The Incarnation And Logic: Their Compatibility Defended

By Norman L. Geisler and William D. Watkins

[Dallas Theological Seminary, Fullerton, California]

In The Myth of God Incarnate, the British theologian Maurice Wiles asks, “Are we sure that the concept of an incarnate being, one who is both fully God and fully man, is after all an intelligible concept?”[1] John Hick replies firmly in the negative. He claims that the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation is contentless because it is logically incoherent, hence meaningless:

… to say, without explanation, that the historical Jesus of Nazareth was also God is as devoid of meaning as to say that this circle drawn with a pencil on paper is also a square. Such a locution has to be given semantic content: and in the case of the language of incarnation every content thus far suggested has had to be repudiated. The Chalcedonian formula, in which the attempt rested, merely reiterated that Jesus was both God and man, but made no attempt to interpret the formula. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the real point of the incarnational doctrine is not indicative but expressive, not to assert a metaphysical fact but to express a valuation and evoke an attitude.[2]

Hick, therefore, concludes that “the idea of divine incarnation is a mythological idea.” By “myth” he means “a story which is told but which is not literally true or an idea or image which is applied to someone or something but which does not literally apply, but which invites a particular attitude in its hearers.” Thus, the idea “that Jesus was God the Son incarnate is not literally true, since it has no literal meaning, but it is an application to Jesus of a mythical concept whose function is analogous to that of the notion of divine sonship ascribed in the ancient world to a king.”[3]

The denial of the logical coherence of the incarnation by many of the myth-of-God-incarnate advocates is a very serious matter. For if it could be shown that the doctrine of the incarnation is on the same logical footing as, say, a square circle, then Christians must either (1) give up the faith, (2) reconstruct the doctrine of the incarnation, or (3) abandon the noncontra-dictoriness of reality. Instead, we shall attempt to demonstrate that the incarnation of Jesus Christ, even as traditionally understood, is logically coherent, hence meaningful. Unfortunately, not all evangelicals share this position. Those who do not and yet wish to retain their Christian faith have opted for either the second or third alternative given above.[4] We shall contend that, contrary to what some evangelicals and the myth-of-God-incarnate advocates believe, the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation cannot justifiably be abandoned, reconstructed, or fideistically accepted simply on the alleged grounds that it is illogical.

It must be pointed out that the orthodox understanding of the incarnation is not usually rejected on logical grounds alone. Often hermeneutical, historical, and other philosophical and theological arguments are given in support of such a rejection.[5] However, it must be kept in mind that if the incarnation as traditionally understood is indeed logically incoherent and therefore meaningless, then those who argue for such a conclusion have an open-and-shut case. No other arguments need be offered against the Chalcedonian view, nor could there be any arguments mustered in favor of it. A meaningless utterance is contentless, thus incapable of being true or false, justified or refuted. If the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation is such an utterance, and we as evangelicals continue to believe and preach it, then as Paul said in another connection, “we are of all men most to be pitied” (1 Cor 15:19). The question of logical coherence is the most fundamental question in the whole debate. With it the orthodox understanding of Jesus Christ as the God-man stands or falls. Consequently, it is this question we wish to address here.

1. An Exposition Of The Orthodox Doctrine Of The Incarnation

Before the question of logical coherence can be adequately dealt with, the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation must be clearly explained. To accomplish this, we shall (1) present some of the more explicit biblical affirmations of Christ’s humanity and deity, (2) offer a theological summary of the biblical affirmations, and then (3) present and expound the orthodox interpretation of these data.

