Occamism
Late medieval nominalism, which ought to be distinguished from the earlier school of the same name, was a unique phenomenon in the history of theology. At the same time that its representatives were sharply opposed to the entire range of previous scholastic thought and contested many of its fundamental principles, they nevertheless perpetuated the scholastic tradition and completed (sometimes in an extreme fashion) the dialectical reworking of theological material. Their profound interest in philosophy is witnessed to by the thorough treatment given to questions on the periphery of theology, and particularly to the problem concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy. (When they commented on Lombard’s Sentences, they dealt chiefly with the Prolog and the first book.)
The originator and foremost representative of this school was William of Occam (teacher at Oxford; accused of heresy and summoned to Avignon, where he was held in custody for four years; later taught at Munich, where he was protected by the emperor, Louis of Bavaria; died in 1349). Chief among his many followers were Peter d’Ailly (d. 1420, cardinal, active in the reform councils) and Gabriel Biel (d. 1495, professor in Tübingen), whose Collectorium summarized the Occamist tradition in an exemplary manner. Biel’s theology was basic for the instruction in a number of German universities, including Erfurt, where Luther was educated.
Occam took a fresh look at the problem of universals which had been prominently discussed by the first scholastics. Occam rejected the realism of Thomas Aquinas and revived the nominalist position, which held that only the individual possesses reality. He did not believe that there was any basis to the claim that universal concepts actually exist, either within or apart from things. Occam proceeded from the principle that one ought not assume the presence of more entities than is necessary. One need not assume that universal concepts exist apart from our thoughts (extra animam). The realistic point of view must therefore be repudiated. Universals are only concepts which are formed in the mind of man to designate a number of individuals of the same kind. The task of science is to investigate concepts in their context and relationships. As a result, logic was the basic science as far as the Occamists were concerned, while metaphysics was to be abolished. In spite of certain tendencies in the direction of a more modern, more empirical method of observation, Occamism actually led to a much more abstract form of speculation than was true among the realists. This was partly because it was no longer believed that science was able to deal with things in their external reality but merely with terms and concepts as they appeared in man’s mind or in verbal presentations.
Occam developed his epistemology primarily in order to deal with the problem of theological knowledge. His criticism was directed against the so-called proof of the existence of God. By denying the reality of the universals, the cosmological proof of Thomas Aquinas fell by the wayside. For this implied, as shown above, that we can attain insight into the existence of God by virtue of our knowledge of the universal element in the things we see. To Occam, God, in the most proper sense, is something individual (res singularissima). Neither can one rationally prove that God is the first cause of all things. Metaphysics can, of course, demonstrate in other ways the existence of one or many gods, but such claims as the oneness of God, and His infinity, must be looked upon as confessions of faith and nothing else.
Still less can the doctrine of the Trinity be pondered in a rational manner. Occam conceded that it presupposes a realistic point of view, for it speaks of relationships which exist independently of our thought processes. While Occam otherwise denied the reality of such relationships, he was content to refer the question of the Trinity to the authority of Scripture, which cannot be invalidated by the principles of empirical knowledge—for such knowledge deals only with creation, not with God.
What has now been said illustrates Occam’s understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy. Unlike Thomas Aquinas, Occam did not consider theology a science. Its propositions cannot be elucidated by logical means; as articles of faith, they have their only support in the Scriptures. Occam felt that there is a radical difference between theology and philosophy. But that is only one side of the matter. The other is that he believed quite simply that theological concepts and propositions could be treated by logical and dialectical means. Indeed, he and his associates practiced this art with great virtuosity. The fact that Occam conceived of theology and philosophy as being radically different did not, therefore, prevent Occamist theology from being more highly colored by philosophical argumentation than was true of any other previous school of thought.
According to Occam, theology must be based on fides infusa. What did he mean by faith? Above all, an inclination to believe Biblical truth. He did not accept the older Franciscan idea of faith as an immediate experience of the divine. Faith is concurrence in or agreement with Biblical truth. Biel defined faith as follows: “One who reads the Bible (if he is a believer) immediately agrees with each and every thing recorded there, because he believes that all these things are revealed by God.” (Collectorium, III, dist. 24, qu. unica, G)
The nominalists held, in principle, that Scripture is the sole authority. Some even attempted to cite its teachings in opposition to the pope and other ecclesiastical authorities. But in general practice the Bible and the doctrines of the church were blended together; ecclesiastical traditions were firmly supported even if they lacked Scriptural foundation. This was true, for example, of transubstantiation, which Occam accepted even though he felt that other theories were more Biblical in nature. The nominalists developed a theory of the immediate inspiration of Scripture. Canonical authority was based on the conviction that the words of the Bible were inspired in the writers by God Himself.
