Schleiermacher
Friedrich Schleiermacher (d. 1834, professor in Berlin from 1810) was educated in a Moravian milieu, but he broke with the Herrnhut faith when he was 19. In his earlier writings, above all in the famous Reden über die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, 1800 (trans. John Oman, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers; New York: Harper Torchbook, 1958) he associated himself with Romanticism and gave expression to its newly awakened feeling for the religious.
One of Schleiermacher’s greatest contributions to the history of theology was his attempt to describe the uniqueness of religion as a function of the human soul. In opposition to rationalism, he asserted in his Reden that religion does not consist of intellectual or moralistic elements; it rather refers to an independent area in the life of the spirit. Religion is not knowing or doing, but “the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things within the infinite and through the infinite, of all temporal things within the eternal and through the eternal” (das unmittelbare Bewusstsein von dem allgemeihen Sein alles Endlichen im Unendlichen und durch das Unendliche, alles Zeitlichen im Ewigen und durch das Ewige). He defined religion in the Reden as “intuition of the universe.” In this immediate consciousness of oneness with all that is, man experiences the divine. The idea of God therefore coincides with a feeling of universal unity and identity with the infinite. This feeling was assumed to be inherent in the soul of man.
In Der Christliche Glaube, 1820–22 (trans. Christian Faith; New York: Harper Torchbooks 108 and 109) Schleiermacher’s major work in the field of dogmatics, religion was defined as “the feeling of absolute dependence” (das schlechthinige Abhäaingigkeitsgefühl). The word “feeling” (Gefühl) was not used in the ordinary sense in this context, but to refer to something which is a part of the immediate self-consciousness. Man senses that he is absolutely dependent on the infinite. Therein lies religion—and it is this feeling of dependence which characterizes man as spirit.
It would be erroneous to think of this concept of religion as being purely subjective. Schleiermacher rather sought, in this context, to put an end to the contrast between subjective and objective: that which is ultimately human coincides with the divine or the infinite. In his innermost being and immediate self-consciousness, man experiences himself as being identical with the all. The objective and the subjective merge into one.
It can also be said of this concept of religion, on the other hand, that it abolishes all dualism: God and the world are thought of, in the final analysis, as identical. There was a pantheistic strain in Schleiermacher, particularly in the Reden. Evil cannot be conceived of as something hostile to God. The idea of a devil or of evil spirits was rejected. The spirit is supreme in man and cannot be thought of as something evil. Schleiermacher’s point of view was, therefore, monistic.
Christianity was to Schleiermacher the highest if not the only expression of this religious consciousness. According to a definition provided in Der Christliche Glaube, Christianity is “a monotheistic form of piety of a teleological variety, in which all refers to the salvation brought to completion through Jesus of Nazareth” (11). In this context, salvation denotes that devout self-consciousness (the feeling of absolute dependence) has been realized. There was therefore a direct connection between Schleiermacher’s general concept of religion and his understanding of the essence of Christianity.
This does not mean, however, as some have thought, that the entire Christian doctrine of faith can be deduced from this feeling of absolute dependence. The doctrine of faith is not based solely on universal principles. According to Schleiermacher, Christian dogma has both a historical and a speculative element. Theology presupposes an empirically discernible fellowship of faith, which is called the Christian church, and it is the function of dogmatics to describe the doctrine of faith as found in the church at a given point in time. Therefore the field of dogmatics is also included in historical theology. In his own dogmatics, Der Christlische Glaube, Schleiermacher intended to set forth the faith as it was then found in the evangelical church. The speculative element in dogmatic theology is found in this, that the claims of faith constantly lead back to the feeling of absolute dependence and therefore to the concept of religion which is derived from universal rational science (or “ethics,” in Schleiermacher’s usage).
The claims of faith do not represent objective knowledge; they are, rather, expressions of devout self-consciousness. They do not describe the object of faith; they describe the personal function of faith. The Christian articles of faith are legitimized by the fact that they correspond to the devout Christian consciousness of faith, or to the Christian’s inner experience (61, 1). The task of dogmatics is not to set forth the claims of faith but merely to give historical expression to the concept of faith as it is actually to be found within the church as a whole or within a certain branch of the church.
On the basis of these principles, Schleiermacher built up a uniform system, which included the various branches of theology and religion. Ethics is the speculative exposition of rational science which parallels natural science. Within ethics we find the universal definition of the concept of religion. The concrete description of the religions of mankind is provided in the philosophy of religion. Theology, the science which is required for the guidance of the church, is divided into philosophical, practical, and historical theology. The first of these (which, in turn, is divided into apologetics and polemics) is designed to present the essence and uniqueness of Christianity. Dogmatics, which is included in historical theology, describes the Christian faith as it appears at a given time or in a certain church body.
In Der Christliche Glaube (1820–22, 2d ed. 1830), we find Schleiermacher’s own presentation of evangelical doctrine. The characteristic ideas of this book, which was epoch-making in its time, must be looked at here at several points:
1. In the doctrine of God, Schleiermacher generally concurred in the philosophic assumptions. The consciousness of God is involved in devout self-consciousness. To sense that one is absolutely dependent is the same as to be conscious of standing in relation to God (4). In this immediate self-consciousness the being of God coincides with man’s own being. The question of the existence of God becomes irrelevant. Dogmatics need only consider the consciousness of God, which coincides with devout self-consciousness.
The doctrines of creation and preservation are treated in a corresponding manner as expressions which show that God and the natural context are one. The world is absolutely dependent on God. This is implicit in the idea of creation, which therefore does not refer to an event in time. The doctrine of providence expresses the consciousness that man’s dependence on nature coincides with his dependence on God. The concept of divine intervention, of miracles or of revelation in the true sense of the term, was rejected. As already indicated in another context, this view of creation cannot be combined with the idea of an evil spiritual power. As a result, no reality or influence can be ascribed to the devil.
2. The Christian teaching of sin similarly caused some trouble for Schleiermacher. Sin is related to the feeling of mental discomfort which is always present in the devout consciousness of God, since this is impeded by sensuality. Sin can be described, therefore, as the flesh in opposition to the spirit; it is this struggle which hampers the consciousness of God. On the other hand, the idea that sin is a transgression of God’s law was rejected. Schleiermacher did not put sin into the field of the will but into that of the pious feelings. One cannot speak of a fall or say that sin originated in a voluntary act. Sin was thought of as being in man originally. It is implicit in the fact that the sense of dependence is not yet complete. The concept of original sin was repudiated as inadequate. Schleiermacher thought of original sin in terms of humanity’s common and original sinfulness or inability to do what is good.
The concept of sin lost its ethical character in Schleiermacher’s theology. He thought of sin not only as something evil but as something included in the consciousness of God—the necessary presupposition for the need of salvation and thereby also for the development of a superior consciousness of God. The consciousness of sin is a lower stage in the development of the good. The contrast between God and sin is eliminated. Schleiermacher assumed it to be part of God’s own order that the consciousness of sin must precede salvation. Sin is undeveloped nature. It is not contrary to creation; it is a part of it. Schleiermacher’s idea of sin represents an attempt to harmonize the Christian concept with the monistic view of the world from which he proceeded.
3. Schleiermacher described salvation as the transition to a superior consciousness of God, unhampered by sensuality, which can be realized in the Christian congregation through faith in Jesus Christ. Jesus had a perfect consciousness of God, the power and blessedness of which He imparts to human nature. Christ is the second Adam, the prototype of the new humanity. His unimpaired consciousness of God denotes the fulfillment of creation. From the very beginning, human nature has been inclined toward this unity with God, but it could not be realized because of the presence of sin in man. The influence exerted upon man by the person of Christ is of the same kind as other spiritual power. One cannot therefore speak of atonement in the proper sense of the term. (Schleiermacher did use the word Versöhnung, but with an entirely different meaning; it refperred particularly to the blessedness conferred by Christ). Christ's work—or His suffering, death, and resurrection—has no bearing on salvation, but only His person, which represents the perfect consciousness of God. Neither was forgiveness of sin looked upon as the substance of salvation; the only thing that matters is the transformation of man with the subsequent improvement of his religious feelings. No significance can be ascribed to Christ’s suffering on the cross in this context. The Passion story serves only as an exemplary illustration of perseverance in suffering. Schleiermacher looked upon the Resurrection as resuscitation from an apparent death, and he referred to the Ascension as Christ’s actual death. Salvation refers only to “God being in Christ” (das Sein Gottes in Christo) and to the posthumous impact of His person—not to Christ’s death and resurrection.
4. In Schleiermacher’s Christology we find a projection of his general concept of God-man relationships. The unity of the divine and the human received its perfect expression in the person of Christ. The person of Christ certainly denotes an improvement over humanity as it was prior to His coming, but at the same time He only represents the highest development of that which is human. Creation and salvation axe only separate stages in one and the same natural process. Schleiermacher did not recognize any history of salvation. His reinterpretation of the Gospel of Christ’s death and resurrection has already been touched upon. In this transformation of Christology into a philosophy-of-religion concept, Schleiermacher’s theology reminds us of Gnosticism. His neglect of Christ’s death and resurrection is, for example, something he had in common with the Gnostics.
The same unity of the divine and the human which we see in a person in Christ can also be found in a fellowship, in the church. The church is the direct continuation of Christ’s appearance; it represents the new humanity, for which Christ is the prototype. Schleiermacher did not, however, accept the idea of Christ’s dominion over the world. Man is related to Christ only in his own inner life and in the fellowship of the church.
5. The doctrine of the Trinity was not emphasized by Schleiermacher as it was by Hegel (see below). The former did not feel that this doctrine gave any direct expression to the devout self-consciousness of the Christian. Schleiermacher recommended a radical alteration of the doctrine of the Trinity as taught by the church. He identified himself most intimately with the Sabellian point of view (see above, pp. 71–72). God is one indivisible substance. The Son and the Spirit are merely forms of revelation for this substance. The Holy Spirit is identified with the public spirit which animates the fellowship of believers.
6. The eschatological statements do not apply to devout self-consciousness any more than the doctrine of the Trinity, inasmuch as they refer to a future event. Schleiermacher did mention them at the end of Der Christliche Glaube, however; he called them “prophetic teachings.” The idea of eternal damnation was repudiated as being inconsistent with Christian feelings. Schleiermacher rather accepted and proclaimed the teaching of universal restoration, accomplished in the power of salvation. This opinion was most consistent with his naturalistic reinterpretation of the history of salvation and his monistic world view.
7. Der Christliche Glaube has strikingly little connection with the Scriptures. This was justified on principle: it was Schleiermacher’s intention to describe faith as it occurs in religious experience, and in this endeavor the Scriptures are allowed to speak only when they express the same consciousness of faith.
According to Schleiermacher, only the New Testament is normative. The Old Testament is found in the canon only because of its historical connection with the New Testament. But it does not serve to express the Christian spirit, and it therefore lacks proper doctrinal authority.
The New Testament was certainly thought of as normative, but Schleiermacher searched its contents above all to find material that coincided with the devout consciousness of the Christian. The true doctrine is that which succeeds in maintaining itself through development. It has been said that Schleiermacher replaced the principle of Scripture with an “evolutionary principle of tradition.” The consciousness of faith existing in the church is the final authority. The Bible is placed on the same level with the Christian tradition, although it enjoys chronological priority and actually contains the most significant description of religious experience.
The authority of Scripture cannot serve as the basis for faith; it rather assumes that faith is already present. The idea of Scripture’s self-evidence or of the ability of the Word to create faith was eliminated.
Revelation, in this context, was synonymous with devout self-consciousness, which denotes God’s presence in man.
The general concept of religion was therefore placed above the Scriptures and the Word. The use of Scriptural proof in dogmatics is justified only if this intimates that a certain doctrinal proposition stands out as a legitimate expression of Christian piety.
Schleiermacher’s theological system represents a thorough transformation of traditional dogmatics. It was an attempt to lay a new foundation for the science of theology. As a result of Schleiermacher’s efforts, theology came to be looked upon as a science, on the same level as the secular branches of learning. Dogmatics became a historically descriptive exposition of devout Christian self-consciousness. In opposition to rationalism and supernaturalism, religion was depicted as a distinct sphere at the side of the intellectual and moral spheres. Theological statements, as expressions of religious feelings, have their own unique character.
But even though Schleiermacher brought theology to a place of eminence in contemporary culture and discovered new ways of solving its scholarly problems, his system of doctrine—as judged purely on the basis of content—was essentially alien to the evangelical doctrine of faith. His dogmatics, based as it was on the theory of immediate self-consciousness as the foundation of religion, in reality led to a gnostic, monistic system, whose connection with historic Christianity did not prevent the reinterpretation and distortion of essential elements in the Christian faith.
Even though Schleiermacher had few personal disciples, the significance of his theology has been exceedingly widespread, not only in the 19th century (when a number of theological schools were influenced by him to a greater or lesser degree) but in our own century as well.
A thorough but sometimes misleading critique of Schleiermacher’s position has come from the ranks of the dialectical theologians (Barth, Brunner), who have attempted to break with the entire tradition of which he was the originator and chief representative.
Hegel and Speculative Theology
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (d. 1831, professor in Berlin from 1818), German idealism’s most influential philosopher, played a significant role also in the history of theology by virtue of his religious and philosophical principles and his extensive impact on 19th-century theology and historical research.
Hegel came out against Schleiermacher and the Romantics, for whom religion manifested itself in immediate intuition and in a sense of the absolute. According to Hegel, religion (like the life of the mind in general) appears above all in the form of man’s thoughts or concepts. Feeling is the lowest expression of consciousness, while thought—that which distinguishes man from the animals—is the highest. “If God reveals Himself to man, He does so essentially for man as a thinking being … animals do not have any religion.” Hegel’s system provided room for the scholarly and speculative aspects of theology. The difference between him and Schleiermacher can be accounted for in part on the basis of their diverse religious backgrounds: for whereas the latter came out of the Herrnhut milieu, Hegel was brought up in an “old Protestant” environment (in Swabia).
For Hegel, concept or scientific thought coincided with reality. Truth is to be found in the system which gives expression to those thoughts which, having been contemplated, become conscious of themselves. This is also called Der Geist—the spirit. The spirit is the absolute, the only reality.
The ideal reality, according to Hegel, is not a static form-world as in Platonic idealism, but one which also includes spatial reality and historical development. It was characteristic of Hegel to insert historical development into his system—and this was probably his foremost philosophical contribution. He combined philosophical speculation with a profound understanding of historical reality.
The absolute, the true reality, and fully developed knowledge always include a progression which Hegel assumed to be of a dialectical, logical variety, at the same time that he also understood it to be a historical change. Hence it was that Hegel based his system on the so-called dialectical method: every concept points beyond itself to another, opposite concept; the opposition is resolved in a higher unity. This progression (from thesis to antithesis to synthesis) forms the pattern for the development of ideas as well as for the course of history. It also provides the basis for the universal system in which Hegel sought to summarize both knowledge and reality.
The absolute appears as pure conception. It is this which constitutes logic, the first part of philosophy. But the absolute is transformed into its opposite, das Anderssein—the individual, the particular, the “thingish.” This aspect of knowledge is treated under the heading of natural philosophy. Finally, the absolute reverts to a consciousness of itself and becomes spirit. The philosophy of the spirit is divided into the doctrine of the subjective spirit (anthropology; phenomenology, i.e., the teaching of the development of consciousness and knowledge; psychology), of the objective spirit (morality, law, politics), and of the absolute spirit (art, religion, and philosophy).
There is complete harmony between religion and philosophy in the Hegelian system. Both have the same object, the absolute. Christianity is the final stage in the development of religion. Its counterpart in the field of philosophy is the Hegelian system (according to Hegel).
Hegel presented Christianity as the absolute religion. He felt that the dialectical method was to be found in the doctrine of the Trinity. Divinity has developed in three stages. God is in His eternal idea (the Father’s kingdom), He reveals Himself in finitude, in consciousness, and in action (the Son’s kingdom), and then reverts to Himself in unity with the finite in the congregation (the Spirit’s kingdom).
Hegel’s influence extended far beyond those who called themselves “Hegelians.” His dialectical method has, for example, exerted a strong influence on the writing of both sacred and secular history and has also contributed new ideas to the presentation of the history of dogma.
During Hegel’s lifetime there were those who looked upon his system as the ultimate solution of theological problems. It was thought that the entire field of theology might be reconciled to the most advanced education of that day on the basis of this system. Christian teachings were inserted into the Hegelian framework. Revelation was placed on the same level with the absolute spirit, with speculative knowledge—which was looked upon at the same time as God’s own knowledge and the human spirit’s knowledge of the absolute.
