusion to which many open theists are drawn, then so be it. But their continued repetition of the (narrow and unqualified) claim that God has no knowledge of the future free acts of humans is less than forthcoming.[30] In light of further analysis, open theism appears to demand a more drastic paradigm shift from classical theism, as the list of entities that God cannot foreknow is not merely coterminous with future acts of creaturely freedom. This is a point that should be explicitly admitted by open theists.

A further question can be raised at this time, namely, on the open theist’s view, for a given future-fact f, does God know that he doesn’t know f? An example will help to clarify my meaning. Suppose God has determined to keep the Grammy Awards an annual event for the next twelve years (he has his reasons), and that it will maintain roughly its current format. He knows that there will be an award given for Best Spoken Word Performance in 2009. Assuming he is providently uninvolved in the Academy’s selection process, does he know the winner of the award? Clearly he does not. His corresponding mental “file” would include something to the effect of, “The2009 winner for Best Spoken Word Performance is _______.” Hence, in this case, God would not know the winner of the award, and would be aware of the fact that he does not know the winner of the award.[31]

But in the case of other future-facts, he could not be so aware. If, for example, the fact appropriately involved an entity whose existence he does not foreknow, then he would not know that he doesn’t know. Again, an example is the best way to make this point. Suppose that in the fifteenth century, God was unaware, as according to open theism he must have been, of the future existence of the twentieth-century Boston Celtic, Kevin McHale. A future-fact regarding Kevin McHale, as we now know, was that he would own a very elaborate ring beginning in 1986. In the fifteenth century, God would not have been aware of the year in which Kevin McHale would own such a ring. Furthermore, in not being able to foreknow the existence of Kevin McHale, God could not have even been aware of this lack of knowledge. Thus, there are some future-facts that God does not know that he doesn’t know.[32] It seems that in God’s book of facts, there are some blank pages, as well as some that are just plain missing.

III. Conclusion

As a position that is relatively new to evangelical theology, open theism has struggled for acceptance. As its advocates no doubt expected, it has been accused of not being evangelical and, frequently, not even Christian. Charges of intolerance have not been far behind, bolstered by the retort that open theism, in the words of C. Stephan Evans (who is not an open theist), is indeed “motivated by a desire to be faithful to the Bible.”[33] Without taking a position on whether the accusations against open theism are deserved, it must be recognized that a commitment to biblical inerrancy and a deep desire to honor God simply prove too little. Sabellius, Arius, Apollinaris, Nestorius (or at least his followers), Pelagius, and all of the paradigm heretics in Christian history have shared these same commitments. In fact, it was these commitments that made them such good heretics and ensured that their teachings would, for centuries, continue to keep people from salvation. It was the job of the Christian community to come together in order to make explicit, not what the Bible says, but what the Bible means (when, for example, it says that Christ is “begotten,” or that he became “flesh,” as Arius and Apollinaris adored the terms), and clearly to codify orthodox Christian belief.[34] It is likewise now the job of the community similarly to evaluate open theism, as, in fact, it is doing. .. complaints notwithstanding.

