Some Observations On The Theological Method Of Faustus Socinus (1539–1604)

By Alan W. Gomes

[Alan W. Gomes is Professor of Historical Theology at Talbot School of Theology, La Mirada, Calif.]

I. Introduction

None of the so-called “radical” sects that arose in the Reformation age so agitated the varied divisions of mainstream Christendom as did the Socinians, named after Faustus Socinus (1539–1604), their preeminent divine.[1] In the theological systems and polemical summae of the seventeenth century, Reformed, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic theologians all excoriated the “execrable Socinians” and their infaustus (unfortunate) leader Faustus, attacking them in often massive works devoted solely to this purpose.[2] Speaking of the Reformed in particular, Clow observes that Socinianism “troubled the Reformed theologians of the 17th cent. and invaded all their communions, so that they grappled with it as the subtlest and strongest enemy of evangelical truth.”[3] For their part, the Socinians regarded their founder as accomplishing truly what the halting and half-way reformers such as Luther and Calvin did not. The Socinian attitude is well expressed by the epitaph on their namesake’s tomb: “Tota licet Babylon destruxit tecta Lutherus, muros Calvinus, sed fundamenta Socinus”: “Although Luther destroyed all the roofs of Babylon, and Calvin the walls, it was Socinus who demolished its foundations.”[4]

It is important to realize that Socinianism is not, as William Cunningham has observed, a dispute about a particular doctrine or set of doctrines, but represents instead a reconstruction and reinvention of the entire Christian edifice. In that respect it is unlike the breach between the Reformers and Rome. Taken as a whole, there is much more continuity than discontinuity between the magisterial Reformers and Rome on the constitutive credenda of the faith. While one ought not to minimize the Reformers’ significant course corrections on such critical issues as the source of religious authority and their effort to reclaim what they saw as a more Pauline doctrine of salvation’s appropriation in their doctrine of justification by faith alone through Christ alone, it nevertheless stands that the Reformers shared a common heritage with Rome, at least when the totality of Christian truth is in view.[5] Socinianism, on the other hand, utterly rejects the ecumenical doctrines of the Trinity and the two natures in Christ, creatio ex nihilo, eternal conscious punishment for the lost, Christ’s satisfaction for sin on the cross, original sin, the immortality of the soul, the orthodox doctrine of the intermediate state, and the traditional attributes of God, such as his omnipresence and his foreknowledge of future contingent events. We therefore must bear in mind that “the controversy with the Socinians is not a mere dispute about some particular doctrines, however important these may be, but really involves a contest for everything that is peculiar and important in the Christian system.”[6] It is for this reason that Johannes Hoornbeek, a late seventeenth-century Dutch theologian, decried Socinianism as “the worst of all” (pessimis omnium)errors. “For however greatly the Papists may err, they hold, nevertheless, to much of the foundations of religion, which they corrupt through a superstructure of various superstitions and errors. But Socinianism destroys everything.” As such, the Socinians are far worse than the Papists in Hoornbeek’s estimation, for “it is much more serious to be altogether devoid of that which one cannot lack than it is to hold to those same [essentials], however vitiated.”[7]

As Clow relates, the great historian of doctrine Adolph Harnack ranks Socinianism, “along with Tridentine Catholicism and Protestantism, as one of the three final stages of dogma.” Clow does not believe that Harnack’s observation is at all hyperbolic, for “when we look broadly at the historic developments of Christian doctrine, and remember how many schools of Christian thought are sympathetic with the conclusions of Socinianism, Harnack’s classification is justified.”[8]

II. Scripture and the Principium of Socinian Dogmatics

To what, then, may we attribute such a great departure from the historic Christian faith? Since the Scriptures have been foundational for constructing the Christian belief system, one might be tempted to attribute the Socinian defection to a denial of scriptural authority simpliciter. That is to say, if the Socinians denied the authority of Scripture as the principium cognoscendi—the “cognitive foundation” of theology—then it would hardly occasion surprise if an edifice constructed from materials alien to Scripture bears an altogether different likeness from historic doctrinal structures, based as they are on the Bible. Can, then, the fundamentally different shape of the Socinian dogmatic be attributed to a rejection of biblical authority, whether implicit or explicit?

There is hardly any insight of the magisterial Protestant Reformation stated with more vigor than Scripture as the sole principium for dogmatics; it is Scripture and Scripture alone that furnishes the material for theological system.[9] However, when one examines the Socinian doctrine of Scripture, and at all events the doctrine as articulated by Faustus himself, one finds little to distinguish it from the classic Protestant position.

In one of his letters Socinus repels the charge of being a vicious heresiarch who teaches doctrines contrary to Scripture, claiming that he “advances nothing” apart from an accurate and careful examination of the Scriptures, “with which [his] writings are filled.”[10] In another place Socinus admonishes his reader,

Go on in this love of searching after divine Truth; but so, that you examine the force of all reasons and proofs from the Scriptures with the greatest temper and patience.... And as to myself, you may assure yourself, I have no greater care than not to deviate, either to the right hand or the left, from the way which the sacred Books prescribe to us: because I well remember, that nothing must be added to, or taken from, the Word of God and his precepts.[11]

Socinus further declares,

God, in his wonderful and gracious providence, has given and preserved to us the written monuments of those holy men who, at the impulse and inspiration of the divine spirit, or being full of the Holy Ghost, committed these principles of truth to writing; these books we call the Bible, or the Old and New Testament. The knowledge of divine things, especially of the Christian religion we embrace, and of the sanctity of which we entertain no doubt, is contained in these books.[12]

It would be a simple matter, though tedious and unnecessary, to multiply citations such as these from the pen of Faustus. The slightly later Racovian Catechism establishes the same position with equal force, declaring that the Christian religion is to be learned from the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. These writings are “received and approved by all pious men as writings of divine authority,” and are to be regarded as both “authentic and credible” and “of themselves sufficient”—indeed, “amply sufficient”—such that “in things necessary to salvation they alone are to be depended upon.”[13] Commenting, albeit aversely, on the primacy of Scripture in Socinianism, Harnack states,” The New Testament as the sole regulative authority, source, and norm of religion cannot be declared more positively and dryly than by Socinianism.”[14] McGiffert makes the same point with comparable derision, stating,” Christianity became in their hands more completely than ever before a book religion.”[15]

Now, perhaps one may attempt to argue that the glowing Socinian statements about the efficacy and authority of Scripture are insincere and offered for rhetorical effect. To state the matter bluntly, talk is cheap. Yet, when one actually examines the use that is made of Scripture in the early Socinian system, the claims of Faustus and of the Socinian generations in close proximity to him fundamentally ring true. For one thing, the Socinians produced voluminous commentaries on Scripture; even a cursory look at the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, the main collection of the Socinian corpus, reveals this fact. Socinus’s own writings contain a good deal of dedicated exegetical work in the form of commentaries and the like, especially in the first volume of his two-volume opera; this is in addition to the significant amount of exegesis that one finds in the dogmatic portion of his works. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Socinians do not merely comment on the Bible but use the fruits of their exegesis in their doctrinal formulations. For example, it is clear that Socinus holds to a literal Adam and Eve, regarding the events in the garden, including the tree of life, as literal history. Adam, he says, was created “truly and properly” (vere ac proprie).[16] The same also holds true for the explicitly supernatural elements of Scripture, including the virgin birth and all of Christ’s earthly miracles. As Wilbur observes, “It [Socinianism] accepts the miraculous element in the record without hesitation, and founds doctrine upon it.”[17]

The Socinian adherence to Scripture has sometimes led to what some see as unexpected results or “systemic hiccups” in their theology, as it were. For instance, despite Socinus’s denial that Jesus is God, he nevertheless argued vigorously that Christ is to be worshiped because of what he regarded to be the clear teaching of Scripture to this effect. This put him on a collision course with the “non-adorant” wing of the Unitarian movement, led most notably by Francis Dávid of Transylvania. Some of the most bitter and heated polemic found in the writings of the generally mild Faustus is directed against him.

McGiffert comes close to the truth, though I believe misses the point, when he declares, “They [the Socinians] carried their loyalty to the Scriptures so far that they accepted many doctrines, and retained many practices, simply because they found them in the Bible, and not a few of these were out of line with their controlling principles.”[18] It is true that some of their conclusions may seem to remain in tension with yet other affirmations that would appear to demand the obverse on a systemic level. Yet, it is more likely that McGiffert has not properly understood the true “controlling principles” of the Socinian system than that so vast a body of their beliefs and practices contradicted these principles. Indeed, if belief in the virgin birth, Christ’s ascension to heaven before his public ministry, his exaltation to the right hand of God, the fact that he is the judge of all men, and that he is to be worshiped are “out of line with their controlling principles”—as McGiffert states to be the case—then one may justly question how “controlling” such principles truly were! On the other hand, if the “controlling principle” for Faustus and the early Socinians was fealty to the Scriptures—as they understood them, of course—then all of these doctrines are readily accounted for simply on the ground that they believed them to be scriptural, whatever systemic tensions the affirmation of these credenda may occasion.

