Calvin’s Forgotten Classical Position On The Extent Of The Atonement: About Sufficiency, Efficiency, And Anachronism

By P. L. Rouwendal

[Pieter L. Rouwendal is a theological editor with De Groot Goudriaan Publishers, Kampen, The Netherlands. He is also currently writing a Ph.D. dissertation on “Predestination and Preaching in Genevan Theology from John Calvin to Jean Alphonse Turretin.”]

I. The Question

Did Calvin teach particular, universal, or hypothetical universal atonement? This question has attracted a lot of attention during the last decennia, especially since the 1979 publication of R. T. Kendall’s Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649. Kendall argued that Calvin taught universal atonement.[1] His opinion was challenged by Paul Helm and Roger Nicole, who tried to prove that Calvin did not teach (hypothetical) universalism, and to make plausible that he taught particular redemption.[2] Kendall was supported by Curt Daniel and Allan C. Clifford.[3] And even more authors participated in the discussion. Obviously, Kendall had addressed a sensitive subject.[4]

I found the results of the research of both parties unsatisfactory. First, the conclusions of both are diametrically opposed to each other; they cannot both be right. Second, both parties offer arguments and quotes from Calvin to prove their position without fully addressing the interpretation of the opposing party.

Third, some of the authors prove themselves to be greatly involved in the subject. They ascribe to Calvin the view they have themselves, or they accommodate their own opinion to what they believe Calvin’s view to have been.[5] Hence, it seems that for some authors their own opinion was of equal or more weight than Calvin’s writings. Some appear to have sought proof texts in Calvin that supported their own view on the atonement. They just looked for arguments and quotations that supported their opinion that Calvin basically subscribed to the same view as they themselves, but then they failed to take into account the arguments and quotations of the other party and hence failed either to refute those arguments or to give them a coherent place in their own view.

This existential involvement raises the question whether people who presuppose that their view either agrees or must agree with Calvin’s (for whatever reason), can distance themselves sufficiently from the subject of their research. This question becomes even more urgent when considering the apologetic strain of some writings. It seems that some authors were not only eager to defend the argument that Calvin held to either particular or universal atonement, but moreover that one or the other is the biblical position.[6] A fourth and last, but by no means least, objection is that almost all authors interpret the sixteenth-century Calvin in seventeenth-century terms, some in terms of TULIP-Calvinism and others in terms of Amyraldianism.

Two scholars who published in the late 1990s did a better job on most points. H. Boersma and G. M. Thomas looked at the paradoxical or contradictory passages on the atonement in Calvin’s works.[7] Both concluded that Calvin did not fit in the camp of either particular or universal redemption. Hence, Boersma concluded that it is not possible to speak of a consistent view on the extent of the atonement in Calvin. Thomas spoke of a “tension” in Calvin’s theology.

But even Boersma and Thomas neglected an important question, namely, “Is it realistic to put Calvin in one of the three camps regarding the atonement as we have come to know them?” In this article, I will argue that Calvin has to be placed in a fourth camp. The first argument for this position is drawn from the developmental history of the doctrine regarding the extent of the atonement. The second is drawn from the historical acknowledgement of four positions regarding this doctrine. The third argument is that Calvin’s view on the atonement does indeed have internal consistency when his seemingly contradictory propositions are understood in the framework of this fourth position.

II. The Development of the Doctrine of the Atonement

The question of how the doctrine of the atonement has developed regarding its extent has been treated by others already. Hence, I will include only as much information as is necessary to place Calvin and his interpreters within the context of this development.[8]

During the era of the Early Church, hardly any thought was given to the extent of the atonement, although Origen’s opinion of universal redemption was condemned. Since Prosper of Aquitaine (d. ca. 460), it was commonly believed that Christ died for the whole world in regard to the value of his sacrifice, but that he died for the elect only in regard to the fruit of his death.[9] This became the common formula in the Middle Ages.[10] It was used by Peter Lombard (ca. 1100–1160) who formulated the distinction between sufficientia and efficientia in his Sententiae.[11] Since Lombard’s four books of sentences became mandatory reading at the theological faculties, this formula became known to all later medieval theologians.[12] It was also accepted by most theologians of the Reformation during the sixteenth century.[13]

After the Reformation, Beza was the first to criticize this formula. During his conflict with Jacob Andreae, the latter maintained that Christ had “satisfied sufficiently for the sins of all individuals.” Beza remarked that this, if rightly understood, was true, but it was said “very roughly and ambiguously, as well as barbarously.” Beza’s criticism of barbarous language was not against words such as “sufficient” and “efficient,”[14] but against the ambiguous use of the word “for” ( pro). The humanistically educated Beza was skilled in Latin and understood that the preposition pro declared a plan and effect. Hence, the statement “Christ died for ...” can only be completed by “the elect” or some equivalent. Calvin himself was dissatisfied with the formula sufficient-efficient, as will be shown in a separate paragraph, but he was not as critical as Beza. Calvin nowhere criticized the content of the formula, but thought it did not answer all questions regarding the atonement. Beza, however, criticized the formula itself as “ambiguous and barbarous.” Beza did not deny the all-sufficiency of Christ’s merit, but he denied that it was the intention of Christ to die for all men.[15]

Beza’s criticism was a new element in the development of the doctrine. Before long, his criticism was accepted by others. For example, Bucanus (professor at Lausanne from 1591 until 1603) wrote that Christ’s death “could have been” (instead of “was”) a ransom for the sins of all people. Piscator went even further and called the classic formula of the distinction “contradictory.” Others, like Ames and Abbot, were also critical.[16] The trend of restricting the atonement to the elect in every respect began with Beza. It is of great importance to acknowledge that this trend did not begin until 1588, twenty-four years after Calvin had died.

