How a Hermeneutical Virus Can Corrupt Theological Systems

By Robert B. Chisholm Jr.

[Robert B. Chisholm Jr. is Chair and Professor of Old Testament Studies, Dallas Theological Seminary, Dallas, Texas.]

The Bible includes many generalizations about God that are universally true. For example when God declared, “I the Lord your God am holy” (Lev. 19:2), one can affirm that this statement is true at all times and in all places. Scripture consistently depicts God as the transcendent Sovereign of the world who has established the moral code by which His creatures are obligated to live. God’s holiness is a fact that remains true at all times in all places.

However, not all generalizations about God are universal truths.[1] Unfortunately in their quest to derive universal truths from Scripture, interpreters sometimes ignore the historical and/or literary contextual boundaries of passages and elevate contextually conditioned generalizations to the status of universal truths and principles. Theological “systems” sometimes then highlight these alleged universals and extrapolate from them. These universals and their derived principles can then be used as theological trump cards, leading one to minimize or deny what other passages clearly teach. However, this procedure may result in a deficient or even warped theological position that is not thoroughly biblical. A theological system’s failure and/or inability to accommodate all of the scriptural data, including competing generalizations, is a telltale sign that it has been corrupted by the hermeneutical virus just described.

God and Sacrifices

Regarding God’s attitude toward ritual sacrifice, several passages in the Old Testament seem to indicate that God considers formal sacrificial ritual repulsive or at least undesirable. For example in Isaiah 1:11 God declared, “I have no pleasure in the blood of bulls and lambs and goats.”[2] In Hosea 6:6 He said, “For I desire mercy, not sacrifice.” In Psalm 51:16-17 the psalmist wrote, “You do not delight in sacrifice, or I would bring it; you do not take pleasure in burnt offerings. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, you will not despise.” One could take these statements at face value and assume there is no place for sacrifices in genuine religion, which consists of ethical and moral standards, not formal ritual. Of course this position would be difficult to sustain because elsewhere in the Old Testament God demands and regulates cultic sacrifices. To interpret the anti-sacrifice texts as expressing a universal truth applicable at all times in all places, one would have to see competing traditions about the role of sacrifice in Israel’s early history and/or propose an evolutionary model of religious development in ancient Israel culminating in an anti-sacrifice policy.[3] Such an approach would threaten to undermine the literary and theological unity of the Old Testament.

Fortunately most interpreters do not resort to such tactics when dealing with this set of texts. Despite the seemingly categorical tone of the anti-sacrifice statements, most interpreters recognize they are contextually conditioned. Schmidt, for example, observes, “The prophets do not intend to utter a general and timelessly valid instruction, but to address the men of their own time.”[4] A closer look at Isaiah’s anti-sacrifice polemic shows that the prophet was denouncing the sacrifices of a specific audience at a specific point in time. He was speaking to Sodom/Gomorrah-like people (Isa. 1:10) who were experiencing God’s judgment (vv. 4-9) despite frequenting His temple (v. 12). The language of the text reflects this specificity: “your sacrifices” (v. 11), “when you come” (v. 12), “who has asked this of you” (v. 12), “your new moon festivals and your appointed feasts” (v. 14). In this context the statement in verse 11b generalizes about God’s attitude at this time and in this place. He had no pleasure in the animal sacrifices of these hypocrites. This does not mean that the message was relevant only to the original audience. Since religious hypocrisy is denounced elsewhere in Scripture, one could extend the generalization to the point of saying that God never takes pleasure in the ritualistic expressions of devotion by hypocrites. In other words wherever the structure of the ancient context is essentially duplicated, the generalization applies. This does not mean that God rejected animal sacrifices under all conditions at all times. Where hypocrisy was not present, He desired and took delight in animal sacrifices.

The same is true of Hosea 6:6. If isolated, the first poetic line in this verse might mean that God rejected sacrifice altogether in favor of loyalty. But an overstatement is used here, as the second line makes clear: “and acknowledgement of God more than burnt offerings” (note the use of the comparative מִ).[5] Sacrifices had their place in Israel’s relationship to God, but only when offered by obedient people. God placed a higher priority on obedience. In light of the overall testimony of Scripture one could even extend the generalization and say that God always places priority on obedience. But this does not imply a universal rejection of sacrifice.

