Religious Pluralism: A Christian Response

By Norman L. Geisler

Religious pluralism is the belief that every religion is true. It is to be distinguished from relativism which claims each religion is true to the one holding it but not to others. Inclusivism claims that one religion is explicitly true, and all others are implicitly true. Exclusivism is the belief that only one religion is true and others opposed to it are false.

Orthodox Christianity is a form of exclusivism since it claims to be the one true religion. Whether or not this claim can be substantiated, three prior questions must be addressed: 1) What is truth? 2) Is truth objective? 3) Are all religions true? Then, and only then, can we address the question: 4) Is Christianity the true religion?

The Nature Of Truth

What is truth? Without going into all the various theories of truth that have been proposed, let us look at the view of truth assumed in the claim that Christianity is the true religion: the correspondence view of truth. This position is the common sense, ordinary understanding of the term truth. It claims that truth is what corresponds to reality. This view is not innovative; it has a venerable tradition, dating back to the great philosophers and on into the modern world. A sampling of citations will suffice to make the point.

The History Of The Correspondence View Of Truth

The correspondence view of truth affirms that truth is that which corresponds to reality. It asserts that a true statement matches its object. It is, in everyday language, a statement that tells it like it is. Early proponents of this view included the great philosophers from antiquity.

Plato wrote, “So if some such assignments of names take place, we may call the first of them speaking truly and the second speaking falsely. But if that is so, it is sometimes possible to assign names incorrectly, to give them not to things they fit but to things they don’t fit. The same is true of verbs. But if verbs and names can be assigned in this way, the same must be true of statements, since statements are, I believe, a combination of names and verbs.”[1] Aristotle added, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be.”[2] Augustine concurred, “For if that which is be spoken, truth is spoken: but if that which is not be spoken, it is a lie.”[3] Anselm agreed: A proposition is true, “when what it affirms to exist does exist, and when what it denies to exist does not exist.. .. Because nothing is true except by its participation in truth; therefore, when something is true, it is because of a truth which is in that thing itself.”[4] Aquinas concluded, “Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect. ..; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing

understood.. .. [A proposition] is said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing.”[5] Further, “the nature of truth is first found in the intellect when the intellect begins to possess something proper to itself, not possessed by the thing outside the soul, yet corresponding to it, so that between the two - intellect and thing—a conformity may be found.”[6]

A Defense Of The Correspondence View Of Truth

The most fundamental defense of the correspondence view of truth is that it is literally undeniable. That is, it cannot be denied without affirming it. For the very claim that “Truth is not that which corresponds to reality” is itself a statement which purports to corresponds to reality. In short, the correspondence view of truth is used in the very denial of the correspondence view of truth. Thus, all who attempt to deny it, affirm it in the very process of denying it.

Why then are there so many other theories of truth: coherence, pragmatism, intentionalism, existentialism, etc.? There are two basic reasons. One reason is the confusion of the theory of truth with the test for truth. That is, truth can be defended in different ways, but should only be defined in one way. For the question as how to test a statement about reality is one thing, but the truth of the statement is found in its correspondence to reality. For instance, one may claim his car is the fastest in the world, but in order to know whether his statement corresponds to reality, it must be tested empirically. Other statements like “Christianity completely satisfies one’s deepest personal needs” can only be tested experientially, even though the statement itself as a truth claim either corresponds to reality or it does not. Then again, the claim that “Euclidian geometry is consistent” cannot be tested empirically; it can only be tested by its internal coherence or consistency. So, there are many different kinds of truth claims and many different ways to test them, but the nature of all truth claims is found in its correspondence to reality. As Mortimer Adler comments, “the definition of truth is the agreement of thought with reality. What makes a descriptive proposition true is that it corresponds to the way things really are.”[7]

Another reason for the confusion is the failure to properly distinguish between the nature of truth and the object of truth. Truth can be applied to persons, but truth as such is not personal. Truth can be applied to experiences, but truth as such is not experiential. Truth is what corresponds to its object—whatever that object may be—a person, a thing, an experience, a practice, or even a concept.

Objections To The Correspondence View Of Truth

There are two chief objections to the correspondence view of truth: (1) it is circular, and (2) it is inadequate.

The First Objection - This objection is illustrated by the statement “The Pope is Catholic.” It is alleged that there is nothing outside the Pope to which this statement could corresponds, since it is he who defines infallibly what a catholic is. And it makes no sense to say the Pope corresponds to the Pope when the Pope is identical to the Pope. There is nothing outside the Pope to which the Pope may correspond. It is further objected that the same is the case with the statement “God is true.” Again, there is nothing outside God to which that statement could correspond. Yet Christians claim it is a true statement. Hence “truth” here must be something other than correspondence.

Response to Objection One - As for the first illustration, there is something outside the Pope to which he must correspond to be a catholic, namely what all previous Popes and Councils speaking infallibly have said as to what “catholic” means. And if the present Pope decrees something new as a criterion of catholicism, then he must himself also believe this to be catholic.

As for God being “truth,” several comments are in order. First, He is truth in the sense of being the Source of all truth. Second, He is “truth” in the sense that every thing He utters corresponds to His nature and will. Third, God’s statements about Himself are true in a formal sense because there is a formal distinction between the statement about Himself and His nature itself. That is, there is an ontological identity but a formal distinction between God’s statements and God’s nature. Or, to put it another way, in God the actual correspondence is an identity—which may be viewed as the most perfect correspondence possible. Finally, more precisely, when we say God is truth we mean that God is the ultimate reality to which all true statements about Him correspond.

