Orthodoxy And Divine Simplicity

By Norman L. Geisler

Introduction

At the heart of the current battle for God is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Classical theism, which is the basis of historic orthodoxy, affirms God’s simplicity and openness theism (hereafter called neotheism)[1] denies it.

Comments will be divided into several parts: first, the meaning of God’s simplicity; second, the classical arguments in favor of it; third, the current objections being leveled against it; and fourth, the relationship between God’s simplicity and orthodox theology.

The Meaning Of Divine Simplicity

Simplicity as applied to God is the doctrine that He is absolutely one in His essence, without any divisions. The simplicity of God means there is no composition or complexity of any kind in God, whether substantially or accidentally. He has no modes, parts, or poles. Whatever is appropriately attributed to Him is said of His absolutely one nature (essence). It also implies that God is without any capacity to be divided.He has no potentiality for division but is Pure Actuality. God is absolutely indivisible.

The Classical Arguments For Divine Simplicity

The importance of simplicity did not escape the keen theological perception of the greatest theologian of the late Middle Ages. Not only did Aquinas treat it first before discussing any other attribute of God,[2] but many of his arguments for the other attributes of God are dependent on it. Its importance can also be estimated by the fact that virtually all the great orthodox Fathers and Teachers of the Church spoke to the issue.[3]

Aquinas’ Five Arguments For Simplicity

In his classic Summa Theologica, Aquinas listed no less than five arguments for God’s simplicity.[4] He stated that “The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways.

“First,. .. [since none of the six possible ways something could differ are possible for God][5], it is clear that God is in no way composite, but is altogether simple.

“Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as has been shown above.

“Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves diverse cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused. .. since He is the first efficient cause.

“Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality (this does not apply to God).. . .” For God is Pure Actuality.

“Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any one of its parts.. .. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite.”[6]

Turretin’s Arguments For Simplicity

Following Aquinas, Turretin systematized the Reformation view on simplicity in these words: “The simplicity of God considered not morally, but physically, is his incommunicable attribute by which the divine nature is conceived by us not only as free from all composition and division, but also as incapable of composition and divisibility:[7]

“(1) from his independence, because composition is of the formal reason of a being originated and dependent (since nothing can be composed by itself, but whatever is composed must necessarily be composed by another; now God is the first and independent being, recognizing no other prior to himself);

“(2) from his unity, because he who is absolutely one, is also absolutely simple and therefore can neither be divided nor composed;

“(3) from his perfection, because composition implies imperfection inasmuch as it supposes passive power, dependency and mutability;

“(4) from his activity, because God is a most pure act having no passive admixture and therefore rejecting all composition (because in God there is nothing which needs to be made perfect or can receive perfection from any other, but he is whatever can be and cannot be other than what he is). When he is usually described not only by concrete but also abstract names—life, light, truth, etc.”[8]

Further Theological Argumentation For Simplicity

In addition to these powerful arguments for simplicity, there are other attributes and acts of God from which the attribute of simplicity seems to follow logically. (Interestingly, four of these are accepted by neotheists.) Hence, the neotheistic denial of simplicity appears to be inconsistent with other things they claim to believe about God.

Simplicity Follows From Infinity

Both classical theists and neotheists agree that God is infinite in His being. But an infinite Being cannot be divided. If it could, it would need to have parts. But there cannot be an infinite number of actual parts[9] since no matter how many parts there are, one more can always be added. But there cannot be one more than an infinite. Hence, an infinite Being cannot have parts. It must be absolutely simple.

To put it another way, no amount of finite parts adds up to an infinite. But God is infinite. Therefore, God cannot have any finite parts.[10]

Hence, God must be absolutely simple.

Simplicity Follows From God As First Cause

Both classical and neotheists accept the fact that God is the uncaused Cause of all that exists. As the First Cause, God has no cause beyond Himself. And He cannot be the cause of Himself, for self-caused beings are impossible (since to cause one’s self, a being would have to be ontologically prior to itself). But every composite being has a cause, for things diverse in themselves cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But since God is uncaused, He cannot have diverse elements in Himself. Hence, He cannot be composite.

