To Whom Does The Law Speak? Romans 3:19 and the Works of the Law Debate

By Herbert Bowsher

[Herbert Bowsher is President of the Cromwell Group, Inc., a pre-employment screening firm in Birmingham, Ala.]

In the ongoing justification controversy, one’s understanding of ἔργα νόμου (“works of the law”) in Rom 3:20 marks a critical stage in any discussion. The literature is massive and the participants are legion, but I will be focusing on the work of four key players: James Dunn and N. T. Wright, on the one hand; and their opponents C. E. B. Cranfield and Douglas Moo, on the other. There are probably few who would take issue with the view that these men have produced four of the best and most useful commentaries on Romans that have appeared in the last thirty years.

Although in general agreement with Cranfield and Moo on this point, I will not be dealing with the meaning of ἔργα νόμου as such. What I will argue is that Dunn’s and Wright’s understanding of this phrase in Rom 3:20 requires some key assumptions about νόμος in 3:19. If these assumptions are found wanting, their argument cannot be sustained. However, these assumptions are shared by Cranfield and Moo, which I believe makes their critique of Dunn’s and Wright’s position on “works of the law” more difficult to advance than it would otherwise be.

In framing the issue in these terms I am not implying that there are two hermetically sealed camps with each defending some sort of “party line.” Although they bring their own theological grid with them (which is unavoidable), all four men are more responsible exegetes than that. Indeed, one factor making this whole discussion of Paul’s thought so fascinating is the way all these men agree or disagree with one another in surprising ways. For example, both Cranfield and Wright argue (rather convincingly, in my opinion) that φύσει is part of the first clause in Rom 2:14, thus speaking of Gentiles not having the law by nature.[1] Dunn and Moo agree with the more common understanding of φύσει belonging with the second clause, thereby seeing Gentiles as doing by nature those things contained in the law.[2]

In this article I will begin with a brief citation of how each side defines ἔργα νόμου in 3:20. This will be followed by a description of Dunn’s and Wright’s three assumptions about νόμος in v. 19, which are shared by Cranfield and Moo. Finally, the remainder of the article will trace the theme of νόμος in Paul’s argument of 1:18–3:18 which I believe calls into question all four scholars’ understanding of this issue.

Both Cranfield and Moo have argued tellingly for the traditional understanding of ἔργα νόμου. It is simply those “works which the law requires”[3] or “those things that are done in obedience to the law” which can justify no one in the sight of God.[4]

Dunn and Wright both argue that this traditional view has misunderstood the thrust of Paul’s argument, which is directed toward his Jewish interlocutor. ἔργα νόμου, as Dunn summarizes, are those “religious practices which set those ‘within the law’ apart as the people of God.”[5] The law then is an “‘identity factor’ to mark out the people of the law in their distinctiveness.”[6] Or, as Wright states, they are “the sign of that membership in Israel, God’s covenant people.”[7] Simple membership in the covenant as evidenced by these identity markers is insufficient for one’s justification. To avoid misunderstanding, Dunn himself has subsequently clarified his position by including obedience within those parameters. Works of the law include “doing what the law requires to maintain one’s status with the covenant.”[8] These identity markers can be seen as “shibboleths” or shorthand designations that summarize the total requirements of Jewish covenantal membership as it is carried over from the OT revelation.

In order to sustain Dunn’s and Wright’s understanding of ἔργα νόμου in 3:20, it is necessary to affirm certain assumptions about the use of νόμος in v. 19:

• Only Jews are ἐν τῶ νόμω—”under the law” or “within the law.”
• The “law” in question is the totality of the OT with Torah understood as a complete unit. Any attempt to see distinctions (i.e., moral vs. ceremonial) within the law is foreign to Paul’s use of the concept.
• Logically following the above, the indictment of v. 19 is restricted to the Jews.

In his discussion of 3:19 Dunn is emphatic in stating that it is here that “the character and function of the law as marking the boundary between Jew and Gentile comes to expression.”[9] It is Jews and Jews only who are ἐν τῶ νόμω— within the confines of the totality of Torah. Put another way, Dunn concludes, “The only law in view is the Jewish law.”[10] And he is surely correct in stating, “I assume from his own comments on these verses that Cranfield agrees.”[1]1 This is echoed by Moo’s affirmation that “‘those in the law’ are the Jews who live within the sphere of the revelation of God given in the Scripture/law.”[12] For Moo, this can only be Jews since they are the unique custodians of this written revelation.[13]

It is just this consensus that I wish to challenge, and I will do so by examining Paul’s argument from its inception in Rom 1:18. I will address only those portions that touch on these questions while, of course, remaining cognizant that they are to be seen in the context of Paul’s total argument.

