General Presuppositions
The development of scholasticism reached its apex during the 13th century. The synthesis between the philosophical Weltanschauung of antiquity and the Christian faith, long anticipated in the West, was now brought to completion and established in fixed patterns. A general advance in science and learning formed the basis for the theological achievements of this age. The University of Paris, which became an international stronghold for theological education, replaced the Parisian cathedral schools in the 12th century. The two mendicant orders, the Dominican and the Franciscan, founded at the beginning of the 13th century, also did much to promote learned theological study. The major theologians of the time were associated with these orders. The increased knowledge of Neoplatonic and above all Aristotelian philosophy which then became available (partly with the assistance of such Arabian commentators as Averroes and Avicenna, partly through direct translations into Latin) contributed significantly to the doctrinal development of high scholasticism.
Prior to this, Western knowledge of Aristotle was confined to his work in the field of logic, but in the 13th century his other writings also came to light. In the sphere of general science the study of his natural philosophy led to a new interest in natural science. And in the field of theology Aristotelian premises gradually came into use—in spite of some opposition from ecclesiastical sources. Theologians discovered, above all in Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics, a number of viewpoints and definitions which could be useful in their scientific approach to doctrinal questions (e. g., Aristotle’s distinction between form and substance, and between actuality and potentiality, his doctrine of causation, and his description of virtue). This new philosophical element created a new attitude in the field of theology, and this in turn did much to prepare the way for the majestic synthesis of theology and philosophy and faith and reason which manifested itself in the theological systems of the 13th century.
Contemporary theological instruction consisted of lectures, chiefly on Biblical texts, and disputations on particular dogmatic problems. At this point, however, a new feature was added in the impressive form of the so-called theological summaries and sentence commentaries (wherein, above all, the scholastic heritage was preserved for posterity). The earlier “dialectical” treatment of the material was replaced by more radical methods, which often reflected the procedure of the disputations. The Biblical-Augustinian tradition was here inserted into a world view which was formed on the basis of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. The doctrinal propositions or sentences previously loosely joined together could thus be transformed into a firm and uniform system.
In high scholasticism, philosophy was accorded a position relative to the knowledge of faith which was different from that given it by the older scholasticism—depending, of course, on the extent to which the new scientific methods were followed. The older scholastics employed the dialectical method in discussing the truths of faith in order, so to speak, to demonstrate their logical necessity a posteriori. Under the high scholastics the rational adaptation became more independent in relation to faith. The metaphysical world view came to form the basis of the entire theological presentation. The Augustinian credo ut intelligam evolved into a system in which faith and reason were looked upon as two equal principles of knowledge, harmoniously working together, even though it was recognized at the same time that they represented two different worlds. The way now led from intelligere to credere. Faith formed the superstructure to the natural knowledge involved in the Aristotelian system of metaphysics.
Augustinianism and Aristotelianism
Even though the theology of high scholasticism did not as a rule cultivate a particular philosophical point of view, preferring instead to synthesize the elements found in various sources, one can nevertheless discern a number of major currents of thought, dominated by those of Augustinian and Aristotelian origin. (Neoplatonism, which also played a significant role, was present to some extent in Augustinian ideas, but it exercised a direct influence as well, particularly in mysticism.)
The Augustinian-Neoplatonic line was represented above all by the older Franciscans (see below), while the theologians of the Dominican order were more closely related to the Aristotelian point of view. But there were no hard and fast lines of demarcation: those who perpetuated the Augustinian tradition also devoted themselves in some measure to the new Aristotelian concepts; at the same time, there were Dominicans who derived a great deal from the Augustinian heritage. Thomas Aquinas, the most prominent of the Dominican theologians, did as a matter of fact combine Augustinian and Aristotelian points of view—the inherited Christian doctrinal tradition and the contemporary philosophical structure. As a philosopher, however, Thomas was closer to Aristotle than to the pure Augustinian concepts.
The incorporation of Aristotelianism into Christian theology presupposed the rejection of certain concepts held by this pagan philosopher and his commentators, inasmuch as they were contradictory to Christianity. Among these, e.g., were Aristotle’s idea concerning the eternal nature of the world, his belief that there is a universal soul rather than an individual soul, etc. At the same time, however, there was a group of theologians who accepted Aristotle without these limitations, just as he was made known to the West by the Arabian philosophers. To do this and simultaneously hold fast to the fundamentals of the Christian faith, these men took refuge in the theory of double truth: what is true in philosophy can be false in theology and vice versa. This school of thought, known as Latin Averroism, was represented, for example, by Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. Its views were condemned by ecclesiastical authorities (Paris, 1277), just as Aristotle’s natural philosophy had been proscribed in order to prevent its initiation into theology. In its “Christianized” form, however, Aristotelian philosophy did provide (in future years) the scientific basis for scholastic theology.
It may be well at this point to mention some of the basic characteristics of the Augustinian-Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian thought forms. These distinctive philosophical points of view left their mark on the opposing theological schools within high scholasticism.
The Augustinian position with respect to epistemology was based on the idea that intellectual knowledge can essentially be derived from an immediate “enlightenment.” Man participates in divine thought, and his intellect therefore possesses within itself the ability to create insight. External things are not the direct cause of our knowledge; they only provide the impulses which cause the subject to form knowledge. This is called the illumination theory, and it also has significance for the understanding of faith. True faith is an immediate certainty, inwardly given, an infused or inspired faith (fides inspirata). This is superior to all authority, and it implies an immediate certainty about divine things.
The Aristotelian epistemology, on the other hand, is based on the idea that the human subject receives knowledge from without. In its relationship to the world without, the intellect is passive, and it possesses the ability to receive the form of things as species intelligibiles, which are transformed from things to the intellect via sensual impressions. “There is nothing in the intellect which was not earlier in the senses.” This position involves a stronger empirical interest and a pronounced sense of tangible reality. This is important also in theology. The Christian concept of creation is, in a sense, of decisive significance in this tradition. God is thought to stand in a direct relationship to external reality and to be active also in the temporal order. The high appreciation of the natural order as an expression of God’s creation which has been characteristic of later Western theology, both within Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism, was promoted by the influence of Aristotelian philosophy. Its epistemology held, therefore, that knowledge is formed by external impressions. The soul is a blank slate (tabula rasa), which is able to receive these impressions and thus form logical knowledge. In the act of knowing, the soul is united with the form of the object which it perceives. Knowing involves the union of the intellect and the object of knowledge. The forms which provide the nature of things, and the forms which the intellect receives and absorbs into itself are identical. According to Thomas Aquinas the soul is, “in a way, all things” (quodammodo omnia). Faith is to be understood in an analogous manner. Faith is not so much inner enlightenment as it is a form of knowledge similar to others, although it has a different object. The truth of faith is not empirical but revealed. This revealed truth comes to man through the authorities (e. g., Scripture), but it has its origins in God’s own truth. What we have here is a question of supernatural knowledge in contrast to natural knowledge.
The Augustinian and the Aristotelian schools also differed with respect to anthropology: in the one case the soul of man was thought of as an independent entity, while in the other soul and body were spoken of as a unit. But dualism is involved to some extent even in those forms of scholasticism which are otherwise Aristotelian in structure. Furthermore, the Franciscan school was voluntaristic, whereas Aristotelianism tended to be intellectual: within the former the will was seen to be the primary factor, ruling in a sovereign manner over one’s actions; according to the latter point of view the intellect was thought to be of prime importance. The intellect, it was said, influences the will, so that the will desires that which the intellect considers to be good. This difference of opinion was of significance in the dispute between Thomism and Scotism (see below), just as it was later on in the controversy between the Thomists and the nominalists.
The Older Franciscans
Alexander of Hales (d. 1245, the first of the Franciscans to teach at the University of Paris) was the founder of bona fide high scholasticism. His book, Summa universae theologiae, was designed to be a commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, but it was at the same time the first and the most comprehensive of theological summaries. As such, it was of fundamental importance for Franciscan scholastic theology. The huge amount of material gathered in this book has not yet been thoroughly researched. It can be said in a general way, however, that Alexander represented the older Augustinian line from Anselm and Hugo of St. Victor but at the same time introduced certain categories derived from Aristotelian metaphysics and further developed the dialectical technique.
Alexander defined theology as a kind of wisdom (sapientia). Man comes to possess theological knowledge through direct inner enlightenment. The knowledge of God is with man from the outset (a congenital factor), while additional knowledge is imparted by grace later on. This enlightenment which comes by grace is identical with infused faith (fides infusa) and it is combined with a certainty (certitudo) which is independent of authority. As will be clear from what has been said, Alexander accepted Augustine’s theory of illumination: all knowledge, both natural and revealed, presupposes the illumination of the soul by a divine light. Alexander’s concept of faith was voluntaristic; he emphasized the practical, voluntary nature of faith. The Franciscan doctrine of grace will be dealt with later on.
Bonaventura (d. 1274, a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas and like him a teacher in Paris) was closely related to his predecessor, Alexander of Hales, and the Augustinian tradition. He too accepted the illumination theory of knowledge as well as the voluntaristic concept of faith. Bonaventura also placed great emphasis on the concept of exemplary ideas—a concept which did much to influence the scholastic view of the world. He said that the prototype of created things was to be found in God’s thoughts. Created things retain an indelible impression of these divine thoughts (to a greater or lesser degree), and they are an expression of them. Those things which most remotely represent the divine are called “shadows” (umbrae), others are called “vestiges” thereof (vestigia), while some things—those that most clearly reflect it—can be called “images” (imagines) of the divine. In this last category, for example, we find the soul of man. This kind of thinking formed the background for the so-called doctrine of analogy: the created world is neither identical with nor absolutely distinct from the divine, but it is in some sense similar to it. There is an analogy between God and creation, and on the basis of this we can know something about God as a result of our knowledge of created things.
Bonaventura and his followers were to some extent opposed to Thomas Aquinas and the Thomists. They disagreed, for example, about the doctrine of grace (see below) and about epistemology and even with respect to the basic view of the relationship between God and creation. Bonaventura referred everything, even natural knowledge, to its divine origins, and he did this in such a way that the natural and the supernatural blended together into a comtemplative unity. Thomas, on the other hand, employing a closely related analogy concept, emphasized the lack of similarity and the fundamental distinction between God and the created world.
Bonaventura combined scholastic erudition with mystical contemplation. Among his many writings there is a sentence commentary—thought by some to be the best of its kind—and also a brief summary of dogmatics, entitled Breviloquium. But he also left behind a number of other works which are clearly of a mystical bent, chief among which is the well-known Itinerarium mentis ad Deum—an attempt to describe the ways in which the soul can raise itself to knowledge of God and to the vision which forms the highest stage of this knowledge.
The Dominican School
Albertus Magnus (d. 1280, a native of Württemberg, active in Cologne and elsewhere) left behind an enormous amount of scholarly works, which testifies to his universal erudition. He was occupied with all the sciences known in his era. In the field of natural science, where his contributions are recognized even today, he demonstrated his ability to make independent observations and also his empirical point of view, which was different from the traditional method of perception.It was Albertus who, more than anyone else, made Aristotelian philosophy known and useful for contemporary science. In the field of theology it was he who prepared the way for the acceptance of the new principles; this was accomplished in part by transforming Aristotelianism in such a way that it harmonized with the doctrine of faith. As a result of this activity, Albertus laid the foundation for the work which was completed by his famous disciple Thomas Aquinas. As atheologian, Albertus followed the traditional Augustinian point of view for the most part.
Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274, when only 50 years old; teacher in Paris, and for a time at the papal curia and in Naples; son of a prominent Italian family) brought scholasticism to its highest point of development. He surpassed Albertus as a systematician, and he also succeeded in bringing the new Aristotelian concepts and the Christian tradition together in an organic union.
The following is a list of some of his better-known works in theology and philosophy: a sentence commentary, written at the beginning of his career; a number of Bible commentaries; Summa contra gentiles, an apologetic work which spans the entire field of theology; Summa theologica, begun in 1269 and not yet finished at the time of his death (the missing parts were supplied later by one of his followers, who used corresponding material taken from Thomas’ sentence commentary); a group of minor works; and commentaries on most of the writings of Aristotle.
The Summa theologica, which was Thomas’ magnum opus and the classical work of all scholasticism, and which is still the basic text for theological study in the Roman Catholic Church, consists of three parts: Part I deals with the divine Being and God’s creative work; Part II concerns God as the goal of human activity; and Part III deals with Christ as the way to reach that goal, and with the sacraments and eternal life.
Thomas’ Teaching about the Knowledge of God
Basic to the Thomistic system is the conviction that the human intellect is in accordance with things in their essential structure and that, in the process of knowing, the mind of man identifies with things and partakes of their essence. One can compare this to the expression referred to above, that the soul of man isquodammodo omnia. Man’s ability to penetrate the very nature of things, and to know their cause and purpose, is the basis of metaphysical speculation. At the same time, however, there is some knowledge of God which is, so to speak, given, such as the knowledge that God is, that He is the highest, perfect Being, etc.
Thus it is that the possibility of man’s knowledge of God as the highest Being and as the Ground of all reality is to be found in the ability of the intellect to comprehend the nature of things. Man cannot, of course, comprehend God’s absolute nature, which is infinitely superior to created things. But there is nevertheless a connection between the absolute Being and the created world—they both exist. When the intellect grasps the nature of things, it can also draw the conclusion that God exists in a corresponding manner. Existence can be ascribed in an analogous way both to God and to created things (to employ a later term: analogia entis).
By virtue of our knowledge of the created world, therefore, we can arrive at some knowledge of God. Thomas presented five different ways in which this can happen. He developed these ideas on the basis of five important aspects of the created world, viz., movement, efficient causes, necessity, perfection, and the order of things. From these Thomas proceeded to speak of God as the first, unmoved Mover (actus purus), the first Cause (ens a se), the absolute Necessity, the absolute Perfection, and finally as the highest Intelligence. On the other hand, Thomas rejected the idea of an immediate, congenital knowledge of God.
Our natural knowledge of God is highly imperfect: it includes a general realization that God exists, but it cannot tell us what He is really like. There is, however, another way of knowing God, which is elevated above reason and cannot be reached by metaphysical speculation. This is the knowledge of God which comes to man through revelation. It is derived directly from God’s own knowledge, and it is accessible to man through the light of grace (per lumen gratiae).
It is this supernatural knowledge of God which is the proper subject of theology. This knowledge is received by faith and is clearly distinct from purely rational, verifiable knowledge. For the content of faith does not possess the kind of evidence that results from direct observance of the object of knowledge or from being able to understand why it is as it is. Faith is based on authority, on something that someone else has said. The certainty of revelation lies in this, that God has spoken. Yet such knowledge is itself basically of the same kind as that derived from natural sources. In this Thomas was opposed to the older Franciscans, who looked upon faith as an immediate illumination, complete with an axiomatic certainty inspired by God (see above). According to Thomas, faith is knowledge (scientia), although its content is different from that which is derived from natural sources.
As a result of this view, Thomas’ concept of faith was influenced by his theory of knowledge. There is an unbroken connection between ordinary conceptual knowledge and the supreme vision of the divine Being. That the intellect partakes of the nature of things is analogous to the fact that faith partakes of the divine.
If faith is to be perfect, it must be combined with love. Man is able to believe in God and truly share in His life only on the strength of the infused gifts of grace. The highest level of sharing is the beatific vision, which shall replace faith in eternity and which implies that man, by the light of glory (per lumen gloriae), will there see God directly and thereby share in His being.
Theology and Science According to Thomas
As already noted, the Thomistic system involved the application of Aristotelian principles to the theological sphere. This was done in such a way that these philosophical concepts did not simply serve as incidental formulae or as principles of methodology; they rather molded the very structure of the system itself. The presupposition was that theology and science are in harmony, just as are faith and reason.
As Thomas understood it, theology is a science. At the same time, it is different from rational knowledge, inasmuch as the content of faith is inaccessible to reason and can come to man only through revelation and the light of grace. Reason is unable to perceive the basis of revealed truth, but faith accepts it on the basis of God’s authority. This might be compared to a peasant hearing someone discuss philosophic truth. He does not recognize the principles which lie behind this truth, but he can nevertheless assume that it is so because he has confidence in the philosopher who is speaking, who does know the principles and why they act as they do. A similar relationship occurs in the sciences: one science will sometimes support its claims on the basis of propositions borrowed from another, without trying to prove them independently. The optometrist, e.g., borrows from geometry, and geometry in turn borrows from mathematics. In the same way, theology builds on borrowed propositions whose correctness it does not itself demonstrate. The higher “science” from which theology secures its principles is the supernatural world’s own knowledge, the knowledge which God and the angels possess about divine matters. In this way theology is given a scientific character, even though it cannot itself prove or even fully comprehend the principles on which it bases its assertions. Complete insight and understanding belong to another world. Theology is the knowledge of God possessed by persons living in this world. It is based on faith, which finds its support on another’s authority and which holds revelation to be true even though it lacks rational evidence.
On the basis of this unique idea—borrowing theological principles from a higher science—Thomas Aquinas succeeded in combining two contradictory scientific concepts: the Aristotelian and the Augustinian. The former held that science, in the strict sense of the term, involves only objects which can be rationally demonstrated. According to the latter, even the knowledge which comes by faith can afterwards be perceived and contemplated by our rational powers. Duns Scotus and the late medieval nominalists criticized this Thomistic compromise and—applying the Aristotelian concept more consistently—rejected the idea that theology is a scientia.
Duns Scotus and His Understanding of Faith and Knowledge
Duns Scotus (d. 1308, teacher at Oxford and Paris) was a Franciscan, and he continued the older Franciscan opposition to the solution suggested by Thomas to the problem of theology and science. Duns Scotus was considered the most astute of the scholastics(doctor subtilis), and it was he who carried the philosophical analysis of theological questions to its extreme. At the same time, Duns gave rise to new trends of thought which foreshadowed the dissolution of scholasticism and signaled the end of the harmonious relationship between theology and philosophy.
Duns, like Thomas, was an Aristotelian, but he was more empirical than Thomas. For Thomas, reality was to be found in the nature of things, i.e., in the universal. For Scotus, also individuality implied logical reality. He argued that individual qualities give a thing its form, while Thomas maintained that only matter is the basis of the division into individual things (matter is the principium individuationis). Scotus himself was a realist, but as a result of his emphasis on the subjective he anticipated the rise of nominalism, which associated all reality with individual things.
While Thomas stressed the relationship between theology and science with respect to knowledge, Scotus demonstrated that there is a cleavage between theological and scientific knowledge. The latter deals with the universal, with that which things have in common, with universal laws and principles. Theology, on the other hand, deals with God’s revelation, which includes, among other things, the singular works of salvation, to which Scripture bears witness. This implies that its objects are somewhat “contingent” (the opposite of “necessary”). Because of this, a theological system cannot be constructed simply on a metaphysical basis, as was the case in Thomism, for when theology deals with supernatural truths it must refer only to the Scriptures and to ecclesiastical tradition. Scotus was unable to find the way which led from natural knowledge to faith; the latter, as he saw it, is supported only by authority.
Theology is not so much a question of theoretical knowledge. Faith is practical knowledge (cognitio practica); it presupposes the surrender of man’s will to God’s, to authority. And its object is not theoretical knowledge; it is rather to change the human will so that it comes to agree with God’s will. Faith finds its goal in love (caritas). According to Thomas, a volitional aspect was also included in knowledge, which was supreme in his estimation. The goal of faith, as Thomas understood it, is the beatific vision, which can be understood in analogy to earthly knowledge.
As has been made clear from the foregoing, Scotus’ point of view, like that of the older Franciscans, was voluntaristic. Fundamental to his theological position was the concept of God’s sovereign will, against which the free will of man is set. The goal is that the latter shall be subjected to the former and be conformed to it.
When Scotus turned against Thomistic intellectualism, and to a certain extent undermined the harmony between theology and science to which Thomas gave expression, this did not mean that Scotus refused to use philosophy in the service of theology. On the contrary, he carried the scholastic method even further than his predecessors. But in principle Scotus looked upon philosophy as merely an aid (through logic, e.g.) in further explicating the doctrines of the church and in refuting false teachings.
Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas
As a result of the work of Duns Scotus, the contrast between the Franciscans and the Dominicans (which we have already touched upon) was accentuated.
With respect to the doctrine of God, the difference between the two schools can be explained as follows: Thomas thought of God as the highest Being, which meant that he conceived of God in intellectual categories. Scotus, on the other hand, emphasized God’s sovereign will as the basis for the course of the world and for revelation. Scotus distinguished between God’s potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. According to the former, God is completely free and can act independently of all rules. Good is good because God wants it so (perdeitas boni). According to the latter, God acts in a manner consistent with the order of creation and the order of salvation, which is to say that He permits men to be saved through the work of Christ and the sacraments of the church. But it is conceivable that God (according to potentia absoluta) could act independently of this order. As Thomas saw it, on the other hand, God’s will always coincides with the order which He established. God wants the good because it is good (perseitas boni).
Scotus also deviated from the prevailing scholastic position in respect to Christology. This was because he strongly emphasized the humanity of Christ. Scholasticism ordinarily conceived of the human nature as having been absorbed by the divine nature. The latter was “person forming,” which was often tantamount to presenting a one-sided picture of Christ. Scotus’ stress on Christ’s humanity can be explained by his empirical point of view, as well as by his conception of the reality of the individual.
As was true of scholasticism in general, Thomas Aquinas associated the doctrine of the Atonement with the sacraments. Through His suffering, which included His entire earthly life and not just His death, Christ has secured sufficient merit to counterbalance the sins of all men for all time. This merit is transferred to the faithful through the sacraments, which bring to us the gifts of grace. Scotus too connected salvation with the suffering of Christ, but this relationship, as he saw it, exists only because God has accepted Christ’s sacrifice as a substitute for human compensation. All depends, in the final analysis, on God’s free acceptance. Such a position is quite far removed from the idea of the rational necessity of the Atonement as set forth by Anselm.
The most important difference between the Franciscans and the Dominicans is to be seen in connection with the doctrine of grace and justification.
The Doctrine of Grace in High Scholasticism
How can a man be justified and share in the blessings of salvation? The high scholastics had much to say in answer to this question (particularly the older Franciscans, who provided a detailedordo salutis). For the most part they built on the inherited tradition. As a rule, however, the merit and reward ideas were emphasized more strongly than in the earlier Augustinian position, and a Semi-Pelagian tendency is dearly visible in Franciscan theology. Greater significance was attached to the sacraments as the agents of grace. Furthermore, the high scholastics distinguished between natural and supernatural operations of grace in a way that was not true previously. This ledto a concept of grace in which it was asserted that man can be elevated above the level of nature. Besides this, the idea of the preparatory acts was inserted into the doctrine of justification itself. The major aspects of theordo salutis developed by the older Franciscan theologians will be apparent from what is said next.
As a result of Christ’s atoning work, God’s plan of salvation for humanity has been put into effect. Through His predestination, God has selected those who believe in Christ to be freed from sin and to attain to blessedness and eternal life. This takes place in justification and in the course of the continued work of grace in man’s life. Life in the church under the influence of the Word and of sacramental grace is, therefore, a continuation of Christ’s atoning work, and the execution in time of predestination’s eternal decree.
What is grace? This was thought to be in part the eternal loving will of God, or uncreated grace (gratia increata), and also to be that grace which comes to man as a gift and therefore prepares the way for human salvation, or created grace (gratia creata). The latter consists chiefly of the so-called infused grace (see below), which brings about justification and good works. But gratia creata also includes all of that which God gives to man for nothing. These gifts, and particularly those which prepare man for salvation, were summarized by the Franciscans under the term gratia gratis data, the grace given freely to man, without involving the question of merit (or, in other words, for nothing).
Some of the preliminaries to salvation can be discerned even in natural man. Among the heathen, for example, one encounters a certain longing for knowledge about God; in the reason and will of man there is a certain proclivity to devise and do what is good. But above all, gratia gratis data refers to that which specifically prepares the way for the reception of the higher grace: an embryonic faith (fides informis), preliminary repentance, which results from the fear of punishment (attritio), a lower form of fear (timor servilis), and an indefinite hope (spes informis). The call which comes through the Word (vocatio) also has its place here.
The proclamation of the Word, or the Gospel, has a relatively obscure place in the order of salvation. It merely provides the knowledge which is necessary if one is to receive sacramental grace, and with it justification. Chief emphasis is given to the sacraments. The Word has something of a legal character, telling us what to believe and do. The Gospel is presented as a new law (nova lex), which not only commands but also provides the power necessary to carry out its commands. But this power is not provided through the Word itself; it comes via the sacraments instituted by Christ.
The gifts which are summed up in the gratia gratis data concept are related exclusively to the natural sphere. The question is: What must a man do in his own strength (facere quod in se est) to be prepared for the reception of grace? The baser forms of faith and repentance which are possible at this stage are not enough in themselves to justify man. But according to the Franciscans, they do constitute a meritum de congruo, or proportional merit. It is probable that God rewards these deeds, even though they are not truly meritorious in themselves. The reward they bring is that God provides the true grace (gratia gratum faciens). It is this which justifies a man—makes him well-pleasing to God—and wipes out his guilt, at the same time that it makes available to human nature that superior equipment which is necessary to produce good works and to win meritum de condigno, genuine merit.
Justifying grace is an infused habitus, a donum habituale, provided through the sacraments, primarily through Baptism but also through penance and the Lord’s Supper. Grace can be lost, and then regained through penance. This habitus elevates a man’s nature to a higher level and replaces the donum superadditum which man lost as a result of the fall into sin. Infused grace alters the direction of man’s will towards God and makes possible both a genuine faith (fides infusa) and a spirit of repentance which is motivated not by fear of punishment but by love for God (contritio; timer filialis). Thus it is that genuine merit can be found, which will be rewarded with eternal life, the grace of glory (gratia glorificationis).
Thomas Aquinas changed certain facets of this scheme. He emphasized the priority of grace in relation to man’s free will, and he rejected the strong psychologizing which characterized the Franciscan position. According to Thomas, man is unable in his own strength to prepare himself to receive grace. We cannot take the initiative in creating faith; the beginning of faith coincides with the coming of grace. As a result, all talk of facere quod in se est must cease. A certain preparation can take place, but only with the assistance of grace, and this (according to Thomas) is not meritorious. It does not, of and by itself, lead to salvation. Justification is purely and simply a supernatural work, which can result only by virtue of infused grace. When a man comes to share in the habitus of grace—and this takes place in a moment—he is justified.
Among the older scholastics, as with Augustine, grace was understood as the making whole of human nature (gratia sanans; see above pp. 174–75), which had been damaged by the Fall. But not so with the high scholastics, who conceived of grace as a supernatural gift which elevates the nature of man to a higher level (gratia elevans). These gifts of grace were looked upon as being necessary, not only because man is a sinner but also because it was thought that man could attain the saving knowledge of God and the blessed vision of God only after these gifts were added to what is ours by nature.
Justifying grace coincides with infused love, which perfects a man and enables him to perform meritorious deeds. As a result of its influence, man’s original righteousness is restored (because it equips man with the habitus of love), and his already converted will is supported in its desire to do what is good (gratia operans and gratia cooperans). Grace is an inner power which enhances his natural qualifications and provides him with supernatural virtues. Hope becomes a firm trust, and faith becomes not simply a fides informis but an inner conviction molded by love. Fear becomes “filial fear” (timor filialis). When grace cooperates with man’s natural powers, merits result. These are meritorious as the work of free will, but they become fully meritorious only with the assistance of grace. Merit is not required for man’s justification; it is needed only in order that man might be able to retain the gifts of grace and attain to blessedness (beatitudo), which thus appears in part as a reward for his merits.
High Scholasticism’s View of the Sacraments
Scholasticism gradually formulated the point of view which came to be accepted quite generally within the Roman Catholic Church. Beginning with Peter Lombard, it was thought that there are seven sacraments: Baptism, confirmation, the Lord’s Supper, penance, extreme unction, ordination, and marriage. Thomas Aquinas conceived of the sacraments as “physical” signs, designed to protect and enhance the life of the spirit. Bodily life begins with birth and then requires growth and nourishment. So it is with spiritual life; it begins with the new birth of Baptism, receives strength to grow from confirmation and nourishment from the Lord’s Supper. Spiritual life is further advanced through penance, which removes the sickness of sin, and by extreme unction, which takes care of the remnants of sin. The last two sacraments concern man in relation to society: ordination, which bestows the right to rule over others in the clerical office (and thus corresponds to political office in the civic sphere), and marriage, which is intended to increase the church numerically (and which is related both to spiritual life and civic life). Thus it was that the seven were justified. It was more difficult, however, to show that each of these had been instituted by Christ. And it was not easy, either, to demonstrate the claim that each sacrament consists in part of an external element (materia) and in part of an accompanying word, which provides its purpose and effect (forma). This was particularly difficult in the case of penance, ordination, and marriage.
All of the sacraments were looked upon as bearers of the grace which resulted from Christ’s substitutionary suffering. The sacraments manifest this suffering in various ways, and they convey its healing and creative influence to the members of the church. This concept was given logical form in a variety of ways. The Franciscans, and especially Duns Scotus, associated themselves with the Augustinian, symbolic point of view, and they looked upon the communication of grace as an effect brought about directly by God, alongside the external use of the sacraments. In other words, the effect of grace is something which accompanies the external use of the sacraments. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, devised a theory in which he referred to the sacraments as instruments for the communication of grace. Thomas believed that grace is not only “morally” related to the external use of the sacraments, but that it is “physically” included within them. According to this theory, the sacraments are not simply signs of the grace which God bestows in an invisible manner, but they are in the real sense the cause of the communication of grace. It was thought, therefore, that the sacramental act is in itself effective, independent of accompanying faith in the words of promise. This conviction is expressed by saying that the sacraments work ex opere operato.
In addition to the elements (materia) and the accompanying words (forma), it was also maintained that the intention of the ministrant to execute the sacraments as the church intended is necessary to sacramental validity. On the other hand, the effect of the sacraments was not thought to be conditioned by whether the officiant has faith or not.
Finally, we shall point briefly to some of the questions discussed in connection with the various sacraments.
Water was the prescribed material to be used in Baptism, and its form was the words spoken by the officiant: Ego te baptizo in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti. Baptism, like confirmation and ordination, was thought to confer a character indelebilis, and because of this these sacraments were never repeated and lack of faith could not render them invalid. When it was asked what this character indelebilis was like, lengthy discussions resulted.
It was held that confirmation provided the power required for the Christian’s spiritual struggle. Its materia is balsam oil, which is smeared on the confirmand’s forehead while these words are spoken: Consigno te signo crucis et confirmo te chrismate salutis in nomine Patris, etc.
The Lord’s Supper was looked upon as the most important sacrament, inasmuch as it is most closely related to the suffering of Christ. The doctrine of transubstantiation—which, as mentioned earlier, was ratified at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215—was interpreted by Thomas to mean that the substance of the bread and wine is changed by the consecration into the body and blood of Christ. On the other hand, the elements retain their accidents, their size, smell, taste, and so on. Nor should it be said that the substances of the elements are destroyed (annihilatio), but rather that they are transformed into the substance of the body and blood of Christ.
Another theory was championed in particular by Duns Scotus. He believed that the bread retains its substance and that Christ’s glorified body comes down into the bread through the consecration and is found there together with the natural substance of the bread, without quantity but whole and complete in every part of the sacramental bread. This is the so-called consubstantiation (or impanation) theory. Scotus attempted to reconcile this theory to the teaching prevalent in the church, but the two were incompatible. Scotus also considered the possibility that the substance of the bread is replaced by the body of Christ and is therefore destroyed. The impanation theory was subsequently adopted by the nominalists, but it was unable to replace the already sanctioned doctrine of transubstantiation.
Penance was thought of simply in terms of auricular confession to a priest, including the three acts which provide the suggested materia of this sacrament: the contrition of the heart, the confession made by the mouth, and the satisfaction prescribed by the priest. The latter consisted of prayer, fasting, and the giving of alms. The form of the sacrament is to be found in the words of absolution: Ego te absolvo, etc. In this form, penance presupposed that the power of the keys (the right to bind or loose a man with respect to sin) has been given to the priest. The so-called indulgences presented a special problem. It was believed that the power of the keys also included the right to exchange one form of satisfaction (corresponding to the sin involved) for another, easier one, or to excuse the need to make satisfaction altogether. The indulgence system was justified by the claim that the church possesses a treasury of surplus merits, acquired by Christ and the saints. The original intention was that an indulgence should be given only in connection with confession and that sincere repentance was a necessary prerequisite. But the practice was separated from genuine penance, and then it was that the gross misuse of the indulgence system, which aroused strong opposition even during the late Middle Ages, appeared.
Extreme unction was given only when it was assumed that death was near; then the sick person’s various members were anointed with consecrated oil while prayer was said. This sacrament was looked upon as a complement to penance, and it was believed to result in the removal of the remnants of sin and—“where practical”—in the healing of the body. Biblical support for this act was found in James 5:14–15.
Ordination, or consecration into the various church offices, was also considered to be a sacrament, inasmuch as it provided sanctifying grace by means of a visible sign. The act itself, which in the case of a priest involved the presentation of chalice and paten with bread and wine, was not considered to bring grace as did the other sacraments; it was the officiating bishop who through his person provided the power of office. The act of ordination was therefore looked upon as symbolic, and not as effective in itself (Thomas, Summa, suppl, qu. 34, art. 5). Most persons believed that the bishops and the priests together form the “priestly office” (sacerdotium), while others thought of the episcopacy as a special office superior to the other (e. g., Duns Scotus).
Marriage, which has both civic and religious implications, was thought to receive its sacramental character from the fact that it symbolizes Christ’s love for the congregation (Eph. 5). Mutual agreement (mutuus consensus) was considered to be the effective cause of marriage. The form of this sacrament was taken not from the priestly benediction but from the verbally expressed consensus. The indissolubility of marriage was regarded as the result of its sacramental nature. In view of the fact that marriage is illustrative of the love which Christ revealed in His suffering, it can be placed (despite the civic overtones) in the same category with the other sacraments—as a mediator of the grace which is a fruit of Christ’s suffering and death.
At the Council of Constance (1414–18) the severe criticisms which John Hus and John Wyclif (see below) directed toward the sacramental system were repudiated. At the Council of Florence (1439) the tradition of the seven sacraments, which had been shaped by scholasticism, was formally accepted (the bull Exultate Deo, by Pope Eugenius IV).
The development of scholasticism reached its apex during the 13th century. The synthesis between the philosophical Weltanschauung of antiquity and the Christian faith, long anticipated in the West, was now brought to completion and established in fixed patterns. A general advance in science and learning formed the basis for the theological achievements of this age. The University of Paris, which became an international stronghold for theological education, replaced the Parisian cathedral schools in the 12th century. The two mendicant orders, the Dominican and the Franciscan, founded at the beginning of the 13th century, also did much to promote learned theological study. The major theologians of the time were associated with these orders. The increased knowledge of Neoplatonic and above all Aristotelian philosophy which then became available (partly with the assistance of such Arabian commentators as Averroes and Avicenna, partly through direct translations into Latin) contributed significantly to the doctrinal development of high scholasticism.
Prior to this, Western knowledge of Aristotle was confined to his work in the field of logic, but in the 13th century his other writings also came to light. In the sphere of general science the study of his natural philosophy led to a new interest in natural science. And in the field of theology Aristotelian premises gradually came into use—in spite of some opposition from ecclesiastical sources. Theologians discovered, above all in Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics, a number of viewpoints and definitions which could be useful in their scientific approach to doctrinal questions (e. g., Aristotle’s distinction between form and substance, and between actuality and potentiality, his doctrine of causation, and his description of virtue). This new philosophical element created a new attitude in the field of theology, and this in turn did much to prepare the way for the majestic synthesis of theology and philosophy and faith and reason which manifested itself in the theological systems of the 13th century.
Contemporary theological instruction consisted of lectures, chiefly on Biblical texts, and disputations on particular dogmatic problems. At this point, however, a new feature was added in the impressive form of the so-called theological summaries and sentence commentaries (wherein, above all, the scholastic heritage was preserved for posterity). The earlier “dialectical” treatment of the material was replaced by more radical methods, which often reflected the procedure of the disputations. The Biblical-Augustinian tradition was here inserted into a world view which was formed on the basis of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. The doctrinal propositions or sentences previously loosely joined together could thus be transformed into a firm and uniform system.
In high scholasticism, philosophy was accorded a position relative to the knowledge of faith which was different from that given it by the older scholasticism—depending, of course, on the extent to which the new scientific methods were followed. The older scholastics employed the dialectical method in discussing the truths of faith in order, so to speak, to demonstrate their logical necessity a posteriori. Under the high scholastics the rational adaptation became more independent in relation to faith. The metaphysical world view came to form the basis of the entire theological presentation. The Augustinian credo ut intelligam evolved into a system in which faith and reason were looked upon as two equal principles of knowledge, harmoniously working together, even though it was recognized at the same time that they represented two different worlds. The way now led from intelligere to credere. Faith formed the superstructure to the natural knowledge involved in the Aristotelian system of metaphysics.
Augustinianism and Aristotelianism
Even though the theology of high scholasticism did not as a rule cultivate a particular philosophical point of view, preferring instead to synthesize the elements found in various sources, one can nevertheless discern a number of major currents of thought, dominated by those of Augustinian and Aristotelian origin. (Neoplatonism, which also played a significant role, was present to some extent in Augustinian ideas, but it exercised a direct influence as well, particularly in mysticism.)
The Augustinian-Neoplatonic line was represented above all by the older Franciscans (see below), while the theologians of the Dominican order were more closely related to the Aristotelian point of view. But there were no hard and fast lines of demarcation: those who perpetuated the Augustinian tradition also devoted themselves in some measure to the new Aristotelian concepts; at the same time, there were Dominicans who derived a great deal from the Augustinian heritage. Thomas Aquinas, the most prominent of the Dominican theologians, did as a matter of fact combine Augustinian and Aristotelian points of view—the inherited Christian doctrinal tradition and the contemporary philosophical structure. As a philosopher, however, Thomas was closer to Aristotle than to the pure Augustinian concepts.
The incorporation of Aristotelianism into Christian theology presupposed the rejection of certain concepts held by this pagan philosopher and his commentators, inasmuch as they were contradictory to Christianity. Among these, e.g., were Aristotle’s idea concerning the eternal nature of the world, his belief that there is a universal soul rather than an individual soul, etc. At the same time, however, there was a group of theologians who accepted Aristotle without these limitations, just as he was made known to the West by the Arabian philosophers. To do this and simultaneously hold fast to the fundamentals of the Christian faith, these men took refuge in the theory of double truth: what is true in philosophy can be false in theology and vice versa. This school of thought, known as Latin Averroism, was represented, for example, by Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. Its views were condemned by ecclesiastical authorities (Paris, 1277), just as Aristotle’s natural philosophy had been proscribed in order to prevent its initiation into theology. In its “Christianized” form, however, Aristotelian philosophy did provide (in future years) the scientific basis for scholastic theology.
It may be well at this point to mention some of the basic characteristics of the Augustinian-Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian thought forms. These distinctive philosophical points of view left their mark on the opposing theological schools within high scholasticism.
The Augustinian position with respect to epistemology was based on the idea that intellectual knowledge can essentially be derived from an immediate “enlightenment.” Man participates in divine thought, and his intellect therefore possesses within itself the ability to create insight. External things are not the direct cause of our knowledge; they only provide the impulses which cause the subject to form knowledge. This is called the illumination theory, and it also has significance for the understanding of faith. True faith is an immediate certainty, inwardly given, an infused or inspired faith (fides inspirata). This is superior to all authority, and it implies an immediate certainty about divine things.
The Aristotelian epistemology, on the other hand, is based on the idea that the human subject receives knowledge from without. In its relationship to the world without, the intellect is passive, and it possesses the ability to receive the form of things as species intelligibiles, which are transformed from things to the intellect via sensual impressions. “There is nothing in the intellect which was not earlier in the senses.” This position involves a stronger empirical interest and a pronounced sense of tangible reality. This is important also in theology. The Christian concept of creation is, in a sense, of decisive significance in this tradition. God is thought to stand in a direct relationship to external reality and to be active also in the temporal order. The high appreciation of the natural order as an expression of God’s creation which has been characteristic of later Western theology, both within Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism, was promoted by the influence of Aristotelian philosophy. Its epistemology held, therefore, that knowledge is formed by external impressions. The soul is a blank slate (tabula rasa), which is able to receive these impressions and thus form logical knowledge. In the act of knowing, the soul is united with the form of the object which it perceives. Knowing involves the union of the intellect and the object of knowledge. The forms which provide the nature of things, and the forms which the intellect receives and absorbs into itself are identical. According to Thomas Aquinas the soul is, “in a way, all things” (quodammodo omnia). Faith is to be understood in an analogous manner. Faith is not so much inner enlightenment as it is a form of knowledge similar to others, although it has a different object. The truth of faith is not empirical but revealed. This revealed truth comes to man through the authorities (e. g., Scripture), but it has its origins in God’s own truth. What we have here is a question of supernatural knowledge in contrast to natural knowledge.
The Augustinian and the Aristotelian schools also differed with respect to anthropology: in the one case the soul of man was thought of as an independent entity, while in the other soul and body were spoken of as a unit. But dualism is involved to some extent even in those forms of scholasticism which are otherwise Aristotelian in structure. Furthermore, the Franciscan school was voluntaristic, whereas Aristotelianism tended to be intellectual: within the former the will was seen to be the primary factor, ruling in a sovereign manner over one’s actions; according to the latter point of view the intellect was thought to be of prime importance. The intellect, it was said, influences the will, so that the will desires that which the intellect considers to be good. This difference of opinion was of significance in the dispute between Thomism and Scotism (see below), just as it was later on in the controversy between the Thomists and the nominalists.
The Older Franciscans
Alexander of Hales (d. 1245, the first of the Franciscans to teach at the University of Paris) was the founder of bona fide high scholasticism. His book, Summa universae theologiae, was designed to be a commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, but it was at the same time the first and the most comprehensive of theological summaries. As such, it was of fundamental importance for Franciscan scholastic theology. The huge amount of material gathered in this book has not yet been thoroughly researched. It can be said in a general way, however, that Alexander represented the older Augustinian line from Anselm and Hugo of St. Victor but at the same time introduced certain categories derived from Aristotelian metaphysics and further developed the dialectical technique.
Alexander defined theology as a kind of wisdom (sapientia). Man comes to possess theological knowledge through direct inner enlightenment. The knowledge of God is with man from the outset (a congenital factor), while additional knowledge is imparted by grace later on. This enlightenment which comes by grace is identical with infused faith (fides infusa) and it is combined with a certainty (certitudo) which is independent of authority. As will be clear from what has been said, Alexander accepted Augustine’s theory of illumination: all knowledge, both natural and revealed, presupposes the illumination of the soul by a divine light. Alexander’s concept of faith was voluntaristic; he emphasized the practical, voluntary nature of faith. The Franciscan doctrine of grace will be dealt with later on.
Bonaventura (d. 1274, a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas and like him a teacher in Paris) was closely related to his predecessor, Alexander of Hales, and the Augustinian tradition. He too accepted the illumination theory of knowledge as well as the voluntaristic concept of faith. Bonaventura also placed great emphasis on the concept of exemplary ideas—a concept which did much to influence the scholastic view of the world. He said that the prototype of created things was to be found in God’s thoughts. Created things retain an indelible impression of these divine thoughts (to a greater or lesser degree), and they are an expression of them. Those things which most remotely represent the divine are called “shadows” (umbrae), others are called “vestiges” thereof (vestigia), while some things—those that most clearly reflect it—can be called “images” (imagines) of the divine. In this last category, for example, we find the soul of man. This kind of thinking formed the background for the so-called doctrine of analogy: the created world is neither identical with nor absolutely distinct from the divine, but it is in some sense similar to it. There is an analogy between God and creation, and on the basis of this we can know something about God as a result of our knowledge of created things.
Bonaventura and his followers were to some extent opposed to Thomas Aquinas and the Thomists. They disagreed, for example, about the doctrine of grace (see below) and about epistemology and even with respect to the basic view of the relationship between God and creation. Bonaventura referred everything, even natural knowledge, to its divine origins, and he did this in such a way that the natural and the supernatural blended together into a comtemplative unity. Thomas, on the other hand, employing a closely related analogy concept, emphasized the lack of similarity and the fundamental distinction between God and the created world.
Bonaventura combined scholastic erudition with mystical contemplation. Among his many writings there is a sentence commentary—thought by some to be the best of its kind—and also a brief summary of dogmatics, entitled Breviloquium. But he also left behind a number of other works which are clearly of a mystical bent, chief among which is the well-known Itinerarium mentis ad Deum—an attempt to describe the ways in which the soul can raise itself to knowledge of God and to the vision which forms the highest stage of this knowledge.
The Dominican School
Albertus Magnus (d. 1280, a native of Württemberg, active in Cologne and elsewhere) left behind an enormous amount of scholarly works, which testifies to his universal erudition. He was occupied with all the sciences known in his era. In the field of natural science, where his contributions are recognized even today, he demonstrated his ability to make independent observations and also his empirical point of view, which was different from the traditional method of perception.It was Albertus who, more than anyone else, made Aristotelian philosophy known and useful for contemporary science. In the field of theology it was he who prepared the way for the acceptance of the new principles; this was accomplished in part by transforming Aristotelianism in such a way that it harmonized with the doctrine of faith. As a result of this activity, Albertus laid the foundation for the work which was completed by his famous disciple Thomas Aquinas. As atheologian, Albertus followed the traditional Augustinian point of view for the most part.
Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274, when only 50 years old; teacher in Paris, and for a time at the papal curia and in Naples; son of a prominent Italian family) brought scholasticism to its highest point of development. He surpassed Albertus as a systematician, and he also succeeded in bringing the new Aristotelian concepts and the Christian tradition together in an organic union.
The following is a list of some of his better-known works in theology and philosophy: a sentence commentary, written at the beginning of his career; a number of Bible commentaries; Summa contra gentiles, an apologetic work which spans the entire field of theology; Summa theologica, begun in 1269 and not yet finished at the time of his death (the missing parts were supplied later by one of his followers, who used corresponding material taken from Thomas’ sentence commentary); a group of minor works; and commentaries on most of the writings of Aristotle.
The Summa theologica, which was Thomas’ magnum opus and the classical work of all scholasticism, and which is still the basic text for theological study in the Roman Catholic Church, consists of three parts: Part I deals with the divine Being and God’s creative work; Part II concerns God as the goal of human activity; and Part III deals with Christ as the way to reach that goal, and with the sacraments and eternal life.
Thomas’ Teaching about the Knowledge of God
Basic to the Thomistic system is the conviction that the human intellect is in accordance with things in their essential structure and that, in the process of knowing, the mind of man identifies with things and partakes of their essence. One can compare this to the expression referred to above, that the soul of man isquodammodo omnia. Man’s ability to penetrate the very nature of things, and to know their cause and purpose, is the basis of metaphysical speculation. At the same time, however, there is some knowledge of God which is, so to speak, given, such as the knowledge that God is, that He is the highest, perfect Being, etc.
Thus it is that the possibility of man’s knowledge of God as the highest Being and as the Ground of all reality is to be found in the ability of the intellect to comprehend the nature of things. Man cannot, of course, comprehend God’s absolute nature, which is infinitely superior to created things. But there is nevertheless a connection between the absolute Being and the created world—they both exist. When the intellect grasps the nature of things, it can also draw the conclusion that God exists in a corresponding manner. Existence can be ascribed in an analogous way both to God and to created things (to employ a later term: analogia entis).
By virtue of our knowledge of the created world, therefore, we can arrive at some knowledge of God. Thomas presented five different ways in which this can happen. He developed these ideas on the basis of five important aspects of the created world, viz., movement, efficient causes, necessity, perfection, and the order of things. From these Thomas proceeded to speak of God as the first, unmoved Mover (actus purus), the first Cause (ens a se), the absolute Necessity, the absolute Perfection, and finally as the highest Intelligence. On the other hand, Thomas rejected the idea of an immediate, congenital knowledge of God.
Our natural knowledge of God is highly imperfect: it includes a general realization that God exists, but it cannot tell us what He is really like. There is, however, another way of knowing God, which is elevated above reason and cannot be reached by metaphysical speculation. This is the knowledge of God which comes to man through revelation. It is derived directly from God’s own knowledge, and it is accessible to man through the light of grace (per lumen gratiae).
It is this supernatural knowledge of God which is the proper subject of theology. This knowledge is received by faith and is clearly distinct from purely rational, verifiable knowledge. For the content of faith does not possess the kind of evidence that results from direct observance of the object of knowledge or from being able to understand why it is as it is. Faith is based on authority, on something that someone else has said. The certainty of revelation lies in this, that God has spoken. Yet such knowledge is itself basically of the same kind as that derived from natural sources. In this Thomas was opposed to the older Franciscans, who looked upon faith as an immediate illumination, complete with an axiomatic certainty inspired by God (see above). According to Thomas, faith is knowledge (scientia), although its content is different from that which is derived from natural sources.
As a result of this view, Thomas’ concept of faith was influenced by his theory of knowledge. There is an unbroken connection between ordinary conceptual knowledge and the supreme vision of the divine Being. That the intellect partakes of the nature of things is analogous to the fact that faith partakes of the divine.
If faith is to be perfect, it must be combined with love. Man is able to believe in God and truly share in His life only on the strength of the infused gifts of grace. The highest level of sharing is the beatific vision, which shall replace faith in eternity and which implies that man, by the light of glory (per lumen gloriae), will there see God directly and thereby share in His being.
Theology and Science According to Thomas
As already noted, the Thomistic system involved the application of Aristotelian principles to the theological sphere. This was done in such a way that these philosophical concepts did not simply serve as incidental formulae or as principles of methodology; they rather molded the very structure of the system itself. The presupposition was that theology and science are in harmony, just as are faith and reason.
As Thomas understood it, theology is a science. At the same time, it is different from rational knowledge, inasmuch as the content of faith is inaccessible to reason and can come to man only through revelation and the light of grace. Reason is unable to perceive the basis of revealed truth, but faith accepts it on the basis of God’s authority. This might be compared to a peasant hearing someone discuss philosophic truth. He does not recognize the principles which lie behind this truth, but he can nevertheless assume that it is so because he has confidence in the philosopher who is speaking, who does know the principles and why they act as they do. A similar relationship occurs in the sciences: one science will sometimes support its claims on the basis of propositions borrowed from another, without trying to prove them independently. The optometrist, e.g., borrows from geometry, and geometry in turn borrows from mathematics. In the same way, theology builds on borrowed propositions whose correctness it does not itself demonstrate. The higher “science” from which theology secures its principles is the supernatural world’s own knowledge, the knowledge which God and the angels possess about divine matters. In this way theology is given a scientific character, even though it cannot itself prove or even fully comprehend the principles on which it bases its assertions. Complete insight and understanding belong to another world. Theology is the knowledge of God possessed by persons living in this world. It is based on faith, which finds its support on another’s authority and which holds revelation to be true even though it lacks rational evidence.
On the basis of this unique idea—borrowing theological principles from a higher science—Thomas Aquinas succeeded in combining two contradictory scientific concepts: the Aristotelian and the Augustinian. The former held that science, in the strict sense of the term, involves only objects which can be rationally demonstrated. According to the latter, even the knowledge which comes by faith can afterwards be perceived and contemplated by our rational powers. Duns Scotus and the late medieval nominalists criticized this Thomistic compromise and—applying the Aristotelian concept more consistently—rejected the idea that theology is a scientia.
Duns Scotus and His Understanding of Faith and Knowledge
Duns Scotus (d. 1308, teacher at Oxford and Paris) was a Franciscan, and he continued the older Franciscan opposition to the solution suggested by Thomas to the problem of theology and science. Duns Scotus was considered the most astute of the scholastics(doctor subtilis), and it was he who carried the philosophical analysis of theological questions to its extreme. At the same time, Duns gave rise to new trends of thought which foreshadowed the dissolution of scholasticism and signaled the end of the harmonious relationship between theology and philosophy.
Duns, like Thomas, was an Aristotelian, but he was more empirical than Thomas. For Thomas, reality was to be found in the nature of things, i.e., in the universal. For Scotus, also individuality implied logical reality. He argued that individual qualities give a thing its form, while Thomas maintained that only matter is the basis of the division into individual things (matter is the principium individuationis). Scotus himself was a realist, but as a result of his emphasis on the subjective he anticipated the rise of nominalism, which associated all reality with individual things.
While Thomas stressed the relationship between theology and science with respect to knowledge, Scotus demonstrated that there is a cleavage between theological and scientific knowledge. The latter deals with the universal, with that which things have in common, with universal laws and principles. Theology, on the other hand, deals with God’s revelation, which includes, among other things, the singular works of salvation, to which Scripture bears witness. This implies that its objects are somewhat “contingent” (the opposite of “necessary”). Because of this, a theological system cannot be constructed simply on a metaphysical basis, as was the case in Thomism, for when theology deals with supernatural truths it must refer only to the Scriptures and to ecclesiastical tradition. Scotus was unable to find the way which led from natural knowledge to faith; the latter, as he saw it, is supported only by authority.
Theology is not so much a question of theoretical knowledge. Faith is practical knowledge (cognitio practica); it presupposes the surrender of man’s will to God’s, to authority. And its object is not theoretical knowledge; it is rather to change the human will so that it comes to agree with God’s will. Faith finds its goal in love (caritas). According to Thomas, a volitional aspect was also included in knowledge, which was supreme in his estimation. The goal of faith, as Thomas understood it, is the beatific vision, which can be understood in analogy to earthly knowledge.
As has been made clear from the foregoing, Scotus’ point of view, like that of the older Franciscans, was voluntaristic. Fundamental to his theological position was the concept of God’s sovereign will, against which the free will of man is set. The goal is that the latter shall be subjected to the former and be conformed to it.
When Scotus turned against Thomistic intellectualism, and to a certain extent undermined the harmony between theology and science to which Thomas gave expression, this did not mean that Scotus refused to use philosophy in the service of theology. On the contrary, he carried the scholastic method even further than his predecessors. But in principle Scotus looked upon philosophy as merely an aid (through logic, e.g.) in further explicating the doctrines of the church and in refuting false teachings.
Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas
As a result of the work of Duns Scotus, the contrast between the Franciscans and the Dominicans (which we have already touched upon) was accentuated.
With respect to the doctrine of God, the difference between the two schools can be explained as follows: Thomas thought of God as the highest Being, which meant that he conceived of God in intellectual categories. Scotus, on the other hand, emphasized God’s sovereign will as the basis for the course of the world and for revelation. Scotus distinguished between God’s potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. According to the former, God is completely free and can act independently of all rules. Good is good because God wants it so (perdeitas boni). According to the latter, God acts in a manner consistent with the order of creation and the order of salvation, which is to say that He permits men to be saved through the work of Christ and the sacraments of the church. But it is conceivable that God (according to potentia absoluta) could act independently of this order. As Thomas saw it, on the other hand, God’s will always coincides with the order which He established. God wants the good because it is good (perseitas boni).
Scotus also deviated from the prevailing scholastic position in respect to Christology. This was because he strongly emphasized the humanity of Christ. Scholasticism ordinarily conceived of the human nature as having been absorbed by the divine nature. The latter was “person forming,” which was often tantamount to presenting a one-sided picture of Christ. Scotus’ stress on Christ’s humanity can be explained by his empirical point of view, as well as by his conception of the reality of the individual.
As was true of scholasticism in general, Thomas Aquinas associated the doctrine of the Atonement with the sacraments. Through His suffering, which included His entire earthly life and not just His death, Christ has secured sufficient merit to counterbalance the sins of all men for all time. This merit is transferred to the faithful through the sacraments, which bring to us the gifts of grace. Scotus too connected salvation with the suffering of Christ, but this relationship, as he saw it, exists only because God has accepted Christ’s sacrifice as a substitute for human compensation. All depends, in the final analysis, on God’s free acceptance. Such a position is quite far removed from the idea of the rational necessity of the Atonement as set forth by Anselm.
The most important difference between the Franciscans and the Dominicans is to be seen in connection with the doctrine of grace and justification.
The Doctrine of Grace in High Scholasticism
How can a man be justified and share in the blessings of salvation? The high scholastics had much to say in answer to this question (particularly the older Franciscans, who provided a detailedordo salutis). For the most part they built on the inherited tradition. As a rule, however, the merit and reward ideas were emphasized more strongly than in the earlier Augustinian position, and a Semi-Pelagian tendency is dearly visible in Franciscan theology. Greater significance was attached to the sacraments as the agents of grace. Furthermore, the high scholastics distinguished between natural and supernatural operations of grace in a way that was not true previously. This ledto a concept of grace in which it was asserted that man can be elevated above the level of nature. Besides this, the idea of the preparatory acts was inserted into the doctrine of justification itself. The major aspects of theordo salutis developed by the older Franciscan theologians will be apparent from what is said next.
As a result of Christ’s atoning work, God’s plan of salvation for humanity has been put into effect. Through His predestination, God has selected those who believe in Christ to be freed from sin and to attain to blessedness and eternal life. This takes place in justification and in the course of the continued work of grace in man’s life. Life in the church under the influence of the Word and of sacramental grace is, therefore, a continuation of Christ’s atoning work, and the execution in time of predestination’s eternal decree.
What is grace? This was thought to be in part the eternal loving will of God, or uncreated grace (gratia increata), and also to be that grace which comes to man as a gift and therefore prepares the way for human salvation, or created grace (gratia creata). The latter consists chiefly of the so-called infused grace (see below), which brings about justification and good works. But gratia creata also includes all of that which God gives to man for nothing. These gifts, and particularly those which prepare man for salvation, were summarized by the Franciscans under the term gratia gratis data, the grace given freely to man, without involving the question of merit (or, in other words, for nothing).
Some of the preliminaries to salvation can be discerned even in natural man. Among the heathen, for example, one encounters a certain longing for knowledge about God; in the reason and will of man there is a certain proclivity to devise and do what is good. But above all, gratia gratis data refers to that which specifically prepares the way for the reception of the higher grace: an embryonic faith (fides informis), preliminary repentance, which results from the fear of punishment (attritio), a lower form of fear (timor servilis), and an indefinite hope (spes informis). The call which comes through the Word (vocatio) also has its place here.
The proclamation of the Word, or the Gospel, has a relatively obscure place in the order of salvation. It merely provides the knowledge which is necessary if one is to receive sacramental grace, and with it justification. Chief emphasis is given to the sacraments. The Word has something of a legal character, telling us what to believe and do. The Gospel is presented as a new law (nova lex), which not only commands but also provides the power necessary to carry out its commands. But this power is not provided through the Word itself; it comes via the sacraments instituted by Christ.
The gifts which are summed up in the gratia gratis data concept are related exclusively to the natural sphere. The question is: What must a man do in his own strength (facere quod in se est) to be prepared for the reception of grace? The baser forms of faith and repentance which are possible at this stage are not enough in themselves to justify man. But according to the Franciscans, they do constitute a meritum de congruo, or proportional merit. It is probable that God rewards these deeds, even though they are not truly meritorious in themselves. The reward they bring is that God provides the true grace (gratia gratum faciens). It is this which justifies a man—makes him well-pleasing to God—and wipes out his guilt, at the same time that it makes available to human nature that superior equipment which is necessary to produce good works and to win meritum de condigno, genuine merit.
Justifying grace is an infused habitus, a donum habituale, provided through the sacraments, primarily through Baptism but also through penance and the Lord’s Supper. Grace can be lost, and then regained through penance. This habitus elevates a man’s nature to a higher level and replaces the donum superadditum which man lost as a result of the fall into sin. Infused grace alters the direction of man’s will towards God and makes possible both a genuine faith (fides infusa) and a spirit of repentance which is motivated not by fear of punishment but by love for God (contritio; timer filialis). Thus it is that genuine merit can be found, which will be rewarded with eternal life, the grace of glory (gratia glorificationis).
Thomas Aquinas changed certain facets of this scheme. He emphasized the priority of grace in relation to man’s free will, and he rejected the strong psychologizing which characterized the Franciscan position. According to Thomas, man is unable in his own strength to prepare himself to receive grace. We cannot take the initiative in creating faith; the beginning of faith coincides with the coming of grace. As a result, all talk of facere quod in se est must cease. A certain preparation can take place, but only with the assistance of grace, and this (according to Thomas) is not meritorious. It does not, of and by itself, lead to salvation. Justification is purely and simply a supernatural work, which can result only by virtue of infused grace. When a man comes to share in the habitus of grace—and this takes place in a moment—he is justified.
Among the older scholastics, as with Augustine, grace was understood as the making whole of human nature (gratia sanans; see above pp. 174–75), which had been damaged by the Fall. But not so with the high scholastics, who conceived of grace as a supernatural gift which elevates the nature of man to a higher level (gratia elevans). These gifts of grace were looked upon as being necessary, not only because man is a sinner but also because it was thought that man could attain the saving knowledge of God and the blessed vision of God only after these gifts were added to what is ours by nature.
Justifying grace coincides with infused love, which perfects a man and enables him to perform meritorious deeds. As a result of its influence, man’s original righteousness is restored (because it equips man with the habitus of love), and his already converted will is supported in its desire to do what is good (gratia operans and gratia cooperans). Grace is an inner power which enhances his natural qualifications and provides him with supernatural virtues. Hope becomes a firm trust, and faith becomes not simply a fides informis but an inner conviction molded by love. Fear becomes “filial fear” (timor filialis). When grace cooperates with man’s natural powers, merits result. These are meritorious as the work of free will, but they become fully meritorious only with the assistance of grace. Merit is not required for man’s justification; it is needed only in order that man might be able to retain the gifts of grace and attain to blessedness (beatitudo), which thus appears in part as a reward for his merits.
High Scholasticism’s View of the Sacraments
Scholasticism gradually formulated the point of view which came to be accepted quite generally within the Roman Catholic Church. Beginning with Peter Lombard, it was thought that there are seven sacraments: Baptism, confirmation, the Lord’s Supper, penance, extreme unction, ordination, and marriage. Thomas Aquinas conceived of the sacraments as “physical” signs, designed to protect and enhance the life of the spirit. Bodily life begins with birth and then requires growth and nourishment. So it is with spiritual life; it begins with the new birth of Baptism, receives strength to grow from confirmation and nourishment from the Lord’s Supper. Spiritual life is further advanced through penance, which removes the sickness of sin, and by extreme unction, which takes care of the remnants of sin. The last two sacraments concern man in relation to society: ordination, which bestows the right to rule over others in the clerical office (and thus corresponds to political office in the civic sphere), and marriage, which is intended to increase the church numerically (and which is related both to spiritual life and civic life). Thus it was that the seven were justified. It was more difficult, however, to show that each of these had been instituted by Christ. And it was not easy, either, to demonstrate the claim that each sacrament consists in part of an external element (materia) and in part of an accompanying word, which provides its purpose and effect (forma). This was particularly difficult in the case of penance, ordination, and marriage.
All of the sacraments were looked upon as bearers of the grace which resulted from Christ’s substitutionary suffering. The sacraments manifest this suffering in various ways, and they convey its healing and creative influence to the members of the church. This concept was given logical form in a variety of ways. The Franciscans, and especially Duns Scotus, associated themselves with the Augustinian, symbolic point of view, and they looked upon the communication of grace as an effect brought about directly by God, alongside the external use of the sacraments. In other words, the effect of grace is something which accompanies the external use of the sacraments. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, devised a theory in which he referred to the sacraments as instruments for the communication of grace. Thomas believed that grace is not only “morally” related to the external use of the sacraments, but that it is “physically” included within them. According to this theory, the sacraments are not simply signs of the grace which God bestows in an invisible manner, but they are in the real sense the cause of the communication of grace. It was thought, therefore, that the sacramental act is in itself effective, independent of accompanying faith in the words of promise. This conviction is expressed by saying that the sacraments work ex opere operato.
In addition to the elements (materia) and the accompanying words (forma), it was also maintained that the intention of the ministrant to execute the sacraments as the church intended is necessary to sacramental validity. On the other hand, the effect of the sacraments was not thought to be conditioned by whether the officiant has faith or not.
Finally, we shall point briefly to some of the questions discussed in connection with the various sacraments.
Water was the prescribed material to be used in Baptism, and its form was the words spoken by the officiant: Ego te baptizo in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti. Baptism, like confirmation and ordination, was thought to confer a character indelebilis, and because of this these sacraments were never repeated and lack of faith could not render them invalid. When it was asked what this character indelebilis was like, lengthy discussions resulted.
It was held that confirmation provided the power required for the Christian’s spiritual struggle. Its materia is balsam oil, which is smeared on the confirmand’s forehead while these words are spoken: Consigno te signo crucis et confirmo te chrismate salutis in nomine Patris, etc.
The Lord’s Supper was looked upon as the most important sacrament, inasmuch as it is most closely related to the suffering of Christ. The doctrine of transubstantiation—which, as mentioned earlier, was ratified at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215—was interpreted by Thomas to mean that the substance of the bread and wine is changed by the consecration into the body and blood of Christ. On the other hand, the elements retain their accidents, their size, smell, taste, and so on. Nor should it be said that the substances of the elements are destroyed (annihilatio), but rather that they are transformed into the substance of the body and blood of Christ.
Another theory was championed in particular by Duns Scotus. He believed that the bread retains its substance and that Christ’s glorified body comes down into the bread through the consecration and is found there together with the natural substance of the bread, without quantity but whole and complete in every part of the sacramental bread. This is the so-called consubstantiation (or impanation) theory. Scotus attempted to reconcile this theory to the teaching prevalent in the church, but the two were incompatible. Scotus also considered the possibility that the substance of the bread is replaced by the body of Christ and is therefore destroyed. The impanation theory was subsequently adopted by the nominalists, but it was unable to replace the already sanctioned doctrine of transubstantiation.
Penance was thought of simply in terms of auricular confession to a priest, including the three acts which provide the suggested materia of this sacrament: the contrition of the heart, the confession made by the mouth, and the satisfaction prescribed by the priest. The latter consisted of prayer, fasting, and the giving of alms. The form of the sacrament is to be found in the words of absolution: Ego te absolvo, etc. In this form, penance presupposed that the power of the keys (the right to bind or loose a man with respect to sin) has been given to the priest. The so-called indulgences presented a special problem. It was believed that the power of the keys also included the right to exchange one form of satisfaction (corresponding to the sin involved) for another, easier one, or to excuse the need to make satisfaction altogether. The indulgence system was justified by the claim that the church possesses a treasury of surplus merits, acquired by Christ and the saints. The original intention was that an indulgence should be given only in connection with confession and that sincere repentance was a necessary prerequisite. But the practice was separated from genuine penance, and then it was that the gross misuse of the indulgence system, which aroused strong opposition even during the late Middle Ages, appeared.
Extreme unction was given only when it was assumed that death was near; then the sick person’s various members were anointed with consecrated oil while prayer was said. This sacrament was looked upon as a complement to penance, and it was believed to result in the removal of the remnants of sin and—“where practical”—in the healing of the body. Biblical support for this act was found in James 5:14–15.
Ordination, or consecration into the various church offices, was also considered to be a sacrament, inasmuch as it provided sanctifying grace by means of a visible sign. The act itself, which in the case of a priest involved the presentation of chalice and paten with bread and wine, was not considered to bring grace as did the other sacraments; it was the officiating bishop who through his person provided the power of office. The act of ordination was therefore looked upon as symbolic, and not as effective in itself (Thomas, Summa, suppl, qu. 34, art. 5). Most persons believed that the bishops and the priests together form the “priestly office” (sacerdotium), while others thought of the episcopacy as a special office superior to the other (e. g., Duns Scotus).
Marriage, which has both civic and religious implications, was thought to receive its sacramental character from the fact that it symbolizes Christ’s love for the congregation (Eph. 5). Mutual agreement (mutuus consensus) was considered to be the effective cause of marriage. The form of this sacrament was taken not from the priestly benediction but from the verbally expressed consensus. The indissolubility of marriage was regarded as the result of its sacramental nature. In view of the fact that marriage is illustrative of the love which Christ revealed in His suffering, it can be placed (despite the civic overtones) in the same category with the other sacraments—as a mediator of the grace which is a fruit of Christ’s suffering and death.
At the Council of Constance (1414–18) the severe criticisms which John Hus and John Wyclif (see below) directed toward the sacramental system were repudiated. At the Council of Florence (1439) the tradition of the seven sacraments, which had been shaped by scholasticism, was formally accepted (the bull Exultate Deo, by Pope Eugenius IV).
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