General Background
It can be said, speaking in general terms, that the age of the Enlightenment on the European continent coincided with the 18th century. A profound scientific and cultural transformation took place during this time, a transformation which completely altered the conditions under which theological activity was carried on.
The roots of this age and its ideas are to be found in Renaissance humanism and Socinianism, as well as in the deism of 17th-century England. The philosophical systems which began to replace the older philosophical structure in the latter half of the 17th century (Descartes, Leibniz, Locke) also helped to prepare the ground for the Enlightenment. New discoveries and theories in the field of natural science (Newton) and in the field of jurisprudence (Grotius, Pufendorf) also contributed to the development of the more modern point of view, which became increasingly widespread during the 18th century. In the theological area, Pietism served to promote this same development in some ways.
The epoch we are now discussing marks the emergence of the modem period. A new world view forced its way into a dominating position in the cultural sphere, and new intellectual assumptions grew apace. In order to understand the import of this radical change, it is desirable to compare it at certain points with the older tradition and its scientific principles.
Philosophical thought was transformed from the ground up, through the great philosophical systems as well as through the new scholastic philosophy which replaced Aristotelian scholasticism at the German universities in the 18th century (Thomasius, Wolff).
The metaphysical concept of substantial forms was replaced by an empirical and atomistic concept of reality. Previously the world of the spirit, epitomized in God (ens supremum), was considered the highest and the primary reality. But not so in the age of the Enlightenment, when the eyes of men were turned toward the empirically conceived material world with all its diversity. The older objective philosophy was replaced by a practical and utilitarian form of wisdom, whose primary objective was to teach man to understand and control his environment and to enjoy happiness in this world (the so-called philosophy of moderation).
Older forms of thought proceeded from the object—metaphysics sought for an objective knowledge of the deepest meaning of reality. The new philosophy began with the subject, which was considered primary in the search for knowledge. Self-consciousness and inner experience were looked upon as the most obvious and fundamental factors—immediately at hand for the thinking and feeling subject. The tendency toward rationalistic thought was thereby given: attempts were made to explain the world on the basis of the principles of human reason.
One of the most important prerequisites of the age of the Enlightenment, and therefore for modern thought as well, was the new concept of learning. Philosophy was no longer regarded as the handmaiden of theology (ancilla theologiae). Learning was freed from its dependence on theology and scholastic metaphysics and was based instead on the observations of experience and on rational principles. Thus it was, beginning already in the 17th century, that the so-called natural system of knowledge—based on the idea that humanistic erudition, religion and morals, law and politics, can be grounded on distinct rational principles common to all men in all ages—began to develop. This rational knowledge was thought of as being autonomous, immediately accessible and fully evident to all, without having been obscured by original sin.
Even more profound, perhaps, was the change which took place in the field of natural science. Scholars now began to apply the mechanical-mathematical method and proceeded more than ever before on the basis of empirical observation.
This new natural science brought with it an altered picture of the world. The empirical investigation of the world came to be of primary interest. It was not until the 18th century that the conception of the solar system which Copernicus set forth in the 16th century was generally accepted. The earth was no longer looked upon as the center of things, and man, in this new perspective, became nothing more than a speck of dust in the universe—at the same time that he controlled the universe through his reason. The Aristotelian conception of form was replaced by a mechanical-atomistic explanation of the world. Life consists of unalterable space, things are compounded of particles which exert a mechanical influence upon one another and fill out space. No longer did men think of substantial forms as the basic elements in the edifice of the universe; they rather thought solely in terms of material entities. A basic contrast between matter and spirit, sensuous and super-sensual, was one of the results of this mechanical explanation of nature. This was quite far removed not only from the older scholastic metaphysics but also from the original Lutheran view of the world (with its finitum capax infiniti).
Behind this new understanding of the world was the conviction that human reason is competent to survey and control its environment, to establish laws for the events of life as well as rules for human society. A rationalistic explanation of nature and a rationalistic doctrine of morality came to the fore as consequences of this new attitude. The Enlightenment was characterized by its naive faith in man and his possibilities.
In the field of jurisprudence new ideas were broached by Hugo Grotius (d. 1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (d. 1694), which have provided the basis for the modern concept of natural rights. The older Protestant tradition also spoke of natural rights or a natural law. But this referred to the knowledge of right and wrong which was put into man’s heart at the time of creation, weak vestiges of which remain even after the Fall. The idea of natural law was therefore involved in the context of revelation and of the Biblical view of man. The natural rights of the age of Enlightenment were emancipated from this. They were rather based on the belief that distinct principles of law are imbedded in human reason and that these form a common basis for the public administration of law. Morality, therefore, was based on autonomous reason. The tie between revelation and natural law was cut.
A similar change took place with respect to the concept of the state. While the Lutheran tradition looked upon authority as a divine institution, commissioned to be “the protector of both tables of the Law” (custos utriusque tabulae), men such as Thomas Hobbes conceived the idea of a secular state, based on human forbearance, designed to promote the salus publica—the general welfare. In the state governed by an absolutist prince, political considerations were placed above the ecclesiastical], and the church lost its independence. The new concept of the state was similarly based on an optimistic faith in reason; it was believed that man was able to adjust political matters in such a way that the common good would be served.
Quite a long time passed before the Enlightenment began seriously to affect the field of theology. It was not until the latter part of the 18th century that neology, or a rationalistic theology, began to appear among German Protestants. Even before this, however, the general shift in the way of thinking had left obvious traces in this area as well.
The most influential of the new ideas introduced into the theology of the Enlightenment was the concept of natural religion. This was first developed in 17th-century English deism. In his book De veritate (1625) Herbert of Cherbury set forth the idea that there is a natural religion, common to all men and independent of revelation, through which man can be blessed even apart from knowledge of revelation. He thought of Christ as a wise teacher and above all as an example in virtue. The meaning of natural religion was presented in the five following propositions: there is a God, a highest being; this highest being ought to be worshiped and served; this worship consists above all in piety and virtue; deviations from virtue (sin) must be repented, and if there is repentance, there will be forgiveness; the evil will be punished and the good will be rewarded in a life to come. The idea that the doctrines of “God, virtue, and immortality” form a summary of religion, much cherished during the age of the Enlightenment, was already present here.
During the 18th century, deism appeared in a more radical form. This can be seen, for example, in Matthew Tindal’s well-known book Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730), as well as in the philosophers of the French Enlightenment and in German rationalism (e.g., in the Wolfenbüttel Fragments, written by Reimarus and published by Lessing).
The culture of the Enlightenment was distinguished by its increasing secularization. The new form of natural science pointed toward an immanent explanation of the world. A secular culture developed, independent of church and confessions. The state was similarly released from its religious purposes and from its connection with the Christian confessions.
The process of secularization did not, however, signify a rejection of Christianity or of religion, but it did bring about a profound alteration of the prerequisites for Christian theology and preaching.
This change revealed itself in (among other things) the following tendencies, which exerted a profound affect on the theology of the Enlightenment.
1. Theology came to be more or less dependent on philosophy and rational thought. Even in those presentations where the author did not wish to go so far as to replace revelation with natural religion, intending rather to stand fully within the Christian tradition, it was not uncommon to find rational arguments placed alongside revelation on an equal basis. The demand that reason be subjected to the testimony of Scripture was replaced by the firm belief that revelation and rational principles are in complete harmony, plus the desire to legitimize revelation in the presence of reason.
2. Parallel with theology’s rationalizing was its tendency to moralize. Morality is a more immediate concern than religion to the modern, rational view of life. The promotion of good morals was looked upon as Christianity’s main objective, and ethical content as its very essence.