Among the representatives of this orthodox Hegelianism (commonly referred to as “speculative theology”) were Karl Daub (d. 1836, professor in Heidelberg) and Philipp Konrad Marheineke (d. 1846, professor in Berlin.) The latter was critical of Schleiermacher, whose description of religion he considered one-sided. To the Hegelians, religion was not merely life and feeling but, above all, knowledge of the truth. Hegelian philosophy was looked upon as the scientific form for the presentation of the Christian faith.
Hegelianism, however, also gave rise to a tendency which drew conclusions entirely different from Hegel’s. This was the so-called Hegelian “left,” represented (among others) by David Friedrich Strauss (d. 1874), who, in his Das Leben Jesu (1835 f.), set forth the Gospel message as a myth. At the center of religious faith he replaced the person of Christ with “the idea of humanity.” Strauss felt that Christological statements ought to be referred to this collective concept, in view of the fact that the historical Jesus was only an ordinary man, a teacher of morality and religion.
Another member of the Hegelian “left” was the philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (d. 1872). His concept of religion as a factor in human life devolved into a specific denial of the existence of God. God, said he, is merely the sum and substance of human qualities, and faith in God is the result of man’s wishful thinking.
Restoration Theology
In the 1830s and 1840s a process of change began, the effects of which are felt even in our own time. The golden age of Romanticism and German idealism had ended by then. New ideologies burgeoned forth, socialism and materialism, which took an entirely different position vis-à-vis religion. As a result of their influence the rationalistic interpretation of Christianity increased once again.
At the same time the economic and political alteration of society was taking place—a transformation designated by the terms industrialism and liberalism. The patriarchal order began to dissolve, and the modem welfare state came into being with both new political ideals and greatly altered social conditions.
No less extensive were the changes made in the scientific (scholarly) field. Modem natural science, the exact writing of history, the division of universal education as a result of strict specialization, the advance of technology—these are some of the phenomena which characterize the epoch which began at this time. This epoch confronted theology with the task of solving—under new conditions—the question of Christianity and culture, of science and religion, a task which has scarcely been taken care of satisfactorily even in our own day.
Many solutions were attempted in the period of time with which we are now chiefly concerned. It was characteristic of these attempts that they either reached back to the older tradition, in order thus to preserve church doctrine intact (restoration theology), or else they subjected themselves entirely to the spirit of the age and thereby surrendered certain fundamental aspects of the Christian faith (“free” or “liberal” theology). The kind of synthesis between Christianity and culture which we find in Hegel and Schleiermacher could no longer be reached. Uniformity in theology and church life was lost, as was the uniformity of cultural life in general.
Die Erweckung (“the Awakening”), the revival movement which was already developing at the beginning of the century, can be classified with restoration theology—i.e., the tendencies to attain theological goals primarily by turning back to the older, prerationalistic tradition. Die Erweckung was an heir of the older Pietism, above all in its Württemberg form, but it was also related to the newly awakened religious interest of Romanticism and German idealism. Its proponents were pleased to claim Luther as a patron (the Reformation jubilee of 1817 served to actualize Reformation ideas), but no importance was attached to the difference between Lutheran and Reformed theology. The influence of the Awakening upon church life in general was of more significance than the contributions it made to systematic theology. This movement was more interested in historical theology and Biblical erudition than it was in dogmatics.
The major spokesmen for what was called “repristination theology” were Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg (d. 1869) and Friedrich Adolf Philippi (d. 1882; Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 1854–79, in six volumes). This school was concerned about the resuscitation of old Protestant theology, which was considered an adequate (and for the evangelical church the normative) interpretation of the Bible and the confessions. The application of modem science to theology was rejected, as well as the idealistic transformation of Christianity. Repristination theology exerted a great influence on church life, and its attempts to make the older tradition vital and living were in many respects fruitful both for the contemporary church and theology. Its achievements were limited, however, by its lack of attention to Luther’s theology and also by reason of the fact that its leaders seemed to ignore the difference between the intellectual assumptions of the old Protestant period and of the 19th century. They instinctively accepted the world view of their own age and thereby fell into contradictions. A genuine repristination proved to be impossible. The older Lutheran position was denied at several points. The distinction between Lutheranism and Calvinism was considered unimportant. Hengstenberg therefore championed the cause of unionism. But as a result of its strong opposition to Pietism and the Enlightenment, as well as to Schleiermacher and idealism, repristination theology did assist in keeping the older Lutheran tradition alive during the 19th century. It should also be mentioned that Hengstenberg tried to restore the Old Testament to its place in the life of the church. Heinrich Schmid’s widely used summary of old Lutheran theology, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, 1843 (trans. Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs, Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church; Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House), is another example of the efforts put forth by the repristination theologians.
“New Lutheranism” was similar to repristination theology, but it is usually referred to as a separate tendency. It too was strongly confessional and sharply opposed to the spirit of the new age. The new Lutherans rejected the dominant subjective interpretation of religion and sought for a palpable, objective reality which could guarantee Christianity’s truth and its continued existence. This objective foundation was found, not in the Word and in faith as in the older Protestantism, but in the church, which was looked upon as an “institution” through which the gifts of salvation are bestowed upon man generation after generation.
Friedrich Julius Stahl (d. 1861), a lawyer, provided the legal basis for this new concept of the church. In his view church and state are divinely established institutions into which the individual is placed and to whose authority he is obligated to subject himself. Among the theologians and churchmen who interpreted and sought to give practical application to high-church ideas concerning the church, the clerical office, and the confessions were Theodor Kliefoth (d. 1895; Acht Bücher von der Kirche, 1854), Wilhelm Löhe (d. 1872, founder of the institutions at Neuendettelsau), and August Friedrich Christian Vilmar (d. 1868). The sacraments were strongly emphasized as the church’s objective foundation, partly at the expense of the doctrine of the Word and of faith.
With respect to the church question, and other facets of Christian life, the intention was to revitalize what was considered the original Lutheran position (hence the name, “new Lutheranism”) and not simply to go back to orthodoxy, as the repristination theologians did. The new Lutherans were strongly opposed to the Reformed tradition, as well as to the burgeoning free-church tendency. Furthermore, they emphasized the unity of the visible and the invisible church (the objective institution and the spiritual fellowship of the true believers) and criticized the Pietists for distinguishing between the two. In doing this they gave expression to a Lutheran idea. In the development of their ecclesiology, however, the new Lutherans accepted to some extent ideas which were not characteristic of original Lutheranism. The church and the sacraments were looked upon as institutional ordinances, to a certain degree independent of the Word.
The conservative tendency also brought with it a renewed demand to base theology on the Bible. A unique form of Biblical theology was created by Johann Tobias Beck (d. 1878, professor in Tübingen). He combined the older Württemberg tradition of Bengel and Oetinger with a strong infusion of idealistic philosophy. Beck’s theology was distinguished by a marked speculative tendency. The content of the Bible was thought of as a divine conceptual system, uniform in nature, which brings to us the living power of the Holy Spirit and the supernatural realities of the kingdom of God. This Beckian Biblicism has exerted a great influence, in Finland for example.
In Sweden a position closely related to German new Lutheranism was developed by a group of Lundensian theologians, including Ebbe Gustaf Bring (d. 1884), Wilhelm Flensburg (d. 1897), and Anton Niklas Sundberg (d. 1900). Their sounding board was a journal called Svensk Kyrkotidning (“Swedish Church News”), published from 1855 to 1863.
The Grundtvig movement in Denmark, which was of great significance for both church and culture, can also be included under “restoration” tendencies, even though it was unique in many ways, both in comparison with contemporary developments and otherwise. Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783–1872) was influenced by the rationalism of the Enlightenment and later on by Romanticism and German idealism. He also became interested in Nordic mythology at an early age, and this came to play an important role in his symbol formation and in his theological development. There was a period in his life when he was a staunch supporter of Lutheran orthodoxy, but his strong historical sense caused him to doubt the orthodox doctrine of inspiration. He made what he himself called the “marvelous discovery” that the foundation of the Christian faith is not to be found in the Scriptures (viewed as written words), but in the living Word in the church, in the sacraments and in the confession used in connection with Baptism. It was on this basis that Grundtvig developed his concept of the church. The ideal, as he saw it, is a free state church, which can embrace various points of view without organizational coercion or compulsion of belief. Grundtvig held that the original, popular form of religiosity, symbolized by Nordic mythology, prepared the way for the coming of Christianity. In his mind, Christian and national elements were combined into one.
Grundtvig was inspired at many points by the theology of Irenaeus. This influence is reflected, for example, in the central position accorded the confession of faith, as well as in the dominant importance of such categories as “death-life” (instead of “guilt-forgiveness”) and “creation-restoration” in his teaching of salvation. Grundtvig was opposed to the doctrine of original sin as then taught, and he believed that man retained a likeness of God which could form a connecting link with Christian instruction and upbringing.
Mediating Theology; the Christological Question
The tradition which began with Schleiermacher was carried on in particular by the tendency which is usually referred to as mediating theology. The appearance of this tendency can be dated from the year 1827, when the journal entitled Theologische Studien und Kritiken was founded. Its stated program was to mediate between Biblical faith and the modern scientific spirit. But at the same time that this theological school sought to mediate between Christianity and science, it also attempted to mediate between various schools of thought as well. Schleiermacher was the guiding light par excellence, but there were close ties with the older tradition too, as well as with the Awakening and at times also with Hegel.
The chief spokesmen for this school were such Schleiermacher disciples as Karl Immanuel Nitzsch (d. 1868; his System der Christlichen Lehre, 1829, was one of the most widely used dogmatics books of the day) and August Detler Christian Twesten (d. 1876). Mention should also be made of Isaak August Dorner (d. 1884), who with the aid of Hegelian thought forms attempted to present a new exposition of Christology (Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre yon der Person Christi, 1839 ff.).
Dorner found it difficult to combine the picture of the historical Jesus, as created by modern research, and the old doctrine of the two natures, and this formed the background of his Christological study. He rejected the idea of the “enhypostasis” (see above, pp. 103–105) and taught that the human nature is an independent person. The divinity of Christ was thought of in this context as a gradually developing unity with the Father. Generally speaking, this concept represented a surrender of the traditional view of the Incarnation. If the divinity of Christ is set forth in terms of His fellowship with God—as a representative and prototype of humanity—this is no longer a question of a Logos who became man, or of a true “God-man.”
Another attempt to solve the Christological problem is found in what is called kenoticism. This was championed above all by the Erlangen theologian Gottfried Thomasius (d. 1875; Christi Person und Werk, 1852–61). He was highly critical of Dorner, and in contrast to the latter held fast to the traditional teaching of the two natures. Thomasius’ basic idea was that when the Logos became man, He divested Himself (kenosis) of all that exceeds human consciousness and laid aside the divine attributes which indicate relationship to the world (omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.). When He was glorified, Christ took these back. In this way the attempt was made to do justice to Christ’s humanity and also retain the old categories. It must be noted, however, that this kenosis doctrine deviated from the older tradition in certain respects. In classical Christology it is not the divine Logos who is said to have divested Himself; rather it is believed that the human nature with which the Logos was united in Christ refrained from using the divine attributes. These remained with Christ during His earthly life, however, in the divine person.
This kenoticist concept clearly illustrates the problem which pervaded all of 19th-century theology: How can the ancient categories of Christian doctrine be combined with the modern point of view? This problem was revealed in the fact that even the conservative and churchly tendencies found it hard to maintain the older tradition intact.
Another of the mediating theologians was a Dane, Hans Lassen Martensen (d. 1884; his Dogmatik, 1849, was used for a long time as a textbook in higher education, also in Sweden). Martensen accepted the kenoticist Christology, which he developed in a masterful way. He was influenced not only by Schleiermacher but also by Hegel and by a theosophical mysticism which set its mark especially on his view of the sacraments.
The most distinctive representative of this school was Richard Rothe (d. 1867), who, with assistance from Schleiermacher and Hegel, built up a complete philosophy of religion as set forth in his Theologische Ethik (1845–48). He went beyond the boundaries of mediating theology and actually stood closer to the point of view of liberal theology.
The Erlangen School
An independent theological principle was worked out by the so-called Erlangen theologians, who were otherwise most closely associated with the confessional group. The founder of this school was Adolf Harless (d. 1879), who based his theology to a large extent on Luther studies. He also developed the characteristic principle of the Erlangen method, which held that the content of Scripture and the individual Christian’s personal experience of salvation correspond with one another.
Johann Christian Konrad von Hofmann (d. 1877), the best known of the Erlangen theologians, made his greatest contributions in the field of Biblical interpretation. His magnum opus, Weissagung und Erfüllung (1841–44), sought to show that prophecy does not only include a foretelling or a presentiment but a profound interpretation of the contemporary situation, based on the fact that history points beyond itself to that which will one day be fulfilled. All of Scripture was interpreted as a uniform history of salvation, in which the Old Testament points forward to Christ, and the New Testament points forward to the consummation. In another great work, Der Schriftbeweis (1852–56), Hofmann set forth the fundamentals of his theological method.
According to Hofmann, a theological system can be tested on the basis of the three objective factors which form the foundation of theological statements. These are: the experience of the new birth, the church, and the Holy Scriptures. Hofmann himself was particularly devoted to the Scriptural test. A system must be in harmony with the history of salvation as presented in the Scriptures. Essentially the method Hofmann outlined amounts to this: the fact of the new birth concludes the history of salvation, which is implied in it. The testimony of experience and Scripture must mutually support each other at all times. The trend of thought is approximately this: that which makes a man a Christian is a fact immediately accessible to theology, viz., the personal fellowship between God and man, mediated through Jesus Christ. Cf. Hofmann’s famous saying: “I as a Christian am the most fitting material for me as a theologian” (Ich der Christ bin mir dem Theologen eigenster Stoff meiner Wissenschaft). This fact involves the entire history of salvation as described in the Bible—the eternal as the presupposition of the historical and the temporal from creation to fulfillment. The validity of this argument, which for the most part was scarcely advocated even by Hofmann himself, has been sharply questioned.
The experiential and subjective basis of Hofmann’s method brought him into close contact with both the Awakening and the theology of Schleiermacher. Of greater significance for posterity was his work in the field of Biblical theology, in which he associated with the Württemberg school (Bengel, Beck). His interpretation of Scripture was distinguished above all by the application of the point of view of the history of salvation. In general, Hofmann’s theology marked the transition from a more philosophical and speculative theology to one more thoroughly conditioned by historical perspective.
Hofmann attempted to replace the orthodox doctrine of salvation with a new theory: The death of Christ, said he, was only the demonstration of an obedience and love which conquers sin and death. An atonement in the true sense was out of the question. This attitude elicited strong opposition, even among theologians of kindred spirit. In order to defend his theory, Hofmann sought to show that Luther, in contrast to later Lutheranism, supported a corresponding point of view. This attempt to show how Luther’s theology was different from subsequent Lutheranism can be considered, to some extent, the beginning of modern Luther research. Theodosius Harnack wrote his famous book Luthers Theologie (1862–86) in opposition to these tendencies.
In general the Erlangen school adopted a conservative position that was strongly attached to the older tradition. G. Thomasius, whose kenoticist concept was touched upon earlier, provides us with a good example of this in his Die Christliche Dogmengeschichte (1874–76). He described the theology of the Formula of Concord as the conclusive summit of the history of dogma, to which all prior doctrinal developments pointed.
Kierkegaard
Kierkegaard’s significance for modern theological developments is sufficient justification for us to devote a special section of this history of 19th-century theology to his ideas.
Søren Kierkegaard (1818–55) was thoroughly trained in aesthetics and philosophy. He was also trained in theology, but he never occupied any position in the church; he devoted himself exclusively to his authorship. His brilliant, creative literary power was placed in the service of an incisive critique of ideas, concerned above all with Romanticism and the Hegelian system, both of which were, according to Kierkegaard, expressions of an attitude which did not touch the true seriousness of life and the existential decision which is necessary if man is to “find himself in his eternal validity.” As an author, Kierkegaard’s chief objective was to describe what real Christianity is. “Thus all [my] activity as an author concerns this: within Christendom to be a Christian.” During his first literary period, which ended with the writing of his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), he sought to depict the way to the Christian “stage” of life as this is confronted by other ideals, which he called the aesthetic and the ethical stages. In the later period, Kierkegaard’s concept of the religious ideal became increasingly acute, and he accused the contemporary church of treason vis-à-vis original, New Testament Christianity. He finally came to present Christianity above all as the imitation of Christ in the tribulation of obedience and loneliness.