While I noted earlier that Socinus’s doctrine of Scripture is fundamentally Protestant in character, there is one important difference that ought to be noted, though in the end I believe it is of no real moment in terms of our present concern, which is the Socinian dogmatic system. Francis Turretin notes this difference when he asks, “Whether there are in Scripture true contradictions, or certain irreconcilable passages, which in no way can be resolved or harmonized?”[19] Turretin states, “Some [doctors] think that they are readily able to solve the matter if it is said that the sacred writers were able to err through a lapse in memory (memoria labi) or in unimportant matters (levioribus). Socinus [argues] thus in his book on the authority of Scripture, as does Castellio in his Dialogs, as well as others.”[20] Turretin himself, as is true for the Protestant scholastics and magisterial Reformers alike, rejects this option, denying any true contradictions or irreconcilable passages in Scripture.

Turretin is, in fact, correct in his description of Socinus’s view, which Faustus set forth clearly in his book De sacrae scripturae auctoritate libellus.[21] Socinus treats two kinds of problems that may arise in Scripture: contradictions within the text (i.e., between one text and another), or matters that appear false per se. However, the “contradictions or diversities—be they real or only apparent”—do not concern matters of significance, but “pertain to history” (quae pertinent ad historiam). Even here there is no disagreement in the historical sections “which are of any consequence” (quae alicuius sint momenti). The historical problems are but few, and moreover these differences not only do not diminish but actually augment the faith one should place in the authors, for it shows that the authors of Scripture were indeed diverse and did not rely on a common core of alleged “facts” that might have been fabricated. Throughout this discussion, Socinus seems keen to avoid diminishing Scripture’s authority through his concession of historical inaccuracies, and stresses repeatedly that these contradictions occur in “few matters which are of no significance” (in quibusdam paucis rebus, quae nullius sunt ponderis).[22] As for matters that appear false per se, Faustus handles these identically to his treatment of contradictions. That is, they concern only historical matters of small or no significance, and take away not a whit from the credence one ought to place in the inspired text.

On the other hand, in matters of doctrine no such diversity, falsity, or contradiction can have any place. “In doctrine,” he states, “it can consistently be affirmed that nothing is found that clearly is known to be false.”[23] Contradictions in doctrine are only apparent, not real; in doctrinal matters there is “so much concord and agreement” (concordia & convenientia) that greater credence and authority ought to be given to this book “than [to] any other book where some doctrine is treated.”[24] He makes the identical point while at the same time using the occasion to take a swipe at papal infallibility. Infallibility in doctrine is guaranteed only to the apostles but not to their successors (even granting, for the sake of argument, that the pope could rightly claim to be such a successor).[25]

The critical point in all of this is that the Socinian denial of “biblical inerrancy” (to speak in parlance familiar to modern American evangelicals) has no bearing on the dispute between them and the orthodox on a systemic level in as much as the debates between them and the orthodox have to do with doctrinal and not historical matters. In other words, for all practical purposes Socinus and his adversaries share a common view of Scripture as touching matters of doctrine, and it is precisely on doctrinal points that the systems diverge.

Granting, then, that the Socinian doctrine of Scripture is functionally the same as that of the orthodox, it becomes clear that one cannot appeal to a different bibliology to account for the vast differences between orthodoxy and Socinianism. Therefore, there must be some factor at work in the movement from the sacra pagina to doctrinal conclusion that can account for the discrepancy.

III. The Role of Reason in Early Socinian Dogmatics

It is a commonplace in the secondary literature on Socinianism to attribute its peculiar views to “rationalism” or to speak of it as “rationalist” in varying degrees. Within this broad framework, the relationship between faith and reason in Socinianism is variously understood, and generally not teased out with any degree of precision.

Some scholars regard Socinianism as a species of rationalism pure and simple.[26] For example, Cauney states that the Socinians give reason the place of “supremacy,” criticizing orthodoxy accordingly.[27] Likewise, Klauber and Sunshine argue that in practice, Socinus “placed Scripture below reason as a means of determining truth.”[28] In their reckoning, “reason is the ultimate source of truth” for Socinus.[29] From this viewpoint it follows that for Socinus “nothing in revelation can be contrary to reason; anything in Scripture that reason finds unacceptable or contradictory cannot be true.”[30] Hägglund takes a similar approach. He declares that Socinianism makes reason the ultimate norm. According to him, the Socinians demand that all dogmas “be justified before the bar of sound human understanding.”[31]

Others, such as McLachlan, Clow, and Herzog, temper this assessment by classifying Socinianism as a “half-way house” or hybrid of rationalism and supernaturalism.[32] According to Herzog, this hybrid system, “in which scriptural and unscriptural elements strangely meet,” represents a way station in a trajectory toward modern rationalist systems, “and in this consideration lies [Socinianism’s] chief claim to prolonged attention.”[33] Clow somewhat confusingly speaks of Socinianism as a “rationalist system of Christian doctrine on a supernatural basis.”[34] Likewise, Harnack affirms the hybrid character of Socinianism when he states, “What we have, rather, is—on the one hand the book, on the other hand the human understanding. The latter is really the second principle in the Socinian dogmatic, which has been not incorrectly described therefore as Supranatural Rationalism.”[35]

It should be noted that the classification of Socinianism as rationalist (whether pure or mixed) is not limited to the modern secondary scholarship but was a charge leveled by contemporaries of the movement. Francis Turretin is representative. Turretin states that the Socinians are guilty of using reason in excessu, in contradistinction to the Anabaptists, Lutherans, and Papists, whose irrationalism at many points evinces that they do not give reason a sufficient role in doctrinal formulation, that is, their use is in defectu.[36] The Socinians, Turretin claims, make “human reason the principium and the norm to which the dogmas of the Christian religion and of theology, which are the object of faith, ought to be weighed.”[37] The Reformed, according to Turretin, maintain just the proper balance in the use of reason. That is, the Reformed use reason “ministerially and organically” (ministerialiter & organice) in drawing out the meaning and implications of revealed truth but not “principally and despotically” (principaliter & despotice) in as much as it is Scripture and not reason that furnishes the material for theological system.[38]

The term “rationalism” used in this context (and in keeping with its apparent use in the secondary sources cited above) means that reason stands in a principial and magisterial position in exercising veto power over what truths, however properly drawn from Scripture through sound exegesis, may be believed. Do the facts, then, truly support the idea that Socinus and the generation of Socinians in close proximity to him were rationalists?

It certainly is true that Socinus believed that the doctrines of the Christian faith are consonant with recta ratio. But this would hardly make Socinus a “rationalist” any more than it would Thomas Aquinas or, for that matter, most of the Christian tradition, which ascribes to the program of fides quaerens intellectum. For him, as for the Christian tradition generally, faith and reason cohere and do not contradict. Further, it is certainly true that Socinus regarded the doctrines of his opponents to be unreasonable at many points, and he leveled logical proof against them. The orthodox, for their part, were more than happy to return the favor. But neither Socinus nor the orthodox ever pitted reason against Scripture; they both believed that a right hermeneutic would always produce an interpretation amenable with sana ratio, and certainly not one that would contradict it.

As even Harnack admits, Socinus held that there are truths in Scripture that are above reason. For example, miracles are above reason, and are credible. But the Bible contains nothing that is contrary to reason. Harnack further observes that Socinus held—in contradistinction to the Nominalists—that Christianity is not contra rationem but supra rationem.[39] As noted earlier, Socinus will give no quarter to the notion that the Bible contains either doctrinal contradictions or doctrinal errors that are false per se.

As McLachlan observes, “It remained for a later generation of Socinian teachers to proclaim the clear supremacy of reason in religion.”[40] Wilbur concurs, stating that “the Socinians in Holland grew yet bolder, and did not hesitate upon occasion to subordinate Scripture to reason when the two seemed to conflict with each other.”[41] However much rationalism may characterize the later Socinianism—not to mention the many others swept along by rationalism’s rising tide in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who were by no means card-carrying Socinians—the present focus is on Faustus, and when his writings are examined with care it becomes clear that it is Scripture and not reason that plays the decisive role.