The Second Objection - The objection that claims the correspondence view of truth is inadequate takes another form. It insists that statements like Jesus’ claim “I am the truth” (John 14:6) are not factual claims but personal claims. Likewise, so-called religious or existential claims to have or be living the truth are not definable as correspondence truth claims.

Response to the Second Objection - In response, the correspondence view of truth includes statements about a person or a practice since they can be the reality to which the statement corresponds. Jesus as the truth embodies in the Second Person of the Godhead. He was the Logos who perfectly corresponded to the Father (John 1:1, 14). He was the “express image” of God (Col. 1:15). Further, when a truth is applied to one’s life, it does not deny that the statement corresponds to reality. To think so is to confuse the nature of truth and the application of that truth. Statements made about persons or practices are correspondence statements because they either correspond to their object or they do not.

In summation, all true statements either correspond to their object or they do not. Even the denial of this entails the use of it. The correspondence view of truth is literally undeniable.

The Objectivity Of Truth

Now that we have established that truth is that which corresponds to reality, we are in a position to ask the question about the objectivity of truth. That is, is truth subjective—being true for one but not for all—or is it objectively true for all people? Despite the popularity of the subjective or relativistic view of truth, it too dies a self-inflicted death. For the very statement that “all truth is relative” is offered as a non-relative view of the matter. That is, the claim that all truth is subjective is an objective claim to truth. There is simply no way to deny that truth is objective without making an objective truth claim. Long-time professor of philosophy at Wheaton College, Arthur Holmes, was fond of saying “All truth is perspectival.” However, when confronted with the question of whether this statement was a perspectival or non-perspectival statement, he reluctantly admitted that it was a non-perspectival statement. But then in that case all truth is not just a matter of one’s perspective; at least that truth statement attempts to transcend subjectivity and relativity. And if one, why not others. It is a classic case of special pleading to deny the possibility of others.

Indeed, not only can a solid case be made for some objective truth claims, but it can also be made for the position that all truth claims are objective truth claims. This can be seen in two ways. First, the very nature of truth as correspondence demands that a truth claim be objective. For, if the statement really corresponds to its object, then that it so corresponds will be true for everyone, not just for the person making the statement. After all, the statement is about one and the same object. Hence, everyone who understands the statement is viewing one and the same statement and one and the same object. Hence, if the statement is true-that is, if it corresponds to that object—then it must be true for one and all.

Second, the alleged examples of a relative truth all fail. The claim that “I feel warm” when the person next to me feels cold is not a subjective statement. That is, it is a statement about my feelings at the moment and not about his. So, the claim that “I feel warm” will be true for all persons—even those who feel cold. For it is not a statement about their feelings but about mine.

The same is true about statements like “John is taller than Jim.” That statement is true for all persons, even if they are taller than John. Likewise, “The door is on the teacher’s right” is true for the students facing him, even though the door is on their left. For the statement is not a statement about their relation to the door; it is a statement about teacher’s relation to the door. And that it is on the teacher’s right is true for everyone. The truth is that there are no subjective truths. All truth claims are objective and absolute. Even the claim that “there are no absolute truths” is an absolute truth claim.

The Exclusivity Of Truth

Now that the nature and objectivity of truth are known, the exclusivity of truth will be examined. That is, can one view be true to the exclusion of all others. An affirmative answer for the exclusivity of truth is based on the self-evident and undeniable law of non-contradiction: logically opposite views cannot both be true.

The Nature Of Exclusivism

First, a word about the law of non-contradiction. Briefly stated, this law states that it is either A or not A (it cannot be both at the same time and in the same sense). Thus, A must be A. This is self-evident in that the predicate is reducible to the subject. For example, all husbands are married men. When examined, it is clear that the predicate “married men” is saying the same thing as the subject, all “husbands.” The same is true of the law of non-contradiction; the predicate is saying the same thing as the subject.

Further, the law of non-contradiction is also undeniable. For the very attempt to deny that “Opposites cannot both be true” assumes that the opposite of that statement cannot be true. In short, one cannot deny the law of non-contradiction without using the law of non-contradiction in the denial.

Practically, we all know that either I exist or I do not exist. Either I am here or I am not here. Either there are apples in the refrigerator or there are not. To paraphrase the famous Muslim philosopher Avicenna: “ If anyone denies the law of non-contradiction, then beat him and burn him until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not being burned!” As Adler notes, “The metaphysical principle of contradiction gives rise to the logical principle which should govern our thought if we aim at the truth; namely, that we should not answer a question by saying both Yes and No to it at the same time.”[8]

But if opposites cannot both be true, then all truth claims, such as those made by opposing religions cannot be true. In short, pluralism is false because it claims that all views are true, even those with opposing truth claims. Thus exclusivism must be true, namely, the view that if one religion is true, then all opposing religions are false.

World Views Are Mutually Exclusive

This can be illustrated by the three major world views, one or the other of which most religions embrace: theism, atheism, and pantheism. Theism claims there is a God beyond the world. Pantheism claims God is the world. And atheism insists that there is no God either beyond the world or in the world. In short, either God made all (theism), or God is all (pantheism), or else there is no God at all (atheism). Likewise, if one of these views is true, then the other two opposing views must be false. For it is clear that there cannot both be and not be a God beyond the world. Nor can God be beyond the world and yet be the world (but not beyond it) at the same time and in the same sense.

Religions Are Mutually Exclusive

All religions making contradictory truth claims are mutually exclusive. For example, polytheistic religions are incompatible with monotheistic religions. For there cannot be only one God and many gods. Likewise, pantheistic religions (like Hinduism and Zen Buddhism) are incompatible with theistic religions (like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), since the latter believe God is beyond the world, and the former insist that God is not beyond the world: God is the world.