Some of the main ideas in Kierkegaard’s critique of contemporary speculative philosophy and of the spirit of the church can be illustrated by an explication of certain basic categories which he used over and over again, and through a description of the “stages” which, as he saw it, were characteristic of the development of man’s life. In what follows we shall pay particular attention to Kierkegaard’s concepts of “existence” and “the individual”—two of his basic categories.
What Kierkegaard meant by “existence” is perhaps most evident in the description he provided of the “stages” of life in such works as Either—Or (1843) and Stages on Life’s Way (1845).
The three “stages”—the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious—do not refer so much to a personal, individual development as they do to three distinct points of view or attitudes about life. The primary aim in this entire presentation of the stages is to determine as carefully as possible what it means to be a Christian. If one does not presuppose this point of view, he cannot understand Kierkegaard’s description of man or his concept of “existence.” It is at this point that modern existentialist philosophy is radically different from its presumed master.
The various points of view are not described with the use of abstract formulae; Kierkegaard rather does this by reflecting them in the lives of different fictitious individuals who appear in his pseudonymous writings (John the Seducer, Assessor Wilhelm, Anti-Climacus, etc.). By stepping back in favor of these various pseudonyms, Kierkegaard intended to bring the reader in an indirect way into an existential situation involving a concrete decision. Kierkegaard sought, through the use of this method—comparable to the “intellectual midwifery” of Socrates—to get away from objective thought and historical observation, which he did not wish to reject in themselves but which he considered of no value in delineating the nature of Christianity. This ought to be added, that we have hereby merely touched upon one of Kierkegaard’s reasons for using pseudonyms. The problem they pose has been thoroughly discussed by Kierkegaard scholars, and it has been shown that a number of other factors prompted Kierkegaard to publish some of his writings in this manner.
The aesthetic stage is characteristic of the superficial epicure, who lives exclusively for visible, temporal, and incidental goals and who judges life from the vantage point of beauty. The aesthetic man is alien to ethical decision, “the choice.” Furthermore, since he is limited to the external and finite elements of life, he is unable to relate the eternal to the temporal—that is, to find a synthesis between time and eternity, which is characteristic of Christianity. The speculative individual, who by means of objective thought flees from situations in which he must make a choice, is also found on the aesthetic level.
The ethical stage begins to exist when a man enters into a relationship with the absolute—when he is confronted by God’s unconditioned demand in “the choice” between good and evil. The ethical does not consist of certain reasonable, universal regulations—as Hegel said—but of an absolute demand on the conscience, which confronts the individual with an “either—or.” In this ethical “choice” the individual finds himself “in his eternal validity.” He either achieves or he misses the destiny which is God’s will for his life. In Fear and Trembling (1843) Kierkegaard sets forth Abraham’s offering of Isaac as an example of a man in a situation where he must make a choice. Abraham’s faith was such that he could humbly obey the divine demand, even though it was contrary to all that was reasonable.
The ethical—unfulfillable—demand forces man to consider his own life with a seriousness which is marked by the eternal weight of choice. This in turn induces within him a condition of remorse or repentance, for he can see that he does not meet the eternal demands adequately. And then it is that the ethical stage leads directly over to the religious stage, with which it partially coincides. For in and with the “ethical” decision, man becomes conscious of God. It is repentance—the knowledge of guilt—which distinguishes the religious stage from the ethical.
Kierkegaard distinguished between a general religious attitude (“religiosity A”) and the true Christian stage (“religiosity B”). The latter consists of Christ’s revelation (God in time), of a consciousness of sin (a consciousness of total sinfulness as over against a general consciousness of guilt), and of faith in the forgiveness of sin in the power of Christ’s atonement.
Within the Christian (the paradox-religious) stage the synthesis between eternity and time, which is man’s lot in life, is realized. To die away from the immediacy of the aesthetic in “the moment”—i, e., in the ever-present now, where eternity impinges on time—to become nothing before God and, cognizant of one’s own nothingness before the eternal demands, to grasp the Christ who is present in faith—this is to realize “the synthesis,” to live in existence.
It is on the basis of this concept of existence—understood either in its general character or in its specific Christian sense—that one must understand Kierkegaard’s statement that “subjectivity is truth.” Objective thought, or speculation, is a flight from existence, from decision. Knowledge arrives at the truth only when it is related to an individual’s existence, to the thinking subject’s own decision, to the synthesis between the finite and the infinite. This is not, therefore, a question of “subjectivism” in the usual sense. True knowledge presupposes that the individual stands in an existential relationship to his object. Kierkegaard’s description of the Christian’s relationship to God is the best illustration of what he means by this. He does not refer to a general, philosophical theory of existential knowledge. When Kierkegaard spoke of “the existential,” he was thinking above all of the synthesis between the temporal and the eternal—“the passionately infinite interest in one’s personal eternal salvation”—which is faith’s prerequisite.
Kierkegaard often emphasized the fact that in his writings he turned to “the individual.” The ethical-religious decision applies to the individual only. The masses, or the human race in general, do not form a link between the individual and the absolute. Christianity is realized only in the faith of the individual. Christ is the One who is always present, with whom the man of faith becomes “contemporaneous,” not by reaching back in history to the Christ who walked on earth but by becoming one with Him and receiving His presence in “the moment,” in the present situation. “Contemporaneousness” is therefore one of the main concepts used in describing the Christian faith (as, e.g., in Training in Christianity, 1850).
The Christian life is characterized by “imitation,” by which Kierkegaard meant not an imitatio in the medieval sense but an emulation of Christ in the suffering of reconciliation and in conquering love. (Cf. The Works of Love, 1847, and Training in Christianity)
In the midst of his bitter controversy with the church, which formed the dramatic end of Kierkegaard’s literary activity, he emphasized more and more the necessity of offense: The hatred and persecution of the world are inevitable in the life of the Christian. The demand for “imitation” was carried to the extreme. In The Moment (1855) Kierkegaard expressed his conviction that the “official” Christianity of the time was a scandalous falsification, that New Testament Christianity no longer existed. Anyone who wanted to be a Christian had to make a radical break with the existing church; this, as Kierkegaard saw it, was an unavoidable demand. Scholarly opinions of Kierkegaard’s last, violent attack on the existing church have been varied in nature. In some respects it seems that this critique was consistent with his earlier ideas, but we cannot overlook the indications of pathological one-sidedness which colored the struggle in which he invested his last measure of strength.
Kierkegaard’s influence was not great during his lifetime. His ideas were too markedly different from the major tendencies of his age to be utilized in contemporary education. But in our present century, and particularly in the past several decades, Kierkegaard’s writings have had an unusually wide distribution. This is due in part to the fact that so-called “existentialist philosophy” has made use of the Danish thinker’s legacy. But this is not all, for also in theology (not least of all in America) serious attempts have been made to go back to the richly seminal sources which Kierkegaard’s books provide. It it true in some ways that Kierkegaard’s work is without parallel not only in the 19th century but in the entire history of theology.
Ritschl and His Disciples
A “liberal” or broad-minded Protestantism appeared in many different forms and in a variety of contexts during the 19th century. Its origins can be traced back in most instances to the deistic and rationalistic opinions of the Enlightenment. Most of the representatives of this liberal school were men who sought to apply the critical historical point of view in the field of theology, including the above-mentioned D. F. Strauss and also Ferdinand Christian Baur (d. 1860, professor in Tübingen). Both of these men applied historical criticism to the Bible, and Baur was also influential as a historian of dogma.
A “liberal” theology which was to some degree new and unique was developed in the latter part of the 19th century and in the early years of the present century by Albrecht Ritschl (d. 1889, professor in Göttingen) and his followers.
Ritschl was closely related to both Kant and Schleiermacher. He located the essence of religion not in the feeling of absolute dependence but rather in the distinctive ideas of the religious fellowship, which refer to the alteration of the will and to the promotion of human salvation or blessedness. Ritschl did not accept revelation in the real meaning of the term. “Revelation,” in his opinion, is the same as positive religion. The “Christian religion” is attached to the Christian congregation and to the person of Jesus. The sole task of theology is to describe man’s fellowship with God as this is expressed in historical Christianity.
Ritschl intended to put firm scholarly ground under theology and to guarantee its position against the attacks of materialistic natural science. In doing so, he resorted to positive religion and regarded it as historical fact. Dogmatics was used to supply a historical description of faith.
In opposition to those who said that Christianity is concerned only with the salvation imparted in Jesus Christ, Ritschl emphasized that we have to deal with two dominant basic ideas: Christianity can be compared to an “ellipse, which is controlled by two foci.” As Ritschl put it, Christianity is just as much concerned about the common ethical goal, the kingdom of God, as it is about the salvation of the individual.
Ethical considerations were decisive for Ritschl. The function of religion is chiefly to promote and bring into being the kingdom of God—man’s destination as conceived in ethical categories.
Salvation, which Ritschl defines as “justification” (Rechtfertigung) or “forgiveness of sin,” restores the ethical freedom impeded by sin. Through faith man’s disturbed relation to God is transformed into confidence and sonship. This results in an inner change of will: man comes to acknowledge God’s will and is thereby predisposed to do what is good. This inner transformation is what Ritschl called “reconciliation” (Versöhnung). It, in turn, results in good deeds. Salvation is not, therefore, concerned only with the blessedness of the individual; it also refers to a common ethical objective, the realization of the kingdom of God, which is man’s highest good.
If one so desires, he can assign “salvation” to religion and “the kingdom of God” to ethics, but in doing so it must be remembered that, according to Ritschl, religion and ethics are interrelated and interact upon one another. One can rather say that the religious is subordinate to the ethical, although both are included as the two “foci” in what Ritschl called the Christian religion.
The traditional doctrines were pruned considerably or reinterpreted to harmonize with the basic “ethical” or “spiritual” ideas which were thought to contain the essential meaning of revelation. Ritschl did not conceive of sin as universal corruption, a condition of guilt before God; he rather thought of it as isolated deviations from the good, resulting from insufficient knowledge of the common welfare, which is simultaneously the ethical good. The ethical freedom which is a part of man’s natural endowment must therefore be strengthened and perfected. This is accomplished through the new relation to God which is available to man by faith in Christ and His salvation.
Christ can be called God only in a figurative sense: His divinity exists in the unity of His will with God, in the perfect fellowship with God which He manifested in His obedience to God’s call. Christ’s suffering and death are simply the ultimate proof of this obedience. They are important for salvation only as examples of the obedience through which Christ can bring others into the same relationship with God the Father in which He stands (Unterricht in der christlichen Religion, 42). References to substitutionary or propitiatory suffering of punishment were rejected. According to Ritschl, God is love, period; wrath, revenge, or judgment are alien to His nature. Punishment and discipline are used only to educate man.
The task of theology, as Ritschl saw it, consists in bringing traditional Christianity into harmony with contemporary man’s “world consciousness.” Religion is not designed to explain the world, or to make theoretical, metaphysical judgments; it can only make value judgments. The goal is a “Christian philosophy,” which fully satisfies the demand for a perfect, moral and spiritual religion.
Ritschl set forth his system primarily in the huge work entitled Die christliche Lehre yon der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, I–III, 1870–74 (Vol. III includes the principle exposition). A brief summary can be found in his Unterricht in der christlichen Religion, 1875.
In his writings Ritschl gave expression to a sober, bourgeois form of religion, which was quite consistent with the cultural attitude of his day. In his rational and practical approach to religion he is strongly reminiscent of Socinianism and other similar forms of rationalism. While he underscored the ethical seriousness of Christianity, he reduced its content to a world view and an ethical system. The widespread influence which Ritschl’s ideas enjoyed can be explained not so much in terms of their depth and originality as by their ability to satisfy the general spirit of the times and to actualize the problems which then confronted theological thought.
Chief among Ritschl’s followers was Wilhelm Herrmann (d. 1922, professor in Marburg, influential also in Sweden), who deepened and completed Ritschl’s ideas in many respects. He drew a much sharper distinction between theology and metaphysics than Ritschl did. Herrmann asserted that statements of faith are judgments which are directly involved in the personal experience of God, and as a result they are on a different level than are all philosophical and metaphysical pronouncements. Religious and philosophical judgments were said to be incompatible. Herrmann concentrated the entire meaning of Christianity in the revelation of Jesus Christ. While Ritschl deduced the meaning of faith from out of this revelation in a more rational and dispassionate manner, Herrmann emphasized the personal experience of the Christ-figure as the basis of faith. Religious reality becomes transparent to man only after he has come to recognize his own impotence and guilt in the light of the ethical imperatives. The man who is serious about these ethical imperatives is inwardly “subdued” by the influence of the person of Jesus and is thereby brought to faith. The concept of a general revelation was repudiated. The connecting link between natural man and the Christian faith is ethical in nature. Herrmann’s best-known works are Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott (1886) and Ethik (1901).
The well-known historian of dogma Adolf von Harnack (d. 1930, professor in Berlin) must also be numbered among the followers of Ritschl. His theological contribution is considered in a subsequent section, under “The Theology of the Early 20th Century.”
English Theology in the 19th Century
Three factors above all dominated the development of English theology during the 19th century: the high-church Oxford Movement, the indigenous philosophical tradition (characterized by a synthesis between Platonism and Christianity), and the increasing influence of historical criticism.
The Oxford Movement was inspired by a group of theologians in Oxford. Among them was John Keble (1792–1866), whose famous sermon of 1833 on “the national apostasy” was sharply critical of the liberal parliamentary politics of that era, which involved itself in ecclesiastical matters and on the strength of a secularized ideal of the state threatened the independence of the church. This sermon is usually considered the Oxford Movement’s point of departure. Among its chief representatives (in addition to Keble) were Edward Pusey (1800–82) and John Henry Newman (1801–90). It was Newman who published the “Tracts for the Times” (beginning in 1833), in which the high-church program was developed, in part with a strong Romanist tendency.
Apostolic succession was set forth as being fundamental to the office of the ministry. The concept of the church and the sacraments was also developed in a manner consistent with the Roman pattern. In Tract No. 90 (published in 1841) Newman attempted to prove that the Thirty-nine Articles could be interpreted in such a way that they harmonized with the decisions of the Council of Trent. The original purpose of the Oxford Movement was to so emphasize the Catholic aspect of the Anglican Church that this communion would be revitalized as a result, but Newman and after him also other theologians interpreted this in such a way that they went over to the Church of Rome (Newman in 1845). The movement continued, however, and gradually became a more general Anglo-Catholic tendency, which has exerted a decisive influence on English church life and theology in modern times. Traditionalism is one of its characteristic features. Its theological program includes a return to the theology of the early church and to the classical Anglican theology of the 16th and 17th centuries. It is because of this, not least of all, that a study of the church fathers has come to have a central place in English theology. A comprehensive publishing program has also been carried through as a result of high-church initiative (cf. the “Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology,” 88 vols., 1841–66).
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834), poet and philosopher, also exerted an extensive influence on English theology, in spite of the fragmentary nature of his philosophical and theological works. Influenced by German Romanticism and idealism, as well as by the Platonizing tradition in England (the Cambridge Platonists of the 17th and 18th centuries), Coleridge opposed deism and created a synthesis between theology and philosophy. Religion for him was a spiritual, mystical reality, into which reason could penetrate ever more deeply by virtue of its participation in the divine nature. Coleridge seems to have oscillated between pantheism and a more orthodox position. On the basis of his reflections upon the distinction between philosophy and theology he expanded the horizons of theology and created an alternative to the negative attitude vis-à vis Christianity held by the deists and the utilitarians.
Under the influence of Coleridge and others Frederick Denison Maurice (1805–72) continued the Platonizing of English theology. His theological position was described as a “Christianized Platonism,” the center of which was formed by the combination of the divine and the highest in humanity, manifested in Christ, “the Son of God and the Son of Man.” This combination bases itself on the love of God and expresses itself in a similar way in the Logos which dwells in every man. This Logos is the source of a progressive revelation, which was brought to perfection in Christ. Maurice interpreted “eternity” (eternal life, eternal punishment) not in temporal but in qualitative categories; this aroused strong opposition, and Maurice lost his Oxford professorship as a result. Maurice represented a Christian idealism which did not deny the historical truth of Christianity but which appealed above all to the heart, to the highest in humanity.
It was the above-named S. T. Coleridge who more than anyone else introduced the historical criticism of the Bible into English theology (it had originated in Germany). He recommended that the Bible be studied as an ordinary book. At the outset such tendencies elicited opposition, both among high-churchmen and evangelicals, but the critical view gradually became entrenched. The new theories of evolution set forth by Charles Darwin (On the Origin of Species, 1859) and Herbert Spencer were not without significance in this regard, in spite of the fact that they met with strong resistance within theological circles for many years.
