Samuel Miller’s (1769–1850) Theological, Historical, Biblical, And Pastoral Defense Of The Eternal Generation Of The Son

By Allen Stanton

[Allen Stanton is a PhD candidate at Puritan Reformed Seminary and pastor of Pinehaven Presbyterian (PCA) in Clinton, MS.]

Abstract

In recent years, the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son of God has been called into question by evangelical scholars. The doctrine has often been charged with being unbiblical, speculative, irrational, or inconsequential, charges which have sparked much debate. The objections to the Chalcedonian doctrine, however, are not new. In fact, a considerable controversy emerged in Reformed circles between two celebrated Calvinist seminarians: Moses Stuart (1780–1852) of Andover Theological Seminary and Samuel Miller (1769–1850) of Princeton Theological Seminary. Stuart denied the validity of the doctrine on philosophical, historical, and biblical grounds in a publication entitled Letters on the Eternal Generation of the Son Addressed to the Rev. Samuel Miller (1822), while Miller, on the other hand, defended the doctrine on historical and philosophical grounds but most substantially on biblical grounds in his response entitled Letters on the Eternal Sonship of Christ Addressed to the Rev. Professor Stuart of Andover (1823). This article examines and evaluates these publications in their historical context in hopes that doing so may contribute to the modern debate.

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Modern scholars recognize four branches in theological studies: biblical, historical, systematic (including philosophical), and practical. Most modern practitioners specialize in one of these four branches and limit their treatments to their field. However, this approach is stretched to the limit when considering the question of the eternal generation of the Son. It appears nearly impossible to consider the biblical testimony aside from systematic and philosophical, historical, or practical factors.[1] The branches intertwine in such a way that appropriate consideration of the issue requires a practitioner with advanced training in all of these fields.

However, the over-specialization of fields in the present academic system does not lend itself well to the production of such an individual. Presently, there appears to be few sufficiently equipped to perform such a task. If such an enterprise cannot be found among the writings of present scholars, one must turn to the pages of the past. Limiting ourselves to the English-speaking world, a brief survey of recent history recalls a debate over this issue between two of the celebrated scholars of the nineteenth century: Moses Stuart of Andover Seminary (1780–1852) and Samuel Miller of Princeton Theological Seminary (1769–1850).[2]

In this debate, Miller exposed the weakness of Stuart’s denial of eternal generation by challenging Stuart’s hermeneutical, philosophical, theological, and historical approaches. Of this work, one modern writer commented:

Samuel Millers’ defense of the parallel doctrines of eternal sonship and generation of the Son is dated in language and in other ways, yet it is still compelling. It represents confessional Reformed and evangelical theological work at its best. I only wish I had found this largely ignored and forgotten book at the beginning of my research, not at the end. It is a must-read for those who would seek to understand the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son.[3]

Sadly, however, this debate and Miller’s work have been only slightly consulted by current thinkers. This article attempts to reintroduce modern readers to this debate with the aim of providing elucidation to the current debate.

I. Historical Context

The dispute between Stuart and Miller stemmed from the Trinitarian controversy of 1819–1820 between Stuart and William Ellery Channing (1780–1842). Channing had helped solidify the Unitarian movement in Baltimore as a result of an anti-Trinitarian sermon series that led to the formation of a Unitarian denomination.[4] In response, Stuart critiqued Channing’s sermon and established himself as one of the foremost defenders of Orthodox Trinitarianism.[5]

However, in this publication he conceded to Channing that the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son appeared irrational, unbiblical, and speculative.[6]

Although pleased with Stuart’s defense of orthodoxy, Miller read this line with great displeasure and made a few pointed comments in print about Stuart’s concession.[7] These provoked Stuart to investigate the topic more fully and to respond to Miller in critique of the eternal Sonship of Christ. He rejected the doctrine on philosophical/theological, historical, and biblical grounds. Our study will proceed by examining Stuart’s grounds of rejection in each branch of theology followed by Miller’s response to him.

II. Systematic Theology

Stuart first rejected the doctrine on five major philosophical/theological objections:

1. The doctrine is illogical and incoherent.
2. That if the Sonship of Christ is voluntary it cannot be necessary and eternal.
3. The doctrine asserts that the same numerical essence communicates the whole self to the same numerical essence.
4. That this must involve inferiority and dependence.
5. That it tends toward Arianism.[8]

Miller responded to each of these objections in turn. First, he denied Stuart’s charge that the doctrine was illogical. Although it exceeds the capacities of men, this should not deter an orthodox Christian who embraced other fundamental mysteries such as the Trinity or the omnipresence of God. The admission of mystery does not amount to irrationality.[9]

Furthermore, Miller charges Stuart with blurring the distinctions between human and divine relationships. He says, “You appear to me evidently to assume, as the foundation of your whole argument, that Sonship with God, and sonship among men, must be essentially the same.”[10] Instead, Miller argues, one should assume that such expressions as begotten, generation, and Son, although they express intelligible truth about the relations between the members of the Godhead, they are accommodated to human capacity.[11]

Next, Miller responded to Stuart’s objection that “if the generation of the Son were necessary and eternal, it could not be voluntary, and if not voluntary,” then “his generation could not have been eternal.”[12] Miller maintained that the orthodox have consistently rejected that logic. Volition does not exclude necessity or eternality. He attempted to illustrate the weakness of the objection by appealing to a similar issue. He urged Stuart to consider the decrees of God which were eternal and yet, simultaneously, voluntary. The logic of Stuart’s objection precluded this possibility. Logical consistency required that God’s existence must necessarily precede his will and, therefore, exclude the eternality of the decrees. This, however, goes against the clear teaching of Scripture and must be rejected (cf. Eph 1:4–11). The orthodox understood the Son’s eternal generation as voluntary, eternal, and necessary. Miller pointedly summarized:

Is not God necessarily and essentially active? Was his existence, prior to the work of creation, an eternal sleep, or repose? If it may be made a question, whether the human soul thinks always; surely it admits of no question, whether the infinite and eternal God thinks always, and has done so from eternity, and done it voluntarily; and yet, at the same time, from a necessity of his nature. Wherein does this differ from an eternal emanation or generation?[13]

Miller admits his inability to fully explain this paradox, yet, in speaking of the infinite being, such mysteries are unsurprising.