1. Explicit Denials in Socinus on the Competency of Reason in Things Divine

Socinus himself repudiates explicitly the competency of reason in matters divine. Consider the following from his De auctoritate in which Socinus asks, for the sake of argument, how one could show an error in a matter of doctrine in the NT writings.[42] The only way an error could be shown would be either “through reasonings” (rationibus)or “through the authority of the Old Testament.” Specifically, one would have to adduce either rational arguments or OT passages that present “decrees or axioms of the Christian religion which are in opposition to some matter written in the New Testament.” This, he believes, would be impossible to do, as both of these sources (and, a fortiori, any other source) are “by far inferior to the New Testament” (multo … sit inferior).[43]

Turning specifically to the possibility of using “reasons” (rationes) to overturn some doctrine of the NT, Socinus rejects this as an utter impossibility, given the fallibility of reason in matters of faith. Socinus states, “Moreover, concerning [the use of ] reasons [for overthrowing a NT doctrine]: This way is much too fallible in a matter which depends upon Divine revelation, such as the Christian faith.”[44] He then moves immediately to a consideration of the possibility of the OT contradicting the NT (which possibility he then rejects) with no further comment on the use of reason.

Furthermore, Socinus’s aversion to any kind of natural theology or innate knowledge of God is contrary to what one would expect from one who “place[s] Scripture below reason as a means of determining truth.”[45] Socinus denies both forms of a natural knowledge of God, namely, an innate, inborn knowledge and a discursive knowledge of God that can be discerned through the observation of the created order.[46] Socinus argues that men have a knowledge of God only because of special revelation. God revealed himself to Adam initially, and Adam passed down this knowledge to his progeny. Besides this initial revelation, God has continued to reveal himself directly at various times in history. But apart from such revelation man could not know God. Indeed, Socinus directly repudiates the notion that man could determine God’s existence from the created order, much less discern his providential care of mankind:

There are those who say that at least it cannot be denied that if anyone should turn his attention merely to the scheme (machina) of this world, he not only will know clearly that God exists, but also will discern plainly that he even oversees human affairs. Indeed, many add further that from this same scheme all sufficiently understand whatever is necessary for the knowledge of God, from which all religion arises.[47]

Socinus then proceeds to explode this falsehood by pointing to Aristotle, whom he regards as the greatest of the philosophers. Even with his phenomenal acumen (qui ingenii acumine omnes superasse videtur) Aristotle was not able to conclude many of the most fundamental facts about God, including his providential care for the world nor even his creation of it.[48]

Socinus further argues against natural religion on empirical or historical grounds. Man cannot have an innate knowledge of God, “otherwise nations would not be found that are altogether lacking in any religion.”[49] Yet, we do find just such nations. In proof, Socinus cites the anthropological observations of a Fransciscan monk of Pistoria, who apparently related to Faustus in personal conversation[50 ]that the people of “Bresilia” (Brazil) whom he had encountered were devoid of any knowledge of God.[51]

Socinus’s denial of an innate knowledge of God is part of a larger argument for the truth of Christianity, which runs as follows. Socinus first details the circumstances surrounding the rise of Christianity, specifically its rapid and amazing spread to all nations and to all classes of men in spite of all the odds against it. From these facts he draws the following inference. Since there is no natural religion (as argued above), then if there is to be a genuine religion it must be revealed.

If that religion is to be the true and eternal religion that is to be common to all men everywhere, it would require, by the nature of the case, that it be spread in just the way that the Christian faith did in fact spread, namely, supernaturally to all men in all circumstances. Socinus’s point, though not stated directly by him but tacitly indicated from the context, is that if there were a natural knowledge of God then it would not require the circumstances surrounding the spread of Christianity that we in fact have. Thus, so far from Socinus merely tolerating the supernatural elements of Christianity’s rise and content—that is, as if the Bible compels him to affirm grudgingly these as tenets that lie “outside of his controlling principles”—the supernatural spread of the Christian faith is integral to his understanding of Christianity as a necessarily revealed religion, required by the nature of the case. This is utterly contrary to rationalist theologies, and stands far closer to Karl Barth than to Herbert of Cherbury or Thomas Paine—or, for that matter, the rationalizing tendencies in later Remonstrant theology.

2. The Actual Use of Reason in Socinus’s Doctrinal Formulations

A final and critical line of argument that runs counter to the notion that Socinus was a rationalist comes from the actual use that Socinus made of reason in his positive doctrinal constructions. If reason were truly principial for Socinus, one would expect to find copious use of philosophical and rational arguments both to establish and to support the credenda of the faith. However, when one examines the writings of Socinus as a whole, one is struck by the fact that his conclusions are almost always supported by exegesis first, and generally arguments from reason are given little if any place. This gives credence to Socinus’s claim (cited earlier) that he “advances nothing” apart from Scripture.

One document that provides a particularly useful baseline is a summary (Epitome) of Socinus’s teaching at a pastors conference held at Rakow from March 7 to 27 in the year 1601.[52] This document consists of notes taken by Valentin Smalcius, Socinus’s amanuensis, who was present at the sessions and recorded the discussion in extensive detail. This colloquium is significant because it evinces Socinus’s mature thought, speaking en famille, as it were, to his most faithful disciples at the close of his life. In this colloquium Socinus canvasses a wide swath of doctrinal truth, both theoretical and practical. What is striking here is the almost complete lack of arguments offered from reason, whether in support of the doctrines he affirms or against those he decries. Instead, one is confronted with chapter and verse at almost every turn. As much as any document in Socinus’s works, the Epitome expounds the issues closest to his heart, presented to the men he held most dear, and who, in turn, were most devoted to him. And here we see that he exhorts them consistently and continuously from the Scriptures.

IV. The True Center of Socinus’s Theology

It has been shown that reason is not controlling nor magisterial for Socinus, and that he bases all of his conclusions on Scripture. At the same time, one is faced with the fact that the theological system Socinus derives from the sacred text departs radically from orthodoxy on most every article of faith. If these discrepancies cannot be accounted for through an overweening use of reason, how can this departure from orthodox belief be explained?

I believe there is most certainly a lens through which Socinus reads the Scriptures, which can be isolated by considering what Socinus believes to be the essence of Christianity. It is from this center that he evaluates all of the doctrines of the Christian system. Fortunately, Socinus makes this center explicit at many places.

1. Explicit Statements on the Essence of the Christian Religion

Socinus undertook to write a catechetical summa of the Christian religion, entitled Summa Religionis Christianae, which death forbade him to complete. Nevertheless, this summa proved influential because many of its ideas and statements found their way into the later Racovian Catechism. The first two sentences of the Summa contain in microcosm the center of gravity for Socinus’s theological system: “The Christian religion is the heavenly doctrine, teaching the true way of attaining eternal life. Moreover this way is nothing other than to obey God, according to those things which he commands us through our Lord Jesus Christ (Heb. 5:9).”[53] Socinus’s conception of the Christian faith can scarcely be summarized more succinctly. For him, man’s chief concern is to attain immortal life—or, as Harnack puts it, Socinus conceives of man “as a mortal, but rational being, who is on the outlook for eternal life.”[54] The Christian faith provides the way that man may attain this coveted prize: by obedience to God through keeping the precepts that Christ conveyed to us as God’s emissary of salvation.

Socinus argues that this center is, in fact, the common belief of all the divisions of Christendom; this is Socinus’s “mere Christianity,” as it were. In his apologetic work on the authority of Scripture, De auctoritate, he makes his conviction clear in tackling the following hypothetical objection to his claim that the Christian religion is the most excellent of all religions. One might object that we are in no position to judge whether the Christian religion is actually the most excellent, since there are so many contrary opinions, both ancient and modern, as to its actual content. This Socinus disputes, arguing that the precepts ( praecepta) and promises ( promissa) of the Christian religion form its core, about which there has always been unanimity. The promises, of course, pertain to immortal life, and the precepts outline the way of attaining it. These two elements are, as he puts it, beyond any doubt the “summa” of the Christian religion, about which “all who profess this religion appear to agree” (omnes, qui eam religionem profitentur, videntur convenire). Beyond any doubt, the”most holy precepts”( praecepta scilicet sanctissima) and “most admirable promises” ( promissaque admirabilia) that it contains show its superiority, and it is in these two foci that “all religion especially consists” (omnis religio potissimum constat).[55]

In contrast, there is no other religion that requires as much, not to say more, innocence and probity of life. Socinus states that the precepts of other religions are like comparing a meager light to that of the sun.[56] At the same time, no other religion offers promises so sublime to those who follow its precepts. It is these promises that provide the needed motivation to follow such superior precepts.[57]

In all of this we see the uniqueness of Christ compared to the author of any other religion. In Christianity the one who conveys these precepts to others first of all kept them himself. Thus, he can teach not only by words but also by his very example.[58] As for the promises, Jesus plainly and manifestly attained the very promises that he preached to others. Socinus urges the singularity of the Christian faith by asking, what other religion is there in which the author and head of it offers promises to his followers if they keep his precepts, but then himself also attains the same promises by keeping these very precepts? Socinus gives the example of Mohammed, who promised pleasures and joys to the followers of his precepts but who provided no evidence that he himself ever attained any of them. Even in the OT, Moses—who conveyed earthly promises to the Israelites—himself only enjoyed but a fraction of these, was vexed by troubles throughout his life, and even at the end of his life did not enter the land. Even though the promises to Moses had regard only to earthly matters and not to immortal life (which Socinus did not believe to have been promised in the OT[59]), Moses did not attain even these.