To rephrase this, many evangelical thinkers, including neotheists, are proponents of some form of the intelligent design theory. This they hold regardless of how much natural evolution they may allow for as a result of this intelligent design.[11] But intelligent design proponents point out that irreducible complexity, such is found in the smallest living things, is evidence of an intelligent Designer. If this is so, then God could not have complexity or else He must have been designed by something beyond Himself. But both neo and classical theists agree that God is the First Cause and there is nothing beyond Him. If so, then God cannot be complex. For if He were, then He would be designed by an intelligent Designer beyond Himself. But there is no being beyond the First Cause. Hence, God cannot be complex. He must be absolutely simple.

Simplicity Follows From Necessity

Christian theists of virtually all stripes agree that God is a necessary Being.[12] That is, He is a Being that cannot not be. His non-existence is not possible. But what has no potentiality for non-existence in its Being is Pure Actuality. And Pure Actuality is unlimited and unique. It is one of a kind. But what is absolutely one cannot be divided.

To state it another way, there cannot be two beings of Pure Actuality, for there is no way one could differ from the other. They cannot differ in their actuality for in this they are entirely the same. And being Pure Actuality, they have no potentiality by which they could differ. Hence, they must be entirely the same. And what is entirely the same is absolutely one in its being, having nothing in it by which it could differ.

And what is absolutely one Being is simple. Hence, God is absolutely simple in His being.[13]

Ex Nihilo Creation Implies Simplicity

Both classical and neotheists believe in ex nihilo creation:[14] God brought the world into existence out of nothing. There was God and nothing else, and as a result of His simple fiat all of the universe came into existence. That is, there were no parts, particles, or other actualities out of which God created the world. There was absolutely nothing that existed apart from God.

Granted ex nihilo creation, it would appear that the God who did this must have been a simple and indivisible Being. For no matter what name one gives to the basic parts or particles of the universe, the One that made them could not have been composed of them. For if all that is composed of parts is created, then the Composer must not have had any parts. If He did, then He too would need a Creator. But both sides agree that He is the First, Uncaused cause of all else that exists. If so, then the composer of all composed things must Himself be uncomposed.

Simplicity Follows From Immutability

Whatever cannot change, cannot be divided since division is a form of change. When something changes in its being, there must be a division between what remains the same and what does not. Otherwise, there would be no change in the being; it would remain the same. Hence, what is immutable is indivisible.[15]

It does not help the neotheists to reject this view of change for its only logical alternative. For annihilation and recreation is not a change in being; it is a change of being. For by it one being is destroyed and another is recreated in its place. But a Necessary Being cannot come to be or cease to be. Hence, since neotheists agree that God is a Necessary Being, it follows that He cannot change in His Being.

It is noteworthy that even many neotheists admit that there is one aspect, dimension, or pole of God that does not change. If so, then this pole must be simple for the reasons just given. Thus, this pole of God is identical to the classical view of God’s nature which they reject. And the other so-called “pole”—the one that changes—is not substantially different from what the classical theists call God’s changing relations with the world.[16] Hence, in this case, neotheism reduces to classical theism which they reject. In any event, their arguments against simplicity fail since they admit a dimension to God that cannot change and, hence, must be simple.

An Evaluation Of The Denial Of Divine Simplicity

Since the advent of process theology,[17] it has been fashionable to deny God’s simplicity and opt for a God composed of poles and properties. Some evangelicals have joined the process bandwagon, admitting their view is “Between Classical and Process Theism.”[18] More recently Clark Pinnock has admitted a whole host of similarities with process thought.[19] Space does not permit examining all their objections to divine simplicity, so we will focus here on what seem to be the most significant ones.[20]

A Historical Objection

Neotheists repeatedly insist that divine simplicity, along with other classical attributes of God (such as immutability and eternality), should be rejected because the notion of divine simplicity is based on Greek philosophy.[21] Indeed, this point is at the heart of their response to the strong argument from history in favor of simplicity (see below). Their objection, however, fails for many reasons. First, it is a genetic fallacy to reject a truth claim based on its origin.

Second, if neotheists are to be consistent, they should reject their own position, too, for the basis of their process view is also grounded in the flux philosophy of Greek thinker Heraclitus. And the fountainhead of process thought and a confessed mentor of neotheism, Alfred North Whitehead, admitted that his thinking was only part of a series of footnotes on the Greek philosopher Plato.[22]

Third, neotheists do not reject the basic laws of logic, even though a Greek philosopher named Aristotle discovered and elaborated on them. Hence, neotheists do not reject everything that is Greek in origin.