Miller responded to Stuart’s third objection at length as it demanded a more thorough response. Stuart objected:

The Father imparts to the Son, the same numerical essence which he himself possesses, without division. Now, if this be the case, you say, it follows, that the same numerical essence communicates the whole of itself to the same numerical essence; but if so, you allege, it follows, that the essential power or virtue of the Father, by which he produces or generates the Son, must also be communicated to him; consequently, by virtue of this communication, the Son must produce another person of the same condition or homoousian with himself; this third person a fourth, and so on without end. If this be denied, then it follows that one essential power or virtue of the Father is not communicated to the Son, viz. the power of necessary and eternal generation. The definition, then, seems either to be inconsistent with itself, or to imply an infinite number of generations in the Godhead. In either case, it must be untenable.[14]

Miller responds in five ways. First, this “old Arian objection” had already been sufficiently dealt with by Daniel Waterland (1683–1740).[15] Second, he charges Stuart with misrepresentation. Stuart ascribed this line of reasoning to Turretin, yet Miller viewed it as a mischaracterization. Turretin, and the orthodox, Miller claims, meant that by virtue of this generation of the Son from the Father the Son “possesses the same complete and perfect Divine nature with the Father.”[16] Third, Miller turns Stuart’s charge back on him. Stuart had proposed that the Logos is eternally divine and shares the divine nature with the first person of the Godhead. Miller asks, “Is this unity of nature or essence, a numerical, or only a specific unity? If the former, the same objection may be made to it, which you urge against my doctrine: if the latter, then I see not how you will avoid the charge of Tritheism.”[17]

Fourth, Miller points out that even Stuart maintained distinction between the persons in the Godhead. If distinction, then there is something “peculiar to each and not possessed by the others.”[18] Christians cannot maintain that these particularities are imperfections. But if they are perfections, it follows that there is something unique to one person that the other is void of, “consequently each does not possess precisely the same predicates in all respects.”[19] Miller recognizes the quandary of such arguments but notes that Stuart’s denial of eternal generation does not absolve him from difficulty. Finally, Miller maintains that Stuart’s mode of arguing proves too much and must be rejected.

Miller next deals with Stuart’s objection that the doctrine of eternal generation necessarily denotes “dependence of the Son on the Father; which you insist is utterly incompatible with all your ideas of supreme Godhead.”[20] In his response to this criticism, Miller responds in three ways. First, Miller denies the conclusion and argues that the generation of which he contends is “so perfectly unique, so infinitely and sublimely peculiar, as not to imply either inferiority or subordination.”[21] Secondly, Miller again puts Stuart under the same scrutiny. Is not the idea that the Logos is divine and eternal and yet distinct from the Father liable to the same charge? Thirdly, Miller affirms what one might call an intra-Trinitarian dependence.[22]

The essential predicates of Divinity, as self-existence, independence, &c. belong not to any one of the Persons of the Trinity, considered absolutely independently of the other two; but they belong to the DIVINE BEING. The TRI-UNE JEHOVAH is self-existent, independent, &c. In this Jehovah there are three Persons, partaking equally, and without limit, of these predicates or attributes. The fact, then, (if it be a fact, as I believe it is) that the Second Person of the Trinity is necessarily and eternally begotten by the First; that is, necessarily and eternally bears that relation to the First Person which is called Sonship, and possesses the same nature with him—[this] will not at all affect the predicates which belong to the infinitely perfect and glorious Divine Being as such.[23]

Miller presents a hypothetical conversation between Stuart and an objector:

Now, suppose an objector were to ask you, whether, when you say the Father is truly God, you mean, that the Father possesses the essence and the perfections of Divinity, altogether independently of the Logos and the Holy Ghost? What would you say? You would not, I presume, say, yes; for that would be to avow a belief in three separate, independent Gods. You would probably say, no; the Sacred Three do not possess, each alone, complete Divinity. They possess it conjointly and equally. But the objector would probably reply. If this be so, then the Father is, in some sense, (that is by his equal, perfect, necessary, and eternal communion in these attributes with the other two Persons) dependent on the Logos, and the Holy Spirit. He is not, he cannot be God without them; and, therefore, he is not, as a distinct Person, absolutely, and in every sense, independent, and, consequently, is not alone the Supreme God. Perhaps you would have much more to say to such an objector than I can think of. But I acknowledge, my dear Sir, if I took the ground on which some of your objections to my creed appear to rest, the reasoning of such an objector would not a little perplex me.[24]

In this hypothetical conversation, Miller acknowledges a mutual dependence of the persons within the Godhead. Outside of the intra-Trinitarian relations this would mean the denial of the independency and aseity of God. However, within the Trinitarian relationships, this mutual interdependence between the three persons maintains the unity of the divine essence while likewise preserving the distinction of each person. For Miller, this must be acknowledged to sustain orthodox Trinitarianism.[25]

Finally, Miller responded to the objection that the doctrine of eternal generation favored Arianism. Referring to the Unitarians, he asserts that historically, those who reject the doctrine typically end up denying Trinitarian orthodoxy rather than those who maintain it.

In conclusion, Miller summarized his understanding of eternal generation, “I do not admit into my views of the subject, any ideas of creation, on the part of the Father, or of derivation, inferiority, or subordination, on the part of the Son.”[26]

Instead, he stated more positively that the titles Father and Son express

not any official investiture, or event, which took place in time; but the eternal relation of the First and Second Persons in the Godhead. That the First Person was from eternity Father, and the Second Person from eternity Son: Son, not by creation, or adoption, or incarnation, or office; but by nature; the true, proper, co-equal; co-essential, and co-eternal Son of the Father, because from eternity possessing the same nature, and the same plenitude of Divine perfection with himself.[27]

Although speaking outside of his professional arena, Miller appears at home with metaphysical questions. Stuart, on the contrary, seems out of his field. Chiefly known as a grammarian and exegete, he appears unfamiliar with philosophical and theological distinctions that the orthodox had generally utilized to maintain Trinitarian orthodoxy without falling into subordinationism or tritheism. Furthermore, Stuart appears chiefly unaware of historical theological developments and previous defenses against attacks on the doctrine. Miller exposes this weakness further in the next section.

III. Historical Theology

Along with philosophical objections, Stuart also rejected the doctrine on historical grounds. Stuart argued that the denial of eternal generation of the Son garnered support in the historical data. He maintained that not only did the church fathers not embrace the doctrine of eternal generation (Stuart understood the Chalcedonian formula to be an aberration rather than representative of ante-Nicene opinions), even the majority of modern New England clergy denied the doctrine. “Nearly all the ministers of New England” were “united in rejecting it,” including “our most distinguished theologians” and furthermore, “a majority of orthodox Christians in this country reject it.”[28]

Miller disputed Stuart’s claims. First, he stated that he had been induced to respond to Stuart by a large constituency of the Presbyterian Church who were of “a very different opinion and that they by no means considered it as a matter of small moment.”[29] Of the Presbyterians, nineteen out of twenty probably adhered to the Nicene formulation and those who did not violated their subscription to the Westminster Standards which explicitly maintained the Chalcedonian formulation.[30]

Miller likewise questioned Stuart’s claims about New England Congregationalists. He disputed: “I am unable with any degree of confidence to decide; but rather suppose it has few adherents out of New-England.”[31] Further, he argued, the most celebrated Congregational theologians, namely, Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758), Joseph Bellamy (1719–1790), and Samuel Hopkins (1721–1803), “rejected this [Stuart’s] opinion, and to their dying day adhered to the old doctrine.”[32]

Instead, Miller’s writing implicitly charges Stuart with novelty which Miller openly despised. Miller claimed that, as seminary professors, he and Stuart ought “to guard against the spirit of rash and hasty innovation, either in faith or practice, which has so often proved the bane of the church of Christ.” He continued, “While free inquiry is commendable, and a Christian duty; a rage for novelty, an ardent love of originality, as such, is one of the most unhappy symptoms, in this bearing on the prospect of future usefulness in the church, that a candidate for the ministry can well exhibit.”[33] In subsequent letters, Miller substantiated this charge by recalling the consistent testimony of the ante- and post-Nicene fathers.