During the Arminian controversy another trend developed in the opposite direction. In the second of their five articles, the Remonstrants wrote that Christ, the Savior of the world, had died for each and every man; that is, by his death on the cross he obtained reconciliation and forgiveness of sins for all men, although no one but the believer actually enjoys the forgiveness of sins. The sufficiency of the atonement became in their opinion an actual remission of sins for all. Its efficiency was made to be contingent upon the faith of man.[17]

Between approximately 1588 and 1618 both the doctrine of particular atonement (Beza) and universal atonement (Arminius) developed out of the classic formula regarding the atonement. Nevertheless, among the Reformed there were also theologians who maintained that Christ had in some sense died for all men. Among them was Matinius Martini, who defended the doctrine of universal atonement at the synod of Dordt in 1618 and 1619, while adhering to the Reformed doctrine of irresistible grace. The best known Reformed position concerning a universal atonement was the position of the school of Saumur, known as “Amyraldianism” or “hypothetical universalism.” The Amyraldian theory can be summarized as follows: Christ did merit grace for all and has promised grace to all upon condition of faith. God even intended the death of Christ to be an atonement for all men upon condition of faith. Seeing, however, that mankind was so corrupt that no one would actually believe, he elected some to be the recipients of faith.[18]

The common, external call to all men is founded on this hypothetical universalism. All men (universalism) should be saved, if they would only believe (the hypothesis). The development of hypothetical universalism was almost contemporaneous with that of the doctrine of universal atonement, but was unfolded more clearly only later in history.

From this short survey it is clear that the development of particular, universal, and hypothetical universal atonement began after Calvin’s death. Hence, if we insist on ascribing one of these three positions to him, we will be guilty of an anachronism. Unfortunately, this is exactly what has been done in interpreting Calvin’s propositions regarding the atonement.

III. Four Historical Positions

From the historical survey above, one could conclude that around 1620 the classical formula was replaced by the three positions that evolved out of it. But this is not true. Beside those who adhered to the three newer positions, there were theologians who subscribed to the classical formula. Voetius, in his disputation on the merit of Christ, recognized four positions: a heterodox position of universal atonement; and three orthodox positions, namely, particular atonement, hypothetical universal atonement, and the position that Christ’s death was effectual for the elect alone, but sufficient even for the reprobate. Voetius named Calvin as one of the theologians of this fourth position.[19] The reason why earlier research has failed to recognize this fourth position regarding the extent of the atonement is probably that presently only the other three remain. It is plausible that the Saumur theologians annexed the classical formula of the aforementioned distinction, and hence all who held the classical position. Those, however, who rejected hypothetical universalism stopped using this formula. Whatever the reason might have been, it is certain that in the second half of the eighteenth century the classical position was not recognized any longer. This is clear from De Moor, who in his Commentarius Perpetuus made the classical formula synonymous with the theology of Saumur.[20] It is likely that the disappearance of the classical position between ca. 1650 and 1750 is the reason why scholars of the twentieth century have failed to recognize it as an individual position and have tried to interpret it in terms of later theology. But Voetius’s remarks about four positions point out that it is historically incorrect to acknowledge just three historical positions.

A very recent example of failing to recognize the classical position as being distinct is Jonathan D. Moore’s work on Preston.[21] Moore argues that hypothetical universalism and Amyraldianism are not equivalents, Amyraldianism being a particular form of hypothetical universalism. All Amyraldians are hypothetical universalists, but not all hypothetical universalists are Amyraldians. According to Moore, all Reformed theologians who did not adhere to particular atonement were hypothetical universalists. Among them were men like Ussher, Preston, and Davenant. Moore’s research is interesting, but I question his conclusion. He fails to distinguish between the classical position and hypothetical universalism.

A mitigating circumstance is that it is indeed problematic to determine when the doctrine of hypothetical universalism began to develop. We can point to 1588 as the exact year when the doctrine of particular atonement started developing, but we do not know the year when hypothetical universalism was conceived. It seems to have developed far more gradually than the doctrine of particular atonement. However, that is exactly why I cannot concur with Moore’s conclusion that Preston “softened” Reformed theology by arguing that Christ in some way died for all men. This conclusion presupposes that Beza and Perkins with their doctrine of particular atonement were representative of original Reformed theology. If Moore had taken into account the development of the doctrine of the atonement, he would have seen that Preston’s opinion was not so much a softening of Reformed theology, but a different branch of the Reformed tree; or, as Voetius would call it, one of the three orthodox views on the atonement.

If we were to place Preston in the chart below, he would fit in the classical category rather than in that of hypothetical universalism.[22] Moore correctly distinguishes between Preston and Amyraldianism, since Preston did not teach the typical Amyraldian distinction in God’s decree, but he fails to make a distinction between Preston’s view and the classical view. In fact, Moore fails to acknowledge the classical view.

We will proceed to investigate whether more is to be learned regarding Calvin’s use of the classical distinction, and hence of his place in the development of the doctrine. We will then try to verify Voetius’s thesis that Calvin held the fourth position by seeing whether the arguments in favor of Calvin subscribing to either a particularistic or a universalistic view both fit in this construction.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, I will give a short description of the four historical positions.[23]

1. The classical position: Christ died sufficiently for all men, but efficiently only for the elect. Faith is a fruit of election.
2. The particular position: Christ died for the elect only. His death could have been sufficient for the whole world, but it was not his intention to die for the whole world. Faith is a fruit of election. (Note the difference with the classic position: Did Christ die in any sense for all men or not? Classic: yes; Particular: no.)
3. The universal position: Christ died for all men, but only believers enjoy the effects of his death. Election follows faith. (Note the difference with the classic position: Does predestination have anything to do with Christ’s death as such, or not? Classic: yes; Universal: no.)
4. The hypothetical universal position. Christ died for the whole world with the intention to save all men. The grace for all men merited is offered to all upon condition of faith. Faith is a fruit of election. (Note the difference with the classic position: Does predestination have anything to do with Christ’s death as such, or not? Classic: yes; Hypothetical universal: no. Note also the difference with the universal position: Is faith the reason for or the fruit of predestination? Universal: reason; Hypothetical universal: fruit.)