Not everyone can attain a firm faith in all of the Biblical truths. A distinction was therefore made between fides implicita, which accepts Biblical or doctrinal truth only in a general way, and fides explicita, which presupposes a knowledge of the individual articles of faith. The latter was required only of clergymen, while the former was considered sufficient for laymen in general.
As far as theological content was concerned, Occam for the most part accepted the older tradition. But he also altered it at a number of points and lodged criticisms which weakened its foundations.
An example can be found in his concept of sin and grace. Occam did not believe that original sin actually exists in man’s nature. It is merely God’s judgment of man, ascribing to man the guilt of Adam; it is not an actual corruption of human nature. In connection with the traditional view of sin, Occam also spoke of sin as fomes, an inclination in man to do what is evil.
One consequence of such a concept of sin would be that grace is looked upon merely as the forgiveness of sin, an exoneration from guilt. If sin is not thought of as habitual depravity, there is certainly little reason to think of grace as an infused habitus. Occam did make a concession to tradition in this case, however, for he spoke of grace as gratia infusa even though he was otherwise critical of the habitus concept.
Occam’s understanding of the order of grace was influenced by Pelagian ideas. When a man has done all that he is able to do (facit quod in se est), he is rewarded with gifts of grace. Man is able, of his own power, to produce merit of a lower order (meritum de congruo). His natural powers can even enable him to love God above all things. These ideas were related to the belief that sin is not a corruption of nature but only separate volitional acts. It was the Occamist teaching about grace which was later criticized above all by the Reformers. (Cf. the Apology to the Augsburg Confession)
With respect to the question of predestination, Occam perpetuated the idea of voluntarism which went back to Duns Scotus. God is the Absolute Will. In His potentia absoluta He is independent of every law. If a man is to be saved, therefore, this depends exclusively on God’s decree. Similarly, the decision as to whether or not an act of man is meritorious is also dependent on God’s will. The old relationship between merit and grace was therefore sundered. Caritas, infused grace, was no longer thought to be a necessary prerequisite for meritorious deeds.
The entire Occamist ethic was marked by this same point of view. Good is good because God wills it. There are no eternal commands, and those which exist are valid because of the power of God’s will. Nothing can prevent God from making other commands valid.
The Late Medieval Opposition
As one could infer from what has already been said, nominalist theology was at many points critical of prevailing church doctrine in its scholastic configuration. This does not mean, however, that there was any overt opposition or deep skepticism involved (as some have tried to find in Occamism). The nominalist theologians adhered very strictly, as a general rule, to the dogmatic position of the church. The eventual heretical contradictions were avoided by their reference to ecclesiastical authority as the foundation of faith and to the cleavage between theological knowledge and rational knowledge. But a more pronounced criticism of the medieval church and its theology did come from other sources, as for example the Waldenses and such individual theologians as Wyclif and Hus.
John Wyclif (d. 1384) was sharply critical of papal authority. Christ alone is the head of the church, he said. Church and state form a unity under the dominion of Christ, with the Scriptures serving as law. Wyclif thus developed the idea of an independent national church.
Theologically speaking, Wyclif began his career as a nominalist, but he later adopted the realist position; he came to feel that the latter position was in closer agreement with the content of revelation. Wyclif found support for his opposition to the medieval church in the writings of Augustine. It was from this point of view that he criticized the doctrine of transubstantiation, which he felt was unbiblical. In opposition thereto he suggested a symbolic interpretation of the Lord’s Supper, citing the Augustinian distinction between sacramental sign and spiritual meaning. Wyclif’s far-ranging critique of church and dogma also included censure of the theory of penance and the indulgence system.
Wyclif’s ideas were subsequently taken up by John Hus (d. 1415), whose activity led to widespread opposition movements in Bohemia.
Jean Gerson (d. 1429) was included among the medieval authors with whom Luther agreed in many things. He was a nominalist, but he criticized the scientific approach of scholasticism and emphasized instead the subjective experience of faith. In other words, Gerson combined the nominalist theological position with the mystical view of life.
The Protestant Reformation was not simply a continuation of the late medieval opposition to the Roman Catholic Church. It was rather a renewal of a much profounder nature and with far greater consequences. But it did not by any means come into being as a completely unexpected revolution; it had deep roots in the developments of the Middle Ages.