Ironically the prophets’ diatribes may be seen as a refutation of the kind of universalizing being called into question. Some in ancient Israel apparently thought that sacrifices, like some good-luck charm, guaranteed divine blessing. Perhaps this was the result of extrapolating from legal texts that demanded sacrifices on a regular, prescribed basis. The prophets’ denunciation of sacrifice proved this view wrong. As Miller points out, “The prophets’ objection to sacrifice as it was practiced was its tendency to substitute for all other aspects of the covenantal obligation of the Israelite. . . . They asserted a divine rejection of sacrifice, but this was because it came to be assumed by some that sacrifice by itself sufficiently covered the obligations of the individual to the deity.”[6]

The author of Psalm 51 also spoke to a specific situation at a specific time. He asked for divine mercy because he had sinned against God. He recognized that sacrifices were inadequate to restore his relationship with the Lord; repentance was primary. Since God always places a priority on repentance, one could generalize that repentance must always precede ritual. But this is a far cry from saying that sacrifices are always inappropriate under all conditions. Indeed the appendix to the psalm, which reflects an application of the psalm to the circumstances of the Exile, anticipates a time when God will restore His sinful but repentant people to their city and once more take delight in their animal sacrifices.

Most would agree with this analysis of these passages on God’s attitude toward sacrifices. While the texts contain generalizations that may transcend the time and place in which they were made, contextual boundaries must still be observed. The generalization was true in the context in which it was made and is true in other contexts that correspond structurally to the original context. But the generalization must not be transported beyond these boundaries and applied universally.

Three Examples of Misappropriated Generalizations

Unfortunately interpreters have not always exercised sensitivity to contextual parameters when dealing with other generalizing texts. The remainder of this article discusses three strains of the universalizing virus that finds a breeding ground in the failure to observe proper contextual limits.

Does God always judge according to the principle of individual responsibility?[7]

In Ezekiel’s time the exiles quoted a proverb that implied they were unfairly suffering the consequences of their parents’ sins (Ezek. 18:1-2; cf. Jer. 31:29). To the contrary, the Lord replied that He held each individual responsible for his own sin (Ezek. 18:3-4). The Lord illustrated the point by posing a hypothetical situation. A righteous man who obeys God’s moral standards will live (vv. 5-9), but if he has a sinful son, that son will die (vv. 10-13). If this sinful person in turn has a son who obeys God, this righteous son will live (vv. 14-17). The point is clear: God deals with a person on an individual basis, based on his own character and actions, not his father’s actions (vv. 18-20). This does not mean the wicked have no hope. If a sinner repents, he will live (vv. 21-23). On the other hand, if a righteous man turns to sin, he will die (v. 24).

The exiles accused God of being unjust, but they were the ones who were guilty of injustice (vv. 25, 29). As the preceding illustration shows, the Lord followed the principle that the righteous live and the wicked die (vv. 26-28). The exiles corresponded to the wicked son in the illustration (v. 30). They were not simply innocent victims of God’s judgment on their fathers; they had followed in their fathers’ sinful ways and needed to take responsibility for their own sinful actions. In His mercy God had spared them and was giving them the opportunity to repent and do what was right (v. 31). The Lord did not want them to persist in sin and die; He wanted them to turn from sin and live (v. 32).

Some understand the principle articulated here as a universal truth: God always judges on an individual basis. However, other verses suggest this is not the case, for they indicate that God’s judgment often has a corporate dimension. The Lord warned His enemies that their sin would have adverse consequences in their families throughout their lifetime (Exod. 20:5; 34:7; Num. 14:18). Dathan’s, Abiram’s, and Achan’s innocent children died along with their sinful parents (Num. 16:27, 32; Josh. 7:24). With divine approval David permitted the Gibeonites to execute seven of Saul’s sons because of their father’s crimes against that city (2 Sam. 21:1-9, 14). The Lord took the lives of four of David’s sons as punishment for his sin of murder (12:5-6, 10; cf. 12:14-15; 13:28-29; 18:15; 1 Kings 2:25).