To see the differences and similarities more clearly, it might be helpful to put them into a chart, which will enable us to compare even more subjects:

	Classic	Particular	Universal	Hyp. Universal
Is the value of Christ’s death enough to save all men, if God so willed it?	yes	yes	yes	yes
Did Christ die sufficiently for all men?	yes	no	yes	yes
Did Christ die efficiently for the elect alone?	yes	yes	yes	yes
For whom did Christ die?	(not answered, since not questioned)[24]	the elect	all men	all men
Is election predicated upon faith, or is the reverse true?	faith due to election	faith due to election	election due to faith	faith due to election
How many kinds of election are there?	one: election unto faith	one: election unto faith	one: election of the believer	two: an election of the believer and an election unto faith

 IV. Calvin’s Use of the Classic Distinction

Although Calvin had no active role in the development of the doctrine of the atonement, we can say something more about the way he dealt with the classical formula. He mentioned it explicitly three times. The first time is in his commentary on 1 John, published in 1551. He comments at 1 John 2:2:25

Here a question may be raised: how have the sins of the whole world been expiated? I pass by the dotages of the fanatics, who under this pretence extend salvation to all the reprobate, and therefore to Satan himself. Such a monstrous thing deserves no refutation. They who seek to avoid this absurdity, have said that Christ suffered sufficiently for the whole world, but efficiently only for the elect. This solution has commonly prevailed in the schools. Though then I allow that what has been said is true, yet I deny that it is suitable to this passage; for the design of John was no other than to make this benefit common to the whole Church. Then under the word all or whole, he does not include the reprobate, but designates those who should believe as well as those who were then scattered through various parts of the world.[26]

He refers to it for the second time in his tract on eternal predestination, published in 1552. Calvin writes:

Some make a distinction here, holding that the Gospel is saving to all regarding its power, but not in effect. But this way they untie the knot by no means. We are still rolled back to the same point, whether the same power to believe is conferred upon all men.[27]

From these two quotations it is clear that Calvin knew the classic formula, and even that it was universally accepted. He himself acknowledged the truth of it, but thought it was not applicable to the matter he dealt with.

The third reference seems to be more problematic. In the same tract Calvin writes:

He [Georgius] imagines himself to argue very cleverly when he says: “Christ is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world. Therefore, those who would exclude the reprobate from a participation in Christ, must of necessity place them somewhere out of the world.” The common solution, that Christ suffered sufficiently for all men, but effectually for the elect, would be of no avail to this question. This great absurdity, by which he has procured for himself so much applause amongst his fraternity, has no weight whatever with me.[28]

At first glance it seems that Calvin here rejected the classical formula as a great absurdity. But a more accurate reading of the quotation in its context proves otherwise.[29] Again, Calvin did not reject the distinction, but thought it not applicable to the matter he was dealing with.

It may seem that researching Calvin’s use of the classical distinction on the atonement will bear very little fruit. Nevertheless, we can conclude at least two things: First, he acknowledged the truth of its content. Second, it is remarkable that in all three instances Calvin’s dissatisfaction is obvious. In three instances the distinction was evident to him, but it was of no avail. With this in mind, it seems that by rejecting the content of the distinction, Beza did not take a very great step.

V. A Consistent Calvin

Calvin’s position in this development, as well as Voetius’s acknowledgment of four positions rather than three, and his reference to Calvin as a theologian of the classical position, are reasons enough to re-read Calvin’s propositions on the extent of the atonement in the context of this classical position. Unlike Boersma and Thomas, it is my opinion that Calvin’s doctrine of the atonement, when examined in Calvin’s own theological context, is actually consistent. Those questions asked at a later stage of Reformed history were not asked by Calvin. Despite his sometimes almost palpable discomfort with the classical formula, he accepted the truth of it. Hence, regarding the extent of the atonement, Calvin’s doctrine has two components:

a. Christ has died sufficiently for all men (the universal component); 

b. Christ has died efficiently for the elect alone (the particular component).

Since these two elements were universally accepted in Calvin’s day, we need not expect that Calvin thoroughly treated them or used very exact formulas to avoid misunderstanding. All who had some theological knowledge in his day knew that Calvin referred to the sufficiency of Christ’s death when he said that Christ died for all men, and that he pointed to the efficiency of his death when he restricted the death of Christ to the elect only. The classical formula was neither a point of difference between Catholics, Lutherans, and the Reformed in Calvin’s day, nor a disputed subject among the Reformed. Attention was given to other subjects. The extent of the atonement first became a point of difference approximately a quarter century after Calvin’s death.

When we realize that Calvin’s doctrine (and that of his contemporaries) on the extent of the atonement has the two aforementioned components, and when we do not interpret one of those elements as being a sign of adhering to particular, universal, or hypothetical universal atonement, we see that for Calvin himself there was no inconsistency or tension regarding this doctrine. As soon as one interprets Calvin in terms of later terminology, tensions, inconsistencies, and contradictions seem to abound in his works; however, this should not be attributed to Calvin, but rather to the reader who is reading him anachronistically.

If Calvin’s propositions regarding the extent of the atonement are read in the context of the classical formula, the problems of earlier research will not surface. For the modern scholar the seemingly contradictory propositions prove to be rooted in a theological position that was regarded as unsatisfying by many later theologians—a position which, however, was accepted for centuries, even subsequent to Calvin’s death.

VI. Verifying the Hypothesis

To make the theory that Calvin taught neither particular nor universal atonement more than just an interesting theory, we need to take into account both the arguments and quotations which seem to support it, and also those which seem to oppose it. I found earlier research especially unconvincing in light of the fact that it usually only did the former and ignored the latter part of verification.

As a result, earlier research failed to account for the passages in Calvin that the opposing party put forward as proof of his particularistic or universalistic view of the extent of the atonement and to offer a credible description of Calvin’s view wherein seemingly inconsistent and contradictory language can actually cohere. To avoid earlier failures, I will investigate whether the arguments for either particularism or universalism can be given a coherent place in my own hypothesis of Calvin’s vision. In subsequent sections, I will review the quotations and arguments of earlier research placing Calvin in one camp or the other. If a consistent and coherent place can be given to them in my hypothesis, I will suppose that it is verified.