Late medieval nominalism, which ought to be distinguished from the earlier school of the same name, was a unique phenomenon in the history of theology. At the same time that its representatives were sharply opposed to the entire range of previous scholastic thought and contested many of its fundamental principles, they nevertheless perpetuated the scholastic tradition and completed (sometimes in an extreme fashion) the dialectical reworking of theological material. Their profound interest in philosophy is witnessed to by the thorough treatment given to questions on the periphery of theology, and particularly to the problem concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy. (When they commented on Lombard’s Sentences, they dealt chiefly with the Prolog and the first book.)
The originator and foremost representative of this school was William of Occam (teacher at Oxford; accused of heresy and summoned to Avignon, where he was held in custody for four years; later taught at Munich, where he was protected by the emperor, Louis of Bavaria; died in 1349). Chief among his many followers were Peter d’Ailly (d. 1420, cardinal, active in the reform councils) and Gabriel Biel (d. 1495, professor in Tübingen), whose Collectorium summarized the Occamist tradition in an exemplary manner. Biel’s theology was basic for the instruction in a number of German universities, including Erfurt, where Luther was educated.
Occam took a fresh look at the problem of universals which had been prominently discussed by the first scholastics. Occam rejected the realism of Thomas Aquinas and revived the nominalist position, which held that only the individual possesses reality. He did not believe that there was any basis to the claim that universal concepts actually exist, either within or apart from things. Occam proceeded from the principle that one ought not assume the presence of more entities than is necessary. One need not assume that universal concepts exist apart from our thoughts (extra animam). The realistic point of view must therefore be repudiated. Universals are only concepts which are formed in the mind of man to designate a number of individuals of the same kind. The task of science is to investigate concepts in their context and relationships. As a result, logic was the basic science as far as the Occamists were concerned, while metaphysics was to be abolished. In spite of certain tendencies in the direction of a more modern, more empirical method of observation, Occamism actually led to a much more abstract form of speculation than was true among the realists. This was partly because it was no longer believed that science was able to deal with things in their external reality but merely with terms and concepts as they appeared in man’s mind or in verbal presentations.
Occam developed his epistemology primarily in order to deal with the problem of theological knowledge. His criticism was directed against the so-called proof of the existence of God. By denying the reality of the universals, the cosmological proof of Thomas Aquinas fell by the wayside. For this implied, as shown above, that we can attain insight into the existence of God by virtue of our knowledge of the universal element in the things we see. To Occam, God, in the most proper sense, is something individual (res singularissima). Neither can one rationally prove that God is the first cause of all things. Metaphysics can, of course, demonstrate in other ways the existence of one or many gods, but such claims as the oneness of God, and His infinity, must be looked upon as confessions of faith and nothing else.
Still less can the doctrine of the Trinity be pondered in a rational manner. Occam conceded that it presupposes a realistic point of view, for it speaks of relationships which exist independently of our thought processes. While Occam otherwise denied the reality of such relationships, he was content to refer the question of the Trinity to the authority of Scripture, which cannot be invalidated by the principles of empirical knowledge—for such knowledge deals only with creation, not with God.
What has now been said illustrates Occam’s understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy. Unlike Thomas Aquinas, Occam did not consider theology a science. Its propositions cannot be elucidated by logical means; as articles of faith, they have their only support in the Scriptures. Occam felt that there is a radical difference between theology and philosophy. But that is only one side of the matter. The other is that he believed quite simply that theological concepts and propositions could be treated by logical and dialectical means. Indeed, he and his associates practiced this art with great virtuosity. The fact that Occam conceived of theology and philosophy as being radically different did not, therefore, prevent Occamist theology from being more highly colored by philosophical argumentation than was true of any other previous school of thought.
According to Occam, theology must be based on fides infusa. What did he mean by faith? Above all, an inclination to believe Biblical truth. He did not accept the older Franciscan idea of faith as an immediate experience of the divine. Faith is concurrence in or agreement with Biblical truth. Biel defined faith as follows: “One who reads the Bible (if he is a believer) immediately agrees with each and every thing recorded there, because he believes that all these things are revealed by God.” (Collectorium, III, dist. 24, qu. unica, G)
The nominalists held, in principle, that Scripture is the sole authority. Some even attempted to cite its teachings in opposition to the pope and other ecclesiastical authorities. But in general practice the Bible and the doctrines of the church were blended together; ecclesiastical traditions were firmly supported even if they lacked Scriptural foundation. This was true, for example, of transubstantiation, which Occam accepted even though he felt that other theories were more Biblical in nature. The nominalists developed a theory of the immediate inspiration of Scripture. Canonical authority was based on the conviction that the words of the Bible were inspired in the writers by God Himself.