Liberal ideas were manifested in Essays and Reviews (1860), which championed the right of free research in the field of theology and upheld the demand for the historical criticism of the Bible. Even more important in this connection was the publication of the anthology entitled Lux mundi (1889). This did not emanate from liberal circles but was the decisive expression of the fact that even high-church Anglicans accepted historical criticism as an indispensable prerequisite in the study of theology. The stated purpose of this collection of essays was to “bring the Christian confession of faith into its proper relation to the modern development of our scientific, historical, and critical knowledge, and to modern problems in politics and ethics.”
The publisher of Lux mundi was Charles Gore (1853–1932), a representative of high-church Anglicanism who sought to combine its principles of authority with an acceptance of scientific norms in theology. Gore worked out his position in connection with a series of lectures on the Incarnation. It was due not least of all to his influence that Anglican theology has placed the Incarnation at its center. This is different from the evangelical point of view, for example, in which the Atonement is to be found at the center. Characteristic of Gore was his kenosis doctrine: Christ, he said, laid His divine attributes aside at the time of the Incarnation and subjected Himself to human limitations. There is a certain connection between this idea and Gore’s attempt to combine the divine authority of Scripture with a critical view of the Bible. As a result of Gore’s influence, the high-church tendency developed along new, more modernistic lines, and he became the leader of what has been referred to as liberal high churchliness. (Cf. R. Ekström, The Theology of Charles Gore, 1944.)
Roman Catholic Theology in the 19th Century
After a period of decline brought about by the Enlightenment, the Roman Catholic Church (like the Protestant Church) was awakened to a new interest in church and theology with the dawning of the 19th century. This interest was aroused and promoted among other things by the spirit of Romanticism. The medieval church, which was so severely criticized during the Enlightenment, was now looked upon with admiration and appreciation.
With respect to the renewal of Roman theology in the 19th century, the so-called Tübingen school made a pioneering contribution. Its foremost representative was Johann Adam Möhler (d. 1838), well-known among other things for his Symbolik, an incisive confrontation with Protestant theology. This school was above all interested in historical theology. Because of this, it also prepared the way for a new and deeper understanding of the patristic and medieval traditions.
The classical tradition of Roman Catholic doctrine has been based on a positive appreciation of rational knowledge as a prerequisite for the knowledge of faith. During the 19th century two tendencies appeared which represented a contrasting point of view. Traditionalism looked upon revelation and faith as the source not only of religious knowledge but also of natural knowledge (within metaphysics and morality). Ontologism, which was represented by Henri Maret (d. 1884) and others, and which found its prototype in the Augustinian tradition, assumed that there is an intuitive knowledge of God which forms the basis of all knowledge of truth. Both of these positions were rejected by official decree, the former in 1840 and 1855 and the latter in 1861.
The question of reason and revelation was answered in a completely different way by the school of thought which became dominant in the middle of the 19th century—neoscholasticism, also known as Neo-Thomism. As a result of the influence of a number of Italian and French theologians—as well as of the Tübingen school in Germany and the outstanding German theologian Joseph Kleutgen (d. 1893)—medieval scholasticism became the center of interest not only within historical theology but also in the field of dogmatics. Confirmation of the dominating position which this tendency enjoyed can be found in Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879), in which the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is enjoined as a basic study for higher education within the church. Thus it is in modern Roman Catholic theology that this medieval theologian stands out as the teacher of the church par excellence. It is prescribed in the church’s canon law (Codex iuris canonici, can. 1366) that study and instruction in both philosophy and theology at Catholic educational institutions must be consistent with the ideas and principles of Thomas Aquinas.
The writings of Matthias Joseph Scheeben (d. 1888), who was probably the major Roman Catholic dogmatician of the 19th century, also testify to the importance then accorded to the classical tradition, both the church fathers and medieval scholasticism. Scheeben based his dogmatics on these sources and sought in an independent and profound analysis to breathe new life into the inheritance received from this older tradition. Scheeben gave particular emphasis to the distinction between Christian faith and that which is merely rational or natural. It was in this connection that he coined the expression “supernature,” by which he referred to that in Christian doctrine which is transcendental and inaccessible to reason (Die Mysterien des Christentums, 1865 [trans. Cyril Vollert, Mysteries of Christianity; St. Louis: Herder, 1946]).
In the bull Ineffabilis Deus (1854) Plus IX proclaimed the dogma of “the Virgin Mary’s immaculate conception,” i.e., the dogma which teaches that Mary, through a special privilege, was preserved from the taint of original sin. This declaration, which was a concession to the popular adoration of Mary, brought to light a new concept of the nature of dogmatic pronouncements, since the otherwise self-evident demand for a Biblical or apostolic basis was set aside. This proclamation of a new dogma presupposed that the highest official in the church has the power to authorize new dogmas that are binding on the church. At the First Vatican Council (1869–70), which the Church of Rome reckons to be the Twentieth Ecumenical Council, this teaching was confirmed and proclaimed in the dogma of papal infallibility: When the pope speaks in his office and defines a teaching concerning faith or morals which is valid for the entire church, he possesses the infallibility which the Savior promised to His church.
In the “Syllabus of Errors,” published in 1864, Pins IX condemned such modern phenomena as pantheism and rationalism, socialism and indifferentism, as well as the critical and agnostic philosophies. Similar judgments were expressed upon various facets of the modern point of view on several occasions. This development continued and intensified during the long and (as seen from the point of view of dogmatics) fateful struggle against modernism at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of this century. Modernism was a widespread movement, whose representatives sought in a variety of ways to combine the Roman Catholic faith with modern culture. In doing so, they advocated historical criticism with regard to the Bible, turned against the dominant scholastic influence in the field of philosophy, and sought to introduce a modern philosophical point of view. One of the centers in which these new ideas were nurtured was the Institute Catholique in Paris, where Alfred Loisy (d. 1040) worked for a time as a teacher and carried on a program of critical Biblical research. In an encyclical Providentissimus Deus (1893) Leo XIII indeed underlined the importance of erudition in the study of the Bible, but he warned against the critical view of history which Loisy defended. Loisy was relieved of his office, but he continued to plead modernism’s name, as for example in his little book L’evangile et l’eglise (1903), in which he attacked A. von Harnack’s Das Wesen des Christentums (see below). Loisy defended the cultus and dogmas of the church against Harnack but indicated at the same time that these could not be traced back to the Gospel; they are a later creation, he said, expressive of a necessary development within the congregation which resulted from the unfulfilled parousia. Loisy’s book was placed on the index, and he was excommunicated in 1908.
The climax of the church’s struggle with modernism was reached with the publication of Pius X’s bull Pascendi Dominici gregis (1907), in which the pope exposed the many different tendencies and concepts in the movement to an incisive analysis and declared them to be heretical. In the same spirit it was decided in 1910 that all priests and teachers should register a confession of the Catholic faith with its repudiation of the false teachings of modernism (the antimodernist oath).
In spite of the original rejection of Biblical criticism, the scientific approach to the Bible has gained ground in Roman Catholic circles just as it has within other communions. The bull Providentissimus Deus (1893) recommended the scientific treatment of the Bible within certain limits. Fifty years later the comparable encyclical Divine afflante Spiritu (1948) made far-reaching concessions to scientific, critical views. A few years later, however, the bull Humani generis (1950) sharply rejected the new form of modernism which, it was felt, threatened the Catholic faith.
The Roman Catholic concept of tradition, like the attitude toward Biblical criticism, has undergone obvious changes in recent years. This development can be traced back into the previous century. In post-Tridentine theology, tradition was understood to be a source of revelation parallel to the Scriptures, different from and yet supplementary to the apostolic testimony which was written down in the Bible. But the intensified contact with the theology of the early church and of the Middle Ages during the 19th century led to a fresh interpretation of the meaning of tradition. The pioneers in this matter were the above-named J. A. Möhler and M. J. Scheeben, together with Cardinal Newman. These men looked upon Scripture and tradition as an organic unity and understood the latter to be a dynamic factor which includes the entire teaching office of the church. Scripture, too, is tradition as seen from a certain point of view. It was emphasized that Scripture could not be interpreted without tradition, but tradition was no longer looked upon as a new source of revelation at the side of Scripture; it was now being thought of as a continuous development of revelation. This new attitude toward tradition has not yet resulted in any official doctrinal decisions, but it does provide an important presupposition for theological discussion in our day, not least for confrontation with the position of the evangelical churches.
Revival Movements in the 19th Century
Extensive revival movements developed during the last half of the 19th century, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world but also in the Scandinavian countries. The task of describing the development of these movements and their leading personalities properly belongs to the sphere of the church historian. In the present context we shall content ourselves with a survey of a number of the basic ideological aspects of the revival movements.
When speaking of revival movements in the broad sense of the term, it would be possible to include such phenomena as Grundtvigianism in Denmark and the Oxford Movement in England. As a general rule, however, the term has a more limited connotation. But even among the more typical “awakenings” there is a marked difference between those that developed out of a free-church matrix (which we shall investigate with care in this study) and the awakenings which took place strictly within the church—those that emerged from within the context of existing ecclesiastical organizations and which took shape while remaining loyal to their rules and regulations.
Among the various churchly awakenings of this period were Schartauism in Sweden (Henrik Schartau, associate pastor in Lund, d. 1825); Haugeism in Norway (Hans Nielsen Hauge, lay preacher, d. 1824); Die Erweckung in Germany (see above, pp. 373–74); and also a number of other Lutheran revivals in Finland and Sweden, with such leaders as Paavo Ruotsalainen (d. 1852), Fredrik Gabriel Hedberg (d. 1893), and Lars Levi Laestadius (d. 1861).
An intermediate position between the earlier Pietist awakening and the free-church movement of the 19th century was assumed by the so-called “new evangelical” movement within the church. In Sweden this was associated with the name of Carl Ol of Rosenius (lay preacher; author; editor of The Pietist, 1842–68; d. 1868). Rosenius’ preaching was influenced above all by Luther, but he was also conditioned by the Pietism within the Church of Sweden and by Herrnhutism, which had a strong foothold in the village in northern Sweden where he grew up. But in addition to this, Rosenius was also under the influence of contemporary Methodist and Reformed preaching. And in spite of his repudiation of separatism he thereby formed an ideological connecting link between certain facets of churchly revivalism and the free-church movements which we shall now proceed to describe.
The Baptist movement, which in the previous century burgeoned forth even in Lutheran territory, can be traced to the Baptist Church in England and America. The Anabaptists of the Reformation era and the Mennonites of Holland were the original precursors. (The Mennonites were named for Menno Simons, a Dutch priest of the 16th century.)
Another branch of the 19th-century awakening developed under the influence of English Methodism and was supported by men from that group. New Methodist church bodies came into being as a result—e.g., in the Scandinavian countries.
The widespread American revival of the 19th century had a direct antecedent in the “Great Awakening” which began in 1734, led by the prominent theologian and preacher Jonathan Edwards (Congregationalist, d. 1758). Among the principal leaders of the 19th-century revival were Charles Grandison Finney (active in Great Britain as well as in America, d. 1875), and another American preacher who was much like him, Dwight Lyman Moody (d. 1899). Moody and his Methodist song leader, Ira David Sankey (d. 1908), also visited Great Britain a number of times and promoted huge revival campaigns there. The energetic Baptist preacher Charles Haddon Spurgeon (d. 1892), whose base of operations was the Metropolitan Tabernacle in London, also exerted a powerful influence on the revival movement, far beyond the confines of his own church group.
In the North the first Baptist congregations were organized in the middle of the 19th century (Denmark, 1839; Sweden, 1848; Finland, 1856; Norway, 1860). And even though the Methodist persuasion had had sympathizers and adherents in Scandinavia before this, the first Methodist congregations were not formed until somewhat later (Norway, 1856; Denmark, 1859; Sweden, 1868; Finland, 1884). Of great significance for this development was the 12 years which Methodist minister George Scott spent in Stockholm as a preacher (1830–42). C. O. Rosenius was deeply influenced by Scott and found in him an example for his own preaching.
The Swedish Mission Covenant (founded in 1878), which was intended from the outset to be a missionary society, actually developed into a free-church denomination of the Congregationalist type. Its doctrinal position was determined for the most part by Paul Peter Waldenström (d. 1917), who was its foremost leader for many years.
As far as outlook and structure are concerned, the free-church revival movements referred to above displayed a large number of common characteristics. The unique nature of the theology of revival can probably be best seen if one undertakes to study what the revivalists taught concerning (1) regeneration and sanctification, (2) the church and its organization, and (3) the sacraments.
1. In its doctrine of justification, Methodism (as previously indicated) was indebted above all to Lutheranism. As a result, it defined justification as the forgiveness of sins and as the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. In other denominations, however, justification was as a rule equated with regeneration and was therefore described as an obvious change in a person’s attitude. “Justification” must mean that a man actually is “made just,” and this was presumed to require an inner transformation.
In the early 1870s the previously mentioned Waldenström set forth the idea that the Atonement, in its New Testament sense, could not involve the propitiation of the Father by the Son, inasmuch as God is the fullness of unchangeable love. Instead, said Waldenström, “atonement” (or “reconciliation”) refers to a change of mind in man. This point of view, which represented a sharp break with the traditional doctrine of the Atonement, elicited a stormy debate during the ensuing years. Over against Waldenström’s concept of the Atonement, with its emphasis on man’s moral transformation (“subjective” atonement), stood the current ecclesiastical position that God’s righteous wrath over man’s sin had been averted by Christ’s sacrifice (“objective” atonement). Waldenström based his doctrine of the atonement on certain patterns of speech which he noted in the New Testament—“it is written” was the argument to which he constantly reverted—but his ideas were also in harmony with the powerful liberal tradition of the 19th century; they were the result of the rational and moralizing interpretation of Christianity which he represented.
Ongoing growth in holiness (or sanctification), conceived of as the continuation of regeneration (the transformation which is the result of justification), is the one point which is most frequently stressed in the theology and preaching of revivalism. The Christian is obligated to live in a manner consistent with Christ’s new law, which is looked upon not only as an explanation and reiteration of the law given at the time of creation, or of the universally valid law incorporated in the Ten Commandments, but as a superior ethical order which can be followed only by the faithful. Sanctification is based on justification by faith, but it is also, in turn, the presupposition for achieving salvation, just as it is also the prerequisite of continued membership in a Christian congregation.
2. As is true of the doctrine of sanctification, the free-church revival movements also possess, in certain respects at least, a uniform position with respect to the church and its functions: The church is a tangible fellowship of believers. Only those who have declared their faith and their willingness to live in holiness are accepted as members of such congregations.
The external organization of the church can, on the other hand, be varied. Methodism has a definite order for the reception of members, and it also forms an international church body with a strictly regulated organization.
But other revivalist groups, such as the Baptists and the Swedish Mission Covenant, are in principle congregationalist, which is to say that they proceed on the assumption that every local congregation is independent and represents the church of Christ. All believers are welcome in such congregations, but all unbelievers ought to be excluded. And just as the individual members are to live in holiness, struggling against the flesh with the help of the Holy Spirit, so too should the congregation grow in holiness and by strict church discipline exclude those who live in unbelief or who openly break the rules of the congregation.
3. As far as the sacraments axe concerned, divergent opinions and practices have developed.
The Baptists see Baptism as only a symbolic act whereby the Christian confesses his faith and is received into the congregation. The demand for adult Baptism resulted from this concept. The significance attached to Baptism varies from one Baptist group to another, but neither Baptism nor the Lord’s Supper is thought of as a means of grace by which forgiveness of sin is mediated.
This Reformed point of view can also be discerned in other freechurch revival groups. Waldenström, on the other hand, took a position which was distinctly at variance with the Baptist, symbolic concept of the sacraments. In spite of this, however, a variety of opinions and practices has prevailed within the Swedish Mission Covenant.
The observer on the modem scene can see that many shifts have taken place with respect to doctrinal presuppositions and that the differences between the large denominations and the free churches are not as sharply drawn as they once were. This can be explained in some instances by a leveling down of doctrine, but there are other reasons too. There is on both sides an ongoing attempt to give a simpler and more factual explanation of the fundamentals of the Christian faith. Because of this the old controversies have become obsolescent. Ecumenical dialog between the established churches and the free churches is one of the contemporary results. The discussions in England between the Methodist Church and the Anglican Church, which are directed toward complete unity within the near future, are perhaps the foremost example of this activity.