How can this tension be resolved? One could argue that there were competing theologies of retribution in ancient Israel (individual accountability versus corporate responsibility) or that God replaced the corporate concept of retribution with the new individual principle in Ezekiel’s time. A better solution is to hold both concepts in balance and understand the Lord’s declaration in Ezekiel 18 as a contextualized generalization, not a universal truth. Children usually experience the negative consequences of their parents’ sins. God even punishes children for a parent’s sin when He decides it is appropriate. But this is not always the case. Sometimes, as in the case of the exiles in Ezekiel’s day, God allows the children to choose for themselves whether to obey or disobey the Lord. When He extends His mercy in this manner, they can be assured that God will evaluate them on the basis of their own deeds, not their parents’ actions.

Kaminsky observes that Ezekiel “is not a systematic theologian . . . rather he is driven by pastoral necessity.” He concludes, “This passage is not signaling an evolution from older corporate concepts to newer individualistic concerns. Because the theology of divine retribution found in Ezekiel 18 is not a systematic doctrinal statement [i.e., a universal truth] about how God always operates, one should not read it as an utter rejection of the older, more corporate model of divine retribution. Rather, one should see it as providing a new vision that attempts to challenge and qualify the older corporate ideas. Ultimately, the two conceptions function in a complementary, rather than in a contradictory fashion.”[8]

Does God cause all disasters?

In Amos 3:6b the prophet asked, “When disaster comes to a city, has not the Lord caused it?” The question expects the answer, “Of course He has!” Does this mean that God is the cause of every disaster that overtakes a city anywhere at anytime? Is He the driving force behind urban disasters such as the Oklahoma City bombing or the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon? A careful examination of Amos 3:6b in its historical and literary context reveals that it is a generalization about how God was operating within the theocratic framework of eighth-century-B.C. Israel, not a universal statement about all disasters that overtake cities.

As Amos confronted Israel with its sin, he announced that divine judgment had already begun and warned that it would culminate in devastation and exile. In the early verses of chapter 3 he validated his message and his role as God’s prophetic spokesman. He asked a series of rhetorical questions that establish the principle of cause and effect. The questions in verses 3-5 expect the answer, “No, of course not!” The question in verse 6a expects the answer, “Yes, of course!” The question in verse 6b (which is the seventh in the list) makes the point that it is just as logical to assume that the Lord is behind a calamity that overtakes a city. This may refer to the impending disaster prophesied by Amos, though it may also include judgments that had already fallen. These judgments are described in 4:6-11, where reference is made to famine overtaking every Israelite city (see v. 6). Apparently the people, because of their fundamental misunderstanding of the upcoming day of the Lord (see 5:18-20), thought they were immune to judgment (see 9:10). But within the theocratic context of ancient Israel, disaster could indeed come as the result of sin and one could be certain that if it did, the Lord, who invariably announced through His prophets that judgment was coming (3:7), was the source.[9]

Since the questions in verses 3-5 deal with common human experience and phenomena from the natural realm that are seemingly universally true, one might assume that verse 6b shares this quality. But there are at least two signals in the immediate context of verse 6b that indicate that this is a contextualized generalization, not a universal truth. In the preceding poetic line the prophet asked, “When a trumpet sounds in a city, do not the people tremble?” The question, which alludes to the cultural phenomenon of a watchman on a city wall blowing a warning signal of impending danger, places Amos’s question firmly within an ancient Israelite context. It is simply not universally true that trumpet sounds in a city elicit fear! Furthermore in verse 7 the prophet declares, “Surely the Sovereign Lord does nothing without revealing his plan to his servants the prophets.” Once more this generalization is firmly within Amos’s ancient Israelite context. Through Amos God had revealed His intention to judge Israel. But when disasters overtake cities today, they are not announced beforehand through a prophet! In other words the disasters referred to in verse 6b were those familiar to the prophet because he himself had announced them. In this regard Lindström rightly concludes, “The intention of the passage in Amos 3:6b is to force its audience to recognize the connexion between YHWH’s actions and the catastrophes which affected Northern Israel. . . . There is nothing in the text to suggest that the prophet attempts to assign all disasters in general to the agency of YHWH.”[10]