It is not necessary to interact with all who have addressed the subject of Calvin and the atonement. Rather, I will focus on some of the most important contributions of the last decennia, namely, Kendall, Clifford, Helm, and Nicole.

Naming Kendall among the most important contributors is not due to the great quantity or quality of his research on Calvin and the atonement. In fact, the quantity of his contribution is very limited (some five pages), and his arguments and proofs are insignificant and not all that convincing. But his contribution has stimulated increased research on this subject (which, in turn, in great part was also not all that convincing). Therefore there is still a need to review the weight of his arguments and proofs, and to see if they can be refuted or given a consistent place in my hypothesis.

VII. Arguments for Universal Atonement

1. Useless Death

Kendall’s first argument addresses Calvin’s conviction that, until faith is given, all that Christ has done for the salvation of the human race remains useless for us. According to Kendall, this sentence assumes that the question of the scope of the atonement is beyond controversy.[30] But this does not mean that Calvin taught universal atonement as opposed to particular atonement. The sentence does fit very well in the classical position. Indeed, this sentence could even be used by some post-Calvinian particularists.

2. All Means All

A second argument is that Calvin never explains the word “all” in the Bible as if it does not mean “all,” or that “world” does not mean “world.”[31] This argument is not true, since Calvin, for example, stated in his commentaries on 1 Tim 2:4 and Titus 2:11 that “all men” means “all sorts of man” and not “all individuals.”

Moreover, earlier we quoted Calvin’s commentary on 1 John 2:2, “And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world.” Even on this “universal” text Calvin remarked that John added these words “for the sake of amplifying, in order that the faithful might be assured that the expiation made by Christ, extends to all who by faith embrace the gospel “ and that

the design of John was no other than to make this benefit common to the whole Church. Then under the word all or whole, he does not include the reprobate, but designates those who should believe as well as those who were then scattered through various parts of the world. For then is really made evident, as it is meet, the grace of Christ, when it is declared to be the only true salvation of the world.[32]

It was also in connection with this text that Calvin showed his dissatisfaction with the classic distinction. The solution that John in these words meant that Christ died sufficiently for the world was not suitable for this passage, for, according to Calvin, John did not mean that Christ was a propitiation for the sins of the whole world, but for the sins of the believers who were then scattered through various parts of the world. Commenting on this universal-looking verse in 1 John, Calvin opposed universalism and showed even dissatisfaction with the classical distinction.[33] This clearly refutes Kendall’s argument.

3. Many Means All

Kendall’s third argument is that Calvin sometimes takes the word “many” in the Bible for “all.”[34] Though this argument is true, it does not convincingly argue in favor of universal atonement. For, as we have seen above, Calvin occasionally rejects universalism when the Bible tells us that Jesus is a propitiation for the sins of the whole world. But both things fit harmoniously in Calvin’s classical position.

4. Christ Died for All Men

A fourth argument of Kendall is that Calvin sometimes explicitly stated that Christ has died for the sins of all people, or for the whole world.[35] In support of this argument, Allan Clifford in his Calvinus: Authentic Calvinism, A Clarification offers a great number of examples.[36] Again, if those examples really point out that Calvin adhered to universal atonement, we would not find passages wherein Calvin rejected universalism.

But on the other hand, if Calvin taught particular atonement, he would not have used the language Clifford has gathered in great number. Thus, the universal propositions in Calvin’s works do prove negatively that he did not subscribe to particular atonement, but they do not prove positively that he subscribed to universal atonement. These propositions can be used to falsify the conclusion that Calvin was a particularist, but are not sufficient to prove him a universalist. Again, these propositions fit perfectly in Calvin’s classical position.

5. Distinction Between Christ’s Death and Intercession

A fifth argument is that according to Calvin, Christ died for all men, but prays only for the elect.[37] This argument is not true. Thomas determined that examples of Calvin designating the intercessory work of Christ as being both particular and universal can be found, albeit that “as the focus moves from the cross to the resurrection … the particularistic elements become accordingly more prominent.”[38]

6. Assurance of Faith

A sixth argument for universalism in Calvin is that universalism was necessary for him in order to maintain that all people could be called to faith, and that assurance is a necessary element of faith. Hence, all people should have ground to believe that Christ died for them.[39] This argument consists in three parts. The first is that Calvin taught that assurance is always connected with faith. The second is that Calvin taught that Christ died for all men. The third element is the connection between the two former, that is to say, that Calvin based the first element on the second.

As to the first element, Helm and Beeke have shown that there are some nuances in Calvin’s thought on faith and assurance,[40] but it is clear that according to Calvin everyone can indeed be called to believe, and that all believers can be assured. It is also clear that Calvin taught that Christ died sufficiently for all men (the second element). But concerning the third element, I cannot find any place in Calvin wherein he explicitly states that assurance is based on Christ’s sufficient death, although it is clear that the common call of the gospel is connected with or based upon his death.[41]

Moreover, Kendall’s argument is weak here. He thinks that the assurance of faith is based on the death of Christ for all, whereas in Calvin’s theology the fact that Christ had died for all is by no means an assurance that all will be saved. Since the assurance of faith is assurance regarding eternal salvation, it is quite strange to base it on something that does not yield that assurance.[42]

Nevertheless, there is a difficulty here. For how should we understand in a consistent way that (a) faith is knowledge of God’s saving grace towards us; (b) God is not gracious in a saving manner toward the reprobate; (c) everyone is called to faith, that is, to acknowledge God’s saving grace toward him? I could not find an answer in Calvin’s works; he did not deal with this question. It was obviously no problem for him. However, Calvin’s definition of faith seems to point to a tension in his theology rather than to a doctrine of universal atonement.