A comparison of the top two religions will make the point more specifically. Numerically, Christianity and Islam are the two largest religions in the world. The former has some 1.8 billion adherents and the latter has some 1.2 billion followers. A brief examination reveals that they cannot both be true. If one is true, then the other must be false and vice versa. All religions cannot be true. Take, for example, the central claims of these two religions:

	Orthodox Christianity	Orthodox Islam
Bible:	The Word of God	Not the Word of God: The Quran Is
God:	Three Persons	Only One Person
Man:	Evil by Nature	Not Evil by Nature
Christ:	God in the Flesh	Not God; Merely a Man
Death of Christ:	Death and Resurrection	No Death and Resurrection of Christ
Means of Salvation:	By Faith Alone	By Faith Plus Good Works

Both religions are theistic, but both cannot be true because they make mutually exclusive truth claims. If one is true, then the other must be false. Let’s examine these claims in more detail.

Contradictory Claims About The Bible

Each religion claims its Holy Book is the Word of God and the other is not. Christians claim the Bible is the Word of God, and the Qur’an is a corruption of the truth. Likewise, Muslims believe the Qur’an is the unadulterated Word of God, and the Bible has been corrupted. Clearly, both views cannot be true. At least one must be wrong.

Contradictory Claims About God

While both Christians and Muslims believe in one theistic God, they have essential but mutually exclusive beliefs about this one God.

For instance, Muslims believe there is one and only one person in God (Sura 4:168; 112). To believe in any more is idolatry. Biblical Christians, however, make the belief in the Trinity (that there are three persons in the Godhead) a test of orthodoxy. So, it follows that both Muslims and Christians cannot be right. Someone is seriously wrong.

Contradictory Claims About The Nature Of Man

Both religions are also in direct opposition on another essential teaching. Islam teaches that human beings are born essentially morally neutral. They are definitely not predisposed to evil by their nature (Sura 30:29–30). Orthodox Christians, on the contrary, insist that we are born with a bend toward sin. As St. Augustine said, “We are born with the propensity to sin and the necessity to die.”[9] David wrote, “In sin did my mother conceive me” (Ps. 51:5) and Paul added that we “by nature are children of wrath” (Eph. 2:3). He added elsewhere, “By one man sin entered the world and death by sin, because all sinned [in Adam]” (Rom. 5:12). One thing is certain, someone is seriously in error. Both Muslims and Christians cannot be right about the nature of human beings.

Contradictory Claims About The Nature Of Christ

Another essential belief of Islam and Christianity revolves around who Jesus is. While Muslims grant Him status as a prophet, they insist that He is 100% human just like the rest of us (Sura 5:79). He is not God or the Son of God. But it is well known that orthodox Christianity confesses that Jesus is “very God of very God” and “very man of very man.”[10] That is, Jesus is both God and man co-joined in one person. He is the God-Man. Here again, both views cannot be true. If the Muslim view is correct, then the Christian view is false and vice versa.

Contradictory Claims About The Death And Resurrection Of Christ

At the core of Christian teaching is the Gospel without which Christians believe no one can be saved (Rom. 1:16; 10:9). St. Paul defined the Gospel as the belief that Christ died for ours sins, and He rose again on the third day (1 Cor. 15:6). Muslims flatly deny both of these claims (Sura 4:157), claiming that Jesus did not die on the cross and, thus, did not rise again three days later. Here again there is a head-on clash between two essential beliefs. If Christianity is true in this affirmation, then Islam is false and, likewise, the reverse. Both religions cannot be true.

Contradictory Claims About The Means Of Salvation

According to Muslims, one is saved by first professing faith in one God and that Muhammed is his prophet. Second, his good works must outweigh his bad works which God will determine by weighing them on the Day of Judgment. But according to Christianity, “We are saved by grace through faith and that not of ourselves. It is the gift of God, not of works, lest anyone should boast” (Eph. 2:8–9). For “unto him who works not, but believes on Him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness” (Rom. 4:5). Clearly, both views cannot be true. For it is either by faith alone, or else it is not by faith alone and good works are a necessary condition of salvation.

The contrast could go on, but this is sufficient for the point at hand: all religions cannot be true. For many of the central beliefs of different major religions are diametrically opposed, and opposites cannot both be true. This is not to say, however, that there are not compatible beliefs among diverse religions; there are. It is simply to point out that core beliefs in different religions are logically incompatible so that if one is true, the other is false. Thus, not only are there some incompatibilities between different religions, but there are logical contradictions on core beliefs. In short, pluralism is false.

It is clear to all that these are opposite beliefs. But since opposites cannot both be true (via the law of non-contradiction), then if those essential orthodox Christian beliefs are true, then the essential beliefs of orthodox Islam are false and vice versa. In brief, pluralism is false, exclusivism is true. In fact pluralism is a form of exclusivism because it believes that pluralism is true to the exclusion of all opposing views. To put it simply, if P (pluralism) is true, then all non-P is false. This view is just as exclusive as saying, if E (exclusivism) is true, then all non-E is false. The truth is that every truth claim is exclusive since it by its very nature excludes its opposite.

A Defense Of Exclusivism

A defense of Christian exclusivism involves three major moves: first, to show (as above) that all religions cannot be true since they make logically contradictory truth claims; second, to show that at least one religion must be true, and third, to show that this religion is Christianity.