Fourth, even neotheists admit that the Greeks were sometimes right. Greg Boyd acknowledged that “Sound philosophizing leads us to the same conclusion. Aristotle wisely taught that what is eternal cannot be other than it is. It is (as philosophers say) ‘necessary.’”[23]

Fifth, there simply are no antecedents in Greek philosophy for the Christian theist’s view of a Trinitarian God who created the world ex nihilo. There were forms of polytheism and even a triad (like Plato’s Good, Demiurgos, and World Soul), but there was no Trinity of three Persons in one Nature.

Sixth, as Etienne Gilson pointed out,[24] the Greeks never identified their ultimate metaphysical principle with God.[25] This was a unique contribution of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Seventh, even if the charge is narrowed to platonic philosophy, it backfires since even those like Alvin Plantinga who deny simplicity, to borrow his own words, accept a whole “Platonic pantheon of universals, properties, kinds, propositions, numbers, sets, states of affairs and possible worlds.”[26] And Whitehead’s process theology, accepted in part by neotheists, is by his own confession a continuation of Plato’s thought.

Eighth, this objection is a case of the kettle calling the pot black, for neotheists admit buying into process philosophy. Pinnock confesses, “I am arguing to reevaluate classical theism in light of a more relational metaphysics (not all philosophy is bad!).”[27] More recently he has moved closer to process theology, saying of its founder, Alfred North Whitehead, “I find the dialectic in its doctrine of God helpful, for example the idea that God is necessary and contingent, eternal and temporal, infinite and finite.” He adds, “Candidly, I believe that conventional theists are more influenced by Plato, who was a pagan, than I am by Whitehead, who was a Christian”![28]

So, the question is not whether the idea of simplicity is Hellenic but whether it is authentic. It does not matter whether the idea is Greek, but whether it is good.

Philosophical Objections

Some neotheists object to divine simplicity because its intelligibility has been seriously questioned. However, upon careful examinations these objections fall short of their mark.

Objection One—Based On Alleged Unintelligibility

Hasker states, “divine timelessness is strongly dependent. .. on divine simplicity (whose intelligibility has been strongly challenged).”[29] However, this neotheistic objection fails for several reasons.

First, divine simplicity cannot be unintelligible in an absolute sense, for the very fact that people deny it is evidence for the intelligibility of divine simplicity. Otherwise, they are denying that which they do not understand.

Second, just because something may not be totally comprehendible (e.g., God’s uncausality, infinity, necessity, eternality, immutability, simplicity, etc.) does not mean that it is not apprehendable. Even neotheist admit that at least the first three of these are intelligible. For example, infinity cannot be comprehended (though it can be apprehended) by a finite mind, yet the neotheist affirms that God is infinite.

Third, a thing may be unintelligible in one of two ways. It may be unintelligible in itself, such as a square circle. Or it may be unintelligible to us,[30] as a sentence in a language we do not understand. Hence, simply to affirm that divine simplicity is unintelligible does not demonstrate that it is unintelligible in itself. It merely demonstrates that it is unintelligible to those who are making the claim.

Objection Two—Based On Alleged Identity Of All Properties

Alvin Plantinga claims “There are two difficulties, one substantial and the other truly monumental. In the first place if God is identical with each of his properties, then each of his properties is identical with each of his properties. This seems fiatly incompatible with the obvious fact that God has several properties.”[31]

A Response To Objection Two

Aquinas addressed this objection over seven hundred years ago[32] He pointed out that there is no contradiction in holding that God has many attributes and only one essence. For many things can be true of one and the same object. For example, a stone can be hard, round, and grey. None of these are the same attribute, but all of them refer to one and the same stone. Even so, God’s many attributes are not the same, but the same God has all these attributes. Since no one attribution tells all about His infinite nature, it is necessary to say many things of God in order to understand Him better. That is to say, the reason we have to attribute many different things to God is that no finite concept can exhaust what can be known about His infinite nature. Hence, in order to know more about God, we must truly predicate more things of Him.

While these many attributes are not synonymous, nevertheless they are coordinated in Him. God is both love and holy. Thus, He is loving holiness and holy love. So, the many attributes in God can be different and yet refer to one and the same thing. Similarly, the many radii have reference to one and the same center of the circle.