In his second letter, Stuart began by considering the testimony of the early church fathers. Like Miller, he maintains that consensus of a doctrine does not establish its truth and that it must be demonstrated from the Scriptures. Nevertheless, since Miller appealed to the consensus testimony of the fathers in his Letters on Unitarianism, Stuart saw fit to address this point. In contrast to most scholars of the time, Stuart denied an ante-Nicene consensus. He charged scholars, particularly Bishop George Bull (1634–1710), author of Defensio fidei Nicaenae,[34] with propagating this misrepresentation. For this reason, Stuart refuted Bull’s influential work on the subject.

Stuart asserted that prior to Nicea, “the great body of the early and influential Christian Fathers, whose works are extant, believed that the Son of God was begotten at a period not long before the creation of the world; or, in other words, that he became a separate hypostasis, at or near the time, when the work of creation was to be performed.”[35]

In his treatment of the fathers, Stuart methodically worked through the various ages and representatives of those respective time periods. He produced a plethora of extended quotations from the church fathers and concluded, “With the exception of this single father [Dionysius], I have not been able to find testimonies in any other early writer of eminence, in favor of the doctrine of eternal generation, as stated in the Nicene Creed.”[36]

Miller objected to Stuart’s reconstruction of the ante-Nicene fathers and responded in four ways. First, if Stuart represented them correctly, then they were decidedly Unitarian. This certainly weakened Stuart’s (and Miller’s) polemic against the American Unitarians. Second, inconsistent language in the case of the fathers does not justify Stuart’s claim. Third, although some may have used language consistent with Stuart’s claims, a broad reading of the fathers exposes this as a minority position. Lastly, Miller proposes that many of the fathers that Stuart quoted did not help Stuart’s cause but actually supported orthodoxy. The primary error of the patristics, Miller maintains, was in “phraseology.”[37]

Miller then appealed to the work of Dr. Waterland, who had demonstrated that the fathers referred to the eternal generation of the Son in three ways. (1) To maintain the same substance of the Son with the Father while distinguishing him from the Father. This, he says, is the most common usage of the doctrine. (2) To refer to the Son’s “coming forth from the father, to exert his power in the work of creation,” what Miller calls the ante-mundane generation. (3) To refer to his “condescension to be born of a virgin, and to become a man.”[38] The first and third found much support to the exclusion of the second common patristic usage. Some of those whom Stuart utilized, however, inconsistently used all three. In short, Stuart failed to adequately represent the broad range in which the fathers utilized the language of generation. Miller found no compulsion to maintain that the fathers never spoke erroneously of a filiation (in the second sense), but he had only to prove that they did use the phrase sometimes to refer to an eternal, pre-temporal relationship with the Father.

Beginning with the Greeks, Miller liberally quoted the church fathers to confirm his thesis. He surveyed the Epistle of Barnabas (ca. 130), the Shepherd of Hermas (ca. 140), Ignatius (ca. 35–107), Justin Martyr (ca. 100–165), Irenaeus (d. 202), Athenagoras (2nd century), Clement of Alexandria (d. 215), Hippolytus (170–235), Gregory Thaumaturgus (3rd century), Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 330–395), Origen (ca. 184–254), Dionysius of Alexandria (d. 264), Dionysius of Rome (d. 268), Lucian (3rd century), and others. Following his treatment of the Greeks he moved to the Latin fathers, concluding his survey with the writings of Tertullian (155–240), Novatian (200–258), Cyprian (200–258), and Lactantius (250–325). From this survey he surmised five things: (1) That the fathers use the terms logos and Son interchangeably and they speak of both as begotten. (2) They stress the fact that the “First Person in the Trinity, had always been Father, and that the Second Person had always been Son.”[39] (3) When the ante-Nicene fathers speak of the Son as being begotten before all creatures, they typically do so in reference to eternity. (4) These things are all confirmed by their normal deployment of similes: the sun and its rays, fountain and stream, fire and another fire, all which were utilized to demonstrate the co-eternity of the Father and Son while simultaneously affirming their distinction. (5) All the fathers represent the Son as belonging to the Godhead as equal in substance.

Miller further explained an important historical hermeneutic for determining what a given period held, and that is to consider “for what purpose the great body of these writers so zealously contended, as they did, for an essential unity of substance, between the Father and the Son, and at the same time an essential and eternal distinction between them.”[40] The contentions with the Praxeans, Noetians, and Sabellians on one side and the Arians on the other side “evince to every impartial reader, that they did not, and could not hold the doctrine concerning the Sonship of the Second Person of the Trinity which you [Stuart] ascribe to them.”[41] “Here, then,” Miller urges, “we have a large and respectable Synod, pronouncing the denial of Christ’s Divine and eternal Sonship a HERESY. Surely nothing can be more unlike the opinion which you have represented as generally prevalent among the Ante-Nicene Fathers.”[42]

After considering the events surrounding the Nicene Creed, in the final analysis Miller concluded,

If the foregoing statements be correct, then the doctrine of the eternal Sonship of Christ, is a doctrine in which the great body of the Ante-Nicene Fathers harmoniously and decisively concurred; which the whole assembled Church, in the fourth century, solemnly professed to believe, with the exception of a few acknowledged Arians; which was UNANIMOUSLY received by all the orthodox in the Christian world, from that time till near the close of the seventeenth century; and which has been since opposed by none but Unitarians and a very small section, compared with the whole body, of Trinitarian believers.… For my part, if the evidence from scripture were much more dubious than I think it is, I should certainly feel extremely reluctant to discard a doctrine, which has so long and so generally been considered as making a part of the form of sound words once delivered to the saints, and which has been incorporated with all the creeds and confessions of the orthodox, so far as I can now call to mind, at least from the Council of Nice to the present day.[43]

In comparing Miller’s response to Stuart, Stuart again appears to be out of his field. Miller’s mastery of the fathers as well as the rules of polemic appears to leave Stuart quite vulnerable at this point. Miller, a seasoned polemicist, exhibits his acquaintance with scholastic disputation. He first clarifies the question, defines terms, and sets parameters for deciding the question. In this, he appears far more polished and, according to his parameters, Miller crafts a highly persuasive response to Stuart. Whether Stuart would have accepted the terms as defined by Miller we have no way of knowing as he did not respond to Miller. Nevertheless, on this point, Miller seems to gain the upper-hand. He places the burden of proof firmly upon Stuart to prove that the fathers never spoke of the Son as eternally begotten in the first or third sense (see above). Miller had only to prove that they did use this language, at least sometimes, in such a way. He did not have to maintain that they did so consistently, or that they did not also use it in other ways, yet he was able to produce an abundance of passages that clearly supported the fathers did utilize the phrase of speech this way. For both men, however, the historical testimony fell secondary to the main source of their differences—the interpretation of Scripture.