7. Decrees of the Council of Trent

A seventh argument is that Calvin, when refuting the Decrees of the Council of Trent, passed over the decree that affirmed that Christ died for all men.[43]

Again, this matter makes indeed clear that Calvin did not teach particular atonement, but it surely does not make clear that he taught universal atonement. For the theologians of Trent, as well as Calvin, taught the classical, commonly acknowledged view on the extent of the atonement. There was no difference concerning this question between Catholics and the Reformed.

8. Distinction in God’s Will

Clifford adds some arguments to those of Kendall. One of them is that, although Calvin viewed God’s will as one, he distinguished between the revealed and the secret will. As it relates to redemption, God’s revealed will is universal and conditional, and hence the death of Christ is presented by Calvin as universal according to God’s revealed intention or decree, although it is limited in efficacy according to God’s secret decree.[44] This argument has some appearance of truth, but is not valid. Clifford acknowledges that according to Calvin there is just one will in God, but he does not take account of that fact in his argument. Calvin used the conditionality of gospel-preaching to show that the universal call or promise of the gospel and God’s secret decree are not contradictory. The universal call or promise is conditional: Everybody is invited (universal) to faith and repentance (condition), and all those who believe and repent will be saved (promise). In this conditional sense one could say, according to Calvin, that God indeed wills the salvation of all men. But since God himself fulfils the condition in his elect, there is no contradiction between his revealed and his secret will. Now, Clifford suggests that Calvin spoke about two different wills or even decrees in God. But Calvin did not say that it is God’s will to save all men without adding any declaration or condition.

VIII. Arguments for Particular Atonement

1. Reply to Heshusius

According to Roger Nicole and Paul Helm, Calvin states explicitly in his reply to Tilemann Heshusius that Christ had not died for unbelievers.[45]

In the dispute between Calvin and Heshusius concerning the Lord’s Supper, Heshusius defended the corporeal presence of Christ. One of Calvin’s contra-arguments was:

I would like to know how the ungodly can eat from Christ’s flesh that was not crucified for them, and how they can drink from the blood that was not shed to reconcile their sins.[46]

These words seem to be a powerful argument to ascribe the doctrine of particular atonement to Calvin, and so they were used by those who argued for this position. But is this really such a powerful argument? We need to observe something before arriving at such a conclusion.

First, these words are a single, isolated remark in a tract that deals with quite another subject. Hence, they cannot be viewed as a thoughtful rejection of universal redemption. Second, it is neither fair nor realistic to use this single sentence in order to ignore the many sentences wherein Calvin stated that Christ died for the whole world. Third, it should be noted that even though Calvin states here that Christ did not die for (some) ungodly, no clear doctrine of particular redemption is offered here. Fourth, one should take notice of Calvin’s word choice, as well as the context wherein he uses them. The words Calvin chooses do not deny that Christ died for all men, but rather that he died for the ungodly. The context does not deal with justification (for Calvin surely maintained that it was for the justification of the ungodly that Christ died, and, hence, that Christ died for the ungodly), but rather with the Lord’s Supper. Calvin’s intention was to make clear that Christ is not corporally present. In the immediate context of the quoted sentence, he uses the argument that if Christ were present corporally, the ungodly would eat his flesh and drink his blood, which Calvin deemed impossible. Hence, it is not implausible to interpret the quoted words as follows: “I would like to know how the ungodly can eat from Christ’s flesh, and how they can drink the blood of which they have no part through faith.”[47] Another (maybe even more plausible) interpretation would be that since the context is about eating and drinking the flesh and blood of Christ by faith, Calvin here had in mind the efficiency of Christ’s death, so that the quotation can be read as follows: “I would like to know how the ungodly can eat from Christ’s flesh that was not crucified for them effectively, and how they can drink from the blood that was not effectively shed to reconcile their sins.”

2. Actual Remission

A second argument is that Christ’s death procured actual remission of sin for the elect only.[48] Although this is true, thus being a convincing argument not to interpret Calvin as a universalist, it is also no more convincing to prove him to be a particularist as using his previously quoted reply to Heshussius in response to the many “all men” passages. But it again fits harmoniously in Calvin’s classical position.

3. Salvation for the Elect Alone

Another argument offered by Helm is that according to Calvin only the elect have their sins remitted.[49] This again is true, but it does not convince us of Calvin’s particularism. For even Amyraldians and Arminians will affirm this tenet.

4. Christ’s Intention

Helm argues that it was actually Christ’s intention to die for the elect.[50] Most of his arguments for this view are not convincing. He argues, for example, that Calvin taught election, that the elect are given to Christ and engrafted into Christ, that Christ has his peculiar people, and so forth, but all these things do not prove positively that it was Christ’s intention to die only for the elect. Helm fails to prove this; he just concludes it by reasoning from other passages in Calvin. And although other parts in Calvin’s theology seem to point to particular redemption, Calvin himself did not teach this doctrine. In the end, Helm can say nothing more than that Calvin “could be said to be committed to definite atonement, even though he does not commit himself to definite atonement.” This is, to say the least, a weak conclusion. Although Helm proves that Calvin did not teach universal atonement, he certainly does not prove that he taught definite atonement. And although Helm makes plausible that the development of the doctrine of definite atonement was in line with most parts of Calvin’s theology, he fails to make plausible that Calvin really was committed to this doctrine.

Just one quotation seems to say, or at least imply, that Christ died only for the elect. It is a passage wherein Calvin stated that “Christ was so ordained to be the Savior of the whole world, as that He might save those that were given unto Him by the Father out of the whole world.”[51] But again, this is not enough to set aside the universal passages, and it fits perfectly in the classical position.

5. All Means Many

Nicole adds some arguments to those of Helm. One of them is that Calvin interpreted the word “all” as “many” in his exegesis of some texts of Scripture.[52] Kendall had argued just the reverse. It is indeed a strange fact that Calvin sometimes interpreted “many” as “all,” and sometimes he interpreted “all” as “many.” Although my hypothesis offers no explanation for this curiosity, both of Calvin’s interpretations do not contradict it. However, each of them contradicts the conclusion of either Nicole or Kendall.