3. The idea that religion was based in particular on principles imbedded in human reason supported an individualistic conception: religion became an individual, private matter, its certainty based on a person’s own experiences.
4. A basic characteristic of the theology of the Enlightenment was the tendency to “humanize” Christianity, to accommodate it to an anthropocentric frame. Theology was expected to promote human welfare, and theological truth was expected to harmonize with commonly recognized rational principles. This-worldly goals predominated: earthly happiness and a rational morality were the primary benefits that men expected from religion.
English Theology in the Age of the Enlightenment
The thought pattern of the modern age began to influence English theology at an early date: by the end of the 17th century it came to dominate a point of view which was called “latitudinarianism.” Its representatives believed that revelation was in full accord with reason and the religious principles discerned therein. Unlike the deists, they did not desire to replace traditional Christianity with natural religion, but they did feel that revealed religion had its best support in reason. Faith was looked upon as a conviction based on rational considerations. Religious truth cannot be “proved,” but moral certainty can be attained, partly on the basis of the assumption that the Bible is a reliable source and that the miracles confirm its authority. One of the chief spokesmen of this influential branch of English theology was John Tillotson (1630–94), famous as a preacher, after 1691 archbishop of Canterbury. The ideas of the latitudinarians were neither radical nor subversive. They were different in that they were independent of the reasoning of scholastic metaphysics and also because of their serene confidence in the belief that the Christian faith can be supported by rational arguments. The latitudinarians held that, in the final analysis, the decisive proof for faith is to be found in an upright conduct of life. For them the moral aspect was superior to the religious.
A kindred spirit can be noted in the contribution which the great philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) made to the question of faith and knowledge. Locke made a clear distinction between revelation and reason, and asserted that the propositions of faith rest on completely different ground than the truths of reason. Direct revelation, such as that which came to the prophets and apostles, involves a certainty equal to that associated with evident knowledge. We cannot expect to receive a direct revelation, however; revelation is mediated to us through language and human understanding. Because of this, the Christian faith, as we comprehend it, must always be judged to a certain extent by reason, and it can be accepted only if it is not contrary to the evident principles of reason. In his book The Reasonableness of Christianity (1693) Locke sought to present a pure Biblical Christianity, independent of the later theology and of the creeds of the church. He did not deny the doctrine of the Trinity, but he endeavored to find the Biblical equivalents of its terms. In Locke we find the prototype of two tendencies which came to be characteristic of the theology of the Enlightenment in England: the first was the desire to exhibit the reasonableness of Christianity, and the second, to reproduce what was considered to be an uncorrupted form of Biblical doctrine.
At the side of latitudinarianism, which was moderate in its attitude and strove to retain the essentials of the Christian tradition, radical deism appeared in new forms, developing in a manner consistent with the ideas set forth earlier by Herbert of Cherbury (see above). A book published by John Toland in 1696, Christianity not Mysterious, attempted to excerpt from Christianity certain simple, basic dogmas about God and immortality, which were referred to as the essential and rational elements thereof. The “mysterious” elements of the Christian faith, on the other hand, ought to be repudiated. In the book by Matthew Tindal mentioned above, Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730), the thesis was set forth that the Gospel was simply a reiteration of the original, natural religion. Its content is essentially the proclamation of a pure and moral life, which promotes God’s glory and man’s happiness. The thesis concerning a rational religion was thereby combined with the idea that morality is the end and purpose of religion. This reductive Christianity, which was excerpted from the gospels, was said to be identical with the natural religion of reason, and therefore the form of religion best equipped to encourage morality and happiness.
Among those who came out against the deists was Joseph Butler (1692–1752, bishop of Durham), who published his famous apologetic work, The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature, in 1736. Butler’s analogy presupposed faith in a supreme Creator of the world. It was not, therefore, directed against atheism, but it sought to manifest the probability of faith and its consistency with reason for those who already recognize God as Creator. In opposition to the deists, Butler asserted the necessity of revelation; natural religion does not by any means make revelation superfluous.
The main argument in the part of Butler’s book which deals with revealed religion is this: If we admit that Scripture has come to us from the God who is the Creator of nature, then we can expect to find in the truths of faith something of the same structure—and of the same difficulty to explain in its totality—as we find in the natural order. This is what Butler called an analogy between religion and the world of nature. He did not suggest that such an analogy can be found everywhere; the examples are at best sporadic. But to him this was sufficient. We cannot expect to have exact proof of the claims of faith. Probability is the highest goal we can reach in this respect, and a demonstration of probability is what Butler sought to establish through a detailed proof of the analogy which exists between nature and religion. He was in many ways very close to the deist position on the affinity between natural religion and Christianity, but unlike the deists he wanted to defend also the specific Christian revelation.
One major point concerned the doctrine of the Atonement. The deists considered the Atonement to be superfluous, inasmuch as God’s mercy ought to be sufficient in itself to forgive the sins of those who repent. But Butler asserted that Christ’s substitutionary suffering is the ground of forgiveness, and he showed that one can find analogies even to this in the world around us. Butler’s encounter with deism was not without its contradictions, but one can discern in his work the contours of a new concept of revelation. During the 19th century Butler’s influence on English theology became even greater than it was while he was alive.
The struggle against deism occupied an important place in 18th-century English theology. It was soon overshadowed, however, by another factor—the victorious progress of the Methodist movement, beginning at the end of the 1730s. This is not the place to describe the history of Methodism, or its effect on church and society; we shall only take note of its theological contours.
John Wesley (1703–91) was a priest in the state church of England, and early became one of the leaders of a high-church movement at Oxford. On his mother’s side he also had connections with the latitudinarian (broad church) and Socinian tradition; furthermore, he had, during a two-year stint as a missionary in the colony of Georgia, come under the direct influence of the Herrnhut point of view. As a result of his association with Herrnhutism, Wesley was convinced that trust in the merits of Christ forms the sole basis of man’s salvation, a doctrine which he found confirmed in the homilies produced within the Church of England during the time of the Reformation. His conversion (1738), which proved to be the point of departure for the Methodist awakening, was described by Wesley as a suddenly aroused inner certainty of forgiveness of sins through faith in Christ alone. This occurred under the impact of Luther’s Preface to Romans. Wesley’s brother Charles had experienced a similar conversion, prompted by his study of Luther’s commentary on Galatians.
Justification by faith alone was the crux of John Wesley’s preaching after his conversion. He therefore broke with an idea that was prevalent in Anglican theology, viz., that good works are the goal of faith, and a necessary qualification for salvation. The clergy of Wesley’s time were generally unacquainted with the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Wesley insisted that sanctification must not be confused with justification. It is the fruit of faith. It is characteristic of Methodism that the new birth is not attributed to Baptism but to justification, which is associated with conversion or the conscious enkindling of faith.
Wesley sought to avoid controversy as long as possible. His entire message was designed to awaken people to lives of active faith and holiness. It was natural, therefore, that his interest in doctrinal dispute would be minor. In spite of this, however, a number of rather profound differences of opinion gradually arose even within Methodism. Wesley subsequently developed the doctrine of faith and works in a direction which led him further away from the Reformation point of view and closer to the current English conception. He maintained that works are a necessary condition for justification. As a result of this, he came into conflict with the conservative Calvinists, who held fast to the belief that the merits of Christ are the sole ground of human salvation.
The teaching of predestination also became controversial. Wesley proclaimed universal grace in the Arminian manner and vehemently opposed the idea of divine reprobation. George Whitefield, with the Wesley brothers the foremost leader of the Methodist movement, followed the strict Calvinist tradition and preached double predestination. Because of these antithetical opinions, Methodism was divided into two factions.