Finally, like other contemporary philosophers, Plantinga does not see the coherence of God’s simplicity and many attributes because he assumes all attributes are predicated of God univocally and, hence, must mean the same thing. However, if, as Aquinas notes, God’s many attributes are predicated analogically of His one essence, then the alleged incoherence vanishes. Hence, to demonstrate the intrinsic incoherence of God’s simplicity one must demonstrate that analogous predication is contradictory. But neither Plantinga nor anyone one else has accomplished this feat. In fact, Plantinga passes on this crucial issue, contenting himself with the claim that proponents must also have an analogous understanding of simplicity.[33] But this by no means destroys its coherence or intelligibility.

Objection Three—Based On Incompatibility Of Property And Person

Plantinga offers what he calls a “monumental” objection, namely, “.. . if God is identical with each of his properties, then, since each of his properties is a property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property. Accordingly, God has just one property: himself.” Plantinga believes “this view is subject to a difficulty both obvious and overwhelming. No property could have created the world; no property could be omniscient, or, indeed, know anything at all.” In short, “If God is a property, then he isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine seems an utter mistake.”[34]

A Response To Objection Three

The key to the response is Plantinga’s phrase “so taken.” One simply does not have to take property and person the way he does. Of course, if God is a person, then He cannot be an abstract object. And if a property is an abstract object, then God cannot have properties. But rather than this being an objection to simplicity (as traditionally understood), it may be a revelation of the incoherency of the view of the objector.

If, on the other hand, “property” is understood as an attribute of real things that are predicated of God in an analogous sense, then there is no reason that God cannot have many “properties” or attributes. (For He is the Creator of them and, so, they must somehow resemble Him because the effect “prexists” in its efficient Cause).[35] Only if properties are considered atomically separate and different realities that exist necessary and eternally in themselves, does one have the difficulty Plantinga envisions. But, again, this more likely is a problem with his own form of platonism and not with God’s simplicity as such.

Finally, there appears to be a serious problem of incoherence in Plantinga’s system which is used as a basis for criticizing God’s simplicity. For he has great difficulty in explaining how God has a nature rather than being a mere bundle of properties. His solution is to claim “The nature of an object can be thought of as a conjunctive property, including as conjuncts just those properties essential to that object.”[36] But what is a “conjunctive property”? How can properties which are essentially different be conjoined? How does this avoid the charge of incoherence which Plantinga leveled against Aquinas that different things cannot be the same, and the same thing cannot be different things?

It would appear that on a univocal concept of “properties” or attributes (such as Plantinga embraces), there cannot be a “conjunctive property” other than in the loose sense that this phrase is a way of describing a mere collection of properties. But in this sense there is no ultimate unity in God and there is no way to explain why these components are composed. How did they get composed without a Composer (who is not composed)? In short, we are lead right back to a basic argument for God’s simplicity.

Theological Objections To Simplicity

Other objections from a theological perspective call for attention. The first springs from the Christian concept of the Trinity.

Theological Objection One—Based On The Trinity

Trinitarian theists affirm a multiplicity in God of three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Hence, it would seem that God cannot be absolutely One or else He could not also be three Persons. For if the Persons are really different, then God cannot be absolutely the same. And if they are not really distinct (but only in our minds), then Modalism (Sabellianism) follows and not Trinitarianism.

A Response To Objection One

The first thing to note about this objection is that it confuses person and essence. Simplicity refers only to God’s essence. Clearly, the orthodox view of the Trinity has a plurality of persons within the unity of one essence. The early Creeds were very careful to distinguish the Persons in the Godhead without dividing His essence.[37]

As Aquinas noted, in reference to the Divine essence, each person is identical to the one essence. But in respect to each other, each person is mutually distinct and not united with each other.[38] Therefore, the Trinity and simplicity are not contradictory.

Classical theists do not deny relationships in God. For the relationships really exist in God. But the distinctions in God are not according to essence, but according to what is related, namely, to the three persons. Therefore, relationality in God does not entail composition.[39]

Theological Objection Two—Based On Many Attributes

In this same vein, it is objected that all things identical to the same thing are identical to each other. For example, if A is identical to B and C is identical to B, then A must be identical to C. But all the members of the Godhead are identical to the same thing (viz., God’s essence). Hence, it would seem to follow that all the members of the Trinity are identical to each other.

A Response To Objection Two

First of all, no Trinitarian (as neotheists claim to be) would want to make this claim, for it denies the plurality of persons in God. It is in fact the claim made by Sabellian (Modalist) heretics.