6. Exegesis and Structure of Theology

Some other arguments, although different, can be answered together. Nicole points to the fact that Calvin explains some texts commonly used to prove that God has a universal saving will in a way that is consistent with predestination. He also remarks that the structure of Calvin’s theology regarding God’s electing purpose makes it implausible that he taught (hypothetical) universal atonement. Moreover, Nicole argues, Calvin’s Trinitarian theology does not allow a different purpose and will regarding the salvation of men. Finally, he wrote that according to Calvin, faith and repentance are fruits of Christ’s work, merited for the elect.[53]

Again, all these arguments are true and make it indeed implausible to think that Calvin taught universal atonement. But none of them does positively prove that he taught particular atonement.[54]

7. Substitutionary Punishment

A better argument offered by Nicole is that Calvin taught that Christ was punished as a substitute. If he was so for all men, all men would be saved. Since Calvin denies this conclusion, he should also have denied this proposition.[55]

Although better than other of Nicole’s arguments, it is still not convincing. For even Arminians and Amyraldians did not conclude that all men will be saved. Besides, it does not point to a definite doctrine of particular redemption. It does, however, fit well in the classic scheme. Being punished as a substitute can be synonymous to the efficientia of Christ’s death.

IX. Concluding Reflections

1. Review

After reviewing the arguments that have been advanced to make Calvin either a universalist or a particularist, it is obvious that no single argument is convincing. Each of the parties had too many arguments that refuted the conclusion of the other party. But none of the parties had such counter-arguments that refuted the arguments of the other party. Hence, we can draw two conclusions: (1) Calvin did not teach universal atonement; (2) Calvin did not teach limited atonement.

Fortunately, we do not have to stop at concluding what Calvin did not teach. I think it has been made clear what Calvin’s position on the extent of the atonement actually was. It was the classical position of Christ having died sufficiently for the whole world, and efficiently for the elect. There are several arguments that support this conclusion.

The first argument is taken from the history of doctrine. From the Middle Ages to at least 1588, this was the position held by almost all theologians (Gottschalk and John Duns Scotus being two of the very rare exceptions). In Calvin’s day, this position was not discussed or questioned. The Reformed, Lutherans, and Catholics recognized the truth of it.

The second argument is that Calvin sometimes referred to this classical distinction between sufficientia and efficientia, and affirmed the truth of it himself.

Although he was convinced that the distinction was no final answer to some questions regarding the extent of the atonement, he neither criticized nor questioned its content.

A third argument is that in the seventeenth century Voetius still recognized four positions regarding the extent of the atonement. Not only universal atonement, hypothetical universal atonement, and particular atonement were recognized categories, but also the position of those who say that Christ died sufficiently for the whole world, but efficiently for the elect. According to Voetius, Calvin was one of the theologians who held this position.

A fourth and powerful argument is that the apparent paradoxical and contradictory statements in Calvin regarding the atonement are proven to dovetail with the classical position. Contradictions and paradoxes only appear when Calvin is read with post-Calvinian paradigms in mind.

With the fourth argument, the progress made in understanding Calvin has been made evident. Reading Calvin’s statements on the extent of the atonement with his own classical paradigm in mind makes Calvin more understandable for the modern reader. The modern scholar should be able to put his own categories regarding the atonement aside. That will preserve him from trying to put Calvin in one of the camps that evolved only after his death.

2. A Broader Scope

Not only can we understand Calvin better in a certain aspect of his theology, but we can also learn from the mistakes made in earlier research.

First, when one studies the position of a theologian regarding some doctrine, it is necessary to account for the place of that theologian in the development of that doctrine. Despite some former scholars having actually attempted to do this, it is amazing that no one has seen that the positions of particular, universal, and hypothetical universal atonement have been post-Calvinian developments.

Second, this should make a historian cautious toward claims of later theologians, who identified their theology with Calvin’s. Some church historians have too easily followed the Perkinsian Puritans (Helm) or the Amyraldians (Clifford), who both have tried to identify Calvin’s positions with their own. Neither Helm nor Clifford has acknowledged that these claims are anachronistic per se.

Third, church historians should be even more cautious about linking their identity to their research subject. If one reads some results of earlier research, one might think that the purpose was not to show what Calvin actually taught, but to defend the “pure doctrine,” or that the purpose was to show that Calvin took the same position as the researcher. It is hard to believe that such a predisposition can result in objective scholarship. A church historian needs to disengage his own doctrinal position from the position of the person he is researching. Engaging in church history must be distinguished clearly from engaging in apologetics.

Fourth, for the sake of arriving at objective conclusions, a historian (or any scholar) should not only seek to find arguments that confirm his hypothesis, but he should also consider arguments that contradict it; it’s a kind of trying to falsify one’s own hypothesis. If one fails to refute these arguments or to give them a coherent place in his own construction, it is likely that his conclusions will not be (wholly) reliable. But if he succeeds at this point, his conclusion will be much more reliable.

Fifth, a church historian should be aware of the historical paradigms regarding the subject he is researching. Due to the fact that presently only three positions are held regarding the extent of the atonement, Calvin was for a long time not read in his own context. The knowledge of Voetius recognizing a fourth position was helpful in discovering the actual position of Calvin.

Of course, a church historian should not take such information for granted. The historical paradigm of the Amyraldians was that Calvin’s position was almost identical with theirs. Evaluation falsified the claims of the Amyraldians and verified the remarks of Voetius. Hence, it seems that the paradigm of someone who did not identify Calvin’s position with his own (i.e., Voetius) is more reliable than the paradigm of those who identified their position with Calvin’s. This underscores the second and third remarks above.

3. Looking Forward

Of course, I do not pretend to have said the last word on Calvin and the extent of the atonement. My thesis can and should be evaluated further by means of verification and falsification. In any case, other interesting subjects remain to be researched in Calvin, even in connection with his view on the atonement. For example, Calvin’s use of the classical formula: Did he stress the universal component or the particular component throughout his life?[56] And what was his position regarding the critique of Gottschalk and Scotus on the formula?[57] These are just two possible subjects for research. Calvin’s theology is still interesting enough to be researched further, and there is enough in his theology still to be researched.