Friedrich Schleiermacher (d. 1834, professor in Berlin from 1810) was educated in a Moravian milieu, but he broke with the Herrnhut faith when he was 19. In his earlier writings, above all in the famous Reden über die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, 1800 (trans. John Oman, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers; New York: Harper Torchbook, 1958) he associated himself with Romanticism and gave expression to its newly awakened feeling for the religious.
One of Schleiermacher’s greatest contributions to the history of theology was his attempt to describe the uniqueness of religion as a function of the human soul. In opposition to rationalism, he asserted in his Reden that religion does not consist of intellectual or moralistic elements; it rather refers to an independent area in the life of the spirit. Religion is not knowing or doing, but “the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things within the infinite and through the infinite, of all temporal things within the eternal and through the eternal” (das unmittelbare Bewusstsein von dem allgemeihen Sein alles Endlichen im Unendlichen und durch das Unendliche, alles Zeitlichen im Ewigen und durch das Ewige). He defined religion in the Reden as “intuition of the universe.” In this immediate consciousness of oneness with all that is, man experiences the divine. The idea of God therefore coincides with a feeling of universal unity and identity with the infinite. This feeling was assumed to be inherent in the soul of man.
In Der Christliche Glaube, 1820–22 (trans. Christian Faith; New York: Harper Torchbooks 108 and 109) Schleiermacher’s major work in the field of dogmatics, religion was defined as “the feeling of absolute dependence” (das schlechthinige Abhäaingigkeitsgefühl). The word “feeling” (Gefühl) was not used in the ordinary sense in this context, but to refer to something which is a part of the immediate self-consciousness. Man senses that he is absolutely dependent on the infinite. Therein lies religion—and it is this feeling of dependence which characterizes man as spirit.
It would be erroneous to think of this concept of religion as being purely subjective. Schleiermacher rather sought, in this context, to put an end to the contrast between subjective and objective: that which is ultimately human coincides with the divine or the infinite. In his innermost being and immediate self-consciousness, man experiences himself as being identical with the all. The objective and the subjective merge into one.
It can also be said of this concept of religion, on the other hand, that it abolishes all dualism: God and the world are thought of, in the final analysis, as identical. There was a pantheistic strain in Schleiermacher, particularly in the Reden. Evil cannot be conceived of as something hostile to God. The idea of a devil or of evil spirits was rejected. The spirit is supreme in man and cannot be thought of as something evil. Schleiermacher’s point of view was, therefore, monistic.
Christianity was to Schleiermacher the highest if not the only expression of this religious consciousness. According to a definition provided in Der Christliche Glaube, Christianity is “a monotheistic form of piety of a teleological variety, in which all refers to the salvation brought to completion through Jesus of Nazareth” (11). In this context, salvation denotes that devout self-consciousness (the feeling of absolute dependence) has been realized. There was therefore a direct connection between Schleiermacher’s general concept of religion and his understanding of the essence of Christianity.
This does not mean, however, as some have thought, that the entire Christian doctrine of faith can be deduced from this feeling of absolute dependence. The doctrine of faith is not based solely on universal principles. According to Schleiermacher, Christian dogma has both a historical and a speculative element. Theology presupposes an empirically discernible fellowship of faith, which is called the Christian church, and it is the function of dogmatics to describe the doctrine of faith as found in the church at a given point in time. Therefore the field of dogmatics is also included in historical theology. In his own dogmatics, Der Christlische Glaube, Schleiermacher intended to set forth the faith as it was then found in the evangelical church. The speculative element in dogmatic theology is found in this, that the claims of faith constantly lead back to the feeling of absolute dependence and therefore to the concept of religion which is derived from universal rational science (or “ethics,” in Schleiermacher’s usage).
The claims of faith do not represent objective knowledge; they are, rather, expressions of devout self-consciousness. They do not describe the object of faith; they describe the personal function of faith. The Christian articles of faith are legitimized by the fact that they correspond to the devout Christian consciousness of faith, or to the Christian’s inner experience (61, 1). The task of dogmatics is not to set forth the claims of faith but merely to give historical expression to the concept of faith as it is actually to be found within the church as a whole or within a certain branch of the church.
On the basis of these principles, Schleiermacher built up a uniform system, which included the various branches of theology and religion. Ethics is the speculative exposition of rational science which parallels natural science. Within ethics we find the universal definition of the concept of religion. The concrete description of the religions of mankind is provided in the philosophy of religion. Theology, the science which is required for the guidance of the church, is divided into philosophical, practical, and historical theology. The first of these (which, in turn, is divided into apologetics and polemics) is designed to present the essence and uniqueness of Christianity. Dogmatics, which is included in historical theology, describes the Christian faith as it appears at a given time or in a certain church body.
In Der Christliche Glaube (1820–22, 2d ed. 1830), we find Schleiermacher’s own presentation of evangelical doctrine. The characteristic ideas of this book, which was epoch-making in its time, must be looked at here at several points:
1. In the doctrine of God, Schleiermacher generally concurred in the philosophic assumptions. The consciousness of God is involved in devout self-consciousness. To sense that one is absolutely dependent is the same as to be conscious of standing in relation to God (4). In this immediate self-consciousness the being of God coincides with man’s own being. The question of the existence of God becomes irrelevant. Dogmatics need only consider the consciousness of God, which coincides with devout self-consciousness.
The doctrines of creation and preservation are treated in a corresponding manner as expressions which show that God and the natural context are one. The world is absolutely dependent on God. This is implicit in the idea of creation, which therefore does not refer to an event in time. The doctrine of providence expresses the consciousness that man’s dependence on nature coincides with his dependence on God. The concept of divine intervention, of miracles or of revelation in the true sense of the term, was rejected. As already indicated in another context, this view of creation cannot be combined with the idea of an evil spiritual power. As a result, no reality or influence can be ascribed to the devil.
2. The Christian teaching of sin similarly caused some trouble for Schleiermacher. Sin is related to the feeling of mental discomfort which is always present in the devout consciousness of God, since this is impeded by sensuality. Sin can be described, therefore, as the flesh in opposition to the spirit; it is this struggle which hampers the consciousness of God. On the other hand, the idea that sin is a transgression of God’s law was rejected. Schleiermacher did not put sin into the field of the will but into that of the pious feelings. One cannot speak of a fall or say that sin originated in a voluntary act. Sin was thought of as being in man originally. It is implicit in the fact that the sense of dependence is not yet complete. The concept of original sin was repudiated as inadequate. Schleiermacher thought of original sin in terms of humanity’s common and original sinfulness or inability to do what is good.
The concept of sin lost its ethical character in Schleiermacher’s theology. He thought of sin not only as something evil but as something included in the consciousness of God—the necessary presupposition for the need of salvation and thereby also for the development of a superior consciousness of God. The consciousness of sin is a lower stage in the development of the good. The contrast between God and sin is eliminated. Schleiermacher assumed it to be part of God’s own order that the consciousness of sin must precede salvation. Sin is undeveloped nature. It is not contrary to creation; it is a part of it. Schleiermacher’s idea of sin represents an attempt to harmonize the Christian concept with the monistic view of the world from which he proceeded.
3. Schleiermacher described salvation as the transition to a superior consciousness of God, unhampered by sensuality, which can be realized in the Christian congregation through faith in Jesus Christ. Jesus had a perfect consciousness of God, the power and blessedness of which He imparts to human nature. Christ is the second Adam, the prototype of the new humanity. His unimpaired consciousness of God denotes the fulfillment of creation. From the very beginning, human nature has been inclined toward this unity with God, but it could not be realized because of the presence of sin in man. The influence exerted upon man by the person of Christ is of the same kind as other spiritual power. One cannot therefore speak of atonement in the proper sense of the term. (Schleiermacher did use the word Versöhnung, but with an entirely different meaning; it refperred particularly to the blessedness conferred by Christ). Christ's work—or His suffering, death, and resurrection—has no bearing on salvation, but only His person, which represents the perfect consciousness of God. Neither was forgiveness of sin looked upon as the substance of salvation; the only thing that matters is the transformation of man with the subsequent improvement of his religious feelings. No significance can be ascribed to Christ’s suffering on the cross in this context. The Passion story serves only as an exemplary illustration of perseverance in suffering. Schleiermacher looked upon the Resurrection as resuscitation from an apparent death, and he referred to the Ascension as Christ’s actual death. Salvation refers only to “God being in Christ” (das Sein Gottes in Christo) and to the posthumous impact of His person—not to Christ’s death and resurrection.
4. In Schleiermacher’s Christology we find a projection of his general concept of God-man relationships. The unity of the divine and the human received its perfect expression in the person of Christ. The person of Christ certainly denotes an improvement over humanity as it was prior to His coming, but at the same time He only represents the highest development of that which is human. Creation and salvation axe only separate stages in one and the same natural process. Schleiermacher did not recognize any history of salvation. His reinterpretation of the Gospel of Christ’s death and resurrection has already been touched upon. In this transformation of Christology into a philosophy-of-religion concept, Schleiermacher’s theology reminds us of Gnosticism. His neglect of Christ’s death and resurrection is, for example, something he had in common with the Gnostics.
The same unity of the divine and the human which we see in a person in Christ can also be found in a fellowship, in the church. The church is the direct continuation of Christ’s appearance; it represents the new humanity, for which Christ is the prototype. Schleiermacher did not, however, accept the idea of Christ’s dominion over the world. Man is related to Christ only in his own inner life and in the fellowship of the church.
5. The doctrine of the Trinity was not emphasized by Schleiermacher as it was by Hegel (see below). The former did not feel that this doctrine gave any direct expression to the devout self-consciousness of the Christian. Schleiermacher recommended a radical alteration of the doctrine of the Trinity as taught by the church. He identified himself most intimately with the Sabellian point of view (see above, pp. 71–72). God is one indivisible substance. The Son and the Spirit are merely forms of revelation for this substance. The Holy Spirit is identified with the public spirit which animates the fellowship of believers.
6. The eschatological statements do not apply to devout self-consciousness any more than the doctrine of the Trinity, inasmuch as they refer to a future event. Schleiermacher did mention them at the end of Der Christliche Glaube, however; he called them “prophetic teachings.” The idea of eternal damnation was repudiated as being inconsistent with Christian feelings. Schleiermacher rather accepted and proclaimed the teaching of universal restoration, accomplished in the power of salvation. This opinion was most consistent with his naturalistic reinterpretation of the history of salvation and his monistic world view.
7. Der Christliche Glaube has strikingly little connection with the Scriptures. This was justified on principle: it was Schleiermacher’s intention to describe faith as it occurs in religious experience, and in this endeavor the Scriptures are allowed to speak only when they express the same consciousness of faith.
According to Schleiermacher, only the New Testament is normative. The Old Testament is found in the canon only because of its historical connection with the New Testament. But it does not serve to express the Christian spirit, and it therefore lacks proper doctrinal authority.
The New Testament was certainly thought of as normative, but Schleiermacher searched its contents above all to find material that coincided with the devout consciousness of the Christian. The true doctrine is that which succeeds in maintaining itself through development. It has been said that Schleiermacher replaced the principle of Scripture with an “evolutionary principle of tradition.” The consciousness of faith existing in the church is the final authority. The Bible is placed on the same level with the Christian tradition, although it enjoys chronological priority and actually contains the most significant description of religious experience.
The authority of Scripture cannot serve as the basis for faith; it rather assumes that faith is already present. The idea of Scripture’s self-evidence or of the ability of the Word to create faith was eliminated.
Revelation, in this context, was synonymous with devout self-consciousness, which denotes God’s presence in man.
The general concept of religion was therefore placed above the Scriptures and the Word. The use of Scriptural proof in dogmatics is justified only if this intimates that a certain doctrinal proposition stands out as a legitimate expression of Christian piety.
Schleiermacher’s theological system represents a thorough transformation of traditional dogmatics. It was an attempt to lay a new foundation for the science of theology. As a result of Schleiermacher’s efforts, theology came to be looked upon as a science, on the same level as the secular branches of learning. Dogmatics became a historically descriptive exposition of devout Christian self-consciousness. In opposition to rationalism and supernaturalism, religion was depicted as a distinct sphere at the side of the intellectual and moral spheres. Theological statements, as expressions of religious feelings, have their own unique character.
But even though Schleiermacher brought theology to a place of eminence in contemporary culture and discovered new ways of solving its scholarly problems, his system of doctrine—as judged purely on the basis of content—was essentially alien to the evangelical doctrine of faith. His dogmatics, based as it was on the theory of immediate self-consciousness as the foundation of religion, in reality led to a gnostic, monistic system, whose connection with historic Christianity did not prevent the reinterpretation and distortion of essential elements in the Christian faith.
Even though Schleiermacher had few personal disciples, the significance of his theology has been exceedingly widespread, not only in the 19th century (when a number of theological schools were influenced by him to a greater or lesser degree) but in our own century as well.
A thorough but sometimes misleading critique of Schleiermacher’s position has come from the ranks of the dialectical theologians (Barth, Brunner), who have attempted to break with the entire tradition of which he was the originator and chief representative.
Hegel and Speculative Theology
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (d. 1831, professor in Berlin from 1818), German idealism’s most influential philosopher, played a significant role also in the history of theology by virtue of his religious and philosophical principles and his extensive impact on 19th-century theology and historical research.
Hegel came out against Schleiermacher and the Romantics, for whom religion manifested itself in immediate intuition and in a sense of the absolute. According to Hegel, religion (like the life of the mind in general) appears above all in the form of man’s thoughts or concepts. Feeling is the lowest expression of consciousness, while thought—that which distinguishes man from the animals—is the highest. “If God reveals Himself to man, He does so essentially for man as a thinking being … animals do not have any religion.” Hegel’s system provided room for the scholarly and speculative aspects of theology. The difference between him and Schleiermacher can be accounted for in part on the basis of their diverse religious backgrounds: for whereas the latter came out of the Herrnhut milieu, Hegel was brought up in an “old Protestant” environment (in Swabia).
For Hegel, concept or scientific thought coincided with reality. Truth is to be found in the system which gives expression to those thoughts which, having been contemplated, become conscious of themselves. This is also called Der Geist—the spirit. The spirit is the absolute, the only reality.
The ideal reality, according to Hegel, is not a static form-world as in Platonic idealism, but one which also includes spatial reality and historical development. It was characteristic of Hegel to insert historical development into his system—and this was probably his foremost philosophical contribution. He combined philosophical speculation with a profound understanding of historical reality.
The absolute, the true reality, and fully developed knowledge always include a progression which Hegel assumed to be of a dialectical, logical variety, at the same time that he also understood it to be a historical change. Hence it was that Hegel based his system on the so-called dialectical method: every concept points beyond itself to another, opposite concept; the opposition is resolved in a higher unity. This progression (from thesis to antithesis to synthesis) forms the pattern for the development of ideas as well as for the course of history. It also provides the basis for the universal system in which Hegel sought to summarize both knowledge and reality.
The absolute appears as pure conception. It is this which constitutes logic, the first part of philosophy. But the absolute is transformed into its opposite, das Anderssein—the individual, the particular, the “thingish.” This aspect of knowledge is treated under the heading of natural philosophy. Finally, the absolute reverts to a consciousness of itself and becomes spirit. The philosophy of the spirit is divided into the doctrine of the subjective spirit (anthropology; phenomenology, i.e., the teaching of the development of consciousness and knowledge; psychology), of the objective spirit (morality, law, politics), and of the absolute spirit (art, religion, and philosophy).
There is complete harmony between religion and philosophy in the Hegelian system. Both have the same object, the absolute. Christianity is the final stage in the development of religion. Its counterpart in the field of philosophy is the Hegelian system (according to Hegel).
Hegel presented Christianity as the absolute religion. He felt that the dialectical method was to be found in the doctrine of the Trinity. Divinity has developed in three stages. God is in His eternal idea (the Father’s kingdom), He reveals Himself in finitude, in consciousness, and in action (the Son’s kingdom), and then reverts to Himself in unity with the finite in the congregation (the Spirit’s kingdom).
Hegel’s influence extended far beyond those who called themselves “Hegelians.” His dialectical method has, for example, exerted a strong influence on the writing of both sacred and secular history and has also contributed new ideas to the presentation of the history of dogma.
During Hegel’s lifetime there were those who looked upon his system as the ultimate solution of theological problems. It was thought that the entire field of theology might be reconciled to the most advanced education of that day on the basis of this system. Christian teachings were inserted into the Hegelian framework. Revelation was placed on the same level with the absolute spirit, with speculative knowledge—which was looked upon at the same time as God’s own knowledge and the human spirit’s knowledge of the absolute.