Second, Thomas Aquinas responded to this very objection in his Summa Theologica (1a.28, 4). Citing Aristotle, he noted that this objection is telling only where there is identity between object and meaning. But such is not the case in God, for while Fatherhood and Sonship in reality refer to the same thing, yet their meaning implies opposing relationships.

Further, God can be one and have two or more relations in the way there can be one line between two points. The relation between Father and Son is the same relationship, yet Father and Son are not the same.[40] They are different persons within the same God. Likewise, one and the same triangle has three corners. This neither destroys the unity of the nature of a triangle, nor does this unity do away with its three corners. The same is true of the Trinity.

Some Concluding Comments

Although not all objections to God’s simplicity can be treated here, the standard ones have been tried and found wanting. Further, in spite of criticism, the theological and philosophical foundation for simplicity is left standing. Hence, there appears to be no good reason for giving up on the traditional view of God’s absolute simplicity.

Finally, the toll for rejecting God’s simplicity is a high one. In fact, it leads logically into process theology. For God ends up being multipolar, having unactualized potential, dependent on His creation, and with no real essence but only changing relations and activities. Since we have treated this topic elsewhere (in The Battle for God), we turn our attention to an examination of the relationship between divine simplicity and orthodoxy.

The Relationship Between Simplicity And Orthodoxy

We will ask here whether the doctrine of simplicity has been an essential part of historic orthodoxy. Then we will pose the question as to whether the denial of simplicity should be considered orthodox.

The Historic View On Simplicity

There is a virtual unbroken continuity in favor of divine simplicity from the earliest Fathers on to and through the Reformation.

Ante-Nicene Creed (A.D. 270) of Gregory Thaumaturus declares “there is one God,. .. a perfect Trinity not divided.. . .”[41]

Apollinarius (A.D. 310-390) said “The divine spirit. .. (A. D. 378; resp. 43) is one, of single form, single character, single substance, indivisible.”[42]

Gregory of Nyssa (A.D. 335-395) believed and taught that both God the Father and God the Son are simple, which he understands to be “free from all compositeness.”[43]

Athanasian Creed (A.D. 373) speaks of “neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the substance” [of the Trinity].

St. Augustine (A. D. 354–430) affirmed that nothing “.. . can have existence apart from Him whose existence is simple and indivisible. He declared, “I say ‘other than,’ not ‘different from,’ because, equally with them, He is the simple, unchangeable, co-eternal Good. This Trinity is one God. And, although it is a Trinity, it is none the less simple.” Thus, “Our reason for calling it simple is because it is what it has with the exception of the real relations in which the Persons stand to each other.”[44] He adds, “.. . this Trinity is indivisible and that each of the Persons is substantial, although there are not three Gods but only one.”[45]

St. Anselm (A.D. 1033-1109) also affirmed that God is absolutely indivisible: [The]. .. supreme Nature is in no wise composite, but is supremely simple, supremely immutable.[46] For its “.. . eternity, which is nothing else than itself, is immutable and without parts.”[47] For “.. . if it [the supreme Being] exists by parts in individual places or times, it is not exempt from composition and division of parts; which has been found to be in a high degree alien to the supreme Nature”[48]

Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1224-1274) gave the most extended defense of the absolute simplicity of God, listing no less than five arguments for it in his magnum opus (noted above). He stated categorically: “I answer that, the absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways” (see above).[49] Indeed, Aquinas felt that simplicity was such a crucial attribute of God that He listed it first in treatment of God’s attributes.

Reformation And Post-Reformation View Of Simplicity

Martin Luther affirmed God’s simplicity by insisting that “.. . if part of God cannot be in one place and another part in another place, then God has no parts. God’s simplicity is implied in His immutability. “For the Godhead is immutable in itself and cannot pass from one place to another as creatures do.”[50] Finally, “The sacred article of the holy Trinity teaches us to believe and say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three distinct persons, yet each person is the one God.”[51]

John Calvin declared: “that, when we profess to believe in one God, under the name of God is understood a single, simple essence, in which we comprehend three persons, or hypostases.”[52]

James Arminius affirmed that “Simplicity is a pre-eminent mode of the essence of God, by which he is void of all composition, and of component parts whether they belong to the senses or to the understanding. He is without composition, because without external cause; and He is without component parts, because without internal cause”[53] Further, the “essence of God is devoid of all cause, from this circumstance arise, in the first place, simplicity and infinity of Being in the essence of God.”[54]

The Augusburg Confession (1530) says that “.. . there is one divine essence, which is called God. .. indivisible.. . .”