In summary, then, for Socinus the goal of the Christian faith is the attainment of eternal life, which is promised to those who keep God’s precepts, particularly as enunciated by Christ, whom God sent for that purpose.

2. The Outworking of Socinus’s Center in the Formulation of Doctrine

I believe that if one stands at the center of Socinus’s conception of the Christian faith, as enunciated above, one can sweep round the whole circle of his system.[60] This view becomes particularly lucid when one studies the highly significant Epitome, referenced earlier. Throughout his teaching to the Unitarian ministers, Socinus applies as his explicitly stated “canon” the thesis that doctrines must be evaluated in terms of whether belief in them is necessary to salvation. Socinus distinguishes between those doctrines that may be “most useful” (utilissimae) versus those that are strictly “necessary” (necessariae) to salvation. Specifically, Socinus’s “canon, as it were” (quasi canone) that enables one to make the proper distinction is as follows: a doctrine is not necessary to salvation if it can be omitted and yet faith in Christ and observance of his commandments can still be maintained.[61]

In what follows throughout the Epitome, Socinus scrutinizes a wide range of theological topics, holding up each doctrine to this test. When viewed by this “canon” some interesting results turn up that may run contrary to expectation. Certain of the doctrines with which Socinus and Socinianism are especially associated turn out not to be of such great moment to him as one might suppose. On the other hand, other doctrines that some have declared to be “outside of his controlling principles” arise as being of critical concern to him. Perhaps the most poignant way of demonstrating the outworking of Socinus’s controlling principles is to select as illustrative certain key doctrinal loci and see how Socinus himself evaluates them.

1. The Doctrine of the Trinity. Granting that Socinus was the preeminent leader of the antitrinitarian movement, one would think that he would wax warmly against the doctrine. According to Herzog, “The antagonism to the threefold personality of God forms the centre of the Socinian opposition to historical Christianity, and it is the special and single aim of many Socinian works to prove the doctrine of the Trinity irrational and unscriptural.”[62] Yet, Socinus explicitly says that neither belief nor disbelief in divine plurality (as stated in the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity) is essential for salvation, because it is quite possible for one to hold this belief and at the same time not run afoul of his canon of obedience. Now, Socinus takes up the commonly offered Unitarian objection that Trinitarian belief does in fact make obedience impossible on the most fundamental point of rendering devotion solely to the one true God, who is the Father alone. Trinitarians, according to this objection, are essentially idolaters, and idolatry is disobedience to the commands of God per se. Socinus parries this objection in defense of Trinitarians by pointing out that the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity sufficiently safeguards the divine unity to obviate this charge. Indeed, “the more sober Papists and evangelicals confess that Christ is essentiated (essentiatum)[63] from the Father and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the same [i.e., from the Father]. And thus, they assert that the Father is the one God and the fountainhead of all divinity.”[64]

Still, one might object that belief in multiple persons in God destroys the knowledge that the Father is the only true God ( John 17:3).[65] In response, Socinus makes the distinction between belief that “the Father alone is true God” (which Unitarians affirm but Trinitarians deny), and “the Father is the only true God” (which Trinitarians and Unitarians both affirm).[66] Affirmation of the latter and not the former is necessary for salvation.

2. The adoration of Christ and his invocation in prayer. One of the doctrines that has been described as “outside of Socinus’s controlling principles” is his belief that Christ ought to receive religious adoration and that he may be invoked in prayer.[67] These issues were a point of contention within the Unitarian movement. Francis Dávid, a leading Transylvanian pastor and theologian, argued that it is idolatrous to worship Christ and to invoke him in prayer, since God alone is to receive our prayers and our worship.

Socinus contended vigorously against Dávid (among others) on both of these points.[68] Christ must be worshipped first of all because God clearly commands it. As proof Socinus cites Ps 49:5, which he claims “ought to be understood mystically” in reference to Christ, which the author of Hebrews makes plain enough. He also argues from the second chapter of Philippians and again from John 5 (which states that all judgment and honor is to be given to Christ). Besides, even if God had not clearly commanded Christ’s worship, his very majesty would require it per se, the thing itself (ratione ipsa) being sufficient to persuade us. “For honor always accompanies dignity.”[69]

Not only do the Scriptures teach that one must render adoration to Christ, but such adoration is necessary to eternal salvation (necessarium hoc est ad salutem aeternam).[70] In fact, to deny this truth is blatantly contrary to the word of God and is a sin more serious than homicide! This is because the one who withholds adoration to Christ denies that Christ has all power, and also sins against God’s express command.[71]

As for invoking Christ in prayer, one is not bound absolutely to do so but it is permissible. Socinus acknowledges that there is no command that directly requires it and therefore it cannot be incumbent upon us. Furthermore, there is no way there could be a command, because the nature of commandments is such that whenever we are presented with an opportunity to obey the commandment we must do so. From this it would follow that, occasion permitting, we must always and only invoke Christ, which clearly is false.[72] At the same time, Christ may be invoked in prayer, and anyone who denies this also denies Christ’s divine power and therefore cannot be saved.

It is interesting, then, to see that Socinus excoriates Francis Dávid, a fellow Unitarian, and is more tolerant by far of Trinitarian Christians. This is because obedience is possible for a Trinitarian Christian, while Dávid’s position is directly disobedient per se to the commands of Christ.

3. The two natures in Christ. As one might guess from Socinus’s earlier treatment of the Trinity, he also states that a correct view on the two natures in Christ is not necessary for salvation. Certainly, he says, there were many Christians who held the false view that Christ is both true God and true man, but who also gave their lives in martyrdom and lived piously. Though some may find it difficult to regard such a one as a brother, it is harder still to exclude someone who lived and died piously for Christ’s sake.[73] While he grants that it is very helpful and strengthens our faith to believe that Christ is a man and only a man, it is not strictly necessary (though nearly so) to believe this in order to have faith in God.[74] Socinus goes so far as to allow that one would not necessarily have to believe that Christ was a man at all, provided that one could come to believe in some other way that Christ announced the way of eternal life, was resurrected, exalted, and attained divine glory.[75]

4. Predestination. Socinus rejected sharply the Reformed doctrine of predestination. His concern was not so much over the metaphysical question of freedom versus determinism, as typifies so much of the modern debate, but rather over the salvific implications of the doctrine, particularly in terms of what he regarded as its chilling effect on moral activity in keeping the commands of Christ.

Predestination is shown to be false, because if it were true then it would follow that the will of man has no place in what pertains to eternal salvation; “the decree necessarily would take away all freedom of the will.” This, in turn, destroys all religion, “which is nothing other than the attempt to obey God.”[76] Observe that Socinus locates the essence of religion in obedience, which, as noted, is part of his larger program of attaining eternal life.