A. Biblical Affirmations

The Bible clearly affirms the humanity of Jesus Christ in a variety of ways. He is said to have had a human genealogy (Matt 1:1–17; Luke 3:23–38) and to have been born of a woman (Matt 1:18–25; Luke 2:7; Gal 4:4). We are also told that he aged (Luke 2:42, 52; 3:23), increased in knowledge (Matt 4:12; Mark 11:13–14; Luke 2:40, 52), became tired (Matt 8:24; Mark 4:38; Luke 8:23–24), grew hungry (Matt 4:2; Mark 11:12; Luke 4:2) and thirsty (John 4:7), and wept (John 11:35). The biblical account also presents him praying to God the Father on numerous occasions (Matt 14:23; Mark 1:35; 14:32–42; John 17) and even performing miracles by God’s power (Luke 5:17; 11:20). In fact, according to the Gospel of John, Jesus said that he could do nothing on his own initiative but could only do that which his divine Father wanted him to do (John 5:30; 6:38; 8:28–29, 54; 10:17–18). We further read that Jesus had a physical body (Rom 8:3; Phil 2:7–8; Heb 2:14; 1 John 4:2–3) and suffered and died “in the flesh” (Rom 8:3; Eph 2:15–16; Col 1:21–22; Heb 2:14; 10:19–20; 1 Pet 2:24). All of these characteristics we normally, and surely should always, ascribe to human beings and not to deity.[6]

On the other hand, the Bible also ascribes to the same Christ that which is unique to deity. In John’s Gospel, Jesus is described as the eternal Logos—very God—and the Creator of all that has ever come to exist (John 1:1–3). Elsewhere Jesus is set forth as the efficient and sustaining cause of all that is (1 Cor 8:6; Col 1:16–17; Heb 1:3, 10; 2:10). We are further told that he is omnipotent and immutable (Heb 1:11–12; 13:8) and worthy of worship (Phil 2:10–11; Heb 1:6; Rev 5:11–14). Indeed, while others declared that he was fully God (Col 2:9; Heb 1:3), he claimed that he was ontologically one with the YHWH of the Old Testament: “‘Truly, truly, I say to you, before Abraham was born I AM’ “(John 8:58; cf. Exod 3:14).[7]

From texts such as these, it is extremely difficult not to conclude, even upon a prima facie reading, that both full deity and full humanity are being predicated of the same person, Jesus Christ, at the same time.

B. A Theological Summary

A theological summary of the biblical affirmations may be set forth in the following manner:

The Person Jesus Christ:

His Humanity is:	His Deity is:
finite	infinite
existence caused	existence uncaused
ontologically dependent on God	ontologically independent of creation
mutable	immutable
spatial	nonspatial
temporal	nontemporal
complex	simple

It seems obvious from this summary that there is, at minimum, an apparent contradiction involved in ascribing finitude and infinitude, dependence and independence, and mutability and immutability to the same person at the same time. The question is this: Is the prediction of full deity and full humanity of the same person at the same time a real contradiction? If the answer is yes, then the God-man doctrine is logically incoherent, hence meaningless. If the answer is no, then it is incumbant upon those who answer thus to demonstrate that it is not a real contradiction and is, therefore, logically coherent and meaningful. Since we think that the orthodox view of the incarnation is noncontradictory, it is necessary for us to demonstrate the validity and soundness of this contention. This we will attempt to do following a fuller exposition of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation.

C. The Orthodox Interpretation of the Incarnation

Several interpretations of the biblical data concerning Christ were proposed during the first seven centuries of the Christian church. they may be summarized in the following manner:[8]

Position	Christ’ s Humanity	Christ’ s Deity	No. of Persons
Docetism	denied	affirmed	1
Ebionitism	affirmed	denied	1
Arianism	affirmed	diminished	1
Apollinarianism	diminished	affirmed	1
Nestorianism	affirmed	affirmed but separated	2
Eutychianism (or Monophysitism)	affirmed	affirmed but mixed	1
Adoptionism	affirmed	affirmed but separated	2

Of course, the Western church firmly rejected all of these interpretations. It claimed that none of them does full justice to all of the biblical affirmations. But to reject interpretive proposals is not enough; one should be able not only to smell rotten eggs but also to lay a better one. And this the church believed it did in 451 A.D. at the Council of Chalcedon. The part of the Chalcedonian statement we are most concerned with here is the following:

We, then following the holy Fathers, all with one consent, teach men to confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead and also perfect in manhood; truly God and truly man, of a reasonable [rational] soul and body; consubstantial [coessential] with the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the manhood; in all things like unto us, without sin; begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our salvation, born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, according to the Manhood: one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures, being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son, and only begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ … [9]