Methodism would appear to provide the greatest contrast to the general theological thought of the Enlightenment with its expressed interest in rational arguments and a harmonious combination of philosophy and religion. Methodism answered the questions raised by deism in a way completely different, e.g., from Butler’s dispassionate analogy. But just in its reaction against rationalism, Methodism was not without connection with the general development of thought in the English Church during the age of the Enlightenment.
Transitional Theology
This designation serves to group together a number of German theologians of the first part of the 18th century who combined a conservative attitude toward the older Lutheran tradition with the philosophical position of the early Enlightenment and the theology of Pietism. In contrast to the bona fide Pietists, these men were deeply interested in systematic and historical theology, and they made significant contributions in these areas.
Johann Franz Buddeus (d. 1729, professor in Halle and Jena) was also active as a philosopher and sought, in several widely used textbooks, to replace Aristotelian scholastic philosophy with an “eclectic” philosophy. Buddeus stressed in particular the practical use of knowledge; metaphysics was limited to an explanation of certain concepts useful to theology; an empirical attitude is evident in his works. Parallels can be found in the writings of Christian Thomasius (d. 1728, professor in Halle), who was the first to give philosophic expression to the spirit of the new age.
In Buddeus’ theology (cf. Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae, 1723) the orthodox Lutheran tradition was permeated by a new ferment. Practical ends were strongly emphasized: the goal of theology was thought to be the presentation of that which sinful man needs to know in order to be saved. Natural religion was placed at the side of revelation; it was held that in man’s innermost being there is the ability to perceive and know God as the highest good. Even the truth of revelation must be legitimized before this natural knowledge of God (which is not only theoretical but above all practical, volitional). Revelation cannot contain anything that is contrary to natural religion; it can only supplement it.
Buddeus strove to understand theology in an empirical-historical manner. He was the first to write the history of the Old Testament period and the apostolic age. One of his foremost disciples in this area was Johann Georg Walch, well-known as a church historian and as a publisher of Luther’s works.
Other “transitional theologians” should also be mentioned. Christoph Matthäus Pfaff (d. 1760, professor in Tübingen and Giessen) was influenced both by Pietism and by the deistic concept of a natural religion of reason, before which revelation must be legitimized. Johann Lorenz yon Mosheim (d. 1755, professor in Helmstedt and Göttingen) applied the new scientific ideas to the field of theology. His Institutiones historiae ecclesiasticae Novi Testamenti (1726 and 1737) treated the history of the church from the point of view of secular history. The same historical point of view is applied to the Bible, whose truths must be scientifically presented by dogmatics.
Theological Wolffianism
Christian Wolff (d. 1754, professor of mathematics and later also of philosophy at Halle and Marburg) sought to construct a rational scholastic philosophical system, using mathematics as a model. He formed his metaphysics not only on the law of contradiction (the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time) but also Leibniz’ “principle of sufficient reason” (“All that exists must have a sufficient rational basis” and “Nothing exists apart from a sufficient rational basis”). While the older scholastic philosophy treated the diversity of existence in a more empirical fashion, Wolff’s so-called demonstration method strove to describe things in such a way that one attribute is derived from another in a strictly logical relationship. Learning must be based on clear and distinct concepts; nothing should be set forth without proof—this was one of Wolff’s basic principles.
When compared to transitional theology, Wolffianism represents a return to a more objective point of view. Independent of practical goals and subjective experience, theology, said Wolff, forms a logically consequent system, open to rational argumentation. This philosophy strongly influenced theological activity for several decades beginning with the 1720s and it also set the standards for contemporary education. The Pietists and some others opposed it on the grounds that it was a dangerous form of rationalism, but others felt that it provided the solution to the problem of learning even in the field of theology.
Among those who sought to apply Wolff’s method in the area of dogmatics were Israel Gottlieb Canz (d. 1753, professor in Tübingen) and Jakob Carpov (d. 1768; Theologia revelata methodo scientifica adornata, 1737–65).
One of the foremost systematicians in the middle of the 18th century was Sigmund Jakob Baumgarten (d. 1757, professor at Halle), who was profoundly influenced by Wolffianism but at the same time continued the tradition stemming from orthodoxy and Pietism. His Evangelische Glaubenslehre (1759–60), the first major dogmatics written in German, was characterized by a sober rationality and a scrupulously logical division of the material. Harmony between reason and revelation was taken for granted; the very natural knowledge of God which we possess leads to the idea of a special revelation, and the rational proofs for the truth of Scripture convince us that the Bible is the source of this revelation. The content of Scripture supplements natural religion. Baumgarten insisted on making a free, scientific investigation. He stood halfway between the older 18th-century tradition and neology proper, for which he prepared the way in certain respects—without, however, intending to deviate from the pure Lutheran doctrine.
Neology
This term denotes the stage in the theological development of the age of Enlightenment when English deism secured a foothold in the cultural life of Germany and when ideas typical of the Enlightenment began to permeate Protestant theology.
While Wolffianism desired to defend traditional church doctrine with the aid of reason, neology represents the transition to a conscious critique of dogmas. The doctrines of original sin and the Trinity, plus the Christology of traditional theology, were rejected with particular emphasis. These dogmas were attacked by the use of the historical method, the application of which had now begun. Christian dogma was looked upon as a variable factor inserted into historical development. Because of this, its content was relativized. It was subjected to the historical point of view, which led to a separation between dogma itself and contemporary theology.
Perhaps the most far-reaching change was that the same historical point of view was applied to the Scriptures. The Bible was inserted into the framework of human development. The Old Testament was separated from the New Testament as something belonging on a lower level. The content of the Bible was exposed to criticism on the basis of modem norms.
Both Wolffianism and neology held fast to the necessity of revelation. But whereas the former largely accepted dogma (having related it to logical, mathematical thought), neology proceeded on the basis of an expanded concept of reason. Feeling (das Gemüt) and moral consciousness were given the major emphasis. The concept of reason was thought to include these facets of man’s spiritual equipment also. Religion was evaluated according to its practical benefit and according to “spiritual need.” Dogma was considered to be largely ineffective, even downright harmful, with respect to morality. As a result it was severely reduced or reinterpreted.
The “moralistic psychologizing” of neology was combined with an optimistic view of man. The doctrine of original sin was thought to be contradictory to the idea of human value. There was no fall into sin. Man must be awakened to an understanding of his inherent goodness. The doctrine of the Trinity and the traditional Christology were also exposed to a thorough criticism. Christ was not looked upon as God’s Son; it was rather said that He was the Savior sent by the Father. All references to atonement and satisfaction were expunged; the Spirit was thought of only as a power to do good.
Most prominent of the neologians was Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem (d. 1789). As early as 1745 he criticized the teaching of original sin from the pulpit, and he gradually developed a position consistent with the new ideas mentioned above. He finally published his point of view in a book entitled Observations Concerning the Major Truths of Religion (1769–79). Other neologians included Johann Joachim Spalding (d. 1804), Johann Gottlieb Toellner (d. 1774), and Johann Christoph Döderlein (d. 1792).
Neology must be distinguished from naturalism, which corresponded to English deism. Like the deists, the naturalists disputed the necessity of revelation and desired to replace it with a natural religion.
Although the essentials of neology were derived from earlier sources, it nevertheless deserves its name, “the new teaching,” for it was in this school that the modern spirit came to expression as a complete theological point of view. From this point on it is possible to speak of the “new Protestantism” as a dominating force in contrast to the “older Protestantism.”