Related to his denial of predestination is his denial of God’s foreknowledge of future contingents.[77] Socinus, as is well known, denied that an exhaustive foreknowledge is compatible with genuine human freedom. Here again one sees the nub of the issue for Socinus, which is the necessity of genuine obedience for salvation. In this context Socinus states, “Without the free will of man neither religion nor the uprightness of God can in any way consist, both of which are exceedingly absurd and blasphemous.” On the other hand, “nothing absurd much less blasphemous arises as a result of God not having foreknowledge.”[78]

If belief in predestination and even in God’s foreknowledge is destructive of true religion, can Calvinists be saved? Socinus answers that if one were clearly to understand the gravity and consequences of this belief then it would actually destroy the religious life; such a one would not be saved. But many do not understand the implications of these matters, and live uprightly and serve God despite their beliefs. Though belief in predestination and absolute foreknowledge may indeed be a hindrance to one’s faith, and at all events cannot possibly help it, “God is able to work religion in [predestinarians] in some other fashion.”[79]

5. Justification by faith alone and the satisfaction of Christ. Socinus disliked exceedingly the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone, and for reasons not hard to discern. The doctrine of justification by faith alone, apart from works, is the polar opposite of Socinus’s view that works are necessary for salvation. Speaking of the hamartiology of the “Evangelicals” (Evangelici), Socinus himself notes “this difference from us, who affirm that good works are the cause (causam) sine qua non of our salvation.”[80] Socinus grew warm in his exhortation that pastors must teach properly on this doctrine, for it is a source of great confusion and harm when handled improperly. As to Luther’s notion that the justified believer is simul justus et peccator, Socinus will have none of it. In a particularly pointed passage Socinus states:

In propagating doctrine he [the pastor] must take care that he speak the things that are necessary for the salvation of men. But especially he ought to give care that he understand rightly the article of justification and that he propound it to others. For it is enveloped in so much darkness that nothing is more crammed full of such great deception, such that the impious have a thousand hiding places by not rightly perceiving that mystery of justification. And so care should be taken that curable men be led to the way of truth and are able to be healed and saved. Justification requires a good man, and therefore the wicked and those who are ignorant of how to repent are unwilling to receive the true way of justification.[81]

Likewise, Socinus exerted great effort in attacking the Protestant doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction for sin. His monograph on the subject, De Iesu Christo Servatore, attacks the doctrine with especial vigor. The very title page describes the work as a response against the “dangerous errors” ( perniciosi errores) of the orthodox view.[82] To be sure, most other Socinian works against the doctrine of satisfaction do little more than recapitulate what Faustus had already stated in this work. John Owen did not overstate the case when he remarked,”De Jesu Christo Servatore is written with the greatest strength, subtilty, and plausibility, [so that] neither is any thing said afterward by himself or the rest of his followers that is not comprised in it.”[83]

It is significant that at the very end of the third part of De Servatore, just before he turns his attention to the doctrine of justification in the fourth and final part, Socinus pens these words to his adversary Covetus:

However, perhaps we will reap a greater advantage by carefully examining certain issues which remain in your writing than from what has been stated thus far. Perhaps we will be able to explain and understand the way of our eternal salvation even more clearly and precisely. Perhaps also the most unwholesome errors that have entered the church of Christ—either through the wickedness or ignorance of people—will be refuted or at least clearly indicated. Therefore, it seems to me that it would be profitable to undertake this further labor for the glory of God.[84]

In view of what has already been noted about Socinus’s beliefs about justification, it should be obvious that he would recoil at the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction, given the systemic connection it sustains to that doctrine. In as much as the death of Christ makes satisfaction for our own disobedience, it becomes difficult for Socinus to see in what sense our obedience can be necessary for salvation. That he would labor to tear down the edifice of satisfaction in order to present a salutary doctrine of justification (as he sees it) is clear enough.

V. Concluding Thoughts

The present article has shown the inadequacy of the oft-repeated claim that the doctrinal system of Faustus Socinus can be attributed to an overweening use of reason in theology. It has established rather that Socinus gives the primacy to Scripture in formulating his doctrinal system. At the same time, I have also suggested that Socinus has isolated from Scripture certain foundational truths that form a kind of organizational center for his overall conception of the Christian faith, which also functions as an interpretive grid for his understanding of the Bible as a whole. The true center of his system, as noted, is the attainment of the promise of immortal life through keeping God’s commandments as conveyed by Jesus Christ. In short, Socinus has a moralistic and not a rationalistic center, and that with a clearly reward-oriented motivation.

The question naturally arises as to just why Socinus sees the essence of Christianity as the attainment of eternal life through keeping the commandments of Christ. Why is this the center from which we may, as suggested earlier, “sweep round the whole circle of his system”? That is, what led Socinus to conceive the essence of the Christian faith in these terms? While the answer to this question takes us beyond the present discussion, which has been merely to establish the fact of this center, I shall present briefly some thoughts about the question itself, leaving a proper and detailed answer for another place.

First, in speaking of the “center” of Socinus’s system, I am not suggesting that he begins with some kind of “central dogma” from which he deduces a moralistic theological system—analogous to (in the minds of some) justification by faith for Lutherans and predestination for the Reformed. The program of certain nineteenth-century historians such as Alexander Schweizer and Albrecht Ritschl, who saw orthodox Protestant systems as the logically deduced outworking of these respective systemic principia,[85] led to a distorted understanding of the true shape of Protestant orthodox dogmatics and, happily, has been rejected by the best modern historiography on the subject.[86] Nor would such a central dogma approach yield any more salutary results when applied to Socinus. Socinus does not postulate a moralistic center and then deduce the doctrines of the faith from this, any more than the Reformed begin with election and deduce an entire predestinarian system from it. Rather, it appears to me that Socinus begins with the Bible, and finds in it the teaching that those who obey the commandments of Christ will attain immortal life. About this, Socinus argues, all Christians agree and always have. And in the most general sense he is certainly correct, mutatis mutandis in order to comport with the variegated Christian perspectives on the relationship between faith and works.

Still, once we grant that Socinus was able to derive from Scripture the fact that Christ’s commands are to be obeyed, and that those who do obey will attain immortal life, it still does not explain why he rejects the classic Protestant nexus between faith and works and the attainment of immortality. Nor does it explain why he makes these themes so dominant, as a kind of theological and even exegetical grid through which he tends to leverage his understanding of the biblical text.

What, then, accounts for this proclivity to filter the text of Scripture through this strongly ethical, even praxis-oriented strain? We can, of course, appeal in broad generalities to the ethical orientation found in Renaissance humanism, such as exemplified by thinkers like Erasmus. (And of Socinus’s acquaintance with the works of Erasmus in particular there is no doubt, as the numerous citations to him readily attest.) But more specific lines of inspiration than this one need to be drawn. Pressing back into possibly more distant antecedents, it would also be interesting to note whether Socinus was specifically influenced by the medieval conversation about whether theology should be seen primarily as practical as opposed to speculative or contemplative. Perhaps there is some reference to this question somewhere in his writings, but as yet I have not come across it.

Yet, whatever may have drawn Socinus to view the Christian faith as “the true way of attaining eternal life,” which is “nothing other than to obey God, according to those things which he commands us through our Lord Jesus Christ,”[87] there can be no doubt that this focus looms large in everything Socinus preached, wrote, and taught. Acknowledging this fact will aid mightily in forming a more accurate estimate of the true dynamic which drove Faustus, and help us do justice to the true shape of his thought.