Notes

1. R. T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (2d ed.; London: Paternoster, 1997), 13–16.
2. Paul Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1982; repr., Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1998). This book is an expansion of his article “Calvin, Calvinism and the Logic of Doctrinal Development,” SJT 34 (1981):179-85. Roger Nicole, “John Calvin’s View of the Extent of the Atonement,” in Standing Forth: Collected Writings of Roger Nicole (Fearn, Ross-shire: Christian Focus Publications, 2002), 283–312. This article was originally published in WTJ 47 (1985): 197-225.
3. Curt Daniel, “Hyper Calvinism and John Gill” (Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 1983); Allan C. Clifford, Calvinus: Authentic Calvinism, A Clarification (Norwich: Charenton, 1996).
4. I will not give a complete survey of former research, which can be found in the books and articles referred to. See esp. Nicole, “Calvin’s View.” One of the most interesting contributions of the 1980s is found in Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Durham, N.C.: Labyrinth, 1986), 34. Muller wrote just a single paragraph on the extent of the atonement according to Calvin, but his remarks are interesting. On the one hand he states that Calvin’s theology “well fits what is loosely called ‘limited atonement,”’ but on the other hand points to Calvin’s closely following the old distinction between sufficiency and efficiency, using words like expiatio or satisfactio, and reconciliatio or redemptio. In fact, however, Muller interprets this classic distinction in terms of limited atonement.
5. See, e.g., Nicole, “Calvin’s View,” 289. Daniel and Nicole acknowledge it, but even they could not escape it. Kendall and Daniel changed their minds after studying Calvin. Although this frees them from the charge of interpreting Calvin in their own terms, it is obvious that Calvin’s opinion was so existential for them that they made their own opinion contingent on his. See Kendall, “Preface to This New Edition,” in Calvin and English Calvinism, v-viii. For Daniel, see Nicole, “Calvin’s View,” 309 n. 46.
6. This effect is very clear in Helm and Clifford; less clear, but unmistakable also in Nicole.
7. Hans Boersma, “Calvin and the Extent of the Atonement,” EvQ 64 (1992): 333-55; G. Michael Thomas, The Extent of the Atonement: A Dilemma for Reformed Theology from Calvin to the Consensus (Carlisle, U.K.: Paternoster, 1997), 12–40.
8. See, e.g., Thomas, Extent of the Atonement, 12–40; and Stephen Strehle, “The Extent of the Atonement within the Theological Systems of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” (Th.D. diss., Dallas Theological Seminary, 1980). There is also a Dutch publication by C. Harinck, De uitgestrektheid van de verzoening (Van de apostolische vaders tot de synode van Dordrecht 1618–19 ) (Utrecht: De Banier, 1989).
9. Thomas, Extent of the Atonement, 5; Harinck, De uitgestrektheid, 40.
10. This opinion was rejected by Gottschalk in the ninth century. Gottschalk “maintained against Rabanus that the Son of God became man and died only for the elect. He measured the extent of the purpose by the extent of the effect. God is absolutely unchangeable, and his will must be fulfilled. What does not happen, cannot have been intended by him” (Philip Schaff, Mediaeval Christianity, A.D. 590–1073 (vol. 4 of History of the Christian Church; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1910),§§119–23. Online: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/hcc4.i.xi.xv.html (accessed 16 May 2008).
11. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, Liber III, dist. 20.3: “Christus se trinitati obtulit pro omnibus, quantum ad pretii sufficientiam, sed pro electis tantum quantum ad efficaciam, quia praedestinatis tantum salutem effecit” (“Christ has offered himself to the Trinity for all, regarding the sufficiency of the price, but for the elect regarding the efficiency, since he has salvation effected for the predestinated alone”).
12. Thomas, Extent of the Atonement, 5. Thomas Aquinas accepted the formula. John Duns Scotus did not speak about the worth of Christ’s death in itself, since he thought Christ’s death had worth only in as much God accepted it. The acceptance of Christ’s offer was only for the elect.
13. E.g., the Reformed theologians Musculus, Vermigli, Zanchius, Perkins, Ursinus, and Olevianus (see Harinck, De uitgestrektheid, 76–85).
14. As Harinck suggests (ibid., 70–76).
15. Ibid., 70-76; Thomas, Extent of the Atonement, 56–58.
16. Bucanus, Institutiones Theologicae (Lausanne, 1602), cap. 23, sec. 20. For the others, see Harinck, De uitgestrektheid, 118–20.
17. Thomas, Extent of the Atonement, 128–61; Harinck, De uitgestrektheid, 98–160.
18. See F. P. van Stam, The Controversy over the Theology of Saumur, 1635–1650: Disrupting Debates among the Huguenots in Complicated Circumstances (Amsterdam/Maarsen: APA-Holland UniversityPress, 1988); and Thomas, Extent of the Atonement, 162–242. A good description of hypothetical universalism can be found in Gisbertus Voetius, Disputationes Selectae, Vol. 2: “Problematum de merito Chrsiti, pars secunda & pars tertia.” These disputations were held in 1650. A Dutch translation is found in W. J. van Asselt and E. Dekker, eds., De scholastieke Voetius: Een luisteroefening aan de hand van Voetius”Disputationes Selectae’(Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1995), 86–114.
19. Voetius, Disputationes Selectae, 2:252–53.
20. B. De Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus in Johannis Marckii (Leiden: Johannes Hasebroek, 1761– 1771), 3:1035: “… non tamen accurate loquuntur, qui dicunt, Christum Sufficienter mortuum esse & satisfecisse pro omnibus & singulis Hominibus, sed pro solis Electis Efficaciter, ut dicebant Amyraldus & Testardus” (“They do not speak accurately, who say that Christ sufficiently died and satisfied for all and every men, but alone for the elect efficiently, as Amyraldus and Testardus say”).
21. Jonathan D. Moore, English Hypothetical Universalism: John Preston and the Softening of Reformed Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 217–20.
22. Moore could argue against this construction by maintaining that I have designated Amyraldism and hypothetical universalism as being synonymous. This is true, since I have not found reasons to distinguish them. Nevertheless, I agree that that no sharp line can be drawn between the classical position and hypothetical universalism, neither in substance nor in history.