Although this interpretation did not end forever the christological debate, the Western church has affirmed and reaffirmed it on numerous occasions, adding little substance to it in subsequent creeds and discussions.[10] It is therefore our point of departure for an exposition of the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation. Of course, we do not accept the Chalcedonian formula just because the Western church has historically supported it. On the contrary, we accept this statement because we believe it comprehensively interprets in an accurate, systematic, and logically coherent way the biblical affirmations concerning the individual Jesus Christ.

In order fully to understand the Chalcedonian interpretation, one must have an understanding of the all important terms “nature” and “person.” The term “nature” (ousia) in the Chalcedonian formula is equivalent to what is meant by “essence” in the traditional sense—that is, the” ‘what-it is’ or ‘whatness’ “of a thing.[11] In other words, the nature of a thing is that which makes the thing what it is. Put another way, “nature” denotes the qualities, attributes, or properties of a thing which are necessary to it.[12] For example, part of the essence or nature of any human being is soulness or immateriality, without which no human being would be human (cf. Gen 2:7; 1 Cor 15:45). However, blue eyes, brown hair, white skin, or two arms are not essential for any human being to be considered human. Things such as these are called accidents—that is, properties or qualities that are not essential to a thing.[13] Therefore the nature, essence, whatness, or objectivity of a thing is that which makes the thing what it is. Hence, a thing’s nature is that which is essential, not accidental, to it.

The term “person” (persona) in the Chalcedonian formula refers to the who of a being as distinct from its whatness. That is, a person is the “ultimate centre of activity, attribution, and responsibility.”[14] A person is a non-objective center of relational activity, or more precisely, the subjective center of volitionality and intentionality. This meaning of “person” is to be distinguished from the modern psychological usage of the concept of personality, which considers the person as performer, assessing how a person affects others.[15] “Person,” as it is defined here, is taken in its classical, ontological meaning rather than its modern, psychological one. Hence, ontologically speaking, a person is the who of a what, the subject of an object, the willing and intending non-objective center in a nature, the subjective center of relational activity subsisting[16] or cohering in an objective essence.

Now when these meanings and distinctions are applied to the two-natures-in-one-person christology of Chalcedon, the following restatements of its central meaning can be made:

The incarnate Christ is: two whats in one who; two objects in one subject; two essences or natures in one person; two sources of objectivity cohering or subsisting in a single subjective center of volitional and intentional activity.

All of these restatements of the Chalcedonian formula we take to be roughly equivalent in meaning though varying in specificity. Thus, these terms shall be used interchangably of the two-natures-in-one-person formula throughout the remainder of this article.

Returning to other aspects of the Chalcedonian formula, the following emerges concerning the incarnation. First, the person of Christ is held to subsist or cohere in two natures, one divine and one human. Second, these two natures are said to be united in one person, not two persons. Third, the two natures of Christ are conjoined within the one person without mixture, separation, or division. Fourth, the effecting of this union did not alter the divine nature in any way; both natures retain that which makes them what they are. Therefore, Christ can be said to be truly God and truly man—the God-man. And fifth, the person is not the two natures or the two natures the one person. That is, a who as such is not a what, a subject is not an object, a non-objective center of relational activity is not an objective’ essence. Although persons are always found with natures, persons and natures should be distinguished, not confused. Applied to the incarnate Christ, this means that he needs to be viewed holistically, as a unity; yet, at the same time, his person needs to be distinguished from his natures without separating them—just as his divine nature is distinguished from his human nature without any separation between them. To do otherwise is to confuse or even identify two different natures, one infinite and the other finite, one uncaused and the other caused. Indeed, such a mixture would result in a contradictory combination—an infinite finite, an uncaused cause, and an unchangeable change.