Not everyone can attain a firm faith in all of the Biblical truths. A distinction was therefore made between fides implicita, which accepts Biblical or doctrinal truth only in a general way, and fides explicita, which presupposes a knowledge of the individual articles of faith. The latter was required only of clergymen, while the former was considered sufficient for laymen in general.
As far as theological content was concerned, Occam for the most part accepted the older tradition. But he also altered it at a number of points and lodged criticisms which weakened its foundations.
An example can be found in his concept of sin and grace. Occam did not believe that original sin actually exists in man’s nature. It is merely God’s judgment of man, ascribing to man the guilt of Adam; it is not an actual corruption of human nature. In connection with the traditional view of sin, Occam also spoke of sin as fomes, an inclination in man to do what is evil.
One consequence of such a concept of sin would be that grace is looked upon merely as the forgiveness of sin, an exoneration from guilt. If sin is not thought of as habitual depravity, there is certainly little reason to think of grace as an infused habitus. Occam did make a concession to tradition in this case, however, for he spoke of grace as gratia infusa even though he was otherwise critical of the habitus concept.
Occam’s understanding of the order of grace was influenced by Pelagian ideas. When a man has done all that he is able to do (facit quod in se est), he is rewarded with gifts of grace. Man is able, of his own power, to produce merit of a lower order (meritum de congruo). His natural powers can even enable him to love God above all things. These ideas were related to the belief that sin is not a corruption of nature but only separate volitional acts. It was the Occamist teaching about grace which was later criticized above all by the Reformers. (Cf. the Apology to the Augsburg Confession)
With respect to the question of predestination, Occam perpetuated the idea of voluntarism which went back to Duns Scotus. God is the Absolute Will. In His potentia absoluta He is independent of every law. If a man is to be saved, therefore, this depends exclusively on God’s decree. Similarly, the decision as to whether or not an act of man is meritorious is also dependent on God’s will. The old relationship between merit and grace was therefore sundered. Caritas, infused grace, was no longer thought to be a necessary prerequisite for meritorious deeds.
The entire Occamist ethic was marked by this same point of view. Good is good because God wills it. There are no eternal commands, and those which exist are valid because of the power of God’s will. Nothing can prevent God from making other commands valid.
The Late Medieval Opposition
As one could infer from what has already been said, nominalist theology was at many points critical of prevailing church doctrine in its scholastic configuration. This does not mean, however, that there was any overt opposition or deep skepticism involved (as some have tried to find in Occamism). The nominalist theologians adhered very strictly, as a general rule, to the dogmatic position of the church. The eventual heretical contradictions were avoided by their reference to ecclesiastical authority as the foundation of faith and to the cleavage between theological knowledge and rational knowledge. But a more pronounced criticism of the medieval church and its theology did come from other sources, as for example the Waldenses and such individual theologians as Wyclif and Hus.
John Wyclif (d. 1384) was sharply critical of papal authority. Christ alone is the head of the church, he said. Church and state form a unity under the dominion of Christ, with the Scriptures serving as law. Wyclif thus developed the idea of an independent national church.
Theologically speaking, Wyclif began his career as a nominalist, but he later adopted the realist position; he came to feel that the latter position was in closer agreement with the content of revelation. Wyclif found support for his opposition to the medieval church in the writings of Augustine. It was from this point of view that he criticized the doctrine of transubstantiation, which he felt was unbiblical. In opposition thereto he suggested a symbolic interpretation of the Lord’s Supper, citing the Augustinian distinction between sacramental sign and spiritual meaning. Wyclif’s far-ranging critique of church and dogma also included censure of the theory of penance and the indulgence system.
Wyclif’s ideas were subsequently taken up by John Hus (d. 1415), whose activity led to widespread opposition movements in Bohemia.
Jean Gerson (d. 1429) was included among the medieval authors with whom Luther agreed in many things. He was a nominalist, but he criticized the scientific approach of scholasticism and emphasized instead the subjective experience of faith. In other words, Gerson combined the nominalist theological position with the mystical view of life.
The Protestant Reformation was not simply a continuation of the late medieval opposition to the Roman Catholic Church. It was rather a renewal of a much profounder nature and with far greater consequences. But it did not by any means come into being as a completely unexpected revolution; it had deep roots in the developments of the Middle Ages.
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