23. It is possible to discern a fifth historical position, viz., that of some of the English hypercalvinists, who rejected the all-sufficiency of Christ’s death. But this opinion only developed in the eighteenth century and I have seen no argument to ascribe this position to Calvin. Hence, there is no reason to include this position here.
24. If Moore were right, the distinction between hypothetical universalism and the classical position would be that theologians of the classical position might answer here: for all men, and for the elect in a special way.
25. In order to increase readability, I will put the translations in the text and the original Latin in the footnotes.
26. Commentarius in Iohannis Apostoli Epistolam (CO, 55:310): “Sed hic movetur quaestio, quomodo mundi totius peccata expientur. Omitto phreneticorum deliria, qui hoc praetextu reprobos omnes, adeoque Satanam ipsum in salutem admittunt. Tale portentum refutatione indignum est. Qui hanc absurditatem volebant effugere, dixerunt, sufficienter pro toto mundo passum esse Christum: sed pro electis tantum efficaciter. Vulgo haec solutio in scholis obtinuit. Ego quamquam verum esse illud dictum fateor: nego tamen praesenti loco quadrare. Neque enim aliud fuit consilium Iohannis, quam toti ecclesiae commune facere hoc bonum. Ergo sub omnibus, reprobos non comprehendit: sed eos designat qui simul credituri erant, et qui per varias mundi plagas dispersi erant.” Herein “CO” refers to Corpus Reformatorum. Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia (ed. G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss; 59 vols.; Braunschweig: C. A. Schwetschke, 1863–1900).
27. De aeterna Dei praedestinatione (CO, 8:299): “Distinguunt quidam, quod potentia salutare sit omnibus evangelium, non effectu: sed nodum hoc modo minime expediunt: quia semper eo revolvimur, aequalisne omnibus conferatur credendi facultas.” This tract was first published in Geneva in 1552 due to the Bolsec controversy, but was in fact a reply to Pighius.
28. CO, 8:336: “Argute se ratiocinari putat, quum dicit: Christus propitiatio est pro peccatis totius mundi. Ergo extra mundum reprobos constituant oportet qui a Christi participatione arcere eos volunt. Ne valeat in praesens communis illa solutio: Christum sufficienter pro omnibus passum esse, efficaciter tantum pro electis. Magna illa absurditas, ob quam plausum sibi inter suos gregales monachus quaesivit, apud me nihil habet momenti.”
29. First, Calvin remarked that the great absurdity was something by which Georgius procured much applause for himself. This is not likely to refer to a distinction that was known for hundreds of years. So it is probable that Calvin with “this great absurdity” did not refer to the classical formula immediately preceding it, but to the reasoning of Georgius. A second argument is that Calvin continued to say that “we do now not ask what the virtue of Christ is, or what power it has in itself, but who they are to whom he exhibits himself to be enjoyed” (“Nec vero qualis sit Christi virtus, vel quid per se valeat, nunc quaeritur: sed quibus se fruendum exhibeat”). (N.B.: It is remarkable that Calvin did not say: for whom he gave himself to save them, but to whom he exhibits himself to be enjoyed. This is an indication that Calvin did not think in terms of later theology, but in terms of: sufficient for all, efficient for the elect alone.) A third argument is that Calvin before had accepted the truth of the distinction in his commentary on 1 John a year before, and moreover, some pages earlier in the same work.
30. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 13. He refers to Institutes, 3.1.1.
31. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 13 n. 2.
32. Commentarius in Iohannis Apostoli Epistolam (CO, 55:310); emphasis added. See n. 26 above for the Latin text.
33. See Calvin’s commentaries (or sermon) on the mentioned places. See n. 26 above for a quotation of Calvin’s remarks on 1 John 2:2.
34. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 13 n. 3. He gives as examples Calvin’s comments on Isa 53:12, Heb 9:28, and Rom 5:15.
35. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 13 n. 3.
36. Clifford, Authentic Calvinism, passim.
37. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 13–14.
38. Thomas, Extent of the Atonement, 33–34.
39. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 14.
40. Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists, 23–31; Joel R. Beeke, The Quest for Full Assurance: The Legacy of Calvin and His Successors (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1999), 36–81.
41. See, e.g., Calvin’s commentary on John 3:16 and his sermons on Isaiah’s prophecy, quoted in Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 14.
42. Kendall himself seems to have acknowledged this (Calvin and English Calvinism, 15).
43. Ibid., 14-15.
44. Clifford, Authentic Calvinism, 11.
45. Nicole, “Calvin’s View,” 303; Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists, 21.
46. CO, 9:484: “… scire velim quomodo Christi carnem edant impii, pro quibus non est crucifixa, et quomodo sanguinem bibant, qui expiandis eorum peccatis non est effusus.”
47. Curt Daniel drew a similar conclusion, which is added to the 2d ed. of Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, Appendix 2, 231–38.
48. Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists, 14–16.
49. Ibid., 16-18.
50. Ibid., 18-22.
51. CO 8:298: “Christum sic toti mundo ordinatum esse in salutem, ut eos servet qui a patre illi dati sunt.”
52. Nicole, “Calvin’s View,” 300.
53. Ibid., 300-304.
54. Nicole does not actually write that these arguments prove limited atonement in Calvin. He just uses them to prove that Calvin did not teach universal atonement. However, in the scope of his whole article, wherein he recognizes only (hypothetical) universal and particular atonement, it seems that to him proving Calvin did not teach universal atonement is (almost) the same as proving he did teach particular atonement.
55. Nicole, “Calvin’s View,” 303–4.
56. Thomas and Boersma have done some research on this point already.
57. See Thomas, Extent of the Atonement, 5, 6.