The Logic Of The Argument For Exclusivism

The basic logic of exclusivism is to demonstrate that at least one religion could be the true religion. This follows logically from the nature of the case. For it is not only true that all religions cannot be true (since they hold contradictory claims), but it is also true that at least one possible religion must be true. This is so for the simple reason that all views cannot be false. For the statement that no view is true claims to be a true statement. Hence, it is self-defeating. It is like saying that no number is the sum of 3 plus 3. Of course, one is, and it is 6. But if all views cannot be false, then at least one view must be true.[11]

There are many objections to exclusivism, but they all miss the mark. Some of the major objections include the following:

The Allegation Of Intolerance

One charge laid at the feet of exclusivism it that of intolerance. This is directed at the exclusivist’s view that one religion view is true and those opposed to it are false. To the pluralists this seems to be a bit of bigotry. After all, why should only one view have a franchise on the truth and all the others be disenfranchised?

A Response To The Objection

A number of observations are relevant in this connection. First of all, if holding an exclusivist’s view makes one “intolerant,” then pluralists are also “intolerant.” For, as was just noted, pluralists also claim their view is true to the exclusion of opposing views (like exclusivism). And they certainly would not tolerate the position that their pluralistic view and opposing non-pluralistic views were both true.

Second, if the charge of intolerance is leveled because of the manner in which one holds his view, then non-pluralists have no monopoly on the market. A pluralist can be equally as intolerant as anyone else.

In fact, there could be tolerant exclusivists and intolerant pluralists. Third, the very concept of tolerance implies a real disagreement. One does not tolerate that with which he agrees. Hence, the concept of tolerance presupposes a non-pluralists view of truth.

The Allegation Of Narrow-Mindedness

One of the favorite allegations of pluralists is that non-pluralists are narrow-minded. For they claim that their view is true and everyone else is in error. But this seems utterly presumptuous on the face of it. Why should only exclusivists be in possession of the truth?

The response to this is clear: Both the pluralists (P) and the exclusivists (E) make an equal claim to truth and error. Both claim that their view is true and whatever opposes it is false. As already stated, if E is true, then all non-E is false. Likewise, if P is true, then all non-P is false. Thus both exclusivism and pluralism are equally “narrow.” In point of fact, all truth is narrow. After all, 2 plus 3 is not 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 or any other number on to infinity. There is only one true answer—5. This is narrow. But that is the way truth is.

Allegation Of Intellectual Imperialism

Another charge against exclusivism is that of intellectual imperialism. They charge that exclusivists are totalitarian, not democratic, with regard to truth. They should be more open to input from many sources, not just to one. Indeed, some pluralists go so far as to claim that not only truth but also the very idea of meaning smacks of fascism.[12]

Response To The Allegation

While this allegation has a certain emotional appeal, especially to those of a particular political mind-set, it is without merit with regard to determining what is true and what is false in religious claims. First of all, the way this allegation is often made is a form of the ad hominem logical fallacy. It attacks the person rather than the position.

Second, this objection has an unjustified presumption, namely, that truth should be more democratic. But truth has no political affiliation. And truth is not decided by majority vote! As we have seen, truth is what corresponds to reality, whether the majority believes it or not. It was true that the world was round, even when most people did not believe it was.

Third, do pluralists really believe that all views are equally true and good? Do they believe fascism or Marxism is as good as democracy? Was Nazism as good as any other government? Should one have tolerated the burning of widows in Hindu funerals of their husbands? Certainly not!

The Uniqueness Of Christianity

Christianity claims to be the true religion. As such it is at odds with the dominant trend in modern comparative religion. Alister McGrath set the stage properly: “How can Christianity’s claims to truth be taken seriously when there are so many rival alternatives and when ‘truth’ itself has become a devalued notion?” He adds, “No one can lay claim to possession of the truth. It is all a question of perspective. All claims to truth are equally valid. There is no universal or privileged vantage point that allows anyone to decide what is right and what is wrong.”[13]

Now that the nature, objectivity, and exclusivity of truth have been established, we are in a position to address the question of its uniqueness: Is Christianity the true religion to the exclusion of all opposing religions?

It is important to note that by “Christianity” here we do not mean any particular organization or institution. We speak here of what C. S. Lewis called “mere Christianity,” that is, the common core of orthodox Christian beliefs held by all Christians held in all denominations that includes the belief in a theistic God, miracles, the Virgin Birth and Deity of Christ, His atoning death and bodily resurrection, and His claim to be the only way to God.[14]

An Important Clarification

Before this can be addressed, some clarifications are in order. The Christian claim to be exclusively true does not mean there are no truths in other religions. It simply means that if the central premises of Christianity are true, then all opposing truth claims in other religions are false—regardless of how many other truth claims in those religions are compatible with Christianity. For example, Confucianism holds the “Silver Rule” or the “Negative Golden Rule” which affirms that “We should not do to others what we would not want them do to us.”[15] Although no such principle is stated in the Bible, nevertheless, it is not incompatible with the Christian Golden Rule which affirms that we should “Do unto others what we would have others do unto us” (Matt. 7:13). There are many other moral and spiritual principles in other religion that are not incompatible with the central teachings of Christianity. For example, both orthodox Judaism and Islam believe in a theistic God, miracles, prophets, and revelation from God. Muslims hold in common with Christians that Jesus was a prophet, performed miracles, was virgin born, spoke against idolatry, bodily ascended into heaven, spoke of a heaven and a hell, and will return again (Sura 3:42–50). These particular Muslim beliefs are not incompatible with orthodox Christianity. However, as noted above, both Christianity and Islam cannot be the true religion because they disagree on a host of fundamental doctrines including the Trinity, the deity of Christ, His substitutionary atonement, and the plan of salvation. And it is these core beliefs that make Christianity unique.

The Essence Of The Claim To Exclusive Truth

The validity of the Christian claim to exclusive truth is based in several premises: (1) a theistic God exists, (2) miracles are possible, and (3) the New Testament documents are historically reliable.