IV. Biblical Theology

Stuart not only denied the doctrine on philosophical and historical grounds, he also did so on biblical grounds.[44] He proceeded to demonstrate that the Scriptures never called Christ “Son of God” in the sense that the theologians had asserted (i.e., as eternally Son). In Letters 6–8, he attempted to prove that the Scriptures used the term “Son of God” figuratively when applied to Christ. Furthermore, he maintained that the term refers to his official capacity as Mediator and never applies to his eternal nature. Stuart built his case by working systematically through the passages in Scripture where Jesus is called Son and concluded: “If I am correct, then, the Logos, before his incarnation, was not, strictly speaking, Son of God, but only to become so by union with the person of Jesus.”[45]

Stuart’s methodology should be noted. For him, if the doctrine of eternal generation were a biblical doctrine, this would be clearly evidenced in the places where Scripture calls Jesus Son. Stuart limited his data to the explicit instances where the title “Son” is applied to Christ. His approach was purely lexical and consequently, his biblical treatment of the doctrine quite brief. Miller proceeded quite differently. For him the absence of express statements referring to the eternal generation of the Son posed little problem. Consequently, Miller’s biblical treatment of the topic extends to more than one hundred pages whereas Stuart’s treatment is limited to thirty. Miller’s biblical arguments will be briefly summarized below.

1. The Titles Father And Son

First, Miller calls attention to “the correlate titles of Father and Son which are confessedly applied to the First and Second Persons in the adorable Trinity.”[46] Throughout the NT, the title “Father” for the first person of the Godhead occurs so frequently that it follows on “strong presumptive evidence, that the correlative term, Son, is the distinctive title of the Second Person, as such.”[47] The term Father necessarily implies a son and vice versa. If the second person in the Godhead only became the Son in time, then likewise the Father only became such in time. Yet the consistent biblical data seems to assume the eternal Fatherhood of God. Miller continues:

If the three Persons, originally, that is from eternity, stood in precisely the same relation to each other, or, in other words, had not each some peculiarity on the score of relation, I do not see how the First should be considered, as he constantly is, Father to the Second, rather than to the Third.[48]

In Stuart’s reasoning, the Fatherhood of God is an expression of his relationship to his creatures and to his Son after the resurrection. However, in baptism, Miller argues, the church has understood the washing with the water in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to be an expression of the “holy and undivided Trinity.” In Stuart’s logic, it is but a baptism into “posterior and subordinate relations.”[49] Stuart appeared unaware of these implications. By limiting his exegesis to passages that only expressly apply Son of God to Christ, he fails to see the relevance of the passages that refer to the first person as Father.

Further, Miller explains that if the term Father is not applied to the first member of the Trinity by virtue of his relationship to the second, it cannot rightfully be applied to creation or the resurrection of Christ to the exclusion of the other two members of the Godhead. The NT attributes the work of creation and providence equally to the Son (Heb 1:2; Col 1:15–20; John 1:1–4) and the incarnation and resurrection to the Holy Spirit (Luke 2; Eph 3). Consequently, the Son would rightly be called Father in regards to the creation, and the Spirit would also appropriately be called Father in reference to the incarnation and resurrection. This would be liable to the heresy of modalism and must be denied. But, on the other hand, if the title Father refers to the first person of the Trinity in his eternal nature, then it would appear that the second person should be understood as Son in reference to his eternal nature.[50]

2. The Use Of “Son Of God” In The New Testament

Secondly, the term Son of God, as “used in the New Testament … appears to me strongly to establish the same truth.”[51] Here Miller directly challenges Stuart’s lexical arguments. Miller maintains that many biblical passages assert that Christ, as the Son: (1) shared equality with the Father; (2) shared equal glory with the Father before the creation of the world; (3) was creator of the world; (4) was himself God; (5) was the object of the Father’s affection before time; and (6) did not become the Son in time but was such before time.[52] Miller focuses in on John 5:17–18 and John 10:22–40.

John 5:17–18: In his defense Jesus said to them, “My Father is always at work to this very day, and I too am working.” For this reason they tried all the more to kill him; not only was he breaking the Sabbath, but he was even calling God his own Father, making himself equal with God.

In reading this passage alongside the similar but more extensive John 10:22–40, Miller notes that the Jews understood that Jesus, by calling God his Father, was “making himself equal with God.” Miller argues that the Jews were right. In calling himself Son, and attributing to himself the same work as the Father, Jesus claimed for himself the same honor. Miller concludes: “If the Son, as such, be one with the Father; if, as such, he is to be honoured equally with the Father; if, as such, he is to raise the dead, and judge the world; the inference is irresistible, that his Sonship is Divine and eternal.”[53]

3. Passages Referring To The Sending/Giving/Not Sparing His Own Son

Miller continues, “I attach no small importance to those passages of Scripture, which represent the Father as not sparing his Son; giving his Son; sending forth His Son etc.”[54] He gives a few examples:

John 3:16: “For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.” 

Rom 8:3: For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh. 

Rom 8:32: He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things? 

Gal 4:4: But when the fullness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law. 

1 John 3:8: For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil. 

1 John 5:20: And we know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true, and we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life.

Miller maintains that these passages assume a Son prior to the incarnation or else the Father had no Son to send. The sending of the Son assumed the preexistence of the Son. Otherwise, these texts would be required to say that God sent one “to become a Son” or something akin.

Stuart objected to this argument by using John the Baptist as an example. In John 1, we read, “There was a man sent from God.” Stuart claimed that God’s sending John the Baptist denoted commencement to his public office and not to his pre-existent human nature. Hence, Stuart argued, phrases that represent the Father as sending the Son do not speak to a previous sonship but to the commencement of sonship.[55] But Miller protested, “This case of John serves my purpose admirably … [for] was he not a man before he was sent forth? Or did he become a man—was he constituted a man, by entering on the duties of his public office?”[56] This man sent from God was a man prior to his being sent. Likewise, God sent forth his Son, who was Son prior to his being sent, to commence an office for which his eternal Sonship qualified him.

4. The Father’s Condescension In Not Sparing His Son

Throughout the NT, there is an abundance of passages that affirm the love of the first person of the Trinity by speaking of him as a Father, moved with such pity for his wayward people, that he sent even his very own Son in order to rescue them. Such imagery intends to move upon the feelings of the Scriptures’ audience. Miller refers specifically to three passages to this effect: John 3:16, Mark 12:6, and 1 John 4:9–10.

John 3:16: For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. 

Mark 12:6: Having yet therefore one son, his well-beloved, he sent him also last unto them, saying, They will reverence my son. 

1 John 4:9–10: In this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein his love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.

If Jesus was not the Son prior to his incarnation, then “all this is mere fancy.”[57] Further, “In a word, in this case, all our ideas of the peculiar and ineffable tenderness and love of the Father, in giving up his Son to humiliation and suffering for sinners, would be, so far as my feelings can instruct me on the subject, not only essentially diminished, but made in a great measure to vanish away. But I cannot, for a moment, admit a principle which leads me to such a conclusion.”[58]

5. The Manner Of Speaking Of The Incarnation

Miller further argues that the NT authors use the terms God, Logos, and Son interchangeably when speaking of the incarnation. He provides four parallel passages to confirm his point (italics added).

1 Tim 3:16: God was manifested in the flesh. 

John 1:14: The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. 

Rom 8:3: God sent forth his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh. 

1 John 3:8: The Son of God was manifested in the flesh that He might destroy the works of the devil.

Miller asks, “Judging from these passages, are not God, the Word, and the Son the very same?”[59] If this is acknowledged, whatever is true of the Logos must be true of the Son. If the Logos was eternally exalted prior to the incarnation, should not the same be concluded about the Son? Miller maintains that his Sonship, in fact, was the “foundation” and “qualification” for the office to which he was appointed in time and which began at the incarnation.