The French Confession (1559) adds: “We believe and confess that there is one God, who is one sole and simple essence.. . .”

Westminister Confession of Faith (1647) declares that “There is but one God who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisibile, without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal.. . .”[55]

Stephen Charnock (1623–1687), the great Puritan divine, insisted that “God is the most simple being; for that which is first in nature, having nothing beyond it, cannot by any means be thought to be compounded; for whatsoever is so, depends upon the parts whereof it is compounded, and so is not the first being: now God being infinitely simple,. .. He being His own essence and existence.”[56] He added, “Since, therefore, God is without all composition, His understanding is not distinct from His essence.”[57]

These sample citations demonstrate the venerable orthodox tradition of the doctrine of simplicity. It remains to examine the theological connection between simplicity and orthodoxy.

The Relationship Between Simplicity And Orthodoxy

Minimally, the connection between divine simplicity and historic orthodoxy is very close. This is clear from several things. First, as just noted, virtually all the orthodox teachers of the church up to modern times who spoke to the issue held to God’s simplicity. Second, no major orthodox theologian during this time argued against it. Third, many orthodox teachers of the church stressed its importance. Fourth, and very importantly, divine simplicity became a part of some of the great orthodox confessions of the church. Finally, there is a close logical connection between simplicity and the other essential attributes and actions of the basic theistic view of God that undergirds all of orthodox theology. For example, God’s immutability, eternality, infinity, and uncausality are logically linked with simplicity. In brief, simplicity is a kingpin which, if denied, leads logically to the disintegration of historic orthodox Christianity, not only in its view of God but in its view of all other doctrines based on this view of God. This includes most major doctrines of the orthodox Faith, since they are all rooted in the historic orthodox view of God.

Conclusion

As for the question as to whether a denial of God’s simplicity is unorthodox, the answer depends on how one defines orthodoxy. According to an unjustifiably narrow rule laid down by some neotheists that “A teaching is only unorthodox if some ecumenical Council of the Church explicitly condemned it,” the denial of simplicity is not unorthodox. However, by that same self-serving criterion, denying the infallibility and inerrancy of the Bible are not unorthodox either. For no ecumenical creed makes any explicit declaration about the divine authority of Holy Scripture. Yet surely in any short list of essential orthodox doctrines this should be included.

With a broader more reasonable definition of orthodoxy, the denial of God’s simplicity does not fair so well. For, as we have seen, it is contrary to the virtually unbroken affirmation of the orthodox Fathers, Creeds, and Confessions of the Christian Church.

Furthermore, a denial of simplicity undermines many of the other orthodox attributes of God. In point of fact, as even some neotheists admit,[58] the traditional attributes of God are pretty much a package deal. That is, the attributes of infinity, necessity, uncausality, immutability, eternality, and simplicity stand or fall together. Hence, the denial of one logically entails the denial of another. And with regard to the kindred attribute of immutability which is also denied by neotheists, the Nicene Creed declares: “But, those who say, Once he was not, or he was not before his generation, or he came to be out of nothing, or who assert that he, the Son of God, is of a different hypostasis or ousia, or that he is a creature, or changeable, or mutable, the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes them.”[59] By the same logic a denial of simplicity is also unorthodox.