II. The Charge Of Contradition And The Defense

As was noted earlier, many of the myth-of-God-incarnate advocates have charged that the Chalcedonian understanding of the incarnation is logically incoherent. Therefore, they argue that this view must be rejected. In recent years a growing number of evangelicals have concurred with their conclusion, but instead of rejecting the orthodox interpretation, many of these evangelicals have embraced it with open arms as the ultimate ontological paradox. For example, some years ago Vernon Grounds cited with approval the conclusions of Soren Kierkegaard, Benedict de Spinoza, and Reinhold Niebuhr, all of whom, said Grounds, contended that the incarnation is logically absurd and nonsensical.[17] Posing what he considered to be other paradoxes in Christianity, he called for evangelical theologians to welcome paradox “proudly into the very throne-room of theology,” considering it “a kind of Cinderella at long last discovered and exalted to her rightful place.”[18] Indeed, he considered the submission of evangelicals to paradox as “not a concession” but as “an indispensable category, a sheer necessity—a logical necessity!—if our faith is to be unswervingly Biblical.”[19] Following in Ground’s footsteps, the evangelical John V. Dahms said this concerning the incarnation:

… by what logic is it possible for a nature that cannot be tempted to be united with a nature that can be tempted, or for a nature that cannot grow weary to be united with one that can grow weary, or for a nature that is always in full and perfect favor with God to be united with a nature that can grow in favor with God? The Monophysites and the Nestorians had more respect for logic than the orthodox, as did the Docetists and the Ebionites before them, and so do those liberals who deny the incarnation today. It is not without some justification that Paul Tillich speaks of the “inescapable contradictions and absurdities into which all attempts to solve the Christological problems in terms of the two-nature theory were driven.”[20]

Hence, it is not only nonevangelicals who are waving the penant of paradox but evangelicals as well. The question is: Are they right in their assessment of the logical status of the incarnation? In order to answer this question, the essence of their argument must first be made clear. Interestingly enough, both evangelicals and nonevangelicals employ basically the same argument. Stating it syllogistically, it may be set forth as follows:

1. For any being to be both fully God (infinite) and fully man (finite) in its being at the same time is a contradiction.
2. Now it is claimed of the incarnate Christ that he is both fully God (infinite) and fully man (finite) in his being at the same time.
3. Therefore, the claim that the incarnate Christ is both fully God (infinite) and fully man (finite) in his being at the same time is a contradiction.

The term “infinite” in the above argument refers to all that is usually considered to be proper to deity but not of humanity—e.g., eternality, immutability, ontological independence, and simplicity. The term “finite,” on the other hand, refers to all that is usually considered to be proper to humanity or even creatureliness in general but not of deity—e.g., temporality, mutability, ontological dependence, and complexity. Thus, the argument is attempting to demonstrate that to claim that the incarnate Christ is eternal and temporal, immutable and mutable, independent and dependent, and simple and complex at the same time is to involve one in a contradiciton, and thus a fortiori to speak nonsense—mere verbiage with no meaning whatsoever. Prima facie this argument looks valid and sound. The problem is that it is not, and this is so for at least two reasons.

First of all, the argument assumes only a partial definition of the law of noncontradiction. The argument assumes that to affirm A and not-A of the same thing at the same time is contradictory. Hence, according to this understanding of the law of noncontradiction, it would be contradictory to affirm that a table could be both green and not green at the same time. This, however, does not necessarily follow. A table could be half green and half red (thus not green), which, of course, would not constitute a contradictory state of affairs even though it satisfies the aforementioned criteria for a contradiciton. Furthermore, according to the assumed definition of a contradiction, a table which was both green all over and red all over at the same time would constitute a contradictory state of affairs. But this is not necessarily so either. For a table could be painted one color, say green, all over, then after the paint dried, the table could be painted all over with another color, say red. Hence a table could, in one respect or sense, be both green and red all over without such a state of affairs constituting a contradiciton. It therefore seems that the definition of a contradiction assumed in the argument is much too weak.