Johann Salomo Semler (d. 1791, professor in Halle) was another prominent leader of this school. He did much to promote the development of neology through the application of his historicocritical method, which he directed toward the Bible as well as the history of dogma. He was in some respects critical of the new ideas, however, and he was decidedly opposed to the naturalism of Karl Friedrich Bahrdt and Hermann Samuel Reimarus. Semler was most closely related to Baumgarten and sought (in spite of his radical new ideas) to retain a connection with the older Lutheranism. He felt, in fact, that he could quote Luther in support of his position. Because of this mediatory attitude his position is in many respects unclear and compromised.
Semler’s major contribution was his application of the historicocritical method. It was his desire to renew theology and to release it from the bonds of dogma on the basis of an unbiased critique. For Semler, historical perspective was a means of release from dogma.
It was Semler who laid the foundation for the history of dogma as a special discipline. He was also one of the first Bible critics, inasmuch as he also applied the critical method of historical research to the Scriptures. He assumed that there is a distinct difference between the Old Testament and the New. To him the canon was simply the collection of writings which the church had accepted. He did not recognize any original canonical authority. The content of Scripture is to be judged with a moralistic measuring rod. The so-called literary criticism of the New Testament can be traced back to Semler’s research—for example, his examination of the language of the Johannine literature.
In order to explain the lack of agreement between the New Testament and the moralistic religion which he used as a measuring rod, Semler assumed that Jesus and the apostles consciously adapted themselves to the ideas of their time (the so-called accommodation theory). Christianity can and ought therefore be developed over and beyond the Biblical position (this is its “perfectability”). Revelation does not coincide with Scripture. That which is essential therein are the basic truths which refer directly to man’s moral improvement and can bring about ethical results (God as Father, Jesus as teacher, the Holy Spirit as the source of a new character).
Semler’s attempt to set forth the new ideas without wholly rejecting the older tradition was expressed in the distinction he drew between theology and religion, and between private and public religion. He did not juxtapose theology with Biblical doctrine or with the content of revelation, as had been done earlier; to him, theology was merely the factual knowledge which theological professors discuss. Theology is, therefore, a human, historical consideration, changeable in content, depending on the time, place, and religious parties. In contrast to theology is religion, which denotes the living piety which coincides with the universal religious consciousness but at the same time is based on the Christian revelation. Vis-à-vis religion, theology has a historicocritical function. The close connection between theology and the faith of the church, which characterized the older tradition, was replaced by Semler with a sharp line of demarcation.
Semler also distinguished between private and public religion. While the individual has to realize his own religious feelings (in association with his moral consciousness), society, for the sake of public order and uniform religious practice, must hold fast to a certain confession and to certain doctrines, which do not entirely correspond to the intentions of individual piety.
So as Semler described it, the development of theology is not a sudden overthrow of the old and existing, but a cautious reform and a gradual perfection of the same.
In spite of the lack of clarity which characterized Semler’s position, his ideas were of profound importance for subsequent developments. Friedrich Schleiermacher (see below) was, in many respects, Semler’s chief heir. It was he, for example, who perpetuated the idea of the historical development of church doctrine. Semler and Schleiermacher were also united with each other (and with neology in general) by their freedom from the authority of Scripture in the earlier sense, by their critique of dogma, as well as by their subjective analysis of religion.
Johann August Ernesti (d. 1781, professor in Leipzig) was more conservative than Semler. His major contributions were made in the field of hermeneutics. It was his conviction that a historical-grammatical interpretation of Scripture should form the basis of theological activity. The interpretation of the Bible was placed on the same level with other interpretation. Work in the field of philology formed the point of departure. Ernesti’s goal was an exegesis free from dogma. He did not recognize Pietism’s demand concerning the personal piety of the interpreter. In spite of his conservative attitude, Ernesti was critical of traditional theology, and he rejected (among other things) the orthodox teaching of Christ’s three offices.
Rationalism and Supernaturalism
The entire point of view of the age of Enlightenment is sometimes referred to as rationalism, but this is a somewhat crude generalization, inasmuch as the question of reason and revelation was solved in many different ways within various movements during this period. It is more proper, on the other hand, to reserve the designation “rationalism” for the concept which held that the religion of revelation includes and by degrees develops into a religion based entirely on reason. (Unlike deism, rationalism did not ignore the Christian heritage altogether.) Such rationalist ideas were expressed as early as in the 1770s by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (d. 1781). They were characteristic of his opposition to both orthodoxy and neology. For also neology believed that the propositions of natural religion were guaranteed by revelation, while Lessing looked upon revelation as a vanquished stage: its content could be transformed into rational truth. Hence he opposed neology as well.
Theological rationalism in refined form is also to be found in Immanuel Kant’s (d. 1804) book Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793 (trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone; New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960). According to Kant’s own distinction, rationalism is different from naturalism (radical deism) in that it does not deny revelation. It does insist, however, that the moralistic religion of reason is the only necessary religion. The most important facet of the religious experience is the change of character whereby the “radical evil” in man is overcome and the good is brought forth. This is accomplished through punishment and repentance. The church, Christianity, can provide the impulse which leads to such salvation. Its teachings ought to be interpreted in accordance with moral ideas, which are alone universal and consistent with the religion of reason. Kant broke with the eudaemonism of the Enlightenment: he placed the absolute ethical demand in the primary position, and not happiness. On the other hand, he retained its Pelagian doctrine of salvation and its moralistic concept of religion. The deistic emphasis on God, virtue, and immortality had a firm place in his theory.
The foremost dogmatician of rationalism was Julius August Ludwig Wegscheider (Institutiones theologiae Christianae, 1815). He either rejected or misinterpreted the basic teachings of Christianity; miracles, as well as everything supernatural, were repudiated; conversion was thought of in a Pelagian sense; the sacraments were interpreted symbolically. Wegscheider explained the resurrection of Christ as a resuscitation from an “apparent death,” and he asserted that the death of Christ symbolizes the fact that sacrifices have ceased. He did not accept the Atonement, and maintained that the Ascension was a fairy tale. The concept of original sin was rejected as a somber illusion, repentance was said to be man’s own work, Baptism was classified as a ceremony of dedication, and the Lord’s Supper as a memorial feast.—Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider stood somewhat closer to the doctrines of the church (cf. his Handbuch der christlichen Dogmatik, 1814).
Rationalism was deliberately opposed by supernaturalism, which was based on the necessity of revelation and the authority of Scripture. As the name implies, there were those who desired to defend the supernatural, that in Christianity which reason cannot comprehend. Both rationalism and supernaturalism had this trait in common, however: an intellectual concept of religion. The substance of religion was set forth in terms of doctrinal propositions, some of which are imbedded in man’s reason, some of which have been given through revelation only. Also supernaturalism was characterized by a sober rationality. Attempts were made to prove the credibility of Scripture and to defend the content of revelation on the basis of rational argument. Representatives of this trend of thought included Gottlob Christian Storr (d. 1805, active in Tübingen) and Franz Volkmar Reinhard (d. 1812).
The contrast between rationalism and supernaturalism—which in fact was bridged over by a variety of mediating tendencies—was brought to an end as a result of Schleiermacher’s new concept of religion. The influence of Romanticism, with its newly awakened sense of the historical in religion, plus its interest in the immediate and the transcendental, also contributed to this same end. When men ceased to think of religion as a collection of doctrines, and thought of it rather as an element in the personal life of the soul, the alternative between rationalism and supernaturalism was no longer relevant, for both could be united into a uniform point of view. Religion was no longer thought of in terms of morality and metaphysics but as an independent manifestation of man’s spiritual life.