Another verse that is sometimes taken to mean that God causes all disasters is Isaiah 45:7, where God affirmed, “I form the light and create darkness, I bring prosperity and create disaster; I, the Lord, do these things.” The statement is clearly a generalization, but is it a universal truth? The statement is made in the context of the Exile, which is presupposed in this section of Isaiah’s prophecy. Throughout these chapters God made it clear that He would deliver His exiled people and restore their prosperity (light), while He would bring disaster (darkness) on Babylon. Just before this He announced His intention to use Cyrus as His instrument of judgment (on Babylon) and deliverance (of the exiles). As Lindström concludes, “The action ascribed to YHWH in Isa 45,7 refers solely to the imminent liberation of Israel from her Babylonian captivity. The positive phrases ‘who forms light’ and ‘who makes weal’ have to do with YHWH’s saving intervention on behalf of people, while the negative phrases ‘who creates darkness’ and ‘who creates woe’ refer to YHWH’s destruction of the Babylonian empire.”[11] Lindström is certainly correct in emphasizing the context of the generalization, but to say that this is the sole referent may be an overstatement. The generalization, while applied to the exiles’ impending deliverance and Babylon’s impending judgment, does transcend that specific situation. The statement may be taken to mean that God is always the source of deliverance and judgment within the context of His theocratic rule over His covenant people and the nations. However, even if the statement is extended in this way, this hardly means that every event falls into the category of deliverance or judgment, or that all disasters are acts of judgment. The passage gives no warrant for such an extrapolation.[12]

Is God directly responsible for all destructive windstorms?

Psalm 148:8 affirms that the elements of the weather, including fire (= lightning?), hail, snow, clouds, and the “stormy wind,” carry out God’s decrees. Does this mean that God is always directly responsible for the weather, including storms and their accompanying natural disasters? Is stormy wind always carrying out God’s orders? Are insurance companies correct when they call such disasters “acts of God”?

The Old Testament makes it clear that God does at times use storms and other natural elements to accomplish His purposes, especially in judgment.[13] God certainly can use the wind to carry out His will, but it does not necessarily follow that He is directly commanding the wind at all times and in all places. One must make room for the natural processes God has set in place. For the most part it would seem that He allows these processes to operate according to fixed patterns and laws (Jer. 33:25) that modern meteorology can identify and explain.

It is possible that God’s enemies may even be the source of some storms. Job’s story indicates that the devil had the power to send a destructive storm (Job 1:19). Granted, Satan had to get God’s permission to test Job, but is this always the case? Jesus “rebuked” a life-threatening storm (Matt. 8:26; Mark 4:39; Luke 8:24), just as He “rebuked” a demon (Matt. 17:18; Mark 9:25; Luke 9:42). He rebuked Peter for a satanically inspired remark (Mark 8:33), and He rebuked Peter’s mother-in-law’s fever (Luke 4:39; cf. Acts 10:38).[14] The storm was cast in an adversarial relationship to Jesus, suggesting that He was not directly responsible for it.

The psalmist’s affirmation must not be pressed beyond its limits to support a deterministic model of God’s involvement in the world that fails to consider the totality of biblical revelation. Here one must pay careful attention to the literary context of the generalization. Using the hymnic genre, the psalmist celebrated the fact that the great Creator and King of the world (Ps. 148:1-6) has at His disposal the elements of nature. He is worthy to receive praise from all His creation, including both inanimate entities (personified here for rhetorical effect) and animate entities (vv. 7-13). Israel experienced His saving intervention, which often demonstrated His sovereignty over His creation (v. 14). The generalization about God’s control of the stormy wind must be understood within this hymnic framework, which merges creation theology with redemptive history. The psalmist may have had in mind, though not exclusively, those times when God used wind or hail to effect deliverance for His people (cf. Exod. 14:21: 15:8, 10; Josh. 10:11; Pss. 78:47-48; 105:32). When the hymns generalize about God and His work in the world, they often reflect Israel’s experience and are therefore contextualized to some degree within the framework of Israel’s salvation history.[15]