N. T. Wright, in his usual clever way, has compared the developing argument of Romans to a symphony:

It is no use picking out a few favorite lines from Romans and hoping from them to understand the whole book. One might as well try to get the feel of a Beethoven symphony by humming over half a dozen bars from different movements. Romans is, indeed, a symphonic composition: Themes are stated and developed (often in counterpoint with each other), recapitulated in different keys, anticipated in previous movements and echoed in subsequent ones.[14]

I find this a useful metaphor. In the course of Paul’s argument from 1:18 through our focal point in 3:19–20, Paul’s understanding of the law, radically at odds with the understanding of both Jew and Gentile, surfaces here and there like a recurring musical motif.

At this point it will probably be helpful to give my own assumptions about the law in 3:19 which it will be my task to demonstrate from Paul’s argument.

• It is all mankind that is within the scope of the law.
• This law is restricted to something very close to the moral law as has been traditionally understood. The ceremonial/restorative law is not in view here.
• The indictment of v. 19 includes all mankind, both Jew and Gentile, which dissolves any boundary line between them.

I recognize that I am swimming against the current of modern theological thought here. Regarding the moral/ceremonial distinction, Heikki Räisänen would probably speak for many when he labels this “anachronistic terminology.”[15] Moo summarizes the issue as well as any:

First-century Jews viewed the law as a unity. It was the Torah, given by God through Moses to the people of Israel as their guide for the whole of life. Jews did not make any fundamental distinction between “moral” and “ceremonial” laws or “moral” and “redemptive” laws. We must assume, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary, that Jesus and Paul maintained this same perspective.[16]

To a certain degree I sympathize with this statement. But the operative phrase is “unless there is clear evidence to the contrary,” and I believe there is.

Romans 1:18–32 marks the initial phase of Paul’s argument detailing examples of the universal sin of all mankind and is directed either exclusively to Gentiles or primarily to Gentiles though Jews are intended as well (so, Cranfield[17]). It is axiomatic that sin cannot be pronounced apart from a violation of law (1 John 3:4). In 1:32 Paul gives a summarizing explanation of the nature of this law that is violated. It is τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ—the statute, ordinance, or judgment of God. The use of δικαίωμα here is significant and points to God’s law as delivered to Moses (there is no other kind). It is the commandments and the ordinances (ταῖς ἐντολαῖς καὶ δικαιώμασιν) in which Zachariah and Elizabeth walked blameless (Luke 1:6). And in the next chapter of Romans (2:26) the “ordinances of the law” are clearly speaking of Mosaic law.

Frank Thielman makes a rather judicious observation concerning the penal sanctions of this first chapter:

Paul describes. .. the penalty of death for those who commit the sins he has just named. Since idolatry, homosexuality, and most of the sins listed in 1:28–31 did not carry the death penalty in any Gentile legal code, Paul is probably echoing the language of the Mosaic code, which calls the choice between obedience and disobedience to the commandments a choice between “life” and “death”(Deut 30:19).[18]

It is at this point that I find Dunn’s argument rather confusing. Regarding δικαίωμα he says, “Paul speaks here of ‘the decree of God’ not of ‘the requirement of the law.”‘[19] The distinction between a decree of God and a requirement of law is lost on this reader. Dunn appears to see something of the awkward nature of his assertion, as he continues, “Of course Paul sees the law as the clear expression of what God requires of man (see also 2:13). But. .. he is not thinking of the requirements of the law as normally understood in Judaism.”[20] Well, yes. The whole reason Paul is writing this letter is to correct the Jews’ (and Gentiles’) normal understanding of all kinds of things.

Moo advances a peculiarity of his own when he states, “The lack of reference to ‘the law’ is significant.”[21] Paul’s use of δικαίωμα in 1:32 shows that the exact opposite is true. It is the use of such a word, which points to the Mosaic law, that is significant.