Among the representatives of this orthodox Hegelianism (commonly referred to as “speculative theology”) were Karl Daub (d. 1836, professor in Heidelberg) and Philipp Konrad Marheineke (d. 1846, professor in Berlin.) The latter was critical of Schleiermacher, whose description of religion he considered one-sided. To the Hegelians, religion was not merely life and feeling but, above all, knowledge of the truth. Hegelian philosophy was looked upon as the scientific form for the presentation of the Christian faith.
Hegelianism, however, also gave rise to a tendency which drew conclusions entirely different from Hegel’s. This was the so-called Hegelian “left,” represented (among others) by David Friedrich Strauss (d. 1874), who, in his Das Leben Jesu (1835 f.), set forth the Gospel message as a myth. At the center of religious faith he replaced the person of Christ with “the idea of humanity.” Strauss felt that Christological statements ought to be referred to this collective concept, in view of the fact that the historical Jesus was only an ordinary man, a teacher of morality and religion.
Another member of the Hegelian “left” was the philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (d. 1872). His concept of religion as a factor in human life devolved into a specific denial of the existence of God. God, said he, is merely the sum and substance of human qualities, and faith in God is the result of man’s wishful thinking.
Restoration Theology
In the 1830s and 1840s a process of change began, the effects of which are felt even in our own time. The golden age of Romanticism and German idealism had ended by then. New ideologies burgeoned forth, socialism and materialism, which took an entirely different position vis-à-vis religion. As a result of their influence the rationalistic interpretation of Christianity increased once again.
At the same time the economic and political alteration of society was taking place—a transformation designated by the terms industrialism and liberalism. The patriarchal order began to dissolve, and the modem welfare state came into being with both new political ideals and greatly altered social conditions.
No less extensive were the changes made in the scientific (scholarly) field. Modem natural science, the exact writing of history, the division of universal education as a result of strict specialization, the advance of technology—these are some of the phenomena which characterize the epoch which began at this time. This epoch confronted theology with the task of solving—under new conditions—the question of Christianity and culture, of science and religion, a task which has scarcely been taken care of satisfactorily even in our own day.
Many solutions were attempted in the period of time with which we are now chiefly concerned. It was characteristic of these attempts that they either reached back to the older tradition, in order thus to preserve church doctrine intact (restoration theology), or else they subjected themselves entirely to the spirit of the age and thereby surrendered certain fundamental aspects of the Christian faith (“free” or “liberal” theology). The kind of synthesis between Christianity and culture which we find in Hegel and Schleiermacher could no longer be reached. Uniformity in theology and church life was lost, as was the uniformity of cultural life in general.
Die Erweckung (“the Awakening”), the revival movement which was already developing at the beginning of the century, can be classified with restoration theology—i.e., the tendencies to attain theological goals primarily by turning back to the older, prerationalistic tradition. Die Erweckung was an heir of the older Pietism, above all in its Württemberg form, but it was also related to the newly awakened religious interest of Romanticism and German idealism. Its proponents were pleased to claim Luther as a patron (the Reformation jubilee of 1817 served to actualize Reformation ideas), but no importance was attached to the difference between Lutheran and Reformed theology. The influence of the Awakening upon church life in general was of more significance than the contributions it made to systematic theology. This movement was more interested in historical theology and Biblical erudition than it was in dogmatics.
The major spokesmen for what was called “repristination theology” were Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg (d. 1869) and Friedrich Adolf Philippi (d. 1882; Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 1854–79, in six volumes). This school was concerned about the resuscitation of old Protestant theology, which was considered an adequate (and for the evangelical church the normative) interpretation of the Bible and the confessions. The application of modem science to theology was rejected, as well as the idealistic transformation of Christianity. Repristination theology exerted a great influence on church life, and its attempts to make the older tradition vital and living were in many respects fruitful both for the contemporary church and theology. Its achievements were limited, however, by its lack of attention to Luther’s theology and also by reason of the fact that its leaders seemed to ignore the difference between the intellectual assumptions of the old Protestant period and of the 19th century. They instinctively accepted the world view of their own age and thereby fell into contradictions. A genuine repristination proved to be impossible. The older Lutheran position was denied at several points. The distinction between Lutheranism and Calvinism was considered unimportant. Hengstenberg therefore championed the cause of unionism. But as a result of its strong opposition to Pietism and the Enlightenment, as well as to Schleiermacher and idealism, repristination theology did assist in keeping the older Lutheran tradition alive during the 19th century. It should also be mentioned that Hengstenberg tried to restore the Old Testament to its place in the life of the church. Heinrich Schmid’s widely used summary of old Lutheran theology, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, 1843 (trans. Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs, Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church; Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House), is another example of the efforts put forth by the repristination theologians.
“New Lutheranism” was similar to repristination theology, but it is usually referred to as a separate tendency. It too was strongly confessional and sharply opposed to the spirit of the new age. The new Lutherans rejected the dominant subjective interpretation of religion and sought for a palpable, objective reality which could guarantee Christianity’s truth and its continued existence. This objective foundation was found, not in the Word and in faith as in the older Protestantism, but in the church, which was looked upon as an “institution” through which the gifts of salvation are bestowed upon man generation after generation.
Friedrich Julius Stahl (d. 1861), a lawyer, provided the legal basis for this new concept of the church. In his view church and state are divinely established institutions into which the individual is placed and to whose authority he is obligated to subject himself. Among the theologians and churchmen who interpreted and sought to give practical application to high-church ideas concerning the church, the clerical office, and the confessions were Theodor Kliefoth (d. 1895; Acht Bücher von der Kirche, 1854), Wilhelm Löhe (d. 1872, founder of the institutions at Neuendettelsau), and August Friedrich Christian Vilmar (d. 1868). The sacraments were strongly emphasized as the church’s objective foundation, partly at the expense of the doctrine of the Word and of faith.
With respect to the church question, and other facets of Christian life, the intention was to revitalize what was considered the original Lutheran position (hence the name, “new Lutheranism”) and not simply to go back to orthodoxy, as the repristination theologians did. The new Lutherans were strongly opposed to the Reformed tradition, as well as to the burgeoning free-church tendency. Furthermore, they emphasized the unity of the visible and the invisible church (the objective institution and the spiritual fellowship of the true believers) and criticized the Pietists for distinguishing between the two. In doing this they gave expression to a Lutheran idea. In the development of their ecclesiology, however, the new Lutherans accepted to some extent ideas which were not characteristic of original Lutheranism. The church and the sacraments were looked upon as institutional ordinances, to a certain degree independent of the Word.
The conservative tendency also brought with it a renewed demand to base theology on the Bible. A unique form of Biblical theology was created by Johann Tobias Beck (d. 1878, professor in Tübingen). He combined the older Württemberg tradition of Bengel and Oetinger with a strong infusion of idealistic philosophy. Beck’s theology was distinguished by a marked speculative tendency. The content of the Bible was thought of as a divine conceptual system, uniform in nature, which brings to us the living power of the Holy Spirit and the supernatural realities of the kingdom of God. This Beckian Biblicism has exerted a great influence, in Finland for example.
In Sweden a position closely related to German new Lutheranism was developed by a group of Lundensian theologians, including Ebbe Gustaf Bring (d. 1884), Wilhelm Flensburg (d. 1897), and Anton Niklas Sundberg (d. 1900). Their sounding board was a journal called Svensk Kyrkotidning (“Swedish Church News”), published from 1855 to 1863.
The Grundtvig movement in Denmark, which was of great significance for both church and culture, can also be included under “restoration” tendencies, even though it was unique in many ways, both in comparison with contemporary developments and otherwise. Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783–1872) was influenced by the rationalism of the Enlightenment and later on by Romanticism and German idealism. He also became interested in Nordic mythology at an early age, and this came to play an important role in his symbol formation and in his theological development. There was a period in his life when he was a staunch supporter of Lutheran orthodoxy, but his strong historical sense caused him to doubt the orthodox doctrine of inspiration. He made what he himself called the “marvelous discovery” that the foundation of the Christian faith is not to be found in the Scriptures (viewed as written words), but in the living Word in the church, in the sacraments and in the confession used in connection with Baptism. It was on this basis that Grundtvig developed his concept of the church. The ideal, as he saw it, is a free state church, which can embrace various points of view without organizational coercion or compulsion of belief. Grundtvig held that the original, popular form of religiosity, symbolized by Nordic mythology, prepared the way for the coming of Christianity. In his mind, Christian and national elements were combined into one.
Grundtvig was inspired at many points by the theology of Irenaeus. This influence is reflected, for example, in the central position accorded the confession of faith, as well as in the dominant importance of such categories as “death-life” (instead of “guilt-forgiveness”) and “creation-restoration” in his teaching of salvation. Grundtvig was opposed to the doctrine of original sin as then taught, and he believed that man retained a likeness of God which could form a connecting link with Christian instruction and upbringing.
Mediating Theology; the Christological Question
The tradition which began with Schleiermacher was carried on in particular by the tendency which is usually referred to as mediating theology. The appearance of this tendency can be dated from the year 1827, when the journal entitled Theologische Studien und Kritiken was founded. Its stated program was to mediate between Biblical faith and the modern scientific spirit. But at the same time that this theological school sought to mediate between Christianity and science, it also attempted to mediate between various schools of thought as well. Schleiermacher was the guiding light par excellence, but there were close ties with the older tradition too, as well as with the Awakening and at times also with Hegel.
The chief spokesmen for this school were such Schleiermacher disciples as Karl Immanuel Nitzsch (d. 1868; his System der Christlichen Lehre, 1829, was one of the most widely used dogmatics books of the day) and August Detler Christian Twesten (d. 1876). Mention should also be made of Isaak August Dorner (d. 1884), who with the aid of Hegelian thought forms attempted to present a new exposition of Christology (Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre yon der Person Christi, 1839 ff.).
Dorner found it difficult to combine the picture of the historical Jesus, as created by modern research, and the old doctrine of the two natures, and this formed the background of his Christological study. He rejected the idea of the “enhypostasis” (see above, pp. 103–105) and taught that the human nature is an independent person. The divinity of Christ was thought of in this context as a gradually developing unity with the Father. Generally speaking, this concept represented a surrender of the traditional view of the Incarnation. If the divinity of Christ is set forth in terms of His fellowship with God—as a representative and prototype of humanity—this is no longer a question of a Logos who became man, or of a true “God-man.”
Another attempt to solve the Christological problem is found in what is called kenoticism. This was championed above all by the Erlangen theologian Gottfried Thomasius (d. 1875; Christi Person und Werk, 1852–61). He was highly critical of Dorner, and in contrast to the latter held fast to the traditional teaching of the two natures. Thomasius’ basic idea was that when the Logos became man, He divested Himself (kenosis) of all that exceeds human consciousness and laid aside the divine attributes which indicate relationship to the world (omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.). When He was glorified, Christ took these back. In this way the attempt was made to do justice to Christ’s humanity and also retain the old categories. It must be noted, however, that this kenosis doctrine deviated from the older tradition in certain respects. In classical Christology it is not the divine Logos who is said to have divested Himself; rather it is believed that the human nature with which the Logos was united in Christ refrained from using the divine attributes. These remained with Christ during His earthly life, however, in the divine person.
This kenoticist concept clearly illustrates the problem which pervaded all of 19th-century theology: How can the ancient categories of Christian doctrine be combined with the modern point of view? This problem was revealed in the fact that even the conservative and churchly tendencies found it hard to maintain the older tradition intact.
Another of the mediating theologians was a Dane, Hans Lassen Martensen (d. 1884; his Dogmatik, 1849, was used for a long time as a textbook in higher education, also in Sweden). Martensen accepted the kenoticist Christology, which he developed in a masterful way. He was influenced not only by Schleiermacher but also by Hegel and by a theosophical mysticism which set its mark especially on his view of the sacraments.
The most distinctive representative of this school was Richard Rothe (d. 1867), who, with assistance from Schleiermacher and Hegel, built up a complete philosophy of religion as set forth in his Theologische Ethik (1845–48). He went beyond the boundaries of mediating theology and actually stood closer to the point of view of liberal theology.
The Erlangen School
An independent theological principle was worked out by the so-called Erlangen theologians, who were otherwise most closely associated with the confessional group. The founder of this school was Adolf Harless (d. 1879), who based his theology to a large extent on Luther studies. He also developed the characteristic principle of the Erlangen method, which held that the content of Scripture and the individual Christian’s personal experience of salvation correspond with one another.
Johann Christian Konrad von Hofmann (d. 1877), the best known of the Erlangen theologians, made his greatest contributions in the field of Biblical interpretation. His magnum opus, Weissagung und Erfüllung (1841–44), sought to show that prophecy does not only include a foretelling or a presentiment but a profound interpretation of the contemporary situation, based on the fact that history points beyond itself to that which will one day be fulfilled. All of Scripture was interpreted as a uniform history of salvation, in which the Old Testament points forward to Christ, and the New Testament points forward to the consummation. In another great work, Der Schriftbeweis (1852–56), Hofmann set forth the fundamentals of his theological method.
According to Hofmann, a theological system can be tested on the basis of the three objective factors which form the foundation of theological statements. These are: the experience of the new birth, the church, and the Holy Scriptures. Hofmann himself was particularly devoted to the Scriptural test. A system must be in harmony with the history of salvation as presented in the Scriptures. Essentially the method Hofmann outlined amounts to this: the fact of the new birth concludes the history of salvation, which is implied in it. The testimony of experience and Scripture must mutually support each other at all times. The trend of thought is approximately this: that which makes a man a Christian is a fact immediately accessible to theology, viz., the personal fellowship between God and man, mediated through Jesus Christ. Cf. Hofmann’s famous saying: “I as a Christian am the most fitting material for me as a theologian” (Ich der Christ bin mir dem Theologen eigenster Stoff meiner Wissenschaft). This fact involves the entire history of salvation as described in the Bible—the eternal as the presupposition of the historical and the temporal from creation to fulfillment. The validity of this argument, which for the most part was scarcely advocated even by Hofmann himself, has been sharply questioned.
The experiential and subjective basis of Hofmann’s method brought him into close contact with both the Awakening and the theology of Schleiermacher. Of greater significance for posterity was his work in the field of Biblical theology, in which he associated with the Württemberg school (Bengel, Beck). His interpretation of Scripture was distinguished above all by the application of the point of view of the history of salvation. In general, Hofmann’s theology marked the transition from a more philosophical and speculative theology to one more thoroughly conditioned by historical perspective.
Hofmann attempted to replace the orthodox doctrine of salvation with a new theory: The death of Christ, said he, was only the demonstration of an obedience and love which conquers sin and death. An atonement in the true sense was out of the question. This attitude elicited strong opposition, even among theologians of kindred spirit. In order to defend his theory, Hofmann sought to show that Luther, in contrast to later Lutheranism, supported a corresponding point of view. This attempt to show how Luther’s theology was different from subsequent Lutheranism can be considered, to some extent, the beginning of modern Luther research. Theodosius Harnack wrote his famous book Luthers Theologie (1862–86) in opposition to these tendencies.
In general the Erlangen school adopted a conservative position that was strongly attached to the older tradition. G. Thomasius, whose kenoticist concept was touched upon earlier, provides us with a good example of this in his Die Christliche Dogmengeschichte (1874–76). He described the theology of the Formula of Concord as the conclusive summit of the history of dogma, to which all prior doctrinal developments pointed.
Kierkegaard
Kierkegaard’s significance for modern theological developments is sufficient justification for us to devote a special section of this history of 19th-century theology to his ideas.
Søren Kierkegaard (1818–55) was thoroughly trained in aesthetics and philosophy. He was also trained in theology, but he never occupied any position in the church; he devoted himself exclusively to his authorship. His brilliant, creative literary power was placed in the service of an incisive critique of ideas, concerned above all with Romanticism and the Hegelian system, both of which were, according to Kierkegaard, expressions of an attitude which did not touch the true seriousness of life and the existential decision which is necessary if man is to “find himself in his eternal validity.” As an author, Kierkegaard’s chief objective was to describe what real Christianity is. “Thus all [my] activity as an author concerns this: within Christendom to be a Christian.” During his first literary period, which ended with the writing of his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), he sought to depict the way to the Christian “stage” of life as this is confronted by other ideals, which he called the aesthetic and the ethical stages. In the later period, Kierkegaard’s concept of the religious ideal became increasingly acute, and he accused the contemporary church of treason vis-à-vis original, New Testament Christianity. He finally came to present Christianity above all as the imitation of Christ in the tribulation of obedience and loneliness.