The hymns also tend to speak in ideal terms of God’s kingship and to focus on what He has accomplished as a basis for faith in what He promises to accomplish. Consequently in some cases the generalizations describe what He is capable of doing or what He intends to do, rather than what He is typically doing at the present time.[16] Viewed in this way, Psalm 148:8 affirms that what God is capable of doing (overriding natural laws He has established) proves His kingship and incomparability (the overall theme of the psalm). Thus one can conclude that the stormy wind indeed does God’s bidding, if and when He desires to send it on a special mission. Such missions can include judgment (Ezek. 13:13), but they are not limited to that purpose. Psalm 107:23-32 describes how God revealed His destructive power to sailors by sending a stormy wind (cf. v. 25) to stir up the sea.[17] As the sailors shook in terror, they cried out for help and experienced God’s deliverance, prompting them to proclaim publicly God’s revealed character. God’s ultimate purpose in sending this storm was to reveal His capacity to redeem helpless human beings who cry out to Him.

Conclusion

Generalized statements about God fall into one of four categories: (a) generalizations that are confined to a specific situation in time and space; (b) generalizations that transcend their primary historical context, but apply only within a structural framework mirroring that context; (c) generalizations that affirm God’s kingship and His capacity to fulfill His royal decrees; and (d) generalizations that are universally true, unbound by time and space.

While generalizations, especially those pertaining to God’s essential character, can be universal truths, they are usually made in and applied to a specific historical context. Sometimes generalizations can be understood only within that particular context (see, e.g., Amos 3:6b and probably also Ezekiel 18). At other times, as with God’s condemnation of sacrifices, generalizations may transcend a particular time and place, but still have contextualized boundaries. In Isaiah 45:7 God’s affirmation about being the author of deliverance and accompanying judgment, while pertaining to a specific historical situation, transcends that time and place. One can take the statement as a universally true principle: The sovereign God is the sole source of deliverance and judgment. But even this needs qualification. The principle is operative only where a complex of events comes under the umbrella of deliverance and judgment.

Also some generalizations are designed to affirm God’s royal authority, prerogatives, and capabilities without implying that He is always exercising His sovereignty in the world in a direct or unilateral way. For example Psalm 148:8 affirms that God can order the wind to do His bidding, but this does not mean that He is always doing so. It simply means that He has done so in the past and is capable of doing so in the present and future.[18]

One must not turn historically contextualized generalizations about God (categories one and two) or hymnic generalizations about God’s royal capabilities (category three) into universal truths (category four). Such generalizations should not be lifted out of their literary-cultural context(s) and/or their structural framework and then transformed into all-encompassing principles. Failure to heed this warning will result in theological systems that threaten to implode because of internal inconsistencies or that suppress valuable biblical evidence. Such systems will in turn cause people to misinterpret their experiences and misunderstand how God works in the world and in their lives.