It can be said, speaking in general terms, that the age of the Enlightenment on the European continent coincided with the 18th century. A profound scientific and cultural transformation took place during this time, a transformation which completely altered the conditions under which theological activity was carried on.
The roots of this age and its ideas are to be found in Renaissance humanism and Socinianism, as well as in the deism of 17th-century England. The philosophical systems which began to replace the older philosophical structure in the latter half of the 17th century (Descartes, Leibniz, Locke) also helped to prepare the ground for the Enlightenment. New discoveries and theories in the field of natural science (Newton) and in the field of jurisprudence (Grotius, Pufendorf) also contributed to the development of the more modern point of view, which became increasingly widespread during the 18th century. In the theological area, Pietism served to promote this same development in some ways.
The epoch we are now discussing marks the emergence of the modem period. A new world view forced its way into a dominating position in the cultural sphere, and new intellectual assumptions grew apace. In order to understand the import of this radical change, it is desirable to compare it at certain points with the older tradition and its scientific principles.
Philosophical thought was transformed from the ground up, through the great philosophical systems as well as through the new scholastic philosophy which replaced Aristotelian scholasticism at the German universities in the 18th century (Thomasius, Wolff).
The metaphysical concept of substantial forms was replaced by an empirical and atomistic concept of reality. Previously the world of the spirit, epitomized in God (ens supremum), was considered the highest and the primary reality. But not so in the age of the Enlightenment, when the eyes of men were turned toward the empirically conceived material world with all its diversity. The older objective philosophy was replaced by a practical and utilitarian form of wisdom, whose primary objective was to teach man to understand and control his environment and to enjoy happiness in this world (the so-called philosophy of moderation).
Older forms of thought proceeded from the object—metaphysics sought for an objective knowledge of the deepest meaning of reality. The new philosophy began with the subject, which was considered primary in the search for knowledge. Self-consciousness and inner experience were looked upon as the most obvious and fundamental factors—immediately at hand for the thinking and feeling subject. The tendency toward rationalistic thought was thereby given: attempts were made to explain the world on the basis of the principles of human reason.
One of the most important prerequisites of the age of the Enlightenment, and therefore for modern thought as well, was the new concept of learning. Philosophy was no longer regarded as the handmaiden of theology (ancilla theologiae). Learning was freed from its dependence on theology and scholastic metaphysics and was based instead on the observations of experience and on rational principles. Thus it was, beginning already in the 17th century, that the so-called natural system of knowledge—based on the idea that humanistic erudition, religion and morals, law and politics, can be grounded on distinct rational principles common to all men in all ages—began to develop. This rational knowledge was thought of as being autonomous, immediately accessible and fully evident to all, without having been obscured by original sin.
Even more profound, perhaps, was the change which took place in the field of natural science. Scholars now began to apply the mechanical-mathematical method and proceeded more than ever before on the basis of empirical observation.
This new natural science brought with it an altered picture of the world. The empirical investigation of the world came to be of primary interest. It was not until the 18th century that the conception of the solar system which Copernicus set forth in the 16th century was generally accepted. The earth was no longer looked upon as the center of things, and man, in this new perspective, became nothing more than a speck of dust in the universe—at the same time that he controlled the universe through his reason. The Aristotelian conception of form was replaced by a mechanical-atomistic explanation of the world. Life consists of unalterable space, things are compounded of particles which exert a mechanical influence upon one another and fill out space. No longer did men think of substantial forms as the basic elements in the edifice of the universe; they rather thought solely in terms of material entities. A basic contrast between matter and spirit, sensuous and super-sensual, was one of the results of this mechanical explanation of nature. This was quite far removed not only from the older scholastic metaphysics but also from the original Lutheran view of the world (with its finitum capax infiniti).
Behind this new understanding of the world was the conviction that human reason is competent to survey and control its environment, to establish laws for the events of life as well as rules for human society. A rationalistic explanation of nature and a rationalistic doctrine of morality came to the fore as consequences of this new attitude. The Enlightenment was characterized by its naive faith in man and his possibilities.
In the field of jurisprudence new ideas were broached by Hugo Grotius (d. 1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (d. 1694), which have provided the basis for the modern concept of natural rights. The older Protestant tradition also spoke of natural rights or a natural law. But this referred to the knowledge of right and wrong which was put into man’s heart at the time of creation, weak vestiges of which remain even after the Fall. The idea of natural law was therefore involved in the context of revelation and of the Biblical view of man. The natural rights of the age of Enlightenment were emancipated from this. They were rather based on the belief that distinct principles of law are imbedded in human reason and that these form a common basis for the public administration of law. Morality, therefore, was based on autonomous reason. The tie between revelation and natural law was cut.
A similar change took place with respect to the concept of the state. While the Lutheran tradition looked upon authority as a divine institution, commissioned to be “the protector of both tables of the Law” (custos utriusque tabulae), men such as Thomas Hobbes conceived the idea of a secular state, based on human forbearance, designed to promote the salus publica—the general welfare. In the state governed by an absolutist prince, political considerations were placed above the ecclesiastical], and the church lost its independence. The new concept of the state was similarly based on an optimistic faith in reason; it was believed that man was able to adjust political matters in such a way that the common good would be served.
Quite a long time passed before the Enlightenment began seriously to affect the field of theology. It was not until the latter part of the 18th century that neology, or a rationalistic theology, began to appear among German Protestants. Even before this, however, the general shift in the way of thinking had left obvious traces in this area as well.
The most influential of the new ideas introduced into the theology of the Enlightenment was the concept of natural religion. This was first developed in 17th-century English deism. In his book De veritate (1625) Herbert of Cherbury set forth the idea that there is a natural religion, common to all men and independent of revelation, through which man can be blessed even apart from knowledge of revelation. He thought of Christ as a wise teacher and above all as an example in virtue. The meaning of natural religion was presented in the five following propositions: there is a God, a highest being; this highest being ought to be worshiped and served; this worship consists above all in piety and virtue; deviations from virtue (sin) must be repented, and if there is repentance, there will be forgiveness; the evil will be punished and the good will be rewarded in a life to come. The idea that the doctrines of “God, virtue, and immortality” form a summary of religion, much cherished during the age of the Enlightenment, was already present here.
During the 18th century, deism appeared in a more radical form. This can be seen, for example, in Matthew Tindal’s well-known book Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730), as well as in the philosophers of the French Enlightenment and in German rationalism (e.g., in the Wolfenbüttel Fragments, written by Reimarus and published by Lessing).
The culture of the Enlightenment was distinguished by its increasing secularization. The new form of natural science pointed toward an immanent explanation of the world. A secular culture developed, independent of church and confessions. The state was similarly released from its religious purposes and from its connection with the Christian confessions.
The process of secularization did not, however, signify a rejection of Christianity or of religion, but it did bring about a profound alteration of the prerequisites for Christian theology and preaching.
This change revealed itself in (among other things) the following tendencies, which exerted a profound affect on the theology of the Enlightenment.
1. Theology came to be more or less dependent on philosophy and rational thought. Even in those presentations where the author did not wish to go so far as to replace revelation with natural religion, intending rather to stand fully within the Christian tradition, it was not uncommon to find rational arguments placed alongside revelation on an equal basis. The demand that reason be subjected to the testimony of Scripture was replaced by the firm belief that revelation and rational principles are in complete harmony, plus the desire to legitimize revelation in the presence of reason.
2. Parallel with theology’s rationalizing was its tendency to moralize. Morality is a more immediate concern than religion to the modern, rational view of life. The promotion of good morals was looked upon as Christianity’s main objective, and ethical content as its very essence.