If these are true, then it is a matter of fact that the New Testament affirms that Jesus was God in human flesh (John 1:1, 14) who performed unique supernatural events to confirm His claims such as His atoning death and supernatural resurrection (Matt. 27–28; Mark 15–16; Luke 23–24; John 18–21). Further, Jesus claimed He was the only way to God. He declared emphatically, “I am the way, the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me” (John 14:6 cf. 3:18, 36; 8:24; 10:1, 9). His disciples confirmed the same. Peter said, “Neither is there salvation in any other. For there is no other name under heaven whereby we must be saved” (Acts 4:12 cf. 1 Tim. 2:5; Heb. 9–10).

A complete treatment of premise one is beyond the purview of this paper though it has been defended extensively elsewhere.[16]

Premise two follows logically from theism for if a theistic God exists, then miracles are not only possible, but the biggest one has already occurred—Creation. For if there is a God who can act supernaturally, then there can be supernatural acts of God. As C. S. Lewis put it, “If we admit God, must we admit Miracle? Indeed, indeed, you have no security against it. That is the bargain. Theology says to you in effect, ‘Admit God and with Him the risk of a few miracles, and I in return will ratify your faith in uniformity as regards the overwhelming majority of events.’”[17]

Hence, the remaining weight of the argument for the uniqueness of Christianity rests on the historical reliability of the New Testament documents. This too has been evidenced and defended elsewhere.[18] The conclusion of that evidence will suffice here: There is more evidence for the historical reliability of the New Testament than for any other book from the ancient world. There are more manuscripts, earlier manuscripts, better copied manuscripts, and more confirmed manuscripts than for any book from antiquity. Hence, when the Gospels claim Jesus said or Jesus did certain things, then He actually did say and do those things. But these things include His claim and proof to be God incarnate and the only way to Heaven. Hence, it follows that Christianity is the true religion, the only way to God.

Answering Objections To The Uniqueness Of Christianity

Before concluding this discussion several objections need to be answered. These are posed by pluralists and are easily answered in view of the above discussion.

The Alleged Moral And Spiritual Equality Of All World Religions

Pluralist John Hick argues, “I have not found that the people of the other world religions are, in general, on a different moral and spiritual level from Christians.” For, he adds, “The basic ideal of love and concern for others and of treating them as you would wish them to treat you is, in fact, taught by all the great religious traditions”[19] Hick offers as proof the fact that statements similar to the Golden Rule of Christianity can be found in other religions.[20]

A Response To This Allegation

Hick’s conclusion can be challenged at several levels. First, it is debatable whether or not “the fruit of the spirit” (Gal. 4:22–23) can really be found in non-Christian religions. While no one denies there are good people in other religions, this is not to say they are manifesting the widely recognized highest moral standard—agape love. One can lead a philanthropic life and even die for his beliefs without having true love (see 1 Cor. 13:3). While God's common grace enables even evil men to do good (see Matt. 7:11), nonetheless, only the supernatural love of God can motivate a person to express true agape love (cf. John 15:13; Rom. 5:6–8; 1 John 4:7). Before one concludes too quickly that William James demonstrated the equality of all forms of saintliness in his famous Varieties of Religious Experiences, one should read carefully Jonathan Edwards’ Religious Affections.[21] He argues forcefully that there are unique manifestations of Christian godliness. My own nearly a half century of study of the matter confirms that there is a difference in the highest level of Christian and non-Christian piety in favor of the former.

Second, even if one could demonstrate a kind of moral equality of practice among most adherents of the great religions, this would not in itself prove there was no moral superiority in the moral teachings of Christianity over the other religions. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a person perfectly practicing a lesser moral code may appear to be better than a person imperfectly living according to a higher ethical standard. In order to make a fair comparison one must do two things. One must compare the highest moral teachings of the various religions. For another thing, one must compare the best examples of the adherents to each. A close comparison between Mother Teresa and Mahatma Gandhi would demonstrate the superiority of Christian compassion for the needy. What is more, one must sort out what is inherent to another religion before Christian influence and what was incorporated into it as the result of Christian missionary activity. For example, Hinduism as a system did not generate social compassion. The social compassion found in some forms of current Hinduism is not indigenous. It is a foreign import from Christianity. Indeed, to the degree that Gandhi manifested such compassion comes from his training in Christianity and his self-confessed admiration for the teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. Finally, finding a moral principle akin to the Golden Rule of Judeo-Christian belief (cf. Matt. 7:12) is not enough to show equality of all religions. This is a manifestation of general revelation, that is, the law written in the hearts of all men (Rom. 2:12–15) by God. This is not the same as the supernatural manifestations of love, joy, and peace (Gal. 5:22–23). Indeed, while applied Christian morality has produced dynamic social compassion, Eastern religions have produced stagnant societies, and Islam intolerant ones.[22]

Third, Hick’s analysis begs the question. For only by assuming that the moral common denominator of all religions is the standard by which they should all be judged does he arrive at the not too surprising conclusion that they are all equal. But one had to negate the superior aspects of Christian morality or teaching in order to show that Christianity is not superior. Hick seems to acknowledge this tacitly when he confessed that the “Acceptance of some form of the pluralistic view prompts each to deemphasize and eventually winnow out that aspect of its self-understanding that entails a claim to unique superiority among the religions of the world.”[23]

Fourth, the moral manifestation of a belief does not settle the truth question. For example, the fact that there are good Mormons does not prove Joseph Smith was a true prophet. Indeed, there is strong evidence that he is not a true prophet since he gave demonstrably false prophecies.[24] There is other evidence for whether something is true than the way its adherents live. Truth is what corresponds to reality and, hence, a religion is true if its central tenets correspond to the real world, not merely whether its followers live a good life or even a better one than adherents of another religion.