The argument against the orthodox understanding of the incarnation cannot succeed given this definition of contradiction. However, the case given against the traditional view can be strengthened by defining a contradiction as a proposition that affirms A and not-A at the same time and in the same sense or respect. Applied to the table illustration, this would mean that if one were to affirm that a table was both green and red all over at the same time and in the same sense, then one would be affirming a contradictory state of affairs. For one would be affirming not that one coat of paint of one color was covered by another coat of paint of another color on the same table, but that both coats of paint occupied the identical space as the other on the same table without any visible change in color. Clearly, this is actually and logically impossible; thus the affirmation is truly contradictory.

Moving our discussion to the incarnation, the situation is something like this. The argument against the orthodox view affirms that it is contradictory to affirm of the incarnate Christ that he is both infinite (fully God) and finite (fully man) in his being at the same time. This, however, does not necessarily follow. It is true that orthodoxy affirms that Christ is both infinite and finite at the same time. However, orthodoxy does not maintain that Christ is both infinite and finite at the same time and in the same sense. If it did, then the traditional view would teach that Christ is both infinite and finite in one nature; but this is Eutychianism, not orthodoxy. As was shown earlier, the orthodox position is that Christ is both infinite in one nature and finite in another nature at the same time. And because infinitude and finitude are predicated of two different natures that are united in one person yet without mixture or confusion, no contradiction is involved. It would be contradictory to say that Christ possessed a finite-infinite nature. But to say that he possesses a finite nature and another infinite nature is not contradictory. Therefore, when a fuller definition of contradiction is applied to the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation, it can be seen that the claim that it is contradictory fails.

Second, the argument against the orthodox view rides on the ambiguity of “being.” It is not clear whether “being” in premise (1), for example, means “nature” or “person.” Perhaps (1) should be restated this way, employing the fuller definition of contradiction:

(1a) For any nature to be both infinite and finite in its nature at the same time and in the same sense is a contradiction.

If “being” is equivalent to “nature” in both of its occurrences as stated above, then (1a) is inapplicable to the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation. For orthodoxy affirms that one person subsists in two natures, not that one nature subsists in another nature, which would result in either a tertium quid (a third something) or a contradiction.[21]

Perhaps “being” means “person” throughout premise (1). If so, then (1) would now read:

(1b) For any person to be both infinite and finite in its person at the same time and in the same sense is a contradiction.

This new premise will not help the argument against the traditional view either, for it is also inapplicable to the orthodox doctrine. Orthodoxy affirms that one person subsists in two natures, not that one person subsists in another person. In fact, the person of Christ does not subsist in another person, but the natures subsist in the one person of Christ. Every person must have a nature, and every human or supernatural nature must have a person in order to exist. There are no whos lacking whats.[22] Now of the second Person of the Trinity, orthodoxy has affirmed that he has two natures, one human and one divine. Therefore, he is not a natureless person. However, it is true that in Chalcedonian orthodoxy God the Son united himself to a personless human nature. That is, the Son did not conjoin himself to a human nature in which a person already subsisted; this would be Nestorianism or Adoptionism. On the contrary, the pre-existent, uncreated Son united to himself a created human nature of which he became its subject. And when the Second Person of the Trinity became man, it was not by the subtraction of his deity but by the addition of humanity. Furthermore, the human nature he added is complete in every respect, yet it has “no created subject of its acts and experiences, since its subject is the eternal and only-begotten Son and Word of God.”[23] Therefore, the incarnate Christ is not a natureless person since he subsists in two natures; neither are his natures personless since they both have the same subjective center of intentionality—namely, the Second Person of the Trinity.

Now since (1) was shown to be vague, and (1a) and (1b) were shown to be inapplicable to orthodoxy, how might (1) be restated so as accurately to represent the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation? The following restatement will accomplish this purpose:

(1c) For any person to be both infinite in one nature and finite in another nature without confusion, mixture, or division of the two natures in that one person at the same time and in the same sense is a contradiction.

Taking into consideration the foregoing discussion, we think it can be agreed that (1c) accurately states the essence of Chalcedonian christology, at least as interpreted in the Augustinian-Thomistic tradition.[24] This assumed, the only problem remaining with (1c) is that it is patently false. For it states that a noncontradictory proposition is contradictory, which is untrue. It would be contradictory to affirm of any person either of the following at the same time and in the same sense: one person yet two persons, or one nature yet two natures. However, to affirm one person in two natures, as (lc) certainly does, is not contradictory. Hence, (1c) is false.