3. The idea that religion was based in particular on principles imbedded in human reason supported an individualistic conception: religion became an individual, private matter, its certainty based on a person’s own experiences.
4. A basic characteristic of the theology of the Enlightenment was the tendency to “humanize” Christianity, to accommodate it to an anthropocentric frame. Theology was expected to promote human welfare, and theological truth was expected to harmonize with commonly recognized rational principles. This-worldly goals predominated: earthly happiness and a rational morality were the primary benefits that men expected from religion.
English Theology in the Age of the Enlightenment
The thought pattern of the modern age began to influence English theology at an early date: by the end of the 17th century it came to dominate a point of view which was called “latitudinarianism.” Its representatives believed that revelation was in full accord with reason and the religious principles discerned therein. Unlike the deists, they did not desire to replace traditional Christianity with natural religion, but they did feel that revealed religion had its best support in reason. Faith was looked upon as a conviction based on rational considerations. Religious truth cannot be “proved,” but moral certainty can be attained, partly on the basis of the assumption that the Bible is a reliable source and that the miracles confirm its authority. One of the chief spokesmen of this influential branch of English theology was John Tillotson (1630–94), famous as a preacher, after 1691 archbishop of Canterbury. The ideas of the latitudinarians were neither radical nor subversive. They were different in that they were independent of the reasoning of scholastic metaphysics and also because of their serene confidence in the belief that the Christian faith can be supported by rational arguments. The latitudinarians held that, in the final analysis, the decisive proof for faith is to be found in an upright conduct of life. For them the moral aspect was superior to the religious.
A kindred spirit can be noted in the contribution which the great philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) made to the question of faith and knowledge. Locke made a clear distinction between revelation and reason, and asserted that the propositions of faith rest on completely different ground than the truths of reason. Direct revelation, such as that which came to the prophets and apostles, involves a certainty equal to that associated with evident knowledge. We cannot expect to receive a direct revelation, however; revelation is mediated to us through language and human understanding. Because of this, the Christian faith, as we comprehend it, must always be judged to a certain extent by reason, and it can be accepted only if it is not contrary to the evident principles of reason. In his book The Reasonableness of Christianity (1693) Locke sought to present a pure Biblical Christianity, independent of the later theology and of the creeds of the church. He did not deny the doctrine of the Trinity, but he endeavored to find the Biblical equivalents of its terms. In Locke we find the prototype of two tendencies which came to be characteristic of the theology of the Enlightenment in England: the first was the desire to exhibit the reasonableness of Christianity, and the second, to reproduce what was considered to be an uncorrupted form of Biblical doctrine.
At the side of latitudinarianism, which was moderate in its attitude and strove to retain the essentials of the Christian tradition, radical deism appeared in new forms, developing in a manner consistent with the ideas set forth earlier by Herbert of Cherbury (see above). A book published by John Toland in 1696, Christianity not Mysterious, attempted to excerpt from Christianity certain simple, basic dogmas about God and immortality, which were referred to as the essential and rational elements thereof. The “mysterious” elements of the Christian faith, on the other hand, ought to be repudiated. In the book by Matthew Tindal mentioned above, Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730), the thesis was set forth that the Gospel was simply a reiteration of the original, natural religion. Its content is essentially the proclamation of a pure and moral life, which promotes God’s glory and man’s happiness. The thesis concerning a rational religion was thereby combined with the idea that morality is the end and purpose of religion. This reductive Christianity, which was excerpted from the gospels, was said to be identical with the natural religion of reason, and therefore the form of religion best equipped to encourage morality and happiness.
Among those who came out against the deists was Joseph Butler (1692–1752, bishop of Durham), who published his famous apologetic work, The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature, in 1736. Butler’s analogy presupposed faith in a supreme Creator of the world. It was not, therefore, directed against atheism, but it sought to manifest the probability of faith and its consistency with reason for those who already recognize God as Creator. In opposition to the deists, Butler asserted the necessity of revelation; natural religion does not by any means make revelation superfluous.
The main argument in the part of Butler’s book which deals with revealed religion is this: If we admit that Scripture has come to us from the God who is the Creator of nature, then we can expect to find in the truths of faith something of the same structure—and of the same difficulty to explain in its totality—as we find in the natural order. This is what Butler called an analogy between religion and the world of nature. He did not suggest that such an analogy can be found everywhere; the examples are at best sporadic. But to him this was sufficient. We cannot expect to have exact proof of the claims of faith. Probability is the highest goal we can reach in this respect, and a demonstration of probability is what Butler sought to establish through a detailed proof of the analogy which exists between nature and religion. He was in many ways very close to the deist position on the affinity between natural religion and Christianity, but unlike the deists he wanted to defend also the specific Christian revelation.
One major point concerned the doctrine of the Atonement. The deists considered the Atonement to be superfluous, inasmuch as God’s mercy ought to be sufficient in itself to forgive the sins of those who repent. But Butler asserted that Christ’s substitutionary suffering is the ground of forgiveness, and he showed that one can find analogies even to this in the world around us. Butler’s encounter with deism was not without its contradictions, but one can discern in his work the contours of a new concept of revelation. During the 19th century Butler’s influence on English theology became even greater than it was while he was alive.
The struggle against deism occupied an important place in 18th-century English theology. It was soon overshadowed, however, by another factor—the victorious progress of the Methodist movement, beginning at the end of the 1730s. This is not the place to describe the history of Methodism, or its effect on church and society; we shall only take note of its theological contours.
John Wesley (1703–91) was a priest in the state church of England, and early became one of the leaders of a high-church movement at Oxford. On his mother’s side he also had connections with the latitudinarian (broad church) and Socinian tradition; furthermore, he had, during a two-year stint as a missionary in the colony of Georgia, come under the direct influence of the Herrnhut point of view. As a result of his association with Herrnhutism, Wesley was convinced that trust in the merits of Christ forms the sole basis of man’s salvation, a doctrine which he found confirmed in the homilies produced within the Church of England during the time of the Reformation. His conversion (1738), which proved to be the point of departure for the Methodist awakening, was described by Wesley as a suddenly aroused inner certainty of forgiveness of sins through faith in Christ alone. This occurred under the impact of Luther’s Preface to Romans. Wesley’s brother Charles had experienced a similar conversion, prompted by his study of Luther’s commentary on Galatians.
Justification by faith alone was the crux of John Wesley’s preaching after his conversion. He therefore broke with an idea that was prevalent in Anglican theology, viz., that good works are the goal of faith, and a necessary qualification for salvation. The clergy of Wesley’s time were generally unacquainted with the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Wesley insisted that sanctification must not be confused with justification. It is the fruit of faith. It is characteristic of Methodism that the new birth is not attributed to Baptism but to justification, which is associated with conversion or the conscious enkindling of faith.
Wesley sought to avoid controversy as long as possible. His entire message was designed to awaken people to lives of active faith and holiness. It was natural, therefore, that his interest in doctrinal dispute would be minor. In spite of this, however, a number of rather profound differences of opinion gradually arose even within Methodism. Wesley subsequently developed the doctrine of faith and works in a direction which led him further away from the Reformation point of view and closer to the current English conception. He maintained that works are a necessary condition for justification. As a result of this, he came into conflict with the conservative Calvinists, who held fast to the belief that the merits of Christ are the sole ground of human salvation.
The teaching of predestination also became controversial. Wesley proclaimed universal grace in the Arminian manner and vehemently opposed the idea of divine reprobation. George Whitefield, with the Wesley brothers the foremost leader of the Methodist movement, followed the strict Calvinist tradition and preached double predestination. Because of these antithetical opinions, Methodism was divided into two factions.