Notes

1. “Openness Theism” is ambiguous and “Free Will Theism” is too all inclusive since all theists claim to believe in free will. So since it is neither classical theism nor process theology, and it is confessedly different from traditional theism, it seems best to call it neotheism.
2. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a.3.7 (Pegis trans).
3. See N. L. Geisler, Wayne House, and Max Herrera, The Battle for God (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2001), chapter 5.
4. Elsewhere in On the Power of God (7.1) Aquinas has a much more extensive treatment of simplicity but rests his case on only three arguments.
5. In this argument Aquinas attempts to show that of all the ways something may differ none of them is possible for God. “For [1] there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; [2] nor composition of form and matter; [3] nor does His nature differ from His suppositum; [4] nor His essence from His being; [5] neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, [6] nor of subject and accident” (Summa Theologica, 1a.3.7).
6. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a.3.7.
7. Emphasis is added in these quotations.
8. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, trans. G. M. Giger (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1992), 1:191–192.
9. There can be an infinite number of abstract points on a line between point A and B. But there cannot be an actual infinite number of sheets of paper between two points, no matter how thin they are.
10. Nor is it possible for two or more infinite parts to exist since there cannot be more than an infinite being. So, one infinite being is all there can be. There can, of course, be beings other than an infinite Being (viz., finite beings), but a finite being is not more than an infinite Being. It is in fact a participation in God’s infinite Being since He is its Cause. As Paul said, “In Him we live and move and have our being.” When an infinite Being creates finite beings, there is not more being, but there are simply more who have it. In like manner, when a teacher teaches the class, there is not more knowledge. There are simply more who have it.
11. Michael Behe, in his widely influential work on intelligent design, not only argues strongly that all irreducible complexity is a sign of intelligent design but claims also to accept an overall evolutionary framework (see Darwin’s Black Box [NY: The Free Press, 1996]).
12. This refers to actual necessity, not logical necessity. The former is real and the latter only conceptual.
13. To restate the problem in terms posed by Parmenides, if God is Pure Actuality, with no admixture of anything else, then He must be simple because there is nothing in Him by which He can differ. For the only two ways a simple being can differ is by either being or non-being. But to differ by non-being is to differ by nothing. And to differ by nothing is not to differ at all. But since something cannot differ by being, since both are the same (namely, Pure Actuality), they cannot differ in their being. Therefore, it follows that a God of Pure Actuality, with no potentiality, must be absolutely one.
14. See Clark Pinnock, The Most Moved Mover (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 145–146.
15. For the arguments for God’s unchangeability see N. L. Geisler, Wayne House, and Max Herrera, The Battle for God (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2001), chapter 5.
16. Of course, classical theist are quick to point out that while creatures change in relation to the world, nevertheless, the world does not change in relation to God. As Aquinas put it, the man changes in relation to the pillar; the pillar does not change in relation to man (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a.13.7).
17. See Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1960 [first published in 1929]).
18. This is the title of Clark Pinnock’s chapter in Process Theology, ed. by Ronald Nash (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987).
19. See Pinnock, The Most Moved Mover, 140–150.
20. For a response to the biblical objections see N. L. Geisler, et. al., The Battle for God.
21. See Pinnock, The Openness of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 129.
22. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 63.
23. Greg Boyd, God of the Possible (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 137.
24. See Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), chapter one on “God and the Greeks.”
25. Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover(s) was not worshipped, and Plato’s Demiurgos was not the ultimate in his system; the Good (Agathos) was.
26. Alvin Platinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 5.
27. Pinnock, The Openness of God, 100.
28. Pinnock, The Most Moved Mover, 143.
29. See William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), quoted in Clark Pinnock, The Openness of God, 129.
30. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a.2.1.
31. Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?, 47.
32. Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God, 7.
33. Plantinga, 59.
34. Ibid., 47.
35. Space does not permit further elaboration here. It suffices to note that Plantinga nowhere gives a compelling argument for the existence of properties in a platonic sense, nor does he offer a refutation of the arguments for analogy (see Norman L. Geisler and Winfried Corduan, Philosophy of Religion [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988], chapter 12 for a defense of analogy).
36. Plantinga, 7.
37. See Philip Schaff, ed., The Creeds of Christendom (NY: Harper, 1919; reprinted, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983), vol. 1.
38. Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God, 3.7.1.
39. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a.28.3.
40. Ibid., 1a.28.4.
41. Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, vol.2, 24–25. Emphasis in all these citations is added.
42. See G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: SPCK, 1959), 10.
43. Gregory Of Nyssa, Answer to Eunomius, 2.
44. See St. Augustine, The City of God, 11.10.
45. Ibid., 11.29.
46. See Anselm, St. Anselm: Basic Writings (LaSalle, Ill: Open Court, 1962), 77.
47. Ibid., 83.
48. Ibid., 74.
49. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a.3, 7.
50. Martin Luther, The Works of Luther (St. Louis: Concordia, 1955–86), 37:62.
51. Ibid., 37:297.
52. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Philadelphia: Westminster), 1.20.
53. James Arminius, The Writings of Arminius, trans. James Nichols and W. R. Bagnall (Reprint, Grand Rapid: Baker, 1956), 2:115.
54. Ibid.
55. Above three quotes found in Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 1.
56. Stephen Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God (Grand Rapids: Sovereign Grace, 1971), 333.
57. Ibid., 328.
58. Pinnock, The Most Moved Mover, 72.
59. See John Leith, ed., Creeds of the Churches (NY: Anchor, 1963), 31, emphasis added.