Now, of course, if premise (2) in the original argument were restated in such a way as to correspond to the conditions given in (1c), it too would be false. Similarly, if the conclusion (3) were restated to correspond to the conditions given in (1c), it would also be false. We would therefore have an argument composed of two false premises, a valid inference, and a false conclusion. Any way one looks at it, it would clearly be false. However, the argument is not useless. For with a minor change in (1c) as well as corresponding changes in the remainder of the argument, the argument could be restated so as to support the noncontradictoriness of the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation:

(1d) For any person to be both infinite in one nature and finite in another nature without confusion, mixture, or division of the two natures in that one person at the same time and in the senses just specified is noncontradictory. 

(2d) Now it is claimed of the incarnate Christ that he is both infinite in one nature and finite in another nature without confusion, mixture, or division of the two natures in his person at the same time and in the senses just specified. 

(3d) Therefore, the claim that the incarnate Christ is both infinite in one nature and finite in another nature without confusion, mixture, or division of the two natures in his person at the same time and in the senses just specified is noncontradictory.

If premises (1d) and (2d) are both true, and the inference made between the premises and conclusion (3d) is valid, then (3d) must be true, and therefore the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation must be logically coherent, hence meaningful. The argument appears to be valid and sound. If it is, then it demonstrates the logical coherence of the orthodox understanding of the incarnation contrary to the claims of many nonevangelicals and even some evangelicals.

Hence, we conclude that the argument posed by many of the myth-of-God-incarnate advocates and some evangelicals against the logical coherence of the incarnation fails. In fact, when their argument is changed to correspond accurately to the traditional doctrine of the incarnation, it cogently demonstrates the logical coherence of the orthodox view. Given this, their argument cannot be used as a rational justification for either abandoning or reconstructing the Chalcedonian interpretation of the incarnation.

III. Some Concluding Comments

As we close, we would like briefly to address two issues with regard to the incarnation, viz. incomprehensibility and mystery. First, some may object to our findings on the grounds that the incarnation, in some sense, is incomprehensible. If by this charge it is meant that the incarnation is logically incoherent, then we have already given our reasons for rejecting this. If, however, it is meant that we are unable to conceive in the sense of imagine (i.e. mentally picture) how, for example, the two natures are united in the one person of Christ, then we would agree. We can state with the Chalcedonian authors what does not occur in the union—namely, mixture, confusion, or separation—and that the union occurred in one person. We can also know that to affirm two natures in one person is not contradictory. But none of these contentions entails that we know exactly how the natures are conjoined. That is, we are unable to conjure up any one mental image that comprehensively exemplifies this union of natures in the Second Person of the Trinity. This does not make the union logically incoherent or false, however, any more than one’s inability to imagine a thousand-sided figure or a Euclidean point mitigates against their logical coherence or truth-value. Truth is a characteristic of predication, not of images. The principle “Only the imaginable is meaningful” is false. The principle “Only the predictable is meaningful” is true. Therefore, even though the incarnation may in some sense be unimaginable, it is nevertheless logically coherent.[25]

Second, some might contend that our understanding of the incarnation is too rationalistic. They may argue that we have destroyed the mystery of the God-man doctrine in our defense of its coherence. To such individuals, we would like to address these final remarks. On the one hand, we do maintain that there is mystery in the incarnation. That is, the incarnation is not fully comprehensible nor fully explainable by finite beings. To affirm otherwise would involve a gigantic overclaim. For the incarnate Christ is both infinite and finite; hence, in order for a finite mind to comprehend Christ in his infinity, it would have to be infinite also, which is impossible given the very nature of finitude. Therefore, granted the two truths that Christ is God and Christ is man, mystery is inevitable for a finite mind.