Notes

1. Evangelical proponents of the view have been particularly prolific in recent years. For examples, see Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity 1994); David Basinger, The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment (Downers Grove: InterVarsity 1996); John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity 1998); Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000); Clark Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001).
2. Boyd, God of the Possible, 10.
3. Notable examples of this retort have taken place both in and out of print. An excellent published example is Robert A. Pyne and Stephen R. Spencer, “A Critique of Free-Will Theism, Part One,” BSac 158 (2001): 259-86.
4. See William Hasker, “The Antinomies of Divine Providence,” Philosophia Christi 4 (2002): 375; and David Basinger, “Practical Implications,” in The Openness of God, 169–71.
5. Edward Wierenga, review of Clark Pinnock et al., The Openness of God, Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997): 252.
6. “Future-facts,” as used here, is not an attempt to beg the question. For argument’s sake, I am not assuming that these are future-tensed propositions that can be made at present and that possess a definite truth-value (“Jones will mow his lawn tomorrow”). Rather, I am referring to facts that, at the very least, will be true in the future. “Future occurrences” would suffice (just as open theists find it not problematic to refer to “future free acts”), except that this article will deal with more than just events. Further, by referring to God’s knowledge in the form of propositions, I am simply following standard procedure for contemporary philosophical examinations of omniscience. I wish to pass over any discussion of whether God can have “know-how” knowledge (e.g., “how to dunk a basketball”), whether he can know temporally-indexed propositions (e.g., “It is now 3 p.m.”) in tenseless form, whether he can know personally-indexed propositions (e.g., “I am Emmitt Smith”) in non-indexed form, whether he can know spatially-indexed propositions (e.g., “Here is North Dakota”) in non-indexed form, or whether his knowledge is simple and non-propositional (as in Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q. 14, aa. 5–7). Neither does my argument depend on such distinctions.
7. Richard Rice, “Divine Foreknowledge and Free-Will Theism,” in The Grace of God and the Will of Man (ed. Clark H. Pinnock; Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1995), 129, 134. Rice says specifically, “All that God does not know is the content of future free decisions” (p. 134). Greg Boyd writes, “[Open theism] only maintains that God doesn’t eternally foreknow the free decisions people will make in the future” (Gregory A. Boyd and Edward K. Boyd, Letters From a Skeptic [Colorado Springs: Victor, 1994], 33). See also Boyd, God of the Possible, 16–17, 120, and Sanders, The God Who Risks, 198.
8. Aristotle, On Interpretation, IX.
9. Sanders, The God Who Risks, 198.
10. Boyd, God of the Possible, 124; italics his.
11. John Sanders, “Be Wary of Ware: A Reply to Bruce Ware,” JETS45 (2002): 224.
12. One likewise adopts a position regarding God s relationship to time, as God must be temporal on the open view, given his sequential cognitive states.
13. Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956; repr., New York: Dover Publications, 1999), 11; italics his.
14. Though, whether or not the nonexistence of the future implies that there are no facts about the future (that future-tense propositions are not bivalent) could remain an open question.
15. This use of the term must be distinguished from its recent use in the divine foreknowledge debate, where it refers to the view that God knows past and present facts, but not future ones.
16. Michael Tooley Time, Tense, and Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). Tooley admits that his view is “quite unusual” (p. 31). The uniqueness of his view is not merely attributable to the coexistence of the past and present, as others have held this. John R. Lucas, an open theist and philosopher of time, holds a comparable position (The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality and Truth [Oxford: Blackwell, 1989], 3–4).
17. William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God’ s Relationship to Time (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2001), 148–54. A. N. Prior confessed that, “on my view [the present and the real/existent] are one and the same concept, and the present simply is the real considered in relation to two particular species of unreality namely the past and the future” (“The Notion of the Present,” Studium Generale 23 [1970]: 245; italics his). After all of his rhetorical carrying-on, this is Augustine’s conclusion as well (Confessions, 11.26). Presentists, myself included, are convinced that there is a certain “presence” inherent to the concept of existence, and that this is not merely a case of our being misled by language. At least some critics of presentism are willing to concede this latter point (e.g, D. H. Mellor, Real Time II [New York: Routledge, 1998], 20).
18. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, introduction to The Philosophy of Time (ed. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4.
19. John Earman and Richard M. Gale, “Time,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (ed. Robert Audi; 2d ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 920. The wording of this definition is a bit imprecise if presentism is adopted.
20. Le Poidevin and MacBeath, T he Philosophy of Time, 4.
21. There is a more general critique at work here, of course. That is, the underlying argument is not directed exclusively towards open theists, but more generally towards those who deny the bivalence of future-tense propositions based on the non-existence of the future (some of whom aren’t theists at all). I see no reason to demand that temporal-existence is, after all, required for one to hold to the bivalence of future-tense propositions. It is a defensible position to claim that future-tense propositions are bestowed bivalence by some state of affairs that will exist. (And even if this weren’t a defensible position, the theological determinist, for her part, does have a presently-existing referent for all future-tense propositions, namely, God’s eternal decree that the given event will take place. At least for the determinist, the crisis is averted. .. and without the metaphysical baggage of the B-theory).
22. And intention to intervene is all that he could have (on the open view), for if he foreknows his intervention, then his intervention could not be free (as some open theists have admitted, e.g., Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995], 177). Thus, the cross event could not be both foreknown and freely chosen. Surely open theists would show the same zeal for God’s freedom as they have for that of his creatures.
23. Sanders, ‘Be Wary of Ware, 225.
24. See n. 6 above for a few examples.
25. Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 39. Hasker recently revisited Cuthbert while discussing open theism (“The Antinomies of Divine Providence,” 369).
26. Some of these relations and properties would belong to God himself.
27. Bruce A. Ware, “Defining Evangelicalism’s Boundaries Theologically: Is Open Theism Evangelical?” JETS 45 (2002): 196-97.
28. Ware, likewise, draws this conclusion (ibid., 204).
29. But not, of course, in section I.
30. This unqualified claim is, to be sure, almost exclusively heard within the community of theologians, while many philosophers have been more forthcoming. William Hasker has called to my attention Michael Robinson’s critique of open theism in which he details other categories of God’s foreknowledge that must be denied by open theists. See Michael Robinson, “Why Divine Foreknowledge?” RelS 36 (2000): 251-75. David Basinger has gone beyond the more narrow mantra, admitting that God would have no “infallible knowledge of any future state of affairs that includes free human decision-making as a causal component” (The Case for Freewill Theism, 40).
31. It is indeed arguable that, in addition to not knowing a proposition p which states a future-fact (e.g., “The 2009 winner for Best Spoken Word Performance is James Earl Jones”), he would neither know why he doesn’t know p, if the explanation of p is the future free act in question (e.g., James Earl Jones’s winning the award). If this argument is more than a mere semantic threat, it is particularly so to open theists, who frequently wield the grounding objection against Molinism, demanding to see the “truth-makers” behind counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. If a truth-maker is identified as the temporal state of affairs which bestows a truth-value to a proposition (e.g., James Earl Jones’s winning the award results in the truth of the proposition, “The 2009 winner for Best Spoken Word Performance is James Earl Jones,” the former being precisely why the latter is true), then God would not know why he doesn’t know p. Whether or not this argument involves a sleight of hand is a matter for an article, not for a footnote.
32. Regarding many future-facts, God would, from eternity, not know that he doesn’t know them (e.g., “The 2009 winner for Best Spoken Word Performance is ,” prior to the existence of the free acts which created the Grammy Awards), and in time learn that he doesn’t know them.
33. Back cover of God of the Possible by Boyd. To be fair, Evans does not make the case that their adherence to biblical inerrancy demonstrates their orthodoxy.
34. For these insights I am indebted to the brilliant patristics scholar, D. Jeffrey Bingham.