6. The Descriptions Of The Eternal Relation Of The Members Of The Godhead

Next Miller claims, “The titles and representations of the Persons of the Trinity, given in the New Testament, appear to have been intended to express RELATION TO EACH OTHER, as well as co-eternity and co-equality.”[60] He specifically appeals to the representations of the Spirit’s relationship to the first and second members of the Trinity to confirm a necessary filial relationship between the first two. He recounts three passages.

John 15:26: But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me. 

John 16:7: Nevertheless I tell you the truth; It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him to you. 

Gal 4:6: And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father.

In these passages, Miller notes that we find an explanation of the relationship between the Father and Spirit that parallels that of the Father and Son. The Spirit proceeds from the Father to fulfill the Father’s purpose, but the church has always assumed that these constructions pointed to his pre-existence with the Father. The Spirit was eternally with the Father and sent by the Father and Son after the ascension.

Miller suggests, in effect, that this relationship parallels that of the Son and the Father. Like the Spirit, the Son was coeternal with the Father and was sent by the Father as a Son to fulfill the task prepared for him. This is further supported by the co-sending of the Spirit (“the Spirit of the Son”). This suggests that the Son shares equal authority with the eternal and omnipotent Father to send the Spirit, which in turn implies the eternality and omnipotence of the Son.

In sum, a harmonization of these texts provides reasonable grounds for understanding the terms Father, Son, and Spirit to refer to eternal relationships between the members of the Godhead. This being the case, to deny the eternal generation of the Son lends favorably to the rejection of the eternal procession of the Spirit. This breaks up a system of tightly bound Trinitarian theology. One should be prepared to recognize the inevitable consequences to follow. Remove these distinctions and one denies that revelation offers any descriptions of the eternal relationships of the various members of the Trinity.[61]

7. Exegesis Of Particular Passages

In his final subheading, Miller concludes his biblical argument by the exegesis of several explicit passages useful for the defense of the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son.

Prov 8:22–31: The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were not depths, I was brought forth; when there were no fountains abounding with water. Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth: While as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields, nor the highest part of the dust of the world. When he prepared the heavens, I was there: when he set a compass upon the face of the depth: When he established the clouds above: when he strengthened the fountains of the deep: When he gave the sea his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment: when he appointed the foundations of the earth: Then I was by him, as one brought up with him: and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him; Rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth; and my delights were with the sons of men.

In this description of the Lord and his relationship to Wisdom, Miller supports the exegetical practice of the church fathers by suggesting that the use of personal language indicates that this passage speaks of a person and not simply an attribute of God (i.e., wisdom). Furthermore, he gives hermeneutical priority to the christological reading of the NT. Since the NT calls Jesus the Wisdom of God (e.g., 1 Cor 1:30), and since the ancient commentators recognized the interchangeability of Logos and Sophia, it is quite likely that John had Prov 8 in mind when writing the prologue to his gospel. This person is said to have been “brought forth,” which, according to the best lexicons, precludes the idea of parturition and contains the semantic range of generation. Hence, if one understands this term as referring to the second person of the Godhead, as Miller maintains had been nearly universally believed through the Reformation, there is no plausible reason why it should not be utilized to prove the second person’s eternal generation.[62]

Prov 30:4: Who hath ascended up into heaven, or descended? Who hath gathered the wind in his fists? Who hath bound the waters in a garment? Who hath established all the ends of the earth? What is his name, and what is His Son’s name, if thou canst tell?

This text, explicitly applied to Christ in Eph 4, speaks of a Son of God in heaven prior to the incarnation. Miller asks, “How can it be believed that the Son was only given such a title upon the commencement of his mediatorial office when he is here spoken of in a text written nearly a thousand years prior to those events?”[63]

In Miller’s treatment of these two texts, one should note the priority given to the christological reading of the OT. Miller assumes that the interpretation of the NT is the proper interpretation of these OT texts. Although Miller, like Stuart, recognizes the importance of discovering the original intent in its original context, he assumes that the ultimate intent of the text is to point to Christ and that christological interpretations must be given priority.

John 1:14: And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father.

Of this passage, Miller notes that the parallelism of the last line highlights an ascription of eternal glory both to the Logos and to the begotten one.

A paraphrase of the text would read: “We beheld the Word’s eternal glory, namely, the glory of the only begotten of God.” This suggests that the Son existed prior to the incarnation and was revealed in time via the incarnation. From the logic of this passage, one would appear justified in using the terms Son and Word interchangeably, and hence, applying the same attributes to both, including eternality.[64]

Matt 11:27: No man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him. 

Luke 10:22: No man knoweth who the Son is, but the Father, and who the Father is, but the Son. 

John 1:18: No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him. 

John 6:45: Not that any one hath seen the Father, save he that is of God, he hath seen the Father. 

John 10:15: As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father.

In these several passages, Miller claims that the authors describe “incomprehensible and ineffable” relationships. That “none can know them but the Father himself; and that the Son, as Son, knows the Father as intimately, as completely, and in precisely the same manner, as the Father knows the Son. But if this be their meaning, I apprehend there is no doctrine to which they so naturally and directly conduct us, as that of a Sonship Divine and eternal.”[65]

Rom 1:3, 4: Concerning his Son Jesus Christ, our Lord, which was made of the seed of David, according to the flesh, and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead.

Following in a long line of exegetes, Miller recognizes here a contrast between Christ’s human and divine natures. He argues that there is no intelligible explanation for the contrast otherwise. Hence, he concludes that the passage should be understood thus: “Concerning his Son, who was of the seed of David according to his HUMAN NATURE, but powerfully declared to be THE SON OF GOD, ACCORDING TO HIS DIVINE NATURE, by his resurrection from the dead.”[66] If this is the intent of the passage, and Christ is a Son, not by incarnation nor mediatorial appointment, but according to his divine nature, then his eternal Sonship is unequivocally confirmed.

Heb 1:2, 8, 10: God hath, in these last days, spoken unto us by his Son, by whom he made the worlds.... But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever—And thou Lord, in the beginning, hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thy hands.

In these verses, the author of Hebrews attributes the creation of the world to the Son. Furthermore, he claims that the Son’s throne extends into eternity past. This cannot be reconciled with the notion that he only became Son in time. Stuart attempted to weaken this argument by claiming Scripture applies such titles retroactively. However, the author of Hebrews makes that statement to apply to the second member of the Godhead prior to his incarnation. That is, he pushes Ps 2:7 into eternity past, into an intra-Trinitarian discussion between the eternal Father and Son.

Heb 3:5, 6: Moses verily was faithful in all his house, as a servant; but Christ as a Son over his own house.

Here the author of Hebrews affirms the superiority of Christ over Moses by highlighting the different relationship that each person shared with the church. Moses was a servant in the household of faith, yet Christ, by virtue of his Sonship, related to the church as an owner of the house. If Christ’s Sonship were contingent upon his Mediatorship, then this distinction breaks down because as Mediator, Christ was a servant (cf. Isa 42:1) just as Moses. But Christ is distinguished from Moses because as Son he was the owner. Only if Sonship is understood as an eternal quality can the Son be said to be a rightful owner of the house of God.