On the other hand, we contend that the mystery of the incarnation lies in the how, not the what. That is, the union of the two natures in the one person of Christ is stateable in a noncontradictory way, even if it is not imaginable by mental pictures. What Christ is must be noncontradictory to be meaningful. But the comprehension of how Christ is both infinte and finite is beyond our finite ability to imagine. So just because the explanation must be noncontradictory, it does not necessarily follow that the explanation must be fully comprehended.

And finally, we strongly disagree with those evangelicals who wish to shroud doctrines like the incarnation in unintelligibility.[26] Not only does that make Christianity, at least in part, vacuous and irrational, but if held consistently, this understanding would lead to a radical scepticism that would rival that of David Hume. To believe in utter nonsense, call it divine or not, is to believe in nothing. And to worship the irrational is to worship nothing. The incarnation may be incomprehensible and thus mysterious, but this is not the same as saying that it is incomprehensible, thus logically incoherent. The former makes sense out of belief while the latter makes nonsense out of belief. We can worship a being that is beyond our reason, but we cannot meaningfully worship one that goes against our reason. Therefore, while we admit mystery in the incarnation, nevertheless we also hold that this belief does not violate the law of noncontradiction. Indeed, it actually stands as an exemplification of the law.

We realize that there will be some individuals who will take issue with our application of reason to a theological doctrine. For them, reason is the enemy of theology, not its friend. Contrary to their line of thought, we align ourselves with what Charles Hartshorne has said: “Those who may fear that the use of exact formal concepts must somehow be hostile to religion will in so far be true enemies of knowledge as well as doubtful friends of religion … Exact thought has its enemies.”[27]

Notes

1. Maurice Wiles, “Christianity Without Incarnation?” in The Myth of God Incarnate (ed. John Hick; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977) 5.
2. John Hick, “Jesus and the World Religions.” in Myth 178.
3. Ibid.
4. Two recent advocates for reconstructing the doctrine of the incarnation are Stephen T. Davis (“Is ‘truly God and truly man’ Coherent?” Christian Scholar’s Review 9 [ 1980] 215-24); and Ronald W. Leigh (“Jesus: The One-Natured God-Man,” Christian Scholar’s Review 11 [1982] 124-37). They both agree that the orthodox view is logically incoherent, and they both reconstruct it in similar ways. An evangelical who opts for abandoning the noncontra-dictoriness of all of reality is John V. Dahms. Two of his articles are “How Reliable is Logic?” JETS 21 (1978) 369-80; and “A Trinitarian Epistemology Defended: A Rejoinder to Norman Geisler,” JETS 22 (1979) 133-48.
5. Some of the works that present these other arguments against the orthodox understanding of the incarnation are: John Hick, ed., Myth; Michael Goulder, ed., Incarnation and Myth: The Debate Continued (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979); Durston R. McDonald, ed., The Myth/Truth of God Incarnate, Wilton: Morehouse-Barlow, 1979); and Don Cupitt, The Debate about Christ (London: SCM, 1979). An evangelical reply, which unfortunately is rather weak, is Michael Green, ed., The Truth of God Incarnate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977).
6. This was the dominant position of the early Christian church—namely, that human characteristics are to be predicated of Christ’s humanity and not of his diety. Athanasius expressed the church’s opinion well: “Peter writes in his letter, ‘Christ therefore suffered in the flesh for our sakes’ (1 Pet 4:1). So when it is said that he hungered and thirsted and toiled and was ignorant and slept and cried out and made request and fled and was born and turned away fromthecup—ingeneral, did all the things which belonged to the flesh—let·. .·. all things of this sort be asserted as ‘for our sakes in the flesh,’ for this is precisely the reason the apostle himself said, ‘Christ therefore suffered; not in the Godhead but ‘for our sakes in the flesh,’ in order that the passions might be recognized to be natural properties not of the Logos but of the flesh” (Orations Against the Arians, bk. 3, as cited by Richard A. Norris, transl. and ed., The Christological Controversy [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980] 92-3).
7. For a substantiation of this ontological rather than functional interpretation of John 8:58, see Calvin T. Stevens, “The ‘I AM’ formula in the Gospel of John,” Studia Biblica et Theologica 7 (1977) 19-30.
8. The idea for this summary chart was occasioned by a similar one found in J. Oliver Buswell, A Systematic Theology of the Christian Religion (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962).2.46.
9. The Symbol of Chalcedon,” in The Creeds of Christendom (transl. Philip Schaff; Grand Rapids: Baker, repr. n.d.; orig. Harper, 1877)2.62–3.
10. G. C. Berkouwer (The Person of Christ [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954] esp. 69-97) aptly demonstrates this fact.
11. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 3a.2.1.
12. See Norman L. Geisler and Paul D. Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980) 431.
13. Ibid. 430. Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [Oxford: Clarendon, 1978] 60451) gives examples of properties which would be essential to every object, such as “self identity, being coloured if red, being something or other, and being either a prime number or else something else. “He also gives examples of properties some things have essentially while other things have only accidentally: “being non-green is a property 7 has essentially and the Taj Mahal accidentally. Being prime or prim is essential to 7; it is accidential to Miss Prudence Allworthy, Headmistress of the Queen Victoria School for Girls.”
14. R. J. Hennessey, “person, persona,” in the Glossary of the Blackfriars’ 1976 ed. of the Summa Theologiae.48.182. For a discussion of this term, see in the same edition, vol.6, Appendix 7, “Divine Persons,” by Ceslaus Velecky.
15. Velecky, “Divine Persons,” 146.
16. By “subsist” is meant “to be, in the sense of existing in oneself, being self-grounded, hence as distinct from or belonging to another” (Hennessey, “subsist, subsistere.”).
17. Vernon C. Grounds, “The Postulate of Paradox,” BETS 7 (1964) 13-14.
18. Ibid. 3.
19. Ibid. 5.
20. John V. Dahms, “How Reliable is Logic?” JETS 21 (1978) 373.
21. Thomas Aquinas clearly points this out in his Summa Theologiae 3a.2.1. See also Tertullian’s argument against the incarnate Christ being a tertium quid in his work Against Praxeas chap.27, reprinted and translated in Norris, The Christological Controversy 62–3.
22. For a further exposition on this point, see E. L. Mascall, Christ, the Christian and the Church:A Study of the Incarnation and Its Consequences (London: Longmans, Green, 1946) 8; Velecky, “Divine Persons”; and John Mcintyre, The Shape of Christology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966) 88ff.
23. Mascall, Christ, the Christian and the Church 8.
24. We do not include the Reformation tradition here largely because there is some confusion concerning exactly what Calvin and Luther held with respect to the hypostatic union. Many writers believe that Calvin, though unclear at times, did nnt depart from Chalcedon. Opinions vary, however, concerning Luther’s views. For further discussion on this, see Berkouwer, The Person of Christ 271–90, and Joseph N. Tylenda, “Calvin’s Understanding of the Communication of Properties,” WT138 (1975) 54-65.
25. Put another way: “The fact that one cannot explain how the two natures unite in one person without contradiciton has nothing to do with the obvious fact that what happens when they do is clearly not a contradiction. A contradiction would result if two natures were uniting in one nature, but not when two natures are united in one person. The mystery of the Incarnation (and there is mystery) does not lie in any contradiction about what but more in our inability to comprehend how. But incomprehensibility is not the same as impossibility. If this were so, then the fact that one does not really know how human birth takes place would mean that it is impossible for anyone to be born” (Norman Geisler,” ‘Avoid … Contradictions’ (1 Timothy 6:20): A Reply to John Dahms,” JETS 22 [1979] 62).
26. That is what Vernon Grounds did in his “The Postulate of Paradox,” 44. For an excellent refutation of those who contend that the incarnation is unintelligible, see Steven T. Katz, “The Language and Logic of ‘Mystery’ in Christology,” in Christ, Faith and History (ed. S. W. Sykes and J. P. Clayton; Cambridge: University Press, 1972) 239-61.
27. Charles Hartshorne, Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (Hamden: Archon Books, 1964) 21.