Fifth, in the final analysis the moral superiority of Christianity does not rest on our imperfection as Christians but on Christ’s unique perfection. It is not based on our fallible moral character but on His impeccable character (John 8:46; 2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 4:15; 1 Pet. 1:19; 1 John 3:3). In this context, there is clearly a moral superiority of Christianity over all other religions.

The Alleged Redemptive Equality Of All Religions

As for the Christian claim of a superior mode of salvation, Hick believes this either begs the question or is not evident in practice. For “if we define salvation as being forgiven and accepted by God because of Jesus’ death on the cross, then it becomes a tautology that Christianity alone knows and is able to preach the source of salvation.” And “if we define salvation as an actual human change, a gradual transformation from natural self-centeredness (with all the human evils that flow from this) to a radically new orientation centered in God and manifest in the ‘fruit of the Spirit,’ then it seems clear that salvation is taking place within all of the world religions—and taking place, so far as we can tell, to more or less the same extent.”[25] Further, what is common to all world religions is an adequate response to the Ultimate. “But they seem to constitute more or less equally authentic human awareness of and response to the Ultimate, the Real, the final ground and source of everything.”[26] There are, of course, “a plurality of religious traditions constituting different, but apparently more or less equally salvific, human responses to the Ultimate. These are the great world faiths.”[27]

A Response To This Argument

There appear to be a nest of problems in this analysis. First of all, this is based on the assumption that all religions have a proper relation to what is really Ultimate. This begs the question. Maybe some are not connected at all to what is really Ultimate. Or, perhaps they are not properly related to what is really Ultimate. After all, as Sigmund Freud pointed out in his famous Future of An Illusion, deception is possible.[28]

Second, Hick wrongly assumes that all religions are merely a human response to the Ultimate. But this begs the question in favor of anti-supernatural views of religion. In fact, it assumes an Eastern pantheistic view of the Ultimate as what transcends all particular cultural manifestations of it in the various world religions.

Third, this denial of the truth of any particular religion is itself a form of exclusivism. For it favors the particular view known as pantheism in order to deny the particularity of a view known as Christian theism. That is to say, even the pantheist is making a particular truth claim as opposed to all non-pantheistic views. But to assume this kind of pantheistic position as a basis for one's analysis of all religions, including non-pantheistic ones, simply begs the question. Or to put it another way, when the pluralist denies any particular religion is true as opposed to others, he thereby makes a particular truth claim.

Fourth, the pluralist view often degenerates to the position that whatever is sincerely believed is true. But this would mean that it mattered not whether one was a passionate Nazi, Satanists, or believer in a flat Earth. For in any event his view would be true. But sincerity is clearly not a test of truth. The road to destruction is paved with good intentions. Many people have been sincerely wrong about many things.

Finally, this implies that all truth claims are a matter of both-and and not either-or. But on this ground there could be square circles, wise fools, and educated illiterates. However, opposites cannot both be true. For the opposite of true is false. Hence, opposing truth claims of various religions cannot both be true. For example, Hindu pantheism and Christian theism cannot both be true since they affirm mutually exclusive world views. Likewise, Islam which denies and Christianity that affirms Jesus died on the cross and rose from the dead three days later cannot both be true.

The Allegation That Christ Is Not Unique

As for the Christian dogma about the uniqueness of Christ to be God incarnate in human flesh, Hick contends that there are two main problems.

The First Allegation - “The first problem is that the historical Jesus did not teach this doctrine.”[29] For “among mainline New Testament scholars there is today a general consensus that these are not pronouncements of the historical Jesus but words put in his mouth some sixty or seventy years later by a Christian writer expressing the theology that had developed in his part of the expanding church.”[30] Hick then cites a list of biblical writers who allegedly agreed that “Jesus did not claim deity for himself.”[31]

A Response to the First Allegation - Hick is misinformed on both points. The New Testament documents are historically reliable. Their historicity has been abundantly attested. The dates of the crucial New Testament books are not written after the eyewitnesses were dead but while they were still alive. Indeed, the Gospel of John claims to be written by the apostle John who was an eyewitness (John 21:24). The Gospel of Luke was written by a contemporary disciple, Dr. Luke, who knew the eyewitnesses (Luke 1:1–4). 1 Corinthians, which even biblical critics admit was written in A.D. 55-56, speaks of 500 eyewitnesses (15:5–7), most of whom were still alive when Paul wrote it only twenty-two years after Jesus’ death. Even the liberal New Testament scholar, the late Bishop John Robinson dated crucial New Testament Gospels as early as A.D. 40-60, much too early to support Hick’s view of a book written by a later generation who had already formulated a view contrary to that of the historical Jesus. Therefore, since the Gospels are reporting, not creating the words and deeds of Jesus, there is firm support for His unique claims to be God incarnate.[32]

The Second Allegation - Hick asserts that “the second problem is that it has not proved possible, after some fifteen centuries of intermittent effort, to give any clear meaning to the idea that Jesus had two complete natures, one human and the other divine.”[33] Hick asks, “Is it really possible for infinite knowledge to be housed in a finite human brain?”[34] Again, “Do we really want to claim that Jesus was literally omnipotent but pretended not to be, as in Mark 6:5?” And “while he was good, loving, wise, just, and merciful, there is an obvious problem about how a finite human being could have these qualities in an infinite degree.”[35] In short, “a finite being cannot have infinite attributes.”[36]

A Response to the Second Allegation - First of all, Hick falls short of claiming that the incarnation involves an outright logical contradiction, though his language could be taken to imply the same. But if it is not a logical contradiction, then there is no demonstrated incoherence in the view. Indeed, Hick himself admits that “It is logically permissible to believe anything that is not self-contradictory.”[37] And as for the claim that it is difficult to show just how this is so, on the same grounds one would have to reject both much of our common experience as well as modern science (which has difficulty explaining just how light can be both waves and particles).