Heb 5:8: Though he were a Son, yet he learned obedience by the things which he suffered.

Miller comments: “The whole spirit and force of this passage evidently lies in the assumed fact, that the Sonship of the Redeemer naturally elevated him above the obligation of obedience: that, as Son, he was not called or bound to obey, being above it: that he voluntarily condescended to be made under the law, which originally had no claim upon him. On his own account, no such obedience was necessary or required of him; but for our sake he learned it, and submitted to it.”[67]

Heb 7:3: Without father, without mother, without descent, having neither beginning of days nor end of life; but made like unto the Son of God, abideth a priest continually.

In this passage, the author compares Melchizedek with the Son. They are similar in that (in a metaphorical sense regarding Melchizedek) the two knew no beginning. However, if Christ only became Son in time, by his constitution as Mediator (which was contingent upon his being begotten of flesh), then the comparison breaks down for in that case the Son did know a beginning.

Heb 7:28: For the law maketh men high priests which have infirmity; but the word of the oath, which was since the law, maketh the Son, who is consecrated for evermore.

The argument of this passage is built upon the supposition that Christ was first a Son and only then a priest. His Sonship qualified him and distinguished him from Aaron’s sons. Miller closes, “His eternal and ineffable relation to the Father—his nearness to him—his lying in his bosom; and sharing equally with him in his glory before the world was—qualified him, at once, to vindicate the divine honor, and to bring in everlasting righteousness for the justification of his people.”[68]

From the survey above, one should note the drastic difference between the approaches of Stuart and Miller. Stuart limited his discussion to a strictly lexical and proof-text approach. With such an approach, it was impossible to arrive at a notion of eternal sonship for, to him, in every instance in the NT where Christ is called the “Son” it appears to refer to his mediatorial office. Miller, however, extends the parameters far beyond those on the basis of four presuppositions.

First, as a proponent of Westminster, Miller believed that an authoritatively biblical logic bore equal authority to the express statements of Scripture. By utilizing sanctified wisdom, under the assistance of the Spirit, one could derive implications from the explicit statements that appear to support the traditional understanding of the eternal Sonship of Christ. These “necessary consequences” bear as much doctrinal authority as do express scriptural statements.

Second, in the tradition of Reformed orthodoxy, Miller understood theology as a system in which individual parts fit and support the whole. At many places, Miller considered the implications of Christ’s Sonship on pneumatology or on theology proper. Understanding the inspiration of the Scriptures in this way enabled Miller to conclude that the parts fit systematically together.

Third, in his doctrinal development, Miller regularly utilizes one passage of Scripture to support another, or he regularly patches a series of related texts together in order to derive one doctrinal position. Because Scripture contains an inspired system, harmonization is appropriate for constructing doctrinal loci. Some may accuse Miller of corrupting the text and extracting it from its original context, but Miller’s approach is resonant not only with a historico-grammatical approach but also, when appropriate, a canonical and christological approach to Scripture.

The vastly different conclusions between Miller and Stuart stem from these hermeneutical commitments. Therefore, a doctrinal position on the eternal Sonship of Christ hinges on the strength of one’s hermeneutical presuppositions. Perhaps this debate provides an example for this statement and provides fodder for the evaluation of current conclusions on the topic which are essentially hermeneutical in nature. A proof-text approach cannot establish the doctrine of eternal generation. However, should that preclude the doctrine necessarily?

Or, should we question the validity of the current evangelical model of doctrinal construction? Should we rather consider the hermeneutical approach of our Reformed forebears who understood doctrinal development to appropriately build upon isolated, individual texts, but also upon good and necessary consequence? Such questions lie at the heart of the debate.

V. Practical Theology

Having been a pastor for nearly forty years by the time of his debate with Stuart, as well as being a professor in practical fields, Miller always appears mindful of the implications of rejecting the doctrine of eternal generation. In his Letters on Unitarianism, Miller claimed that those who rejected this doctrine were in “very serious error.”[69]

In short, my belief is, that the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, is so closely connected with the doctrine of the Trinity, and the Divine character of the Savior, that where the former is generally abandoned, neither of the two latter will be long retained.… It is a mystery, but a precious mystery, which seems to be essentially interwoven with the whole substance, as well as language, of the blessed economy of mercy.[70]

Stuart reacted sharply to these lines on two grounds. First, he denied this to be a doctrine of fundamental importance. Secondly, he claimed that some of the church’s “brightest ornaments … men who are not only orthodox, but distinguished champions of orthodoxy; reject, as I have done, the doctrine of eternal generation.”[71] This latter comment is interesting given that the Chalcedonian formula provided the standard by which orthodoxy had been determined for a thousand years! It is a great irony that Stuart should claim that men have been orthodox while denying a tenant of the standard by which orthodoxy had been determined.

In his Letters on the Eternal Sonship of Christ, Miller appears to have these reactions in mind when he considers particular side effects of rejection of the doctrine, and he appears to temper his tone. He concedes that the doctrine “ought [not] to be ranked among the fundamentals of Christianity. If a brother maintain faithfully the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity; avoiding Sabellianism on the one hand, and Tri-theism on the other.”[72] He calls it an error but not a “radical error.”[73] This is quite a different tone from his previous statements. Stuart’s reply undoubtedly led him to soften his expressions. Miller should perhaps be criticized at this point. Nevertheless, he continued to maintain that the denial of the doctrine has the likelihood of a “pernicious influence.” He offers four practical consequences of rejecting the doctrine.

First, it cannot be a harmless rejection because it lies so close to the Redeemer himself. The gospel centers on the identity of the Son of God. A misrepresentation of his identity cannot be inconsequential. Second, embracing the position of Stuart and his compatriots would undoubtedly confuse and shake faith in the doctrine of the Trinity. Miller offers baptism as an example. In baptism, recipients are sealed in the name of the Father, Son, and Spirit. The church has always viewed this formula as representing the equality of the three members of the Godhead and their eternal relations to one another. If, however, Stuart’s objections should be upheld, then the baptismal formula must be altered which most assuredly would cast aspersion on the doctrine of the Trinity.[74]

This would give way to a third practical side effect of rejecting eternal Sonship—the weakening of the orthodox defense of the Trinity. Miller claimed that “some of the strongest passages in the New Testament in favor of the Divinity of Christ, are among those which ascribed Divine attributes to him as Son.”[75] Although one must take care not to make passages point to things to which they do not actually point, “neither am I willing,” he continued, “to relinquish any which do really teach that precious truth, which lies at the foundation of my hopes.”[76] At this point, Miller seems to return inadvertently to his previous description of the severity of rejecting the doctrine. Here he suggests that the eternal Sonship of Christ stands in close proximity to the divinity of Christ and therefore to the heart of the Christian’s eternal assurance. It seems that Miller cannot maintain his position that eternal generation is not fundamental to the system.