Notes

1. General histories of Socinianism, including the life and background of Faustus, are readily available. The best single treatment of the history of Unitarianism in Poland, together with its historical antecedents, is undoubtedly Earl Morse Wilbur’s two-volume History of Unitarianism (Boston: Beacon, 1945). Wilbur also has an article-length piece, which places Faustus in his proper historical setting, entitled “Faustus Socinus, Pioneer,” HibJ 33 (1935): 538-48. Another standard work is David Cory’s Faustus Socinus (Boston: Beacon, 1932). H. J. McLachlan, Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), 3–24, provides a compact summary of the background to Socinus. The most comprehensive nineteenth-century work on Socinianism, which provides theological analysis as well as historical background, is Otto Fock’s Der Sozinianismus nach seiner Stellung in der Gesamtentwicklung des christlichen Geistes, nach seinem historischen Verlauf und nach seinem Lehrbegriff (Keil: C. Schro¨der, 1847). A significant treatment of relatively more recent origin is Delio Cantimori’s Eretici Italiani del Cinquecento (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1967). Brief discussions of Socinian history are also available in Alexander Gordon, “The Sozzini and Their School,” The Theological Review 65 (1879): 293-322; Zbigniew Ogonowski, “Faustus Socinus,” in Shapers of the Religious Traditions in Germany, Switzerland, and Poland, 1560–1600 (ed. Jill Raitt; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 195–97; and George H. Williams, The Radical Reformation (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962), 749–63. More recently, Lech Szczucki has written a helpful and concise article on”Socinianism”in the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation (4 vols.; ed. Hans J. Hiller-brand; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4:83–86. For a seventeenth-century portrait of Faustus written by a Unitarian, available in English translation, see Samuel Przypkowski, The Life of that Incomparable Man, Faustus Socinus Senensis, Described by a Polonian Knight. Whereunto is added An Excellent Discourse, which the same Author would have had premised to the Works of Socinus; Together with a Catalogue of those Works (London: Printed for Richard Moone, at the Seven Stars in Paul’s Church-yard, neer the great North-doore, 1653). The original appears as a preface to Socinus’s Opera omnia, contained in the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum quos Unitarios vocant (ed. Andreas Wissowatius; Amsterdam, 1668). This nine-volume work, hereafter cited as BFP, is the main collection of Socinian writings, the first two volumes of which comprise the complete works of Socinus. In the eighteenth century, Joshua Toulmin’s sympathetic Memoirs of the Life, Character, Sentiments, and Writings of Faustus Socinus (London, 1777) provides a very helpful portrait of Socinus, including basic biographical backgrounds and a sometimes insightful sketch of his theological system. Also writing in the eighteenth century, Edward Coombe compiled a compact summary of Socinus’s life, which he prefaced to his translation of Socinus’s De auctoritate sacrae scripturae, under the title An Argument for the Authority of Holy Scripture from the Latin of Socinus … to which is Prefixed a Short Account of His Life (London, 1731). For modern treatments of Socinus’s soteriology in particular, see John C. Godbey, “A Study of Faustus Socinus’ De Jesu Christo Servatore” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1968); Godbey, “Fausto Sozzini and Justification,” in Continuity and Discontinuity in Church History (ed. F. F. Church and T. George; Studies in the History of Christian Thought 10; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979); Alan W. Gomes, “De Jesu Christo Servatore, Part III: Historical Introduction, Translation, and Critical Notes” (Ph.D. diss., Fuller Theological Seminary, 1990); and Gomes, “De Jesu Christo Servatore: Faustus Socinus on the Satisfaction of Christ,” WTJ 55 (1993): 209-31.
2. The number of works written against the Socinians is truly enormous. Considering the disputations written by students under the supervision of a professor, and later collated by that professor into a single massive work attacking the Socinian system, Wilbur notes, “The writer [Wilbur] has found in print over 700 such products of the universities, and the list must be far from complete. The dates range between 1595 and 1797. The responsible professors would sometimes make a collection of their students’ dissertations and publish them as a more or less comprehensive refutation of Socinianism. Thus Scherzer of Leipzig published a collection of 154 dissertations as Collegii anti-Sociniani (1672), filling over 1,200 pages; Josua Stegmann of Rinteln collected 56 under the title of Photinianismus (1623), running to over 900 pages; Becmann of Zerbst in Exercitationes theologicae (1639) collected 17 long dissertations, which occupied over 1,000 columns; and Crocius of Bremen combined 28 disputations into Antisocinismus contractus (1639). The separate items usually extended to about 20 pages, but sometimes reached the proportions of a moderate-sized book” (Wilbur, History of Unitarianism, 1:525).
3. W. M. Clow, “Socinianism,” in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (ed. James H. Hastings; 13 vols.; New York: Scribners, 1908–1927), 11:653.
4. Toulmin, Memoirs, 12; citing Pluquet, Dictionnaire des he´re´sies (2 vols.; 1762, 1764), s.v. “Socinianisme,” 2:519. Toulmin supplies a translation of this epitaph, which I have not adopted, as follows: “Luther destroyed the houses of Babylon, Calvin the walls, but Socinus subverted the foundations.”
5. Note, for instance, this statement from the Augsburg Confession: “This is the sum of our doctrine, in which, as can be seen, there is nothing that varies from the Scriptures, or from the church catholic, or from the Church of Rome as known from its writers. This being the case, they judge harshly who insist that our teachers be regarded as heretics. There is, however, disagreement on certain abuses, which have crept into the church without rightful authority… . Our churches dissent in no article of faith from the church catholic, but only omit some abuses which are new, and which have been erroneously accepted by the corruption of the times” (Art. 21).
6. William Cunningham, Historical Theology (2 vols.; London: Billing & Sons, 1960), 2:171; emphasis in the original.
7. “Initio cum Papismo acerrimum bellum fuit, inde cum Anabaptistis, & Enthusiastis, pridem cum Remonstrantibus, nunc cum pessimis omnium Socinianis decertandum nobis venit. Quamvis enim Papistae graviter errant, tenent tamen adhuc multa religionis fundamenta, sed quae variorum superstitionum & errorum epiokodomei corrumpunt: Sociani vero tollunt omnia. At gravius est carere omnino, quibus carere nequeas, quam habere eadem utcunque valde vitiara” ( Johannes Hoornbeek, “De Socinianismo,” in Summa controversiarum religionis [Utrecht, 1653], 448).
8. Clow, “Socinianism,” 11:651.
9. For an excellent study on this point see Richard A. Muller, Holy Scripture, the Cognitive Foundation of Theology (vol. 2 of Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993).
10. Toulmin, Memoirs, 101; BFP 1:475–77 (letter to Vadovitz).
11. Toulmin, Memoirs, 161; BFP 1:432.
12. Toumin, Memoirs, 353–55; BFP 1:287.
13. The Racovian Catechism, with Notes and Illustrations, Translated from the Latin: to Which is Prefixed a Sketch of the History of Unitarianism in Poland and the Adjacent Countries (trans. Thomas Rees; London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme & Brown, Paternoster Row, 1818; repr., Lexington, Ky.: American Theological Library Association, 1962), ch. 1, p. 5. Note that I have recast this citation into declarative form, though the original presents some of this wording as interrogative, in keeping with the catechetical format.
14. Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma (ed. and trans. Neil Buchanan; 7 vols.; New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), 7:138.
15. Arthur Cushman McGiffert, Protestant Thought Before Kant (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1924), 115.
16. Faustus Socinus, Epitome colloquii Racoviae habiti anno 1601 (ed. Lech Szczucki and Janusz Tazbir; critical Latin text printed in Warsaw, 1966), lines 1081–82.
17. Wilbur, History of Unitarianism, 1:415.
18. McGiffert, Protestant Thought, 117.
19. “An in Scriptura occurrant verae contradictiones, seu loca quaedam aluza, quae nulla ratione solvi & conciliari possint?” (Francis Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae [Geneva, 1689], 2.5).
20. “Quidam facile rem expediri posse putant, si dicatur Scriptores sacros, memoria labi, aut in levioribus errare potuisse, Sic Socinus de authoritate Scripturae, Castellio in Dialogis & alii” (Turretin, Institutio, 2.5.3).
21. Faustus Socinus, De sacrae scripturae auctoritate libellus, in BFP 1:265–80 (hereafter De auctoritate). As mentioned in n. 1 above, this is one of the few works of Socinus available in English translation. Since, however, the accuracy of the translation is often seriously wanting, I have followed the Latin text from BFP.
22. De auctoritate, in BFP 1:267.
23. “In doctrina, affirmare constanter potest, nihil inveniri, quod falsum esse aperte cognoscatur” (De auctoritate, in BFP 1:267).