Second, Hick appears to be misinformed about the orthodox view of the two natures of Christ. Indeed, his objections assume an unorthodox view known as the Monophysite view which confuses the two natures of Christ. His question “is it really possible for infinite knowledge to be housed in a finite human brain?”[38] reveals such a confusion. For the orthodox view does not claim that there was infinite knowledge in the finite brain of Christ. Rather, it affirms that there were two distinct natures of Christ, one infinite and the other finite. So the person of Christ did not have infinite knowledge in His finite brain. He had infinite knowledge only in His infinite nature. As God, He knew all things. As man, Jesus grew in knowledge (Luke 2:52). The same thing applies to Jesus’ other attributes. As God, He was omnipotent. As man, He was not.

Some Challengeable Presuppositions Of Pluralism

Before concluding, several unjustified presuppositions of pluralism should be noted. If these are not true, then the argument for pluralism collapses.

That There Are Universally Agreed Upon Trans-Religious Moral Criteria

In order to make the moral equality argument work, one must assume a set of moral criteria not unique to any particular religion by which all can be evaluated. But pluralists generally deny any universally binding moral law. If there were such absolute moral laws then there would need to be an absolute Moral Law Giver. But at best, only broadly theistic type religions accept these criteria, and even then some reject the absolute perfect nature of God (e.g., some Finite Godists). Further, if there is a moral law common to all religions, then it is not unique to one. And no religion can be judged inferior for lacking it. Finally, if there are no such universal moral laws, then there is no way to judge morally all religions from any standard beyond them. And it is not fair to take the standards of one religion and apply them to another, claiming that the other falls short.

That All Religious Phenomena Can Be Explained Naturalistically

Beneath the pluralist’s attack on exclusivism is a naturalistic presupposition, that all religious phenomena can be explained naturalistically. No supernatural explanations are allowed. But this presumptive naturalism is without justification. If God exists, miracles cannot be ruled out a priori. Indeed, if God created the world, then the biggest miracle of all has already occurred. There is no problem in making wine out of water, if one can make water out of nothing. Likewise, there is no difficulty in multiplying loaves, if one can make matter out of nothing. So, the naturalism that underlies pluralism is unjustified in view of the evidence for theism.

That The World Is “Religiously Ambiguous”

Hick believes that “the universe, as presently accessible to us, is capable of being interpreted intellectually and experientially in both religious and naturalistic ways”[39] He claims that “the Real is perfectly undifferentiated; that is, it has no properties to which our concepts veridically [truly] apply.”[40]

In response, some important observations should be made. First of all, it is self-defeating to claim that we know that we cannot know the real.[41] Second, simply because we do not know reality exhaustively does not mean we cannot know it truly. As Geivett notes, “To the extent that God is known at all, he is known truly.”[42] Third, the very notion of an undifferentiated Real is implausible, if not self-defeating. Hick’s claim that the Real can be symbolized by the concept of sunyata in Buddhism is a case in point. For if the Real is so undifferentiated, then how can any symbol represent it? Fourth, neither can the Real be manifested in various traditions, as Hick claims. In order for something to be manifested, at least some of its characteristics must be revealed.[43] But the Real as totally undifferentiated has no discernible characteristics. Hence, it could not be manifested in our experience in any meaningful way. Fifth, there is a kind of mystical epistemology presumed in this “God is Unknowable” approach. It has a rather imperialist’s decree on how God can and cannot reveal himself. One may appropriately ask what pipeline to metaphysical truth supplied this absolute information.[44]

That Pluralistic Dialogue Is The Only Way To Truth

Another seriously flawed presupposition is the position that pluralistic interreligious dialogue is the only valid way to discover truth. No genuine religious dialogue is possible if one assumes his religion is true in advance of the dialogue. This is sure proof that he is not “open” to truth. True dialogue assumes one is tolerant, open, humble, willing to listen and learn, and engage in a shared search for truth, in a self-sacrificing, other-oriented love.

In response, a number of things are necessary to point out. First, true dialogue is possible without adopting a pluralistic position on truth. One can have the attitude of humility, openness, tolerance, etc. without sacrificing his convictions about truth. Second, even the pluralist is not willing to give up his commitment to pluralism as a condition for such dialogue. Hence, he violates his own imperative. Third, the very idea of tolerance necessitates that there is a real disagreement.

That Hick’s View Is Religiously Neutral

John Hick feigns religious neutrality. But no such thing exists. His alleged pluralism is not religiously neutral at all. It is patterned after Hinduism’s conception of the Transcendent.[45] And it is antagonistic to the core principles of Christianity. Furthermore, it does not really encourage genuine dialogue between the traditions. Indeed, it renders vacuous the concept of being “in a given religious tradition.” After all, according to pluralists, every tradition is essentially the same. So, to accept pluralism is to reject one’s own tradition for another—the pluralist’s tradition.