Some of the main ideas in Kierkegaard’s critique of contemporary speculative philosophy and of the spirit of the church can be illustrated by an explication of certain basic categories which he used over and over again, and through a description of the “stages” which, as he saw it, were characteristic of the development of man’s life. In what follows we shall pay particular attention to Kierkegaard’s concepts of “existence” and “the individual”—two of his basic categories.
What Kierkegaard meant by “existence” is perhaps most evident in the description he provided of the “stages” of life in such works as Either—Or (1843) and Stages on Life’s Way (1845).
The three “stages”—the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious—do not refer so much to a personal, individual development as they do to three distinct points of view or attitudes about life. The primary aim in this entire presentation of the stages is to determine as carefully as possible what it means to be a Christian. If one does not presuppose this point of view, he cannot understand Kierkegaard’s description of man or his concept of “existence.” It is at this point that modern existentialist philosophy is radically different from its presumed master.
The various points of view are not described with the use of abstract formulae; Kierkegaard rather does this by reflecting them in the lives of different fictitious individuals who appear in his pseudonymous writings (John the Seducer, Assessor Wilhelm, Anti-Climacus, etc.). By stepping back in favor of these various pseudonyms, Kierkegaard intended to bring the reader in an indirect way into an existential situation involving a concrete decision. Kierkegaard sought, through the use of this method—comparable to the “intellectual midwifery” of Socrates—to get away from objective thought and historical observation, which he did not wish to reject in themselves but which he considered of no value in delineating the nature of Christianity. This ought to be added, that we have hereby merely touched upon one of Kierkegaard’s reasons for using pseudonyms. The problem they pose has been thoroughly discussed by Kierkegaard scholars, and it has been shown that a number of other factors prompted Kierkegaard to publish some of his writings in this manner.
The aesthetic stage is characteristic of the superficial epicure, who lives exclusively for visible, temporal, and incidental goals and who judges life from the vantage point of beauty. The aesthetic man is alien to ethical decision, “the choice.” Furthermore, since he is limited to the external and finite elements of life, he is unable to relate the eternal to the temporal—that is, to find a synthesis between time and eternity, which is characteristic of Christianity. The speculative individual, who by means of objective thought flees from situations in which he must make a choice, is also found on the aesthetic level.
The ethical stage begins to exist when a man enters into a relationship with the absolute—when he is confronted by God’s unconditioned demand in “the choice” between good and evil. The ethical does not consist of certain reasonable, universal regulations—as Hegel said—but of an absolute demand on the conscience, which confronts the individual with an “either—or.” In this ethical “choice” the individual finds himself “in his eternal validity.” He either achieves or he misses the destiny which is God’s will for his life. In Fear and Trembling (1843) Kierkegaard sets forth Abraham’s offering of Isaac as an example of a man in a situation where he must make a choice. Abraham’s faith was such that he could humbly obey the divine demand, even though it was contrary to all that was reasonable.
The ethical—unfulfillable—demand forces man to consider his own life with a seriousness which is marked by the eternal weight of choice. This in turn induces within him a condition of remorse or repentance, for he can see that he does not meet the eternal demands adequately. And then it is that the ethical stage leads directly over to the religious stage, with which it partially coincides. For in and with the “ethical” decision, man becomes conscious of God. It is repentance—the knowledge of guilt—which distinguishes the religious stage from the ethical.
Kierkegaard distinguished between a general religious attitude (“religiosity A”) and the true Christian stage (“religiosity B”). The latter consists of Christ’s revelation (God in time), of a consciousness of sin (a consciousness of total sinfulness as over against a general consciousness of guilt), and of faith in the forgiveness of sin in the power of Christ’s atonement.
Within the Christian (the paradox-religious) stage the synthesis between eternity and time, which is man’s lot in life, is realized. To die away from the immediacy of the aesthetic in “the moment”—i, e., in the ever-present now, where eternity impinges on time—to become nothing before God and, cognizant of one’s own nothingness before the eternal demands, to grasp the Christ who is present in faith—this is to realize “the synthesis,” to live in existence.
It is on the basis of this concept of existence—understood either in its general character or in its specific Christian sense—that one must understand Kierkegaard’s statement that “subjectivity is truth.” Objective thought, or speculation, is a flight from existence, from decision. Knowledge arrives at the truth only when it is related to an individual’s existence, to the thinking subject’s own decision, to the synthesis between the finite and the infinite. This is not, therefore, a question of “subjectivism” in the usual sense. True knowledge presupposes that the individual stands in an existential relationship to his object. Kierkegaard’s description of the Christian’s relationship to God is the best illustration of what he means by this. He does not refer to a general, philosophical theory of existential knowledge. When Kierkegaard spoke of “the existential,” he was thinking above all of the synthesis between the temporal and the eternal—“the passionately infinite interest in one’s personal eternal salvation”—which is faith’s prerequisite.
Kierkegaard often emphasized the fact that in his writings he turned to “the individual.” The ethical-religious decision applies to the individual only. The masses, or the human race in general, do not form a link between the individual and the absolute. Christianity is realized only in the faith of the individual. Christ is the One who is always present, with whom the man of faith becomes “contemporaneous,” not by reaching back in history to the Christ who walked on earth but by becoming one with Him and receiving His presence in “the moment,” in the present situation. “Contemporaneousness” is therefore one of the main concepts used in describing the Christian faith (as, e.g., in Training in Christianity, 1850).
The Christian life is characterized by “imitation,” by which Kierkegaard meant not an imitatio in the medieval sense but an emulation of Christ in the suffering of reconciliation and in conquering love. (Cf. The Works of Love, 1847, and Training in Christianity)
In the midst of his bitter controversy with the church, which formed the dramatic end of Kierkegaard’s literary activity, he emphasized more and more the necessity of offense: The hatred and persecution of the world are inevitable in the life of the Christian. The demand for “imitation” was carried to the extreme. In The Moment (1855) Kierkegaard expressed his conviction that the “official” Christianity of the time was a scandalous falsification, that New Testament Christianity no longer existed. Anyone who wanted to be a Christian had to make a radical break with the existing church; this, as Kierkegaard saw it, was an unavoidable demand. Scholarly opinions of Kierkegaard’s last, violent attack on the existing church have been varied in nature. In some respects it seems that this critique was consistent with his earlier ideas, but we cannot overlook the indications of pathological one-sidedness which colored the struggle in which he invested his last measure of strength.
Kierkegaard’s influence was not great during his lifetime. His ideas were too markedly different from the major tendencies of his age to be utilized in contemporary education. But in our present century, and particularly in the past several decades, Kierkegaard’s writings have had an unusually wide distribution. This is due in part to the fact that so-called “existentialist philosophy” has made use of the Danish thinker’s legacy. But this is not all, for also in theology (not least of all in America) serious attempts have been made to go back to the richly seminal sources which Kierkegaard’s books provide. It it true in some ways that Kierkegaard’s work is without parallel not only in the 19th century but in the entire history of theology.
Ritschl and His Disciples
A “liberal” or broad-minded Protestantism appeared in many different forms and in a variety of contexts during the 19th century. Its origins can be traced back in most instances to the deistic and rationalistic opinions of the Enlightenment. Most of the representatives of this liberal school were men who sought to apply the critical historical point of view in the field of theology, including the above-mentioned D. F. Strauss and also Ferdinand Christian Baur (d. 1860, professor in Tübingen). Both of these men applied historical criticism to the Bible, and Baur was also influential as a historian of dogma.
A “liberal” theology which was to some degree new and unique was developed in the latter part of the 19th century and in the early years of the present century by Albrecht Ritschl (d. 1889, professor in Göttingen) and his followers.
Ritschl was closely related to both Kant and Schleiermacher. He located the essence of religion not in the feeling of absolute dependence but rather in the distinctive ideas of the religious fellowship, which refer to the alteration of the will and to the promotion of human salvation or blessedness. Ritschl did not accept revelation in the real meaning of the term. “Revelation,” in his opinion, is the same as positive religion. The “Christian religion” is attached to the Christian congregation and to the person of Jesus. The sole task of theology is to describe man’s fellowship with God as this is expressed in historical Christianity.
Ritschl intended to put firm scholarly ground under theology and to guarantee its position against the attacks of materialistic natural science. In doing so, he resorted to positive religion and regarded it as historical fact. Dogmatics was used to supply a historical description of faith.
In opposition to those who said that Christianity is concerned only with the salvation imparted in Jesus Christ, Ritschl emphasized that we have to deal with two dominant basic ideas: Christianity can be compared to an “ellipse, which is controlled by two foci.” As Ritschl put it, Christianity is just as much concerned about the common ethical goal, the kingdom of God, as it is about the salvation of the individual.
Ethical considerations were decisive for Ritschl. The function of religion is chiefly to promote and bring into being the kingdom of God—man’s destination as conceived in ethical categories.
Salvation, which Ritschl defines as “justification” (Rechtfertigung) or “forgiveness of sin,” restores the ethical freedom impeded by sin. Through faith man’s disturbed relation to God is transformed into confidence and sonship. This results in an inner change of will: man comes to acknowledge God’s will and is thereby predisposed to do what is good. This inner transformation is what Ritschl called “reconciliation” (Versöhnung). It, in turn, results in good deeds. Salvation is not, therefore, concerned only with the blessedness of the individual; it also refers to a common ethical objective, the realization of the kingdom of God, which is man’s highest good.
If one so desires, he can assign “salvation” to religion and “the kingdom of God” to ethics, but in doing so it must be remembered that, according to Ritschl, religion and ethics are interrelated and interact upon one another. One can rather say that the religious is subordinate to the ethical, although both are included as the two “foci” in what Ritschl called the Christian religion.
The traditional doctrines were pruned considerably or reinterpreted to harmonize with the basic “ethical” or “spiritual” ideas which were thought to contain the essential meaning of revelation. Ritschl did not conceive of sin as universal corruption, a condition of guilt before God; he rather thought of it as isolated deviations from the good, resulting from insufficient knowledge of the common welfare, which is simultaneously the ethical good. The ethical freedom which is a part of man’s natural endowment must therefore be strengthened and perfected. This is accomplished through the new relation to God which is available to man by faith in Christ and His salvation.
Christ can be called God only in a figurative sense: His divinity exists in the unity of His will with God, in the perfect fellowship with God which He manifested in His obedience to God’s call. Christ’s suffering and death are simply the ultimate proof of this obedience. They are important for salvation only as examples of the obedience through which Christ can bring others into the same relationship with God the Father in which He stands (Unterricht in der christlichen Religion, 42). References to substitutionary or propitiatory suffering of punishment were rejected. According to Ritschl, God is love, period; wrath, revenge, or judgment are alien to His nature. Punishment and discipline are used only to educate man.
The task of theology, as Ritschl saw it, consists in bringing traditional Christianity into harmony with contemporary man’s “world consciousness.” Religion is not designed to explain the world, or to make theoretical, metaphysical judgments; it can only make value judgments. The goal is a “Christian philosophy,” which fully satisfies the demand for a perfect, moral and spiritual religion.
Ritschl set forth his system primarily in the huge work entitled Die christliche Lehre yon der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, I–III, 1870–74 (Vol. III includes the principle exposition). A brief summary can be found in his Unterricht in der christlichen Religion, 1875.
In his writings Ritschl gave expression to a sober, bourgeois form of religion, which was quite consistent with the cultural attitude of his day. In his rational and practical approach to religion he is strongly reminiscent of Socinianism and other similar forms of rationalism. While he underscored the ethical seriousness of Christianity, he reduced its content to a world view and an ethical system. The widespread influence which Ritschl’s ideas enjoyed can be explained not so much in terms of their depth and originality as by their ability to satisfy the general spirit of the times and to actualize the problems which then confronted theological thought.
Chief among Ritschl’s followers was Wilhelm Herrmann (d. 1922, professor in Marburg, influential also in Sweden), who deepened and completed Ritschl’s ideas in many respects. He drew a much sharper distinction between theology and metaphysics than Ritschl did. Herrmann asserted that statements of faith are judgments which are directly involved in the personal experience of God, and as a result they are on a different level than are all philosophical and metaphysical pronouncements. Religious and philosophical judgments were said to be incompatible. Herrmann concentrated the entire meaning of Christianity in the revelation of Jesus Christ. While Ritschl deduced the meaning of faith from out of this revelation in a more rational and dispassionate manner, Herrmann emphasized the personal experience of the Christ-figure as the basis of faith. Religious reality becomes transparent to man only after he has come to recognize his own impotence and guilt in the light of the ethical imperatives. The man who is serious about these ethical imperatives is inwardly “subdued” by the influence of the person of Jesus and is thereby brought to faith. The concept of a general revelation was repudiated. The connecting link between natural man and the Christian faith is ethical in nature. Herrmann’s best-known works are Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott (1886) and Ethik (1901).
The well-known historian of dogma Adolf von Harnack (d. 1930, professor in Berlin) must also be numbered among the followers of Ritschl. His theological contribution is considered in a subsequent section, under “The Theology of the Early 20th Century.”
English Theology in the 19th Century
Three factors above all dominated the development of English theology during the 19th century: the high-church Oxford Movement, the indigenous philosophical tradition (characterized by a synthesis between Platonism and Christianity), and the increasing influence of historical criticism.
The Oxford Movement was inspired by a group of theologians in Oxford. Among them was John Keble (1792–1866), whose famous sermon of 1833 on “the national apostasy” was sharply critical of the liberal parliamentary politics of that era, which involved itself in ecclesiastical matters and on the strength of a secularized ideal of the state threatened the independence of the church. This sermon is usually considered the Oxford Movement’s point of departure. Among its chief representatives (in addition to Keble) were Edward Pusey (1800–82) and John Henry Newman (1801–90). It was Newman who published the “Tracts for the Times” (beginning in 1833), in which the high-church program was developed, in part with a strong Romanist tendency.
Apostolic succession was set forth as being fundamental to the office of the ministry. The concept of the church and the sacraments was also developed in a manner consistent with the Roman pattern. In Tract No. 90 (published in 1841) Newman attempted to prove that the Thirty-nine Articles could be interpreted in such a way that they harmonized with the decisions of the Council of Trent. The original purpose of the Oxford Movement was to so emphasize the Catholic aspect of the Anglican Church that this communion would be revitalized as a result, but Newman and after him also other theologians interpreted this in such a way that they went over to the Church of Rome (Newman in 1845). The movement continued, however, and gradually became a more general Anglo-Catholic tendency, which has exerted a decisive influence on English church life and theology in modern times. Traditionalism is one of its characteristic features. Its theological program includes a return to the theology of the early church and to the classical Anglican theology of the 16th and 17th centuries. It is because of this, not least of all, that a study of the church fathers has come to have a central place in English theology. A comprehensive publishing program has also been carried through as a result of high-church initiative (cf. the “Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology,” 88 vols., 1841–66).
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834), poet and philosopher, also exerted an extensive influence on English theology, in spite of the fragmentary nature of his philosophical and theological works. Influenced by German Romanticism and idealism, as well as by the Platonizing tradition in England (the Cambridge Platonists of the 17th and 18th centuries), Coleridge opposed deism and created a synthesis between theology and philosophy. Religion for him was a spiritual, mystical reality, into which reason could penetrate ever more deeply by virtue of its participation in the divine nature. Coleridge seems to have oscillated between pantheism and a more orthodox position. On the basis of his reflections upon the distinction between philosophy and theology he expanded the horizons of theology and created an alternative to the negative attitude vis-à vis Christianity held by the deists and the utilitarians.
Under the influence of Coleridge and others Frederick Denison Maurice (1805–72) continued the Platonizing of English theology. His theological position was described as a “Christianized Platonism,” the center of which was formed by the combination of the divine and the highest in humanity, manifested in Christ, “the Son of God and the Son of Man.” This combination bases itself on the love of God and expresses itself in a similar way in the Logos which dwells in every man. This Logos is the source of a progressive revelation, which was brought to perfection in Christ. Maurice interpreted “eternity” (eternal life, eternal punishment) not in temporal but in qualitative categories; this aroused strong opposition, and Maurice lost his Oxford professorship as a result. Maurice represented a Christian idealism which did not deny the historical truth of Christianity but which appealed above all to the heart, to the highest in humanity.
It was the above-named S. T. Coleridge who more than anyone else introduced the historical criticism of the Bible into English theology (it had originated in Germany). He recommended that the Bible be studied as an ordinary book. At the outset such tendencies elicited opposition, both among high-churchmen and evangelicals, but the critical view gradually became entrenched. The new theories of evolution set forth by Charles Darwin (On the Origin of Species, 1859) and Herbert Spencer were not without significance in this regard, in spite of the fact that they met with strong resistance within theological circles for many years.