Fourth, and finally, Miller concludes, “If the Lord Jesus Christ may be Son by office, and not by nature and eternally; will not many be ready to suppose, upon similar principles, that he may be God by office?”[77] Here again Miller employs his hermeneutic of “good and necessary consequences,” as well as his commitment to the analogia Scripturae. If theology is a system, then our doctrinal constructions must be consistent. This logic can lead to fatal conclusions about Christ and lends itself favorably to Socinian and Arian Christology. This should cause the theologian to pause and consider his approach to doctrinal development. Should it not be criticized if it leads so easily to such harmful errors? Miller concludes that denial of eternal generation is instead “unfriendly, in a variety of respects, to the Divine dignity and glory of Him who is the Foundation of our hope, and the Life of our souls.”[78]

Although Stuart deems the rejection of the doctrine inconsequential, Miller exposes the serious alterations that would be made to the orthodox system of doctrine if the Son’s eternal generation is rejected. Stuart, however, appears unable to recognize the implications of the consistent application of his position to the church’s theology and practice.

VI. Conclusions

In this debate there are several matters of interest. Because of spatial constraints, my concluding reflections will be limited to two areas: (1) Old Princeton scholarship, and (2) current scholarship on the doctrine of eternal generation.

In reference to Old Princeton scholarship, we should consider two things. First, Princeton scholars have often limited discussion of the “Princeton Theology” to the systematicians of the seminary. The prevailing assumption appears to be that the seminary system in the early nineteenth century generally reflected the modern seminary including clear separation between the theological departments. This anachronistic way of thinking displays a limited understanding of the development of the Princeton Theology.[79] As confirmed by this article, although professor of history and church government, Miller took a decisive role in defending the seminary’s theology though officially out of his field. Although Archibald Alexander was the first professor of didactic and polemic theology, he did not retain exclusive rights to teaching and publishing in that field; as we have seen, his colleague Samuel Miller likewise shared the responsibility. A proper understanding of the development of Old Princeton’s theology must take this overlap into account.

Second, students of Old Princeton should note Miller’s utilization of sources. In his Letters, Miller demonstrates familiarity with a number of representatives of Reformed theology and Protestant Scholasticism such as John Calvin (1509–1564), Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Francis Turretin (1623–1687), Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), George Bull (1634–1710), Daniel Waterland (1683–1740), Johann Friedrich Stapfer (1708–1775), Pierre Allix (1644–1717), Lorenz Reinhard (1700–1752), Richard Kidder (1633–1703), Theophilus Gale (1628–1679) as well as Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758). This evidence of broad reading may temper suppositions that Scottish Common Sense Realism asserted a dominant influence on the theological constructions of Old Princeton (ca. 1812–1929). On such metaphysical matters it might have appeared an opportune time to employ the philosophical writings of Thomas Reid (1710–1796) or Dugald Stewart (1753–1828). Miller chose instead to employ the writings of orthodoxy. Could it be that Miller relied more heavily upon his Protestant forebears than previously supposed? Perhaps it is time for a reappraisal.

Miller’s work may also be beneficially consulted in the current debates over the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. It appears that much of the time, scholars have proceeded as if the church ceased wrestling with the doctrine after the fourth century. This is one clear example of modern evangelicalism’s agnosticism of its past. The church and academy would do well to consider their past more carefully and the Stuart/Miller debate documents for three reasons.

First, the Stuart/Miller debate makes clear the primary issues and the practical implications of the doctrine of eternal generation. The drastic difference between the approaches of Miller and Stuart vividly elucidate the heart of the debate as hermeneutical in nature. How does one read the Scriptures and how does one legitimately construct theological dogma? This remains a primary issue today. Those seeking to construct doctrine on a word-study or proof-text approach can readily write off the doctrine of eternal generation; yet this form of doctrinal construction veers far from our theological forebears and, perhaps, undermines the classic Protestant understanding of inspiration.[80]

Furthermore, Miller explored the far-reaching consequences of rejecting the doctrine in question. Far too often, scholars consider doctrine only through the grid of theology, philosophy, or exegesis, to the exclusion of its practical significance and its implications upon an ecclesiastical context. Concerning this doctrine, scholars often speak (as did Stuart) as if the rejection or acceptation is inconsequential. Miller helpfully demonstrates that a doctrine so near to that of the Trinity, the Divinity of the Son, and even the sacraments, cannot be inconsequential. One seldom gets the idea that those consequences have been considered to any serious degree.

Second, the high quality of Miller’s arguments continues to warrant a high readership among proponents and opponents. The few modern scholars who have read Miller have acknowledged the significance of his work.[81] This estimation also can be found among Miller’s peers; for example, Dr. John Henry Livingston (1746–1825) of New Brunswick Theological Seminary wrote the following in a letter to Miller:

Before I had finished your second letter, I felt inclined to thank you for your valuable present: after reading the whole, my approbation increased, and you must permit me to express the pleasure and satisfaction I received from your whole arrangement, your critical citations, and your unanswerable conclusions. Whether you will convince Dr. S. of his error is doubtful; but that you have established the doctrine, and will confirm others in their knowledge and faith, respecting the eternal generation of the Son of God, is certain; and our churches will unite with me in thanking you for a work in which erudition, and faithfulness, and zeal are successfully blended.[82]

This judgment received similar reception amongst Southern Presbyterians well into the second half of the nineteenth century. Robert Lewis Dabney (1820–1898), for instance, required his students to read Miller’s work as an authorized defense of the doctrine of the Son’s eternal generation.[83] Miller’s arguments—whether biblical, theological, historical, or practical—are cogent and forcible and provide considerable strength for defenders of the doctrine and obstacles for opponents.

Third, Miller’s publication establishes the interdisciplinary requisite of proceeding on this issue. One cannot adequately handle the biblical material without addressing the philosophical, theological, and practical aspects surrounding the biblical data. One must be ready to converse in all the branches of theology if one hopes to answer the question well. Perhaps this debate between Stuart and Miller provides a critique of the over-specialization of the modern academy and perhaps it provides reasonable grounds for reassessment of modern theological education.

For these reasons, the debate should be consulted. However, one should note that there is not a perfect correspondence between the Stuart/Miller debate and those that rage at the present. The arguments today do not take place on entirely parallel soils. Consequently, this nineteenth-century pamphlet war does not directly translate to the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, there is much from the Stuart/Miller controversy that can be commended to the modern practitioner. Although perfect correspondence between the past and the present does not exist, nevertheless, much from the debate remains useful.