24. “… in qua [Holy Scripture] non modo nulla vera in scriptis illis repugnantia aut diversitas invenitur, sed tanta est concordia & convenientia, ut vel hoc satis esse deberet ad conciliandam libro illi auctoritatem maiorem, quam quivis alius liber habeat, ubi doctrina aliqua tradatur” (De auctoritate, in BFP 1:267).
25. “Infallibilem veritatem doctrinae Christi tenere proprium erat apostolorum; non autem umquam pastoram fuit, qui ab ipsis apostolis et eorum scriptis eam haurire semper debuerunt” (Epitome, lines 3041–44).
26. The following paragraphs in which the secondary literature on Socinianism is summarized vis-à-vis the question of rationalism are adapted from my Ph.D. dissertation, “De Jesu Christo Servatore, Part III: Historical Introduction, Translation, and Critical Notes,” 322–27.
27. Maurice A. Cauney, “Socinians,” in An Encyclopedia of Religions (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1921), 330.
28. Martin I. Klauber and Glenn S. Sunshine, “Jean-Alphonse Turrettini on Biblical Accommodation: Calvinist or Socinian?” CTJ 25 (1990): 13.
29. Ibid., 14.
30. Ibid., 13.
31. Bengt Hägglund, History of Theology (trans. Gene J. Lund; St. Louis: Concordia, 1968), 322.
32. McLachlan, Socinianism, 12; Johann Herzog, “Socinus (Faustus) and the Socinians,” in A Religious Encyclopedia or Dictionary of Biblical, Historical, Doctrinal, and Practical Theology (ed. Philip Schaff and Johann Herzog; 4 vols.; New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1891), 4:2210.
33. Herzog, “Socinus,” 4:2210.
34. Clow, “Socinianism,” 11:651.
35. Harnack, History of Dogma, 7:139; emphasis in the original.
36. “In hac Controversia peccatum fuit & in excessu & in defectu: In excessu ab iis qui plus justo rationi tribuunt in rebus fidei, prout fit a Socinianis: In defectu ab iis qui non satis, ut fit ab Anabaptistis, Lutheranis & Pontificiis” (Turretin, Institutio 1.8.2; emphasis in the original).
37. “An Ratio humana sit principium, & norma ad quam exigi debent Religionis Christianae & Theologiae dogmata, quae sunt fidei objectum? N. c. Socin” (Turretin, Institutio 1.8).
38. “Aliud est ministerialiter & organice se habere; Aliud principaliter & despotice: Ratio priori modo se habet respectu Theologiae, non posteriori” (Turretin, Institutio 1.8.6; emphasis in the original).
39. Harnack, History of Dogma, 7:142. This is a most interesting assertion, to be sure, especially in light of the claim made by some scholars (e.g., Hägglund, History of Theology, 322) that Socinianism derives its alleged rationalist tendencies from its supposed adoption of a nominalist frame of reference.
40. McLachlan, Socinianism, 12.
41. Wilbur, “Faustus Socinus, Pioneer,” 547. Later Socinianism does show the impact of seventeenth-century Cartesianism. Interestingly, the Socinian Johann Ludwig von Wolzogen regards Cartesianism with alarm. He worries that if reason replaces Scripture the inevitable result will be a fundamental departure from the Christian faith. For this reason Wolzogen attacked the rising tide of Cartesian rationalism. Wolzogen’s protest not withstanding, later Socinians and Remonstrants alike were to imbibe significant aspects of Cartesian thought. See Wilbur, History of Unitarianism, 1:530. By the time Andreas Wiszowaty came on the scene, the Socinian movement had moved significantly toward genuine rationalism. Wiszowaty was influenced particularly by Spinoza and Descartes. He outlines his approach in his important Religio rationalis seu de rationis judicio, in controversiis etiam theologicis, ac religiosis, adhibendo, tractatus (n.p., 1658). In this work he states unequivocally that sound reason is the touchstone of truth. Anything taught in Scripture that offends reason must be rejected. Wilbur (History of Unitarianism, 1:572) says that Wiszowaty was the first Socinian to enunciate this view unambiguously. But this hardly makes the Socinians the “forerunners” of the modern rationalist movement. By Wiszowaty’s time, rationalism was gaining ground among those who were not formally Socinians, and by the turn of the century it became the dominant intellectual pattern in many circles; even the orthodox are affected by it. Note, for example, Stapfer and Wyttenbach, who were”orthodox”theologians attempting to incorporate the philosophy of Christian Wolff. Stapfer, who wrote in the mid eighteenth century, is described by Hadorn as advocating an “orthodox rationalism of the mild Reformed type” (W. Hadorn, “Johann Friedrich Stapfer,” in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge [ed. J. Herzog, P. Schaff, and A. Hauck; 13 vols.; New York: Funk & Wagnells, 1908–1914; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1953], 11:64). On the rise of rationalism in late seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Reformed theology see Richard A. Muller, Prolegomena to Theology (vol. 2 of Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), 38–39; Michael Heyd, Between Orthodoxy and Enlightenment: Jean-Robert Chouet and the Introduction of Cartesian Science in the Academy of Geneva (The Hague: Njhoff, 1982); John W. Beardslee, “Theological Development at Geneva under Francis and Jean-Alphonse Turretin, 1648–1737” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1956); and Ernst Bizer, “Die reformierte Orthodoxie und der Cartesianismus,” ZTK 55 (1958): 306-72. Concerning the rise of “natural religion” in later Socinianism, in contradistinction to the view of Faustus, see Ogonowski, “Faustus Socinus,” 206–7. See also Cantimori, Eretici Italiani, 359–62.
42. He is here treating an error per se, rather than possible contradictory doctrinal teachings within the NT itself. (He dealt with the question of possible internal inconsistencies in the NT earlier.)
43. “Neque enim id aliter quodammodo facere potest [i.e., an error in a matter of doctrine could be proven], quam si decreta, aut axiomata religionis Christianae proferat, quae alicui rei in Novo Testamento scriptae adversentur. Atqui unde petat iste eiusmodi decreta, vel axiomata, quave auctoritate illa confirmare poterit, quae ipso Novo Testamento multo non sit inferior; in quo, quod ad res externas attinet, sua fundamenta habet omnis cognitio, quae habetur, decretorum, & axiomatum religionis Christianae?” (De auctoritate, in BFP 1:267).
44. “Quod enim ad rationes attinet, haec nimis fallax via est in re, quae ex divina patefactione pendeat qualis est Christiana religio” (De auctoritate, in BFP 1:267).
45. Klauber and Sunshine, “Jean-Alphonse Turrettini,” 13.
46. For an interesting discussion see John E. Platt, “The Denial of the Innate Idea of God in Dutch Remonstrant Theology from Episcopius to van Limborch,” in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment (ed. Carl R. Trueman and R. S. Clark; Carlisle, U.K.: Paternoster, 1999), 213–26. Although Platt’s focus is on the doctrine in Remonstrant theology, he devotes some discussion to possible lines of connection with Socinus, concluding that whereas the typical Remonstrant doctrine agrees with Socinus in denying an inborn, innate knowledge of God, it departs from him in affirming that man, through the right use of reason, can discern God’s existence from the created order, apart from Scripture.
47. “At sunt qui dicant, id saltem negari non posse, ex sola huius mundi machina, si quis animum advertat, posse quemlibet, non solum Deum esse, manifeste cognoscere, verum etiam rebus humanis eum prospiscere, plane percipere. Imo complures addunt, ex eadem machina omnes satis intelligere, quicquid opus est ad eam Dei notitiam, ex qua omnis religio proficiscitur” (Praelectiones theologicae, in BFP 1:538).
48. Praelectiones theologicae, in BFP 1:538.
49. “… alioqui non invenirentur nationes omni prorsus religione carentes” (De Auctoritate, in BFP 1:273).
50. “… mihique constanter affirmavit...” (De auctoritate, in BFP 1:273).
51. “Nam cum religio res naturalis nequaquam sit (alioqui non inveniretur nationes omni prorsus religione carentes; quales nostra aetate quibusdam in locis inventae sunt, ac nominatim in regione Bresilia: quemadmodum testantur scriptores digni quibus habeatur fides, mihique constanter affirmavit Pistoriensis quidam monachus Franciscanus concionator ex iis, quod Capuccinos vulgo vocant, homo honesto loco natus, prudens admodum ac cordatus, qui in ea regione fuerat) cum, inquam, religio nequaquam res naturalis sit, sed, si vera est, patefactio sit quaedam divina” (De auctoritate, in BFP 1:273).
52. Lech Szczucki and Janusz Tazbir provide historical background of the colloquy and an introduction to the document as a preface (written in Latin) to the work. George H. Williams also discusses this document and its significance in The Polish Brethren (Missoula, Mont: Scholars Press, 1980), 83–87.
53. “Religio Christiana, est doctrina caelestis, docens veram viam perveniendi ad vitam aeternam. Haec autem via, nihil est aliud, quam obedire Deo, iuxta ea, quae ille nobis praecepit, per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum (Hebr. 5:9)” (Summa Religionis Christianae, in BFP 1:281).
54. Harnack, History of Dogma, 7:139.
55. “Sed dicet quispiam: Quanam ratione vis, me quidquam de Christiana religione iudicare posse, cum nesciam qualisnam sit ista Christiana religio, propter tot tamque diversas immo contrarias opiniones, quae antiquitus fuerunt, hodieque sunt, de rebus ad eam pertinentibus? Respondeo, istas tot tamque diversas, aut etiam contrarias opiniones, nihil impedire, quominus de summa quadam constare possit eius religionis; quae summa sine dubio id est, in quo omnes, qui eam religionem, profitentur, videntur convenire; praecepta scilicet sanctissima quae in ipsa dantur, promissaque admirabilia vereque Deo digna, quae in ipsa continentur: quibus duabus rebus tanquam partibus, omnis religio potissimum constat” (De auctoritate, in BFP 1:272; emphasis in the original).