Liberal ideas were manifested in Essays and Reviews (1860), which championed the right of free research in the field of theology and upheld the demand for the historical criticism of the Bible. Even more important in this connection was the publication of the anthology entitled Lux mundi (1889). This did not emanate from liberal circles but was the decisive expression of the fact that even high-church Anglicans accepted historical criticism as an indispensable prerequisite in the study of theology. The stated purpose of this collection of essays was to “bring the Christian confession of faith into its proper relation to the modern development of our scientific, historical, and critical knowledge, and to modern problems in politics and ethics.”
The publisher of Lux mundi was Charles Gore (1853–1932), a representative of high-church Anglicanism who sought to combine its principles of authority with an acceptance of scientific norms in theology. Gore worked out his position in connection with a series of lectures on the Incarnation. It was due not least of all to his influence that Anglican theology has placed the Incarnation at its center. This is different from the evangelical point of view, for example, in which the Atonement is to be found at the center. Characteristic of Gore was his kenosis doctrine: Christ, he said, laid His divine attributes aside at the time of the Incarnation and subjected Himself to human limitations. There is a certain connection between this idea and Gore’s attempt to combine the divine authority of Scripture with a critical view of the Bible. As a result of Gore’s influence, the high-church tendency developed along new, more modernistic lines, and he became the leader of what has been referred to as liberal high churchliness. (Cf. R. Ekström, The Theology of Charles Gore, 1944.)
Roman Catholic Theology in the 19th Century
After a period of decline brought about by the Enlightenment, the Roman Catholic Church (like the Protestant Church) was awakened to a new interest in church and theology with the dawning of the 19th century. This interest was aroused and promoted among other things by the spirit of Romanticism. The medieval church, which was so severely criticized during the Enlightenment, was now looked upon with admiration and appreciation.
With respect to the renewal of Roman theology in the 19th century, the so-called Tübingen school made a pioneering contribution. Its foremost representative was Johann Adam Möhler (d. 1838), well-known among other things for his Symbolik, an incisive confrontation with Protestant theology. This school was above all interested in historical theology. Because of this, it also prepared the way for a new and deeper understanding of the patristic and medieval traditions.
The classical tradition of Roman Catholic doctrine has been based on a positive appreciation of rational knowledge as a prerequisite for the knowledge of faith. During the 19th century two tendencies appeared which represented a contrasting point of view. Traditionalism looked upon revelation and faith as the source not only of religious knowledge but also of natural knowledge (within metaphysics and morality). Ontologism, which was represented by Henri Maret (d. 1884) and others, and which found its prototype in the Augustinian tradition, assumed that there is an intuitive knowledge of God which forms the basis of all knowledge of truth. Both of these positions were rejected by official decree, the former in 1840 and 1855 and the latter in 1861.
The question of reason and revelation was answered in a completely different way by the school of thought which became dominant in the middle of the 19th century—neoscholasticism, also known as Neo-Thomism. As a result of the influence of a number of Italian and French theologians—as well as of the Tübingen school in Germany and the outstanding German theologian Joseph Kleutgen (d. 1893)—medieval scholasticism became the center of interest not only within historical theology but also in the field of dogmatics. Confirmation of the dominating position which this tendency enjoyed can be found in Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879), in which the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is enjoined as a basic study for higher education within the church. Thus it is in modern Roman Catholic theology that this medieval theologian stands out as the teacher of the church par excellence. It is prescribed in the church’s canon law (Codex iuris canonici, can. 1366) that study and instruction in both philosophy and theology at Catholic educational institutions must be consistent with the ideas and principles of Thomas Aquinas.
The writings of Matthias Joseph Scheeben (d. 1888), who was probably the major Roman Catholic dogmatician of the 19th century, also testify to the importance then accorded to the classical tradition, both the church fathers and medieval scholasticism. Scheeben based his dogmatics on these sources and sought in an independent and profound analysis to breathe new life into the inheritance received from this older tradition. Scheeben gave particular emphasis to the distinction between Christian faith and that which is merely rational or natural. It was in this connection that he coined the expression “supernature,” by which he referred to that in Christian doctrine which is transcendental and inaccessible to reason (Die Mysterien des Christentums, 1865 [trans. Cyril Vollert, Mysteries of Christianity; St. Louis: Herder, 1946]).
In the bull Ineffabilis Deus (1854) Plus IX proclaimed the dogma of “the Virgin Mary’s immaculate conception,” i.e., the dogma which teaches that Mary, through a special privilege, was preserved from the taint of original sin. This declaration, which was a concession to the popular adoration of Mary, brought to light a new concept of the nature of dogmatic pronouncements, since the otherwise self-evident demand for a Biblical or apostolic basis was set aside. This proclamation of a new dogma presupposed that the highest official in the church has the power to authorize new dogmas that are binding on the church. At the First Vatican Council (1869–70), which the Church of Rome reckons to be the Twentieth Ecumenical Council, this teaching was confirmed and proclaimed in the dogma of papal infallibility: When the pope speaks in his office and defines a teaching concerning faith or morals which is valid for the entire church, he possesses the infallibility which the Savior promised to His church.
In the “Syllabus of Errors,” published in 1864, Pins IX condemned such modern phenomena as pantheism and rationalism, socialism and indifferentism, as well as the critical and agnostic philosophies. Similar judgments were expressed upon various facets of the modern point of view on several occasions. This development continued and intensified during the long and (as seen from the point of view of dogmatics) fateful struggle against modernism at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of this century. Modernism was a widespread movement, whose representatives sought in a variety of ways to combine the Roman Catholic faith with modern culture. In doing so, they advocated historical criticism with regard to the Bible, turned against the dominant scholastic influence in the field of philosophy, and sought to introduce a modern philosophical point of view. One of the centers in which these new ideas were nurtured was the Institute Catholique in Paris, where Alfred Loisy (d. 1040) worked for a time as a teacher and carried on a program of critical Biblical research. In an encyclical Providentissimus Deus (1893) Leo XIII indeed underlined the importance of erudition in the study of the Bible, but he warned against the critical view of history which Loisy defended. Loisy was relieved of his office, but he continued to plead modernism’s name, as for example in his little book L’evangile et l’eglise (1903), in which he attacked A. von Harnack’s Das Wesen des Christentums (see below). Loisy defended the cultus and dogmas of the church against Harnack but indicated at the same time that these could not be traced back to the Gospel; they are a later creation, he said, expressive of a necessary development within the congregation which resulted from the unfulfilled parousia. Loisy’s book was placed on the index, and he was excommunicated in 1908.
The climax of the church’s struggle with modernism was reached with the publication of Pius X’s bull Pascendi Dominici gregis (1907), in which the pope exposed the many different tendencies and concepts in the movement to an incisive analysis and declared them to be heretical. In the same spirit it was decided in 1910 that all priests and teachers should register a confession of the Catholic faith with its repudiation of the false teachings of modernism (the antimodernist oath).
In spite of the original rejection of Biblical criticism, the scientific approach to the Bible has gained ground in Roman Catholic circles just as it has within other communions. The bull Providentissimus Deus (1893) recommended the scientific treatment of the Bible within certain limits. Fifty years later the comparable encyclical Divine afflante Spiritu (1948) made far-reaching concessions to scientific, critical views. A few years later, however, the bull Humani generis (1950) sharply rejected the new form of modernism which, it was felt, threatened the Catholic faith.
The Roman Catholic concept of tradition, like the attitude toward Biblical criticism, has undergone obvious changes in recent years. This development can be traced back into the previous century. In post-Tridentine theology, tradition was understood to be a source of revelation parallel to the Scriptures, different from and yet supplementary to the apostolic testimony which was written down in the Bible. But the intensified contact with the theology of the early church and of the Middle Ages during the 19th century led to a fresh interpretation of the meaning of tradition. The pioneers in this matter were the above-named J. A. Möhler and M. J. Scheeben, together with Cardinal Newman. These men looked upon Scripture and tradition as an organic unity and understood the latter to be a dynamic factor which includes the entire teaching office of the church. Scripture, too, is tradition as seen from a certain point of view. It was emphasized that Scripture could not be interpreted without tradition, but tradition was no longer looked upon as a new source of revelation at the side of Scripture; it was now being thought of as a continuous development of revelation. This new attitude toward tradition has not yet resulted in any official doctrinal decisions, but it does provide an important presupposition for theological discussion in our day, not least for confrontation with the position of the evangelical churches.
Revival Movements in the 19th Century
Extensive revival movements developed during the last half of the 19th century, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world but also in the Scandinavian countries. The task of describing the development of these movements and their leading personalities properly belongs to the sphere of the church historian. In the present context we shall content ourselves with a survey of a number of the basic ideological aspects of the revival movements.
When speaking of revival movements in the broad sense of the term, it would be possible to include such phenomena as Grundtvigianism in Denmark and the Oxford Movement in England. As a general rule, however, the term has a more limited connotation. But even among the more typical “awakenings” there is a marked difference between those that developed out of a free-church matrix (which we shall investigate with care in this study) and the awakenings which took place strictly within the church—those that emerged from within the context of existing ecclesiastical organizations and which took shape while remaining loyal to their rules and regulations.
Among the various churchly awakenings of this period were Schartauism in Sweden (Henrik Schartau, associate pastor in Lund, d. 1825); Haugeism in Norway (Hans Nielsen Hauge, lay preacher, d. 1824); Die Erweckung in Germany (see above, pp. 373–74); and also a number of other Lutheran revivals in Finland and Sweden, with such leaders as Paavo Ruotsalainen (d. 1852), Fredrik Gabriel Hedberg (d. 1893), and Lars Levi Laestadius (d. 1861).
An intermediate position between the earlier Pietist awakening and the free-church movement of the 19th century was assumed by the so-called “new evangelical” movement within the church. In Sweden this was associated with the name of Carl Ol of Rosenius (lay preacher; author; editor of The Pietist, 1842–68; d. 1868). Rosenius’ preaching was influenced above all by Luther, but he was also conditioned by the Pietism within the Church of Sweden and by Herrnhutism, which had a strong foothold in the village in northern Sweden where he grew up. But in addition to this, Rosenius was also under the influence of contemporary Methodist and Reformed preaching. And in spite of his repudiation of separatism he thereby formed an ideological connecting link between certain facets of churchly revivalism and the free-church movements which we shall now proceed to describe.
The Baptist movement, which in the previous century burgeoned forth even in Lutheran territory, can be traced to the Baptist Church in England and America. The Anabaptists of the Reformation era and the Mennonites of Holland were the original precursors. (The Mennonites were named for Menno Simons, a Dutch priest of the 16th century.)
Another branch of the 19th-century awakening developed under the influence of English Methodism and was supported by men from that group. New Methodist church bodies came into being as a result—e.g., in the Scandinavian countries.
The widespread American revival of the 19th century had a direct antecedent in the “Great Awakening” which began in 1734, led by the prominent theologian and preacher Jonathan Edwards (Congregationalist, d. 1758). Among the principal leaders of the 19th-century revival were Charles Grandison Finney (active in Great Britain as well as in America, d. 1875), and another American preacher who was much like him, Dwight Lyman Moody (d. 1899). Moody and his Methodist song leader, Ira David Sankey (d. 1908), also visited Great Britain a number of times and promoted huge revival campaigns there. The energetic Baptist preacher Charles Haddon Spurgeon (d. 1892), whose base of operations was the Metropolitan Tabernacle in London, also exerted a powerful influence on the revival movement, far beyond the confines of his own church group.
In the North the first Baptist congregations were organized in the middle of the 19th century (Denmark, 1839; Sweden, 1848; Finland, 1856; Norway, 1860). And even though the Methodist persuasion had had sympathizers and adherents in Scandinavia before this, the first Methodist congregations were not formed until somewhat later (Norway, 1856; Denmark, 1859; Sweden, 1868; Finland, 1884). Of great significance for this development was the 12 years which Methodist minister George Scott spent in Stockholm as a preacher (1830–42). C. O. Rosenius was deeply influenced by Scott and found in him an example for his own preaching.
The Swedish Mission Covenant (founded in 1878), which was intended from the outset to be a missionary society, actually developed into a free-church denomination of the Congregationalist type. Its doctrinal position was determined for the most part by Paul Peter Waldenström (d. 1917), who was its foremost leader for many years.
As far as outlook and structure are concerned, the free-church revival movements referred to above displayed a large number of common characteristics. The unique nature of the theology of revival can probably be best seen if one undertakes to study what the revivalists taught concerning (1) regeneration and sanctification, (2) the church and its organization, and (3) the sacraments.
1. In its doctrine of justification, Methodism (as previously indicated) was indebted above all to Lutheranism. As a result, it defined justification as the forgiveness of sins and as the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. In other denominations, however, justification was as a rule equated with regeneration and was therefore described as an obvious change in a person’s attitude. “Justification” must mean that a man actually is “made just,” and this was presumed to require an inner transformation.
In the early 1870s the previously mentioned Waldenström set forth the idea that the Atonement, in its New Testament sense, could not involve the propitiation of the Father by the Son, inasmuch as God is the fullness of unchangeable love. Instead, said Waldenström, “atonement” (or “reconciliation”) refers to a change of mind in man. This point of view, which represented a sharp break with the traditional doctrine of the Atonement, elicited a stormy debate during the ensuing years. Over against Waldenström’s concept of the Atonement, with its emphasis on man’s moral transformation (“subjective” atonement), stood the current ecclesiastical position that God’s righteous wrath over man’s sin had been averted by Christ’s sacrifice (“objective” atonement). Waldenström based his doctrine of the atonement on certain patterns of speech which he noted in the New Testament—“it is written” was the argument to which he constantly reverted—but his ideas were also in harmony with the powerful liberal tradition of the 19th century; they were the result of the rational and moralizing interpretation of Christianity which he represented.
Ongoing growth in holiness (or sanctification), conceived of as the continuation of regeneration (the transformation which is the result of justification), is the one point which is most frequently stressed in the theology and preaching of revivalism. The Christian is obligated to live in a manner consistent with Christ’s new law, which is looked upon not only as an explanation and reiteration of the law given at the time of creation, or of the universally valid law incorporated in the Ten Commandments, but as a superior ethical order which can be followed only by the faithful. Sanctification is based on justification by faith, but it is also, in turn, the presupposition for achieving salvation, just as it is also the prerequisite of continued membership in a Christian congregation.
2. As is true of the doctrine of sanctification, the free-church revival movements also possess, in certain respects at least, a uniform position with respect to the church and its functions: The church is a tangible fellowship of believers. Only those who have declared their faith and their willingness to live in holiness are accepted as members of such congregations.
The external organization of the church can, on the other hand, be varied. Methodism has a definite order for the reception of members, and it also forms an international church body with a strictly regulated organization.
But other revivalist groups, such as the Baptists and the Swedish Mission Covenant, are in principle congregationalist, which is to say that they proceed on the assumption that every local congregation is independent and represents the church of Christ. All believers are welcome in such congregations, but all unbelievers ought to be excluded. And just as the individual members are to live in holiness, struggling against the flesh with the help of the Holy Spirit, so too should the congregation grow in holiness and by strict church discipline exclude those who live in unbelief or who openly break the rules of the congregation.
3. As far as the sacraments axe concerned, divergent opinions and practices have developed.
The Baptists see Baptism as only a symbolic act whereby the Christian confesses his faith and is received into the congregation. The demand for adult Baptism resulted from this concept. The significance attached to Baptism varies from one Baptist group to another, but neither Baptism nor the Lord’s Supper is thought of as a means of grace by which forgiveness of sin is mediated.
This Reformed point of view can also be discerned in other freechurch revival groups. Waldenström, on the other hand, took a position which was distinctly at variance with the Baptist, symbolic concept of the sacraments. In spite of this, however, a variety of opinions and practices has prevailed within the Swedish Mission Covenant.
The observer on the modem scene can see that many shifts have taken place with respect to doctrinal presuppositions and that the differences between the large denominations and the free churches are not as sharply drawn as they once were. This can be explained in some instances by a leveling down of doctrine, but there are other reasons too. There is on both sides an ongoing attempt to give a simpler and more factual explanation of the fundamentals of the Christian faith. Because of this the old controversies have become obsolescent. Ecumenical dialog between the established churches and the free churches is one of the contemporary results. The discussions in England between the Methodist Church and the Anglican Church, which are directed toward complete unity within the near future, are perhaps the foremost example of this activity.
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