Notes

1. The most recent attempt at retrieval of this doctrine confirms the point. See Fred Sanders and Scott R. Swain, eds., Retrieving Eternal Generation (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 20.
2. Moses Stuart, Letters on the Eternal Generation of the Son of God Addressed to the Rev. Samuel Miller (Andover, MA: Mark Newman, 1822), hereafter LEGS; and Samuel Miller, Letters on the Eternal Sonship of Christ: Addressed to the Rev. Professor Stuart, of Andover (Philadelphia, 1823), hereafter LESC. For a brief treatment of the life of Moses Stuart, see William Adams, A Discourse on the Life and Services of Professor Moses Stuart; Delivered in the City of New-York: Sabbath Evening, January 25, 1852 (New York: John F. Trow, 1852); Edwards A. Park, A Discourse Delivered at the Funeral of Professor Moses Stuart (Boston: Tappan & Whittemore, 1852). For biographical material on Miller, see Samuel Miller Jr., The Life of Samuel Miller, D.D., L.L.D., Second Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church, At Princeton, New Jersey, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, 1869).
3. Kevin Giles, The Eternal Generation of the Son: Maintaining Orthodoxy in Trinitarian Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2012), 196.
4. William Ellery Channing, Unitarian Christianity: A Discourse on Some of the Distinguishing Opinions of Unitarians Delivered at Baltimore, May 5, 1819 (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1819).
5. Moses Stuart, Letters on the Trinity, and on the Divinity of Christ; Addressed to the Rev. William E. Channing, In Answer to His Sermon “On the Doctrines of Christianity;” Preached and Published at Baltimore (1819, repr., Dundee, Scotland: James Adam, 1829).
6. For a fuller examination of these events, see: Terry Bilhartz, Urban Religion and the Second Great Awakening (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1986), 119–22; Jeffrey A. Wilcox, “A More Thorough Trinitarian: Reconsidering Moses Stuart’s Role in the Trinitarian Debate in New England, 1819–1850” (PhD diss., Marquette University, 2008), 2. See also Miller, Life of Samuel Miller, 2:73–82.
7. Samuel Miller, Letters on Unitarianism; Addressed to the Members of the First Presbyterian Church, in the City of Baltimore (Trenton, NJ: George Sherman, 1821), 86–93.
8. These objections are raised by Stuart in LEGS, 77–93. Miller responded to these objections in LESC, 248–90. Interestingly, these very same grounds are the basis for modern rejection of the doctrine. See Giles, Eternal Generation of the Son, 36–37; Matthew Y. Emerson, “The Role of Proverbs 8: Eternal Generation and Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern,” in Retrieving Eternal Generation, 59.
9. LESC, 248–53.
10. LESC, 253. Miller quotes Stuart: “We are acquainted with no paternity or sonship among men which does not imply priority on the part of the father, and posteriority on the part of the son; therefore, it must be so with respect to the relation of Father and Son in the Godhead” (quoting LEGS, 80).
11. LESC, 255–56.
12. LEGS, 80.
13. LESC, 261. At this point, Miller included a lengthy quote from Johann Friedrich Stapfer (1708–1775), professor of theology at Bern, which he explained had been mediated to him through Jonathan Edwards. See Johann Stapfer, Institutiones theologiae polemicae universiae, ordine scientifico dispositae, 4 vols. (Zurich: Heidegger & Associates, 1756–1757), 1:318.
14. LEGS, 80; LESC, 264–65.
15. Daniel Waterland, A Vindication of Christ’s Divinity (Cambridge, England, 1719).
16. LESC, 266. See Francis Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae (Geneva: Samuel de Tournes, 1679–1686), vol. 1.
17. LESC, 266.
18. LESC, 268.
19. LESC, 268.
20. LESC, 270–71.
21. LESC, 271.
22. For a helpful modern treatment of this issue and a similar response to the criticism, see Mark Makin, “God from God: The Essential Dependence Model of Eternal Generation,” RelS 54 (2018): 377–94.
23. LESC, 272.
24. LESC, 273.
25. LESC, 274.
26. LESC, 31.
27. LESC, 38.
28. LEGS, 4–7.
29. LESC, 16–17. This is an important acknowledgment by Miller. Beginning in 1801 with the passing of the “Plan of Union,” Congregationalists and Presbyterians had enjoyed an expansive degree of unity with the hopes of more speedily supplying ministers to the Western frontier. Congregationalists were allowed to send a considerable number of commissioners to the annual gathering of the Presbyterians; and Presbyterians, vice versa. Consequently, commissioners of the different denominations were allowed the right to vote. In time this became a serious problem as doctrinal and confessional differences began to widen the gap between the two denominations. Many Presbyterians opined that doctrinal laxity was a consequence of this union, and Congregationalists likewise charged Presbyterians with benefitting from the union at their expense. Miller actually served as a commissioner at the 1801 meeting and voted in favor of the union only to lament later the disorderly action of the assembly despite noble intentions. In 1837, he attributed the schism of the Presbyterian Church, in many ways, to the effects of this union. By the time of his writing here in 1823, Miller was just beginning to sour toward the union and recognize its undesirable outworkings. His suspicion of Congregationalists was likely strengthened by Stuart’s statements that the vast majority of Congregationalists had moved away from Chalcedonian Christology (i.e., orthodox Christology).
30. LESC, 26.
31. LESC, 25.
32. LESC, 26. See Christina N. Larsen, “Jonathan Edwards and Eternal Generation,” in Retrieving Eternal Generation, 208–25.
33. LESC, 28.
34. George Bull, Defensio fidei Nicaenae (Oxford: The Sheldonian Theatre, 1685).
35. LEGS, 17.
36. LEGS, 61.
37. LESC, 156.
38. LESC, 158.
39. LESC, 224.
40. LESC, 228.
41. LESC, 229.
42. LESC, 230.
43. LESC, 243–44.
44. LEGS, 90.
45. LEGS, 122.
46. LESC, 47.
47. LESC, 48.
48. LESC, 49.
49. LESC, 50.
50. Two modern authors have attempted to establish the doctrine on similar grounds. See Scott R. Swain, “The Radiance of the Father’s Glory: Eternal Generation, the Divine Names, and Biblical Interpretation,” in Retrieving Eternal Generation, 29–43; and Giles, Eternal Generation of the Son, 71–78.
51. LESC, 53.
52. LESC, 56–57.
53. LESC, 62.
54. LESC, 62.
55. LEGS, 143.
56. LESC, 66.
57. LESC, 69.
58. LESC, 71.
59. LESC, 72.
60. LESC, 73.
61. LESC, 73–76.
62. For an interesting article on the hermeneutical requirement for reading Prov 8 this way, see Mark S. Gignilliat, “The Role of Proverbs 8: Eternal Generation and Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern,” in Retrieving Eternal Generation, 44–66.
63. LESC, 77.
64. Interestingly, on this point Miller cites the Remonstrant commentator Hugo Grotius (1583–1645).
65. LESC, 86.
66. LESC, 87.
67. LESC, 96.
68. LESC, 98.
69. Miller, Letters on Unitarianism, 89.
70. Ibid., 90.
71. LEGS, 4–5.
72. LESC, 284.
73. LESC, 285.
74. LESC, 285–86.
75. LESC, 287.
76. LESC, 287.
77. LESC, 287.
78. LESC, 288.
79. For example, see Mark Noll, The Princeton Theology, 1812–1921: Scripture, Science, and Theological Method from Archibald Alexander to Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001).
80. Failure to recognize the interconnectivity of all of Scripture and failure to practice analogia Scripturae (the method employed by Miller) implicitly weakens the doctrine of inspiration that evangelicals unanimously maintain. Requiring an express statement of Scripture to construct dogma, read in isolation from the full canon of Scripture, can call into question the divine authorship and trustworthiness of Scripture. Miller’s approach, which assumes that various passages of Scripture can be read in harmony, displays a far more robust notion of inspiration and embracing of the trustworthiness of Scripture.
81. See the Giles quote, n. 3 above.
82. Cited in Miller, Life of Samuel Miller, 2:82.
83. Robert Lewis Dabney, Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology Taught in Union Theological Seminary, Virginia, 2nd ed. (St. Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Co., 1878), 202–11.