Notes

1. A “generalization” is a statement that describes a divine characteristic and/or typical divine behavior. This article discusses generalizations that pertain to God’s character and/or interaction with the world over which He rules. Also these remarks are limited to generalizations made by God Himself, by prophetic spokesmen for God, or by the authors of the Psalter’s hymns, which often make generalizations about God’s character and self-revelation in the world. Not included are generalizations made by those whose testimony, while recorded in Scripture, is not necessarily accurate (e.g., comments made by Job and his friends). A “universal truth” is a generalization that is operative under all circumstances, at all times, and in all places.
2. Unless noted otherwise, all Scripture quotations are from the New International Version.
3. Amos 5:25 and Jeremiah 7:21-23 seem to offer an alternative tradition about the role of sacrifices in Israel’s formative period. In Amos 5:25 the Lord, recalling the period of the wilderness wandering, asked, “Did you bring me sacrifices and offerings forty years in the desert, O house of Israel?” The question anticipates a negative answer. Similarly the Hebrew text of Jeremiah 7:22 reads literally, “I did not speak with your fathers and I did not command them . . . concerning matters related to a burnt offering and a sacrifice.” This raises a problem since the Pentateuch clearly depicts Israel sacrificing to God during this period. Both texts may utilize hyperbole. Though Moses gave Israel numerous laws about sacrifices and offerings, the sacrificial system per se could not be fully implemented until the people settled in the land. Though important, sacrifices were never the essence of God's relationship with His people. Loyalty, expressed through obedience, was always the higher priority. Sacrifices had significance only when offered by one who was committed to God and obedient to His moral will. One could rephrase the question in Amos 5:25, “Did you bring me only sacrifices and offerings?” The implied answer would be, “No, I required and still do demand something much more basic from you, namely, obedience.” In a similar manner the hyperbolic and ironic statement in Jeremiah 7:22 points out that sacrifice was not God’s primary concern.
4. Werner H. Schmidt, The Faith of the Old Testament: A History, trans. J. Sturdy (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983), 130.
5. See 1 Samuel 15:22 and Roland de Vaux, Ancient Israel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 2:454-55.
6. Patrick D. Miller, The Religion of Ancient Israel (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 130.
7. Robert B. Chisholm Jr., Handbook on the Prophets (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 253-54. Although it addresses the topic, this volume’s discussion does not correlate Ezekiel 18 with the hermeneutical principle discussed in this article.
8. Joel S. Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, JSOT Supplement (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 177-78.
9. See Chisholm, Handbook on the Prophets, 386-87.
10. Fredrick Lindström, God and the Origin of Evil: A Contextual Analysis of Alleged Monistic Evidence in the Old Testament (Lund: Gleerup, 1983), 237. His detailed analysis of the passage is on pages 199-214.
11. Ibid., 198 (italics his).
12. Psalm 115:3 (see also 135:6) might seem to support a deterministic model and to run counter to the argument of this article. But this generalization should not be universalized to mean that everything that happens is the result of God’s antecedent (or ideal) will. Both verses affirm God’s kingship (to do as one wills is a characteristic of kings; see Eccles. 8:3) and His incomparability in relation to the gods of the surrounding nations (see Pss. 115:4-8; 135:15-18), as motivation for His people to praise Him. While God is certainly free to do as He desires and fully capable of doing as He desires, in fact He often delegates authority in His world and grants people freedom to act as they desire, even when their desires do not conform to His antecedent (or ideal) will. In this regard qevlw is used in Matthew 23:37 of both Jesus’ redemptive purpose for Jerusalem and, in collocation with a negative particle, for Jerusalem’s refusal to accept that purpose. When the city willfully rejected God’s antecedent will (that the city repent and experience His salvation and protection), He had no choice but to implement judgment (His consequential will, vv. 38-39). His consequential will in this case was His response to human sin and ran counter to His antecedent desire for His people, mirroring their rejection of the latter.
13. Fire (אֵשׁ) is often an instrument of divine judgment (see, e.g., Amos 1:4, 7, 10, 12, 14). With the exception of snow (שֶׁלֶג), each of the other terms used in Psalm 148:8 is at times associated with judgment as well: hail (בָּרָד; Exodus 9:18-35; Joshua 10:11); clouds (קִיטוֹר; Genesis 19:28, which speaks of the cloud of smoke that ascended from Sodom and Gomorrah); stormy wind (רוּךֶח סְעָרָה; Ezekiel 13:13).