Thus the conclusion that Gentiles are, in a certain sense, within the parameters of the Mosaic law is difficult to escape. A fair question to ask would be whether Gentiles who did not possess the written law could be held accountable for its contents. This absence of a written law is probably behind Moo’s “lack of reference to the law” statement. It is not an easy question but follows Paul’s thinking earlier in the chapter when he discusses the natural man’s knowledge of God. What’s important is that this represents no novelty. If Israel’s God is pictured in the OT as the creator and judge of all nations then it follows that all nations are subject to His law. For example, in Lev 18 Moses gives detailed and specific case law application of the Decalogue to the covenant people. Warning that violations of these statutes and judgments would cause the land to be defiled, he states that such violations and defilements were committed by the nations (Gentiles) in the land. He then gives this as the specific reason for the Gentiles’ being cast out (“vomited out”) in vv. 24 and 25. Gentiles, in other words, are required to keep the Mosaic law whether they have it in written form or not.

It is just this common accountability between Jews and Gentiles that leads to the next phase of Paul’s argument in the second chapter. Only the premise of a common standard would enable Paul to argue successfully that Jews would not be given a “free pass” to sin on the basis of their identity as God’s chosen people. For if it can be stated that God shows no partiality between peoples (i.e., Jews and Gentiles) with respect to judgment (2:11), this means there cannot be different standards of authority by which they are judged. There may be (indeed I believe there are) different degrees of responsibility according to providential privilege, but there must be a common standard of accountability or Paul’s argument becomes muddled and confused.

Accountability particularly means obedience. Not simply hearers but doers of the law will be justified (2:13). How this truth relates to justification by faith is developed by Paul as the letter proceeds, but is beyond the scope of this article.

At this point one can imagine a possible place of refuge for Paul’s Jewish interlocutor. He could say, “Well, it may be as you say, that I am without an apologetic (2:1) in a certain sense, but if the Mosaic law is the common standard and I am to be compared to sinners of the Gentiles, you must at least concede that they have quite a bit of catching up to do. I carry the badge of the covenant (circumcision). I keep the Sabbaths, the feasts, and the food laws. I am doing much of what the law requires. So if you can come up with Gentiles who are serious enough about the law of Moses to take upon themselves the yoke of Torah, then we can continue this discussion.”

Paul drives his Jewish interlocutor from this supposed refuge in vv. 14–15. He introduces Gentiles who do not have the law by nature yet do τὰ τοῦ νόμου (“the things of the law”). Puzzling to many, these verses are not an odd parenthetical aside but represent an essential stage in Paul’s argument. Consider what is being stated: these are people who do not embrace those visual identity markers that his hearers would assume to be essential. Yet Paul says they do τὰ τοῦ νόμου. In other words, Paul is assigning a reduced and narrower meaning to νόμος than what his hearers would have first imagined.[22] There is no other way of understandingthis.Räisänenwouldliketoretainthefull,traditionalmeaning of νόμος yet he sees the problem clearly:

It is only by tacitly reducing the Torah to a moral law that Paul can think of the Christians (as well as some non-Christian Gentiles, Rom 2:14f.) as fulfilling the Torah. This state of affairs is also revealed in Rom 8:4. If the ‘just requirement of the law’ is fulfilled in the life of Christians, nomos cannot really mean the Torah in its totality.[23]

 Exactly. Of course Räisänen’s solution (if one can call it that) is simply to throw up his hands and say Paul is confused and doesn’t really understand what he is saying. Further, like a true citizen of the twentieth century, he approves of this imprecision since it enables Paul to “impress his Christian readers on the emotional level.”[24]

Stephen Westerholm, presumably summarizing Räisänen, states, “Nevertheless, when Paul speaks in Romans 2 of Gentiles who ‘keep the law’ (2:27; cf. vv. 14, 26) the statement is patently untrue if Israel’s ritual law is included.... It is obvious that he has tacitly reduced Torah to its moral requirements.”[25] His “nevertheless” refers to the previous paragraph that begins, “Though some scholars have suggested that Paul rejected only the ritual elements of the law, such a view does not withstand scrutiny: Paul can speak positively of Israel’s cult (latreia, Rom 9:4) and negatively about the moral law (Rom 4:15; 7:5, 7–11; 2 Cor 3:6–7)....”[26]

Westerholm’s caveat[27] affords me the opportunity to state clearly what I am not saying. I am not saying that Paul’s reduction of νόμος to the moral law is true across the board for his entire corpus. Though I might quibble with the exegetical understanding of the verses cited, Westerholm’s larger point is well taken. Even within Romans itself, Paul does not speak of νόμος in a uniform way. But Rom 1:18–3:20 is a logical, self-contained argument that must, first of all, be interpreted in its own terms. One should not assign shifting meanings to specific concepts unless there is a clear indication that Paul is doing so or that such a shift is required to avoid an obvious contradiction.