That A Relativistic View Of Truth Is Correct

Beneath the pluralist assertion that all major religions have equal claim to the truth is a relativistic view of truth. But, as shown above, the denial of absolute truth is self-defeating. It claims that relativism is true for everyone, everywhere, and always. But what is true for everyone, everywhere, and always is an absolute truth. Therefore, it claims that relativism is absolutely true. As Paul Eddy remarked, “it is curious that the pluralist feels so comfortable drawing such absolute, non-relative conclusions.”[46] He adds eloquently, the relativist “would do well to exercise a healthy ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ with regard to its own program and avoid the temptation of wholesale transposition of these modern shibboleths onto all of reality.”[47]

Summary And Conclusion

Truth is that which corresponds to reality. It is objective, not subjective. What is true for one is true for all. Further, the opposite of true is false. And there are opposite truth claims on essential teachings among the great religions of the world. Hence, all religions cannot be true in their central truth claims. However, one religion could be the true religion for there is nothing inherently wrong about an exclusivistic claim. In fact, all truth claims—even those of pluralists—are exclusivistic since they exclude their opposite. Christianity claims to be and proves to be that religion because all of its major truth claims correspond to reality: (1) there is a theistic God, (2) miracles are possible, (3) the New Testament is historically reliable, and (4) the New Testament teaches that Jesus was miraculously confirmed to be God by His sinless life, atoning death, and bodily resurrection.[48] He also claimed to be the only way to God. Thus, orthodox Christianity which affirms these truths has been uniquely and miraculously confirmed as the true religion.[49]

Notes

1. Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, Cratylus (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1997), 431b.
2. The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1, Metaphysics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 4.7.1011b25-9.
3. Augustine, On The Psalms, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Cleveland Coxe (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Pub., 1999), 5.7.
4. Anselm, Concerning Truth, in Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues, ed. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 2.
5. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a.16.8.
6. Thomas Aquinas, On Truth, 1.1.3.
7. Mortimer Adler, Truth in Religion: The Plurality of Religions and the Unity of Truth (New York: Collier Books, 1990), 21.
8. Ibid., 133.
9. Augustine, City of God, vol. 2, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Pub., 1999), 14.1.
10. Philip Schaff, ed. “The Athanasian Creed,” vol. 2, The Greek and Latin Creeds, The Creeds of Christendom (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998 reprint), 66.
11. Of course, it is logically possible that no one actual religion possesses all the essential true statements. But this is contrary to practical reason in a theistic universe since by His very nature as all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful Being, God wants His creatures to know how to identify the essential truths to be saved. And since the plan of salvation in religions involves mutually exclusive claims, opposing views cannot both be true. Neither does it make practical sense that the plan of salvation would be right in one religion and the other claims be wrong since the other truths are inseparably connected with the plan of salvation. But this is another topic for another day (see Norman Geisler, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, Harmartiology and Soteriology [Minneapolis: Bethany House, 2004]). It will suffice here to argue logically that one religion could be the true religion, and practically that this religion is Christianity since all its essential truth claims, including salvation, are correct.
12. Alister McGrath, “The Challenge of Pluralism for the Contemporary Christian Church,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 35 (September 1992): 364.
13. Ibid., 365.
14. For a list of the essentials for a fully orbed orthodoxy see Norman Geisler, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, Harmartiology and Soteriology (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 2004), chap. 17.
15. Confucius, “Central Harmony: IV,” in The Wisdom of Confucius, ed. and trans. Lin Yutang (n.p.: Random House, 1943), 99.
16. See Norman Geisler and Frank Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004); Geisler, Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1976); Geisler, Miracles and the Modern Mind (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1992); and Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1999).
17. C. S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 106.
18. See F. F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable? (Grand Rapids: Inter-Varsity Press, 1985); and Craig Blomberg, The Reliability of the Gospels (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1987); and Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the John’s Gospel (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 2001). For a summary of the evidence see Norman Geisler, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, Prolegomena and Bibliology (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 2002), chap. 16 cf. chap. 11.
19. John Hick, “A Pluralist View,” in Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, ed. Dennis Okholm and Timothy Phillips (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 39.
20. Ibid., 39-40.
21. William James, “The Varieties of Religious Experience,” in William James: Writings 1902–1910 (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1987), 1–478. Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, ed. James Houston (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1996).
22. Clark Pinnock, “Response to John Hick,” in Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, ed. Dennis Okholm and Timothy Phillips (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 61.
23. Hick, “A Pluralist View,” 51.
24. See Jerald Tanner and Sandra Tanner, The Changing World of Mormonism (Chicago: Moody Press, 1981), chaps. 3–9, 14.
25. Hick, “A Pluralist View,” 43.
26. Ibid., 45.
27. Ibid., 47.
28. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961).
29. Hick, “A Pluralist View,” 52.
30. Ibid., 53.
31. Ibid.
32. See Geisler, “Christ, Deity of,” in Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1999), 129–35.
33. Hick, “A Pluralist View,” 55.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 56.
36. Ibid.
37. John Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 104.
38. Ibid., 55.
39. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 129.
40. R. Douglas Geivett and W. Gary Phillips, “Response to John Hick,” in Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, ed. Dennis Okholm and Timothy Phillips (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 77.
41. See Geisler, “Agnosticism,” in Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1999), 10–14.
42. Geivett and Phillips, “Response to John Hick,” 77.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 78-9.
45. Hick, “A Pluralist View,” 38–9.
46. Paul Eddy, “Paul Knitter’s Theology of Religions: A Survey and Response,” The Evangelical Quarterly 65 (July 1993): 237.
47. Ibid.
48. See Geisler and Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheists, chaps. 9–13.
49. It should be noted that this answers the objection of David Hume (Enquiry, Book Ten) that miraculous claims are self-canceling since all religions have them. If true, Hume’s point would be valid, but the truth is that only Christianity has a founder who lived a sinless, miraculous life as confirmed by multiple, and reliable, contemporary eyewitness accounts. Hence, only Christianity’s unique claims to be the true religion have been confirmed to be true. By contrast, Muhammed never claimed to be God and never performed miracles as Jesus did to confirm his claims. The miracle claims for Muhammed post date his time by a century and a half or more. Indeed, in the Qur’an Muhammed refused to perform such miracles when challenged, even though he acknowledged that Jesus did do miracles including raising people from the dead (see Sura 3:181–4; 5:110).