14. Jesus attributes illness, at least in some cases, to Satan and his demons (Matt. 12:22-29). In summarizing Jesus’ ministry, Peter said, “He went around doing good and healing all who were oppressed by the devil” (Acts 10:38). So at least in some cases illness was caused by the devil. Since Jesus came to destroy the devil (Heb. 2:14) and his works (1 John 3:8), it is incoherent to argue that God was directly responsible for such illness, for then Jesus would be opposing God.
15. For a fuller discussion of this point with several illustrations of generalizations rooted in Israel’s historical experience see Robert B. Chisholm Jr., “A Theology of the Psalms,” in A Biblical Theology of the Old Testament, ed. Roy B. Zuck (Chicago: Moody, 1991), 274-75.
16. For example the hymns depict God as the incomparably just King who ensures that there is justice on earth (Pss. 33:5; 97:2; 99:4). He delivers the poor (113:7), gives barren women children (v. 9), frees captives (146:7-8), and provides for widows and orphans (v. 9). Of course human experience collides with these affirmations, for the world is characterized by injustice and the cries of the oppressed go largely unheeded. (In this regard Job objected to the simplistic theodicy of his friends.) This does not marginalize the hymns, however. When the world is observed carefully, there is evidence for God’s justice, especially in Israel’s experience, though it is not perfectly or fully revealed. Nevertheless the hymnic affirmations of justice, rather than describing or reflecting the world as it is known, focus on the fact that God is just and that He is committed to establishing justice on the earth (96:11-13; 98:7-9). In this sense the idealism of the hymns has an eschatological dimension.
17. The style of Psalm 107:23-32 is narratival, not generalizing. A perfect verbal form initiates the narrative in verse 24 and three prefixed verbs with waw consecutive carry on the story line in verse 25. In verses 26-27 six prefixed verbal forms appear, none of which has waw consecutive, but the narratival style resumes in verse 28 with a prefixed verb with waw consecutive. A distinct preterite form occurs at the beginning of verse 29 (יָקֵם), followed by three prefixed forms with waw consecutive in verses 29b–30. Verses 32-33 seem to be a concluding call to praise; the three prefixed verbal forms are probably functioning as jussives (note especially the prefixed form with waw conjunctive at the beginning of v. 32).
18. Another example of generalizations transcending a particular time and place, but still being restricted by contextual boundaries, are the statements about God relenting or not relenting. Statements affirming that God does not relent (Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29; Ps. 110:4) are typically universalized and understood as ontological windows into the divine nature. As such they are taken to mean that God, in contrast to humankind, never relents under any circumstances. Interpreted in this way they become proof texts for the biblical doctrine of God’s immutability. Of course the totality of the biblical evidence poses a serious obstacle to this universalizing approach. Many other verses assert that God typically relents (Jer. 18:5-10; Joel 2:13; Jon. 4:2), and they describe Him as doing so (Exod. 32:14; Amos 7:3, 6; Jon. 3:10), or at least they assume that He might (Jer. 26:3; Joel 2:14; Jon. 3:9). How does one resolve this tension? Those who universalize the “God does not relent” passages dismiss this potentially embarrassing evidence as anthropomorphic. In other words God does not really relent—these texts simply utilize a human perspective and describe Him as if He does. This solution is unsatisfying, however, for several texts generalize about God’s capacity to relent and seem to have just as much right to be an ontological window as the competing set of texts. If someone insists on universalizing these generalizations also, an impasse is created, for the two sets of texts cannot both be universally true—if God never really relents then He cannot typically relent. Fortunately the impasse is fairly easily resolved if the universalizing virus is eliminated. Both generalizations are true within their respective contextualized boundaries. The passages affirming that God does not relent pertain to formalized divine decrees, defined as unconditional, unalterable statements of divine intention. God does not alter His stated intention when it is a formalized decree; in fact one of the ways He formally marks a statement of intention as a decree is by attaching to it a declaration that He will not change His mind. (In this regard see Richard L. Pratt Jr., “Historical Contingencies and Biblical Predictions,” in The Way of Wisdom: Essays in Honor of Bruce K. Waltke, ed. J. I. Packer and Sven K. Soderlund [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000], 187.) While the statements affirming that God does not relent are applied to specific divine decrees in particular contexts, they are nonetheless true anytime God issues a decree. Likewise the many statements about God relenting (some of which say this is typical of God), while also applied to specific situations, are true anytime God states His intentions contingently. See Robert B. Chisholm Jr., “Does God ‘Change His Mind’?” Bibliotheca Sacra 152 (July–September 1995): 387-99.