56. “Quin potius, quaenam alia religio est, cuius praecepta, si cum praeceptis Christianae religionis comparentur, non videantur tanquam exiguum & obscurum aliquod lumen soli oppositum atque collatum?” (De auctoritate, in BFP 1:272).
57. Socinus argues that, due to our weakness, we would do almost nothing apart from the promise of future reward: “Sed absque spe praemii nihil propemodum faceremus. Adeo sumus infirmi” (Epitome, lines 475–76). In proof, he cites the philosophers, “who used to preach nothing other than virtue, but scarcely was one among them found who was truly diligent in practicing virtue” (Epitome, lines 476–79).
58. “Hic enim is, qui praecepit, primus etiam omnium ea, quae praecepit aliis, ipse fecit; idque manifeste atque absolute, ut non minus docuerit, quae facienda sint, suo ipsius exemplo, quam verbis” (De auctoritate, in BFP 1:272).
59. E.g., “Quod nulla ibi sub testamento veteri promissio vitae aeternae” (Epitome, lines 1636–37).
60. I am indebted to Clow (“Socinianism,” 11:652) for this metaphor, though Clow himself was referring to the significance of the death and resurrection of Christ for Socinus, not to the center as I have given it above. While I would agree that a knowledge of Socinus’s conception of Christ’s death and resurrection is critical to understanding his system, I disagree that this locus forms the systemic center for Socinus. Rather, Christ’s death and resurrection serve to confirm what is the true center, namely the precepts that Christ taught, the keeping of which enables one to attain to the promises he offered.
61. “Sed tamen non necessarium cognitu id esse ad salutem hoc axiomate et quasi canone probatur: Omnia dogmata sine quibus fides in Christum et conservatio mandatorum Dei constare potest, ad salutem aeternam consequendam non sunt necessaria” (Epitome, lines 19–23).
62. Herzog, “Socinus (Faustus) and the Socinians,” 4:2209.
63. The meaning here is that Christ receives the divine essence from the Father, i.e., the Father communicates the divine essence to him.
64. “Nego assumptionem [i.e., that Trinitarians deny divine oneness], quia et Papistae et evangelici plus sobrii confitentur Christum esse essentiatum a Patre et Spiritum Sanctum ab eodem procedere. Et sic Patrem unum Deum esse et fontem omnis divinitatis asserunt” (Epitome, lines 27–30). It is quite interesting to note that of the Trinitarian models, the one that Socinus finds least objectionable is the Eastern, with a single procession of the Spirit from the Father. That Socinus has the Eastern approach in mind is evident in his use of “fons divinitatis” language. What is not so evident is just who these “more sober papists and evangelicals” are, who opt for a (presumably) single procession of the Spirit through the Son.
65. Epitome, lines 34–35.
66. “Aliud praeterea est dicere: solus Pater est verus Deus, et aliud: Pater est solus verus Deus” (Epitome, lines 50–51).
67. McGiffert, Protestant Thought, 117.
68. See, e.g., his De Iesu Christi invocatione disputatio … cum Francisco Davidis, in BFP 2:709–66. Note also his dispute against Christian Franken on the adoration of Christ in his Disputatio inter Faustum Socinum Senensem & Christianum Franken, de honore Christi, in BFP 2:767–804.
69. “… an Christus debeat adorari. Responsio: Debet, 1. quia Deus iussit aperte, … 2. Etsi Deus id non iussisset, Christi tamen maiestas hoc a nobis requirit ratione ipsa suadente. Honor enim semper comitatur dignitatem” (Epitome, lines 781–88).
70. Epitome, line 788.
71. “Honor enim semper comitatur dignatatem. Necessarium hoc est ad salutem aeternam. Qui enim hoc non facit, non credit Christum esse omnipotentem et peccat contra verbum Dei iubens, et multo gravius peccatum est Christum non adorare quam hominem occiderre” (Epitome, lines 78991).
72. “Non tenetur [i.e., invoking Christ in prayer] quis absolute, sed potest tamen eum invocare. Non teneri aliquem absolute Christum Christum invocare vel hinc patet, quod id nusquam praeceptum exstet; nec, ut praeceptum exstet, fieri ulla ratione potest. Nam si praeceptum de Christo invocando exstaret, oblata occasione aliquem invocandi non liceret alium invocare quam Chris-tum. Nam haec est natura praeceptorum omnium, ut quoties sese occasion ea faciendi offert, teneamur illa facere” (Epitome, lines 793–800).
73. “Durum est eum, qui sic sentit, pro fratre habere, sed durius est eum, qui pie vivit et pro Christo moritur, ita sentientem excludere. Non esse autem excludendos docent tot martyria ab eis pro Christo perpessa” (Epitome, lines 530–33). Socinus makes it clear that he does not believe that martyrdom ipso facto conduces to salvation. He is here speaking about individuals who demonstrated their true probity of life and dedication to Christ by making the ultimate sacrifice for him.
74. “Quamvis autem hoc credere sit adeo utile, ut fere sit necessarium, tamen non est omnino necessarium” (Epitome, lines 821–23).
75. “… tamen non necessario concidit, quia potest aliunde suffulciri, si scilicet credam illum nihilominus viam vitae aeternae mihi annuntiasse, resurrexisse, exaltatum esse et divinam gloriam consecutum, quae fidei meae causa esse possunt” (Epitome, lines 838–41).
76. “Decretum enim necessarium tollit omne liberum arbitrium. Quo sublato omnis etiam religio, quae nihil aliud est quam conatus Deo oboediendi, concidat necesse est” (Epitome, lines 1326–28).
77. Socinus treats this in chs. 8–11 of his Praelectiones theologicae, in BFP 1:544–50.
78. “… quod sine hominis libero arbitrio nec religio nec Dei rectitudo consistere potest ullo modo, quae duo sunt longe absurdissima atque adeo blasphema maxime. Atqui nec absurdi quicquam, multo minus blasphemi aliquid inde proficiscitur, quod Deus praescientiam istam habere noluerit” (Epitome, lines 1548–52).
79. “Etiamsi, si vim spectes et momentum istius sententiae [i.e., of predestination], religionem omnem tollat, tamen, quia id homines non considerant, facit Deus pro sua ingenti benignitate, ne eis, alioquin probis et servabilibus, hic error obsit ad vitam aeternam consequendam. Potest enim Deus alio modo in eis efficere religionem” (Epitome, lines 1583–86).
80. “Nobis hac differentia est opus, qui affirmamus opera bona esse causam sine qua non salutis nostrae” (Epitome, lines 2372–73).
81. “In doctrina propaganda curet, ut ea dicat, quae ad salutem hominum sunt necessaria. Maxime vero det operam, ut iustificationis articulum probe intelligat et aliis proponat. Is enim tantis est tenebris involutus, ut nihil magis, et tanta simulatione est refertus, ut mille latibula impii habeant non recte percepto itso de iustificatione mysterio. Curandum itaque est, ut homines sanabiles ad viam veritatis adduci et servari et sanari possint. Requirit iustificatio hominem probum, ideoque improbi et resipiscere nescii nolunt veram iustificationis viam recipere” (Epitome, lines 2965–72).
82. Similarly, the Racovian Catechism, the main Socinian confession of faith, attacks the “commonly held opinion” that Christ “merited our salvation through His death” and made “full satisfaction for our sins” as “false, erroneous, and very dangerous.” “Etsi nunc vulgo Christiani sentiunt, Christum morte sua salutem meruisse, et pro peccatis nostris plenarie satisfecisse, quae sententia fallax est et erronea, et admodum perniciosa” (Racovian Catechism; cited by John Owen, Vindicae evangelicae; or, the Mystery of the Gospel Vindicated and Socinianism Examined [vol. 12 of The Works of John Owen; ed. William H. Goold; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1862], 542).
83. Owen, Vindicae evangelicae, 26.
84. “Verùm, quia ex eorum, quae in tuo scripto reliqua sunt, diligente examinatione maior fortasse utilitas, quàm ex omnibus, quae hucusque dicta fuere, proficisci potest, & salutis nostrae aeternae ratio multò adhuc clariùs, & exactiùs explicari atque intelligi, pestilentissimique errores per hominum aut malitiam, aut imprudentiam in Christi ecclesiam invecti aut retegi, atque refelli, aut certè manifestèindicari; non abs re visum est mihi hoc adhuc laboris ad Dei gloriam suscipere” (De Servatore, 3.11, in BFP 2:213.). Godbey argues that De Servatore ought to be analyzed based on the more affirmative presentation of justification and faith in Christ found in part 4 (Godbey, “Study,” 406–28). Note, however, that in his earlier “Faustus Socinus in the Light of Modern Scholarship,” Godbey argued for the centrality of part 3: “In this Part Three … he [Socinus] announced two propositions which he wished to establish: ‘that Christ did not make satisfaction to divine justice for our sins, and, that it was not necessary that he should make satisfaction.’ These are two very important statements; they are not only the basis of Part Three, they are the core of De Jesu Christo Servatore.... The section which we have been considering [part 3] is one of the most crucial parts of his entire treatise. Much that goes before it is prolegomena; much that comes after it is commentary. This is, I think, the core.” See John C. Godbey, “Faustus Socinus in the Light of Modern Scholarship,” The Proceedings of the Unitarian Historical Society 15, part 1 (1964): 66-92.
85. Schweizer, Die Protestantischen Centraldogmen (2 vols.; Zurich, 1854–1856); Ritschl, A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation (trans. John S. Black; Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1872).
86. See, e.g., Muller, Prolegomena, 82–87.
87. Summa Religionis Christianae, in BFP 1:281.