Methodism would appear to provide the greatest contrast to the general theological thought of the Enlightenment with its expressed interest in rational arguments and a harmonious combination of philosophy and religion. Methodism answered the questions raised by deism in a way completely different, e.g., from Butler’s dispassionate analogy. But just in its reaction against rationalism, Methodism was not without connection with the general development of thought in the English Church during the age of the Enlightenment.
Transitional Theology
This designation serves to group together a number of German theologians of the first part of the 18th century who combined a conservative attitude toward the older Lutheran tradition with the philosophical position of the early Enlightenment and the theology of Pietism. In contrast to the bona fide Pietists, these men were deeply interested in systematic and historical theology, and they made significant contributions in these areas.
Johann Franz Buddeus (d. 1729, professor in Halle and Jena) was also active as a philosopher and sought, in several widely used textbooks, to replace Aristotelian scholastic philosophy with an “eclectic” philosophy. Buddeus stressed in particular the practical use of knowledge; metaphysics was limited to an explanation of certain concepts useful to theology; an empirical attitude is evident in his works. Parallels can be found in the writings of Christian Thomasius (d. 1728, professor in Halle), who was the first to give philosophic expression to the spirit of the new age.
In Buddeus’ theology (cf. Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae, 1723) the orthodox Lutheran tradition was permeated by a new ferment. Practical ends were strongly emphasized: the goal of theology was thought to be the presentation of that which sinful man needs to know in order to be saved. Natural religion was placed at the side of revelation; it was held that in man’s innermost being there is the ability to perceive and know God as the highest good. Even the truth of revelation must be legitimized before this natural knowledge of God (which is not only theoretical but above all practical, volitional). Revelation cannot contain anything that is contrary to natural religion; it can only supplement it.
Buddeus strove to understand theology in an empirical-historical manner. He was the first to write the history of the Old Testament period and the apostolic age. One of his foremost disciples in this area was Johann Georg Walch, well-known as a church historian and as a publisher of Luther’s works.
Other “transitional theologians” should also be mentioned. Christoph Matthäus Pfaff (d. 1760, professor in Tübingen and Giessen) was influenced both by Pietism and by the deistic concept of a natural religion of reason, before which revelation must be legitimized. Johann Lorenz yon Mosheim (d. 1755, professor in Helmstedt and Göttingen) applied the new scientific ideas to the field of theology. His Institutiones historiae ecclesiasticae Novi Testamenti (1726 and 1737) treated the history of the church from the point of view of secular history. The same historical point of view is applied to the Bible, whose truths must be scientifically presented by dogmatics.
Theological Wolffianism
Christian Wolff (d. 1754, professor of mathematics and later also of philosophy at Halle and Marburg) sought to construct a rational scholastic philosophical system, using mathematics as a model. He formed his metaphysics not only on the law of contradiction (the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time) but also Leibniz’ “principle of sufficient reason” (“All that exists must have a sufficient rational basis” and “Nothing exists apart from a sufficient rational basis”). While the older scholastic philosophy treated the diversity of existence in a more empirical fashion, Wolff’s so-called demonstration method strove to describe things in such a way that one attribute is derived from another in a strictly logical relationship. Learning must be based on clear and distinct concepts; nothing should be set forth without proof—this was one of Wolff’s basic principles.
When compared to transitional theology, Wolffianism represents a return to a more objective point of view. Independent of practical goals and subjective experience, theology, said Wolff, forms a logically consequent system, open to rational argumentation. This philosophy strongly influenced theological activity for several decades beginning with the 1720s and it also set the standards for contemporary education. The Pietists and some others opposed it on the grounds that it was a dangerous form of rationalism, but others felt that it provided the solution to the problem of learning even in the field of theology.
Among those who sought to apply Wolff’s method in the area of dogmatics were Israel Gottlieb Canz (d. 1753, professor in Tübingen) and Jakob Carpov (d. 1768; Theologia revelata methodo scientifica adornata, 1737–65).
One of the foremost systematicians in the middle of the 18th century was Sigmund Jakob Baumgarten (d. 1757, professor at Halle), who was profoundly influenced by Wolffianism but at the same time continued the tradition stemming from orthodoxy and Pietism. His Evangelische Glaubenslehre (1759–60), the first major dogmatics written in German, was characterized by a sober rationality and a scrupulously logical division of the material. Harmony between reason and revelation was taken for granted; the very natural knowledge of God which we possess leads to the idea of a special revelation, and the rational proofs for the truth of Scripture convince us that the Bible is the source of this revelation. The content of Scripture supplements natural religion. Baumgarten insisted on making a free, scientific investigation. He stood halfway between the older 18th-century tradition and neology proper, for which he prepared the way in certain respects—without, however, intending to deviate from the pure Lutheran doctrine.
Neology
This term denotes the stage in the theological development of the age of Enlightenment when English deism secured a foothold in the cultural life of Germany and when ideas typical of the Enlightenment began to permeate Protestant theology.
While Wolffianism desired to defend traditional church doctrine with the aid of reason, neology represents the transition to a conscious critique of dogmas. The doctrines of original sin and the Trinity, plus the Christology of traditional theology, were rejected with particular emphasis. These dogmas were attacked by the use of the historical method, the application of which had now begun. Christian dogma was looked upon as a variable factor inserted into historical development. Because of this, its content was relativized. It was subjected to the historical point of view, which led to a separation between dogma itself and contemporary theology.
Perhaps the most far-reaching change was that the same historical point of view was applied to the Scriptures. The Bible was inserted into the framework of human development. The Old Testament was separated from the New Testament as something belonging on a lower level. The content of the Bible was exposed to criticism on the basis of modem norms.
Both Wolffianism and neology held fast to the necessity of revelation. But whereas the former largely accepted dogma (having related it to logical, mathematical thought), neology proceeded on the basis of an expanded concept of reason. Feeling (das Gemüt) and moral consciousness were given the major emphasis. The concept of reason was thought to include these facets of man’s spiritual equipment also. Religion was evaluated according to its practical benefit and according to “spiritual need.” Dogma was considered to be largely ineffective, even downright harmful, with respect to morality. As a result it was severely reduced or reinterpreted.
The “moralistic psychologizing” of neology was combined with an optimistic view of man. The doctrine of original sin was thought to be contradictory to the idea of human value. There was no fall into sin. Man must be awakened to an understanding of his inherent goodness. The doctrine of the Trinity and the traditional Christology were also exposed to a thorough criticism. Christ was not looked upon as God’s Son; it was rather said that He was the Savior sent by the Father. All references to atonement and satisfaction were expunged; the Spirit was thought of only as a power to do good.
Most prominent of the neologians was Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem (d. 1789). As early as 1745 he criticized the teaching of original sin from the pulpit, and he gradually developed a position consistent with the new ideas mentioned above. He finally published his point of view in a book entitled Observations Concerning the Major Truths of Religion (1769–79). Other neologians included Johann Joachim Spalding (d. 1804), Johann Gottlieb Toellner (d. 1774), and Johann Christoph Döderlein (d. 1792).
Neology must be distinguished from naturalism, which corresponded to English deism. Like the deists, the naturalists disputed the necessity of revelation and desired to replace it with a natural religion.
Although the essentials of neology were derived from earlier sources, it nevertheless deserves its name, “the new teaching,” for it was in this school that the modern spirit came to expression as a complete theological point of view. From this point on it is possible to speak of the “new Protestantism” as a dominating force in contrast to the “older Protestantism.”