Wright takes note that Gentiles, apart from any ceremonial identity markers, are said to keep the law. Yet, wishing to cling tenaciously to the essential unity of Torah, he understands “νόμος as referring to Jewish law throughout.”[28] How can he do this without descending into Räisänen-like irrationalism? He does it by jettisoning the occurrence of actual obedience (something Dunn, as we have seen, is unwilling to do). For Wright this fulfillment of the law is accomplished for Gentile Christians “by their very existence.... The fulfillment of which Paul speaks is, I think, first and foremost a matter of status.”[29] He terms this a “new sort of theological category” in keeping with the Spirit’s work in the new covenant.[30]

The chief problem with Wright’s “new theological category” is that it sounds suspiciously like special pleading. Paul’s argument has been that if those in covenant membership commit the same sins as uncircumcised Gentiles they will share in the common condemnation. As has been shown, this implies one common standard of accountability. God is no respecter of persons. Not hearers only but doers of the law will be justified. By speaking of fulfillment of the law “by one’s very existence” with corresponding “status” language, Wright is introducing a privileged category of special people who are exempt from the ethical requirements that apply to everyone else. This is special pleading, that is, the use of a double standard in order to ensure that a particular group will be judged more leniently than those less favored. Such special pleading would seriously compromise Paul’s apologetic against his Jewish interlocutor. In fact, Rom 2 speaks of actual law obedience and disobedience, not privileged status. Once more we are driven to conclude that νόμος is being reduced to the moral law to which everyone must give an answer.

This reduced νόμος motif resurfaces even more clearly in 2:26. ἡ ἀκροΒυστία (“the uncircumcised”), by very definition, are those who do not keep the Mosaic law in its totality. Yet they are said to comply in the manner prescribed by the Mosaic legislation. Wright notes that the phrase τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ νόμου φυλάσση (“keep the ordinances of the law”) uses the same root words as the LXX of Deut 30:16: φυλάσσεσθαι τὰ δικαιώματα.[31] φυλάσσω is particularly linked with the keeping of the Mosaic law in the NT. It is the word used each time in the Synoptic Gospels for the confident claim of the rich young ruler (Matt 19:20 || Mark 10:20 || Luke 18:21). Again, Gentiles, who are not keeping the ceremonial law (or do not possess the identity markers, if one prefers that language) are said to be keepers of the Mosaic legislation.

For Paul, therefore, 2:26, following his earlier usage, is a bold use of νόμος which radically redefines and narrows the concept of what has traditionally been called “the moral law.” I don’t know how else this could be understood. This culminates in the scandalous and revolutionary declaration that uncircumcised law keepers (an oxymoron to his hearers) would judge circumcised law breakers (v. 27).[32] So radical is this idea that in the opening verses of ch. 3 Paul deems it necessary to posit an early introduction to the theme he will develop more fully in ch. 11: there is an advantage to being a Jew, and the unfaithfulness of the original covenant people will not negate the faithfulness of God to His promises.

Verse 9 of the third chapter represents a summing up as Paul declares he has proved that all ( Jew and Gentile) are alike under sin.[33] He has made his case and is done with his Jewish interlocutor, in a sense. The OT citations that follow encompass this “all.” Verses 10–18 return full circle to the theme of universal sinfulness introduced in 1:18–32. But this time the indictment encompasses both Jews and Gentiles equally.

Wright disagrees and sees Paul still dealing with his Jewish interlocutor. “The Biblical quotations,” he says, “.. . are themselves indictments, not of pagans but of Jews.”[34] Normally the careful exegete, Wright simply states this without offering any proof. This is not the way these OT passages are commonly understood. For example, following Rashi and Kimchi, Cohen indicates that the normal Jewish way of viewing Ps 14 is “in understanding it as a description of the hard lot of Israel in a godless world.”[35] Granted, some would view it as sin within Israel itself, but this is clearly the minority opinion that would certainly not be the way the Jewish hearers of Paul’s day would understand it. And since Paul does not come down on one side or the other we must assume the more common interpretation. Moo catches the correct sense by describing 3:10–18 as “the variety of the sin that so characterizes all humanity.”[36]

Verse 19 concludes with what is surely a universal indictment as πᾶν στόμα (“all mouths”) and πᾶς ὁ κόσμος (“all the world”) would indicate. These mouths, though full of cursing (v. 14), are being silenced without a defense.

In v. 19 where νόμος reappears (twice), this law speaks to those within its scope. At a minimum, at even the most basic level, it is hard to see how Gentiles can be excluded from operating within the sphere of the law (ἐν τῶ νόμω) in 3:19. Throughout 1:18–3:17 every time Paul touches on νόμος, Gentiles are in some way connected.[37] The only way that one can argue for the exclusion of Gentiles as ἐν τῶ νόμω in 3:19 is to say that Paul is now employing a different understanding of νόμος from what he has argued before. This is an appeal, as far as I know, that no one is making. Nevertheless, Dunn sees the law as something that separates. For Paul the law is something that Gentiles have a place within.

Dunn (and to a lesser extent, Wright and Moo) has written much about boundary lines and identity markers that define the OT Jews and set them apart from Gentiles. Dunn is advancing a helpful concept that is clearly embedded in Paul’s thought. But for Paul the shorthand designation for these things is not νόμος but περιτομή (circumcision). It is περιτομή that divides; νόμος unites. It is the νόμος, understood as the moral law representing the just requirement of all people, that Paul has in mind when he states that we establish the law (3:32).

Notes

1. C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (ICC; 2 vols.; London: T&T Clark, 2003), 1:155–63; N. T. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans” (NIB; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002), 10:440–43; Wright, “The Law in Romans 2, ” in Paul and the Mosaic Law (ed. James D. G. Dunn; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 131–50.
2. James D. G. Dunn, Romans (WBC 38A-B; 2 vols.; Dallas: Word, 1988), 1:98–102; Douglas Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 148–53.
3. C. E. B. Cranfield “The Works of the Law in the Epistle to the Romans,” JSNT 43 (1991): 100.
4. Moo, Romans, 209.
5. Dunn, Romans, 154.
6. Ibid., 159.
7. Wright, “Letter to the Romans,” 460.
8. Dunn, “Yet Once More—’The Works of the Law’: A Response,” JSNT 46 (1992): 110.
9. Dunn, Romans, 152.
10. Dunn, “Yet Once More,” 105.
11. Ibid.
12. Moo, Romans, 205.
13. Ibid.
14. Wright, “Letter to the Romans,” 396.
15. Heikki Räisänen, Paul and the Law (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 28.
16. Douglas J. Moo, “Response to Greg L. Bahnsen,” in Five Views on Law and Gospel (ed. Wayne Strickland; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 167.
17. Cranfield, Romans, 105–6.
18. Frank Thielman, Paul and the Law: A Contextual Approach (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994), 169.
19. Dunn, Romans, 69.
20. Ibid.
21. Moo, Romans, 121.
22. My use of the phrase, “do not have the law by nature,” implies Wright’s and Cranfield’s understanding. If one prefers the more traditional “do by nature the things of the law” the argument I am advancing in this article is unaffected. νόμος is being narrowed either way.
23. Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 23 (italics in original).
24. Ibid.
25. Stephen Westerholm, Israel’s Law and the Church’s Faith (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 1998), 94–95.
26. Ibid., 94.
27. Here Westerholm appears to be summarizing Raisänen’s discussion from Paul and the Law, 24–25.
28. Wright, “Law in Romans 2, ” 138.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 139.
31. Wright, “Letter to the Romans,” 456.
32. Is the heart-circumcised Jew in v. 29 to be identified as a Christian? When we think broadly about the Spirit’s work in the New Covenant, it appears that an affirmative answer is compatible with the character of the New Covenant and with the Apostle’s thinking in 2 Cor 3. This may indeed be the Apostle’s meaning in this verse. But as I reflect on the matter I am less comfortable with this identification. That Paul is referring to the circumcised heart of Deut10:16 is without controversy. Perhaps all he is saying (not without genuine sorrow and affection) to his Jewish interlocutor is, in effect, “This, after all, is what has been required all along.” At this point in the text he is then not making any direct statement, or furnishing any detail, as to how a Jew or Gentile may come to be a Jew inwardly, but only saying that this is what is required.
33. Moo has argued that this should be understood as an accusation rather than a proof of guilt. Either way, the argument I am advancing is unaffected. Moo, Romans, 201 n. 18.
34. Wright, “Letter to the Romans,” 456.
35. A. Cohen, The Psalms: Hebrew Text and English Translation with an Introduction and Commentary (Soncino Books of the Bible; London: Soncino Press, 1950), 33.
36. Moo, Romans, 198.
37. 2:17 is not an exception. It is merely a passing reference to the Jewish interlocutor’s fundamental misunderstanding of both the law and what it means to be a Jew.