Johann Salomo Semler (d. 1791, professor in Halle) was another prominent leader of this school. He did much to promote the development of neology through the application of his historicocritical method, which he directed toward the Bible as well as the history of dogma. He was in some respects critical of the new ideas, however, and he was decidedly opposed to the naturalism of Karl Friedrich Bahrdt and Hermann Samuel Reimarus. Semler was most closely related to Baumgarten and sought (in spite of his radical new ideas) to retain a connection with the older Lutheranism. He felt, in fact, that he could quote Luther in support of his position. Because of this mediatory attitude his position is in many respects unclear and compromised.
Semler’s major contribution was his application of the historicocritical method. It was his desire to renew theology and to release it from the bonds of dogma on the basis of an unbiased critique. For Semler, historical perspective was a means of release from dogma.
It was Semler who laid the foundation for the history of dogma as a special discipline. He was also one of the first Bible critics, inasmuch as he also applied the critical method of historical research to the Scriptures. He assumed that there is a distinct difference between the Old Testament and the New. To him the canon was simply the collection of writings which the church had accepted. He did not recognize any original canonical authority. The content of Scripture is to be judged with a moralistic measuring rod. The so-called literary criticism of the New Testament can be traced back to Semler’s research—for example, his examination of the language of the Johannine literature.
In order to explain the lack of agreement between the New Testament and the moralistic religion which he used as a measuring rod, Semler assumed that Jesus and the apostles consciously adapted themselves to the ideas of their time (the so-called accommodation theory). Christianity can and ought therefore be developed over and beyond the Biblical position (this is its “perfectability”). Revelation does not coincide with Scripture. That which is essential therein are the basic truths which refer directly to man’s moral improvement and can bring about ethical results (God as Father, Jesus as teacher, the Holy Spirit as the source of a new character).
Semler’s attempt to set forth the new ideas without wholly rejecting the older tradition was expressed in the distinction he drew between theology and religion, and between private and public religion. He did not juxtapose theology with Biblical doctrine or with the content of revelation, as had been done earlier; to him, theology was merely the factual knowledge which theological professors discuss. Theology is, therefore, a human, historical consideration, changeable in content, depending on the time, place, and religious parties. In contrast to theology is religion, which denotes the living piety which coincides with the universal religious consciousness but at the same time is based on the Christian revelation. Vis-à-vis religion, theology has a historicocritical function. The close connection between theology and the faith of the church, which characterized the older tradition, was replaced by Semler with a sharp line of demarcation.
Semler also distinguished between private and public religion. While the individual has to realize his own religious feelings (in association with his moral consciousness), society, for the sake of public order and uniform religious practice, must hold fast to a certain confession and to certain doctrines, which do not entirely correspond to the intentions of individual piety.
So as Semler described it, the development of theology is not a sudden overthrow of the old and existing, but a cautious reform and a gradual perfection of the same.
In spite of the lack of clarity which characterized Semler’s position, his ideas were of profound importance for subsequent developments. Friedrich Schleiermacher (see below) was, in many respects, Semler’s chief heir. It was he, for example, who perpetuated the idea of the historical development of church doctrine. Semler and Schleiermacher were also united with each other (and with neology in general) by their freedom from the authority of Scripture in the earlier sense, by their critique of dogma, as well as by their subjective analysis of religion.
Johann August Ernesti (d. 1781, professor in Leipzig) was more conservative than Semler. His major contributions were made in the field of hermeneutics. It was his conviction that a historical-grammatical interpretation of Scripture should form the basis of theological activity. The interpretation of the Bible was placed on the same level with other interpretation. Work in the field of philology formed the point of departure. Ernesti’s goal was an exegesis free from dogma. He did not recognize Pietism’s demand concerning the personal piety of the interpreter. In spite of his conservative attitude, Ernesti was critical of traditional theology, and he rejected (among other things) the orthodox teaching of Christ’s three offices.
Rationalism and Supernaturalism
The entire point of view of the age of Enlightenment is sometimes referred to as rationalism, but this is a somewhat crude generalization, inasmuch as the question of reason and revelation was solved in many different ways within various movements during this period. It is more proper, on the other hand, to reserve the designation “rationalism” for the concept which held that the religion of revelation includes and by degrees develops into a religion based entirely on reason. (Unlike deism, rationalism did not ignore the Christian heritage altogether.) Such rationalist ideas were expressed as early as in the 1770s by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (d. 1781). They were characteristic of his opposition to both orthodoxy and neology. For also neology believed that the propositions of natural religion were guaranteed by revelation, while Lessing looked upon revelation as a vanquished stage: its content could be transformed into rational truth. Hence he opposed neology as well.
Theological rationalism in refined form is also to be found in Immanuel Kant’s (d. 1804) book Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793 (trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone; New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960). According to Kant’s own distinction, rationalism is different from naturalism (radical deism) in that it does not deny revelation. It does insist, however, that the moralistic religion of reason is the only necessary religion. The most important facet of the religious experience is the change of character whereby the “radical evil” in man is overcome and the good is brought forth. This is accomplished through punishment and repentance. The church, Christianity, can provide the impulse which leads to such salvation. Its teachings ought to be interpreted in accordance with moral ideas, which are alone universal and consistent with the religion of reason. Kant broke with the eudaemonism of the Enlightenment: he placed the absolute ethical demand in the primary position, and not happiness. On the other hand, he retained its Pelagian doctrine of salvation and its moralistic concept of religion. The deistic emphasis on God, virtue, and immortality had a firm place in his theory.
The foremost dogmatician of rationalism was Julius August Ludwig Wegscheider (Institutiones theologiae Christianae, 1815). He either rejected or misinterpreted the basic teachings of Christianity; miracles, as well as everything supernatural, were repudiated; conversion was thought of in a Pelagian sense; the sacraments were interpreted symbolically. Wegscheider explained the resurrection of Christ as a resuscitation from an “apparent death,” and he asserted that the death of Christ symbolizes the fact that sacrifices have ceased. He did not accept the Atonement, and maintained that the Ascension was a fairy tale. The concept of original sin was rejected as a somber illusion, repentance was said to be man’s own work, Baptism was classified as a ceremony of dedication, and the Lord’s Supper as a memorial feast.—Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider stood somewhat closer to the doctrines of the church (cf. his Handbuch der christlichen Dogmatik, 1814).
Rationalism was deliberately opposed by supernaturalism, which was based on the necessity of revelation and the authority of Scripture. As the name implies, there were those who desired to defend the supernatural, that in Christianity which reason cannot comprehend. Both rationalism and supernaturalism had this trait in common, however: an intellectual concept of religion. The substance of religion was set forth in terms of doctrinal propositions, some of which are imbedded in man’s reason, some of which have been given through revelation only. Also supernaturalism was characterized by a sober rationality. Attempts were made to prove the credibility of Scripture and to defend the content of revelation on the basis of rational argument. Representatives of this trend of thought included Gottlob Christian Storr (d. 1805, active in Tübingen) and Franz Volkmar Reinhard (d. 1812).
The contrast between rationalism and supernaturalism—which in fact was bridged over by a variety of mediating tendencies—was brought to an end as a result of Schleiermacher’s new concept of religion. The influence of Romanticism, with its newly awakened sense of the historical in religion, plus its interest in the immediate and the transcendental, also contributed to this same end. When men ceased to think of religion as a collection of doctrines, and thought of it rather as an element in the personal life of the soul, the alternative between rationalism and supernaturalism was no longer relevant, for both could be united into a uniform point of view. Religion was no longer thought of in terms of morality and metaphysics but as an independent manifestation of